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PREFACE
What strikes me as I write this is the complexity of the forces shaping macroeconomic evolutions around the world and the resulting difficulty 
of distilling a simple bottom line. Let me develop and 
expand. 
Two deep forces are shaping these evolutions over 
the medium term: 
Legacies of both the financial and the euro area 
crises are still visible in many countries. To varying 
degrees, weak banks and high levels of debt—public, 
corporate, or household—still weigh on spending and 
growth. Low growth, in turn, makes deleveraging a 
slow process. 
Potential output growth has declined. As shown in 
Chapter 3, potential growth in advanced economies 
was already declining before the crisis. Aging, together 
with a slowdown in total productivity, has been at 
work. The crisis made it worse, with the large decrease 
in investment leading to even lower capital growth. As 
we exit from the crisis, and as suggested by Chapter 4, 
capital growth will recover, but aging and weak pro-
ductivity growth will continue to weigh. The effects 
are even more pronounced in emerging markets, 
where aging, lower capital accumulation, and lower 
productivity growth are combining to significantly 
lower potential growth in the future. More subdued 
prospects lead, in turn, to lower spending and lower 
growth today. 
On top of these two underlying forces, the cur-
rent scene is dominated by two factors that both have 
major distributional implications, namely, the decline 
in the price of oil and large exchange rate movements. 
The sharp decline in the price of oil came as a 
surprise. Many explanations have been offered after 
the fact, the most convincing of which focus on 
the steady increase in supply from nonconventional 
sources combined with a change in strategy by OPEC 
(the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries). Most of these explanations suggest that the 
decline will likely be long lasting.
The price declines have effected a large reallocation 
of real income from oil exporters to oil importers. 
The early evidence suggests that in oil importers from 
the United States, to the euro area, to China, and to 
India, the increase in real income is increasing spend-
ing. Oil exporters have cut spending but to a smaller 
extent: many have substantial financial reserves and 
are in a position to reduce spending slowly. 
Exchange rate movements have been unusually 
large. Among major currencies, the dollar has seen a 
major appreciation and the euro and the yen a major 
depreciation. These movements clearly reflect major 
differences in monetary policy, with the United States 
expecting to exit the zero lower bound this year, but 
with no such prospects for the euro area or Japan. 
Given that these differences have been clear for some 
time, the surprise here may be how long it took for 
these exchange rate movements to occur. To the extent 
that both the euro area and Japan were at risk of 
another relapse, the euro and yen depreciations will 
help. To some extent, the United States has the policy 
room to offset the adverse effects of the dollar appre-
ciation. Thus, this adjustment of exchange rates must 
be seen, on net, as good news for the world economy. 
Now, put these four forces together. Some countries 
suffer from legacies, others do not. Some countries 
suffer from lower potential growth, others do not. 
Some countries gain from the decrease in the price 
of oil, others lose. Some countries’ currencies move 
with the dollar, others move with the euro and the 
yen. Add to this a couple of idiosyncratic develop-
ments, such as the economic troubles in Russia or the 
weakness of Brazil. It is no surprise that the assess-
ment must be granular. On net, our baseline forecasts 
are that advanced economies will do better this year 
than last year, that emerging markets and low-income 
countries will slow down relative to last year, and that, 
as a result, global growth will be roughly the same 
as last year. But these aggregate numbers do not do 
justice to the diversity of underlying evolutions. 
Moving from the baseline to the risks, have they 
increased? I see macroeconomic risks as having 
slightly decreased. The major risk last year—namely, 
a recession in the euro area —has decreased, as has 
the risk of deflation. But financial and geopolitical 
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risks have increased. Large movements in relative 
prices, whether exchange rates or the price of oil, 
create losers and winners. Energy companies and 
oil-producing countries face both tougher condi-
tions and higher risks. So do non-U.S. companies 
and governments that have borrowed in dollars. If 
large exchange rate movements were to continue, 
they could both create further financial risks and 
reignite talk of currency wars. A Greek crisis cannot 
be ruled out, an event that would surely unsettle 
financial markets. Turmoil continues in Ukraine and 
in the Middle East, although so far without systemic 
economic implications. 
Finally, given the diversity of situations, it is 
obvious that policy advice must be country specific. 
Even so, some general principles continue to hold. 
Measures to sustain growth both in the short and 
the longer term continue to be of the essence. With 
the introduction of quantitative easing in the euro 
area, monetary policy in advanced economies has 
largely accomplished what it can. Fiscal room exists 
in some countries but is limited; the decrease in the 
price of oil has created an opportunity to decrease 
energy subsidies and replace them with better-
targeted programs. The case for more infrastructure 
investment that we made in the previous World 
Economic Outlook remains. And while structural 
reforms cannot do miracles, they can increase the 
level of output and increase growth for some time. 
The proper menu differs by country. Given the 
short-term political costs associated with many 
of these reforms, the challenge will be to choose 
carefully among them. 
Olivier Blanchard
Economic Counsellor
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Global growth remains moderate, with uneven prospects 
across the main countries and regions. It is projected to 
be 3.5 percent in 2015, in line with forecasts in the 
January 2015 World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Update. Relative to last year, the outlook for advanced 
economies is improving, while growth in emerging 
market and developing economies is projected to be 
lower, primarily reflecting weaker prospects for some large 
emerging market economies and oil-exporting countries.
A number of complex forces are shaping the out-
look. These include medium- and long-term trends, 
global shocks, and many country- or region-specific 
factors:
• In emerging markets, negative growth surprises for 
the past four years have led to diminished expecta-
tions regarding medium-term growth prospects.
• In advanced economies, prospects for potential 
output are clouded by aging populations, weak 
investment, and lackluster total factor productiv-
ity growth. Expectations of lower potential growth 
weaken investment today. 
• Several advanced economies and some emerging 
markets are still dealing with crisis legacies, includ-
ing persistent negative output gaps and high private 
or public debt or both.
• Inflation and inflation expectations in most 
advanced economies are below target and are in 
some cases still declining—a particular concern for 
countries with crisis legacies of high debt and low 
growth, and little or no room to ease monetary 
policy. 
• Long-term bond yields have declined further and 
are at record lows in many advanced economies. To 
the extent that this decline reflects lower real inter-
est rates, as opposed to lower inflation expectations, 
it supports the recovery.
• Lower oil prices—which reflect to a significant 
extent supply factors—provide a boost to growth 
globally and in many oil importers but will weigh 
on activity in oil exporters. 
• Exchange rates across major currencies have 
changed substantially in recent months, reflecting 
variations in country growth rates, monetary poli-
cies, and the lower price of oil. By redistributing 
demand toward countries with more difficult mac-
roeconomic conditions and less policy space, these 
changes could be beneficial to the global outlook. 
The result would be less risk of more severe distress 
and its possible spillover effects in these economies. 
The net effect of these forces can be seen in higher 
projected growth this year in advanced economies 
relative to 2014, but slower projected growth in 
emerging markets. Nevertheless, emerging markets 
and developing economies still account for more than 
70 percent of global growth in 2015.
This growth outlook for emerging markets primar-
ily reflects more subdued prospects for some large 
emerging market economies as well as weaker activity 
in some major oil exporters because of the sharp 
drop in oil prices. The authorities in China are now 
expected to put greater weight on reducing vulnerabil-
ities from recent rapid credit and investment growth. 
Hence the forecast assumes a further slowdown in 
investment, particularly in real estate. The outlook for 
Brazil is affected by a drought, the tightening of mac-
roeconomic policies, and weak private sector senti-
ment, related in part to the fallout from the Petrobras 
investigation. The growth forecasts for Russia reflect 
the economic impact of sharply lower oil prices and 
increased geopolitical tensions. For other emerging 
market commodity exporters, the impact of lower oil 
and other commodity prices on the terms of trade and 
real incomes is projected to take a toll on medium-
term growth. Growth in emerging markets is expected 
to pick up in 2016, driving an increase in global 
growth to 3.8 percent, mostly reflecting some waning 
of downward pressures on activity in countries and 
regions with weak growth in 2015, such as Russia, 
Brazil, and the rest of Latin America.
In many emerging market and developing econo-
mies, macroeconomic policy space to support growth 
remains limited. In oil importers, however, lower 
oil prices will reduce inflation pressure and external 
vulnerabilities, and in economies with oil subsidies, 
the lower prices may provide some fiscal space or, 
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where needed, scope to strengthen fiscal positions. Oil 
exporters have to absorb a large terms-of-trade shock 
and face greater fiscal and external vulnerabilities. 
Those with fiscal space can allow public spending to 
adjust gradually to lower oil revenues. In oil-exporting 
countries with some exchange rate flexibility, a depre-
ciation would facilitate the adjustment. Emerging mar-
ket and developing economies also have an important 
structural reform agenda, including measures to sup-
port capital accumulation (such as removing infrastruc-
ture bottlenecks, easing limits on trade and investment, 
and improving business conditions) and raise labor 
force participation and productivity (through reforms 
to education, labor, and product markets). And lower 
oil prices offer an opportunity to reform energy sub-
sidies but also energy taxation (including in advanced 
economies).
Advanced economies are generally benefiting from 
lower oil prices. Growth in the United States is pro-
jected to exceed 3 percent in 2015–16, with domestic 
demand supported by lower oil prices, more moder-
ate fiscal adjustment, and continued support from an 
accommodative monetary policy stance, despite the 
projected gradual rise in interest rates and some drag 
on net exports from recent dollar appreciation. After 
weak second and third quarters in 2014, growth in the 
euro area is showing signs of picking up, supported by 
lower oil prices, low interest rates, and a weaker euro. 
And after a disappointing 2014, growth in Japan is 
also projected to pick up, sustained by a weaker yen 
and lower oil prices.
In an environment of moderate and uneven growth, 
raising actual and potential output continues to be 
a policy priority in advanced economies. In many of 
these economies, the main macroeconomic policy issues 
are the persistent and sizable output gaps, as well as dis-
inflation dynamics, which, as discussed in earlier WEO 
reports, pose risks to activity where monetary policy is 
constrained at the zero lower bound. Accommodative 
monetary policy—including through unconventional 
means—remains essential to prevent real interest rates 
from rising, and the recent decision by the European 
Central Bank to expand its asset purchase program 
through sovereign asset purchases is welcome. A strong 
case can be made for increased infrastructure invest-
ment in some advanced economies and for structural 
economic reforms more generally. Priorities vary, but 
many of these economies would benefit from reforms 
to strengthen labor force participation and trend 
employment, given aging populations, as well as mea-
sures to tackle private debt overhang. 
The distribution of risks to global growth is now 
more balanced relative to the October 2014 WEO, but 
still tilted to the downside. A greater lift to demand 
from oil prices is a significant upside risk. The most 
salient downside risks identified in the October 2014 
WEO remain relevant, however. Geopolitical tensions 
could intensify, affecting major economies. Disruptive 
asset price shifts in financial markets remain a concern. 
Term and other risk premiums in bond markets are 
still low in historical terms, and the context underlying 
this asset price configuration—very accommodative 
monetary policies in the major advanced economies—
is expected to start changing in 2015. Triggers for 
turmoil include changing expectations about these 
elements as well as unexpected portfolio shifts more 
broadly. A further sharp dollar appreciation could trig-
ger financial tensions elsewhere, particularly in emerg-
ing markets. Risks of stagnation and low inflation in 
advanced economies are still present, notwithstanding 
the recent upgrade to the near-term growth forecasts 
for some of these economies.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS
 Global growth in 2014 was a modest 3.4 percent, 
reflecting a pickup in growth in advanced economies 
relative to the previous year and a slowdown in emerging 
market and developing economies. Despite the slow-
down, emerging market and developing economies still 
accounted for three-fourths of global growth in 2014.
Complex forces that affected global activity in 2014 
are still shaping the outlook. These include medium- and 
long-term trends, such as population aging and declining 
potential growth; global shocks, such as lower oil prices; 
and many country- or region-specific factors, such as crisis 
legacies and exchange rate swings triggered by actual and 
expected changes in monetary policies. Overall, global 
growth is projected to reach 3.5 percent and 3.8 percent 
in 2015 and 2016, respectively, in line with the projec-
tions in the January 2015 World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) Update. Growth is projected to be stronger in 
2015 relative to 2014 in advanced economies, but weaker 
in emerging markets, reflecting more subdued prospects for 
some large emerging market economies and oil exporters.
Medium-term prospects have become less optimistic 
for advanced economies, and especially for emerging 
markets, in which activity has been slowing since 2010. 
At the same time, the distribution of risks to global 
growth is now more balanced relative to the October 
2014 WEO, but is still tilted to the downside. A greater 
boost to demand from oil prices is an important upside 
risk, while on the downside, the most salient risks 
identified in the October 2014 WEO remain relevant, 
including those related to geopolitical tensions, disrup-
tive asset price shifts in financial markets, and, in 
advanced economies, stagnation and low inflation. 
In this setting, raising actual and potential out-
put continues to be a general policy priority. In many 
advanced economies, accommodative monetary policy 
remains essential to support economic activity and lift 
inflation expectations. There is also a strong case for 
increasing infrastructure investment in some economies, 
and for implementing structural reforms to tackle lega-
cies of the crisis and boost potential output. In many 
emerging market economies, macroeconomic policy 
space to support growth remains limited. But in some, 
lower oil prices will help reduce inflation and external 
vulnerabilities, thereby reducing pressure on central 
banks to raise policy interest rates. Structural reforms to 
raise productivity, with a varied agenda across coun-
tries, are of the essence to sustain potential output.
Recent Developments and Prospects
The World Economy in Recent Months
Four key developments have shaped the global out-
look since the release of the October 2014 WEO.
Uneven Global Growth, Slower Infl ation in 2014
While preliminary statistics indicate that global 
growth in the second half of 2014 was broadly in line 
with the October 2014 projections (Figure 1.1), these 
broad numbers masked marked growth surprises point-
ing to more divergence among major economies, with 
the U.S. recovery stronger than expected, but eco-
nomic performance in many other parts of the world 
falling short of expectations. Specifi cally:
 • Growth in the United States was stronger than 
expected, averaging about 4 percent annualized in 
the last three quarters of 2014. Consumption—the 
main engine of growth—has benefited from steady 
job creation and income growth, lower oil prices, 
and improved consumer confidence. The unemploy-
ment rate declined to 5.5 percent in February, more 
than 1 percentage point below its level of a year ago. 
 • In Japan, after a weak second half of the year, 
growth in 2014 was close to zero, reflecting 
weak consumption and plummeting residential 
investment. 
 • In the euro area, activity was weaker than expected 
in the middle part of 2014 but showed signs of a 
pickup in the fourth quarter and in early 2015, 
with consumption supported by lower oil prices and 
higher net exports. 
 • Although activity was broadly in line with the 
forecast, investment growth in China declined in 
the second half of 2014, reflecting a correction in 
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Table 1.1. Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections
(Percent change, unless noted otherwise)
Year over Year
Difference from January 
2015 WEO Update1
Q4 over Q4
Projections Projections
2013 2014 2015 2016 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016
World Output2 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.8  0.0 0.1  3.2 3.5 3.7
Advanced Economies 1.4 1.8 2.4 2.4  0.0 0.0  1.7 2.5 2.3
United States 2.2 2.4 3.1 3.1  –0.5 –0.2  2.4 3.1 2.8
Euro Area3 –0.5 0.9 1.5 1.6  0.3 0.2  0.9 1.7 1.6
Germany 0.2 1.6 1.6 1.7  0.3 0.2  1.5 1.7 1.7
France 0.3 0.4 1.2 1.5  0.3 0.2  0.2 1.6 1.3
Italy –1.7 –0.4 0.5 1.1  0.1 0.3  –0.5 1.0 1.1
Spain –1.2 1.4 2.5 2.0  0.5 0.2  2.0 2.4 1.8
Japan 1.6 –0.1 1.0 1.2  0.4 0.4  –0.7 2.4 0.5
United Kingdom 1.7 2.6 2.7 2.3  0.0 –0.1  2.7 2.7 2.2
Canada 2.0 2.5 2.2 2.0  –0.1 –0.1  2.6 1.8 2.0
Other Advanced Economies4 2.2 2.8 2.8 3.1  –0.2 –0.1  2.6 3.0 3.1
Emerging Market and Developing Economies5 5.0 4.6 4.3 4.7  0.0 0.0 4.6 4.4 5.0
Commonwealth of Independent States 2.2 1.0 –2.6 0.3 –1.2 –0.5 –1.2 –4.9 1.7
Russia 1.3 0.6 –3.8 –1.1 –0.8 –0.1 0.1 –6.4 2.0
Excluding Russia 4.2 1.9 0.4 3.2 –2.0 –1.2 . . . . . . . . .
Emerging and Developing Asia 7.0 6.8 6.6 6.4 0.2 0.2 6.7 6.8 6.4
China 7.8 7.4 6.8 6.3 0.0 0.0 7.2 6.8 6.3
India6 6.9 7.2 7.5 7.5 1.2 1.0 6.8 7.9 7.5
ASEAN-57 5.2 4.6 5.2 5.3 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.5
Emerging and Developing Europe8 2.9 2.8 2.9 3.2 0.0 0.1 2.7 4.1 2.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.9 1.3 0.9 2.0 –0.4 –0.3 1.1 0.5 2.4
Brazil 2.7 0.1 –1.0 1.0 –1.3 –0.5 –0.2 –1.4 2.3
Mexico 1.4 2.1 3.0 3.3 –0.2 –0.2 2.6 3.3 3.2
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.8 –0.4 –0.1 . . . . . . . . .
Saudi Arabia 2.7 3.6 3.0 2.7 0.2 0.0 2.0 2.8 2.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.2 5.0 4.5 5.1 –0.4 –0.1 . . . . . . . . .
Nigeria 5.4 6.3 4.8 5.0 0.0 –0.2 . . . . . . . . .
South Africa 2.2 1.5 2.0 2.1 –0.1 –0.4 1.3 1.6 2.4
Memorandum            
European Union 0.1 1.4 1.8 1.9 0.2 0.1 1.4 2.0 2.0
Low-Income Developing Countries 6.1 6.0 5.5 6.0 –0.4 –0.1 . . . . . . . . .
Middle East and North Africa 2.3 2.4 2.7 3.7 –0.5 –0.1 . . . . . . . . .
World Growth Based on Market Exchange Rates 2.5 2.6 2.9 3.2 –0.1 0.0 2.4 2.9 3.1
World Trade Volume (goods and services) 3.5 3.4 3.7 4.7 –0.1 –0.6 . . . . . . . . .
Imports
Advanced Economies 2.1 3.3 3.3 4.3 –0.4 –0.5 . . . . . . . . .
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 5.5 3.7 3.5 5.5 0.3 –0.6 . . . . . . . . .
Exports
Advanced Economies 3.1 3.3 3.2 4.1 –0.3 –0.5 . . . . . . . . .
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 4.6 3.4 5.3 5.7 0.0 –0.5 . . . . . . . . .
Commodity Prices (U.S. dollars)
Oil9 –0.9 –7.5 –39.6 12.9 1.5 0.3 –28.7 –16.4 8.0
Nonfuel (average based on world commodity export weights) –1.2 –4.0 –14.1 –1.0 –4.8 –0.3 –7.6 –10.0 0.1
Consumer Prices
Advanced Economies 1.4 1.4 0.4 1.4 –0.6 –0.1 1.0 0.6 1.6
Emerging Market and Developing Economies5 5.9 5.1 5.4 4.8 –0.3 –0.6 5.1 5.7 4.5
London Interbank Offered Rate (percent)
On U.S. Dollar Deposits (six month) 0.4 0.3 0.7 1.9 0.0 0.0 . . . . . . . . .
On Euro Deposits (three month) 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.1 . . . . . . . . .
On Japanese Yen Deposits (six month) 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 . . . . . . . . .
Note: Real effective exchange rates are assumed to remain constant at the levels prevailing during February 6–March 6, 2015. Economies are listed on the basis of economic 
size. The aggregated quarterly data are seasonally adjusted. Lithuania is included in the advanced economies. In the January 2015 WEO Update, Lithuania was included in the 
emerging market and developing economies.
1Difference based on rounded figures for both the current and January 2015 WEO Update forecasts.
2The quarterly estimates and projections account for 90 percent of the world purchasing-power-parity weights.
3Excludes Lithuania, which joined the euro area in January 2015. Data for Lithuania are not included in the euro area aggregates because Eurostat has not fully released the 
consolidated data for the group.
4Excludes the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) and euro area countries but includes Lithuania.
5The quarterly estimates and projections account for approximately 80 percent of the emerging market and developing economies. 
6Data and forecasts are presented on a fiscal year basis, and GDP from 2011 onward is based on GDP at market prices with FY2011/12 as a base year. Growth rates in the 
January 2015 WEO Update were based on the GDP at market prices with FY2004/05 as a base year.
7Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam.
8The projections for Lithuania are included in the January 2015 WEO Update but are excluded in the columns comparing the current forecasts with those in the January 2015 WEO Update.
9Simple average of prices of U.K. Brent, Dubai Fateh, and West Texas Intermediate crude oil. The average price of oil in U.S. dollars a barrel was $96.25 in 2014; the assumed 
price based on futures markets is $58.14 in 2015 and $65.65 in 2016.
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the real estate sector, and high-frequency indicators 
point to some further slowdown.
 • Growth in Latin America in the second half of 2014 
was modest, reflecting weak activity in Brazil, lower-
than-expected growth in Mexico, and weakening 
momentum in other economies in the region. 
 • Economic performance in Russia was a bit stronger 
than expected in the second half of 2014, but the 
increase in geopolitical tensions, declining confi-
dence, and the repercussions of the oil price decline 
point to a more severe weakening of the outlook in 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as 
a whole at the start of the year. 
Headline inflation has declined in advanced econo-
mies (Figure 1.2), reflecting the decline in oil prices, 
softer prices for other commodities, and a weakening 
of demand in a number of countries already experienc-
ing below-target inflation, such as the euro area and 
Japan. This decline in inflation, together with changes 
in the growth outlook and announcements by the 
Bank of Japan in October and the European Central 
Bank (ECB) in January of larger-than-expected asset 
purchase programs, has strengthened expectations of a 
protracted divergence in monetary policy stances across 
the main advanced economies, widening long-term 
interest rate differentials (Figure 1.3). With regard to 
emerging markets, lower prices for oil and other com-
modities (including food, which has a larger weight 
in the consumer price index of emerging market and 
developing economies) have generally contributed to 
reductions in inflation, with the notable exception of 
countries suffering sizable exchange rate depreciations, 
such as Russia.
The weaker-than-expected growth for emerging mar-
kets, coming on the heels of sequential negative growth 
surprises for the past four years, has led to diminished 
expectations for their medium-term growth prospects, 
as also noted in recent WEO reports, implying a 
weaker global outlook. In retrospect, the strong eco-
nomic performance in emerging markets in the imme-
diate postcrisis period partly reflected high growth in 
China, particularly in investment, which contributed 
importantly to the strength in commodity prices, as 
well as an easing of global financial conditions. The 
gradual slowdown in China and the partly related 
decline in commodity prices (which also reflected a 
sizable supply response) weakened the growth momen-
tum to some extent in commodity-exporting countries 
and others with close trade links to China, and the eas-
GDP Growth
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Figure 1.1.  Global Activity Indicators
Global growth in the second half of 2014 was broadly in line with October 2014 
projections, but this masks marked growth surprises, which point to greater 
divergence among major economies. While U.S. activity was stronger than expected, 
economic performance in other major economies fell short of expectations.
1. World Trade, Industrial Production, and Manufacturing PMI
    (Three-month moving average; annualized percent change)
Sources: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis; Haver Analytics;
Markit Economics; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: IP = industrial production; PMI = purchasing managers’ index.
1Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, euro area, Hong Kong SAR (IP only),
Israel, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway (IP only), Singapore, Sweden (IP only),
Switzerland, Taiwan Province of China, United Kingdom, United States.
2Argentina (IP only), Brazil, Bulgaria (IP only), Chile (IP only), China, Colombia (IP
only), Hungary, India, Indonesia, Latvia (IP only), Lithuania (IP only), Malaysia (IP
only), Mexico, Pakistan (IP only), Peru (IP only), Philippines (IP only), Poland,
Romania (IP only), Russia, South Africa, Thailand (IP only), Turkey, Ukraine (IP
only), Venezuela (IP only).
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Figure 1.2.  Global Inflation
(Year-over-year percent change, unless noted otherwise)
3. Commodity Prices
    (Index, 2005 = 100)
2. Headline Inflation2
United States
Euro area
Japan3
–3
–2
–1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
–3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
RUS
CHN
CHL
BRA
USA
ESP
JPN
ITA
GRCDEU
FRA
Ch
an
ge
 in
 c
or
e 
in
fla
tio
n,
 2
01
3–
14
Change in headline inflation, 2013–14
4. Changes in Headline versus Core Inflation4
Advanced economies
Emerging market and 
developing economies
Energy 
Sources: Consensus Economics; IMF, Primary Commodity Price System; and IMF 
staff estimates.
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1Excludes Venezuela.
2Dashed lines are the six- to ten-year inflation expectations.
3In Japan, the increase in inflation in 2014 reflects, to a large extent, the increase 
in the consumption tax.
4Changes in inflation are calculated as the year-over-year inflation rate in 
December 2014 minus the year-over-year inflation rate in December 2013.
Headline inflation has declined in advanced economies, reflecting the decline in oil 
prices, softer prices for other commodities, and a weakening of demand in a 
number of countries already experiencing below-target inflation, such as the euro 
area and Japan. With regard to emerging markets, lower prices for oil and other 
commodities have generally contributed to reductions in inflation through 2014, 
with the notable exception of countries suffering sizable exchange rate 
depreciations, such as Russia.
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ECB calculations are based on the Eurosystem’s weekly financial statement. 
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The decline in headline inflation, together with changes in the growth outlook and 
the announcements by the Bank of Japan in October and the European Central 
Bank in January of larger-than-expected asset purchase programs, has 
strengthened expectations of a protracted divergence in monetary policy stances 
across the main advanced economies, widening long-term interest differentials.
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ing of financial conditions for emerging markets after 
the crisis likely contributed to higher output, but not 
to a steadily higher growth rate. And increased geopo-
litical tensions played a role in explaining the growth 
slowdown, particularly in CIS countries and some in 
the Middle East.
These developments in emerging markets come 
on top of concerns about slowing potential output 
in advanced economies, reflecting long-term factors 
such as demographics and a protracted period of weak 
investment following the crisis. These topics are dis-
cussed in more detail in Chapter 3 (potential output) 
and Chapter 4 (investment). 
Decline in Oil Prices
Oil prices have declined by about 45 percent since 
September (Figure 1.4). A variety of factors have played 
a part: weaker-than-expected global activity; weaker 
demand for oil, given activity; and greater supply. 
Unexpected demand weakness in some major 
economies, in particular emerging market economies, 
has clearly played a role in the oil price decrease. Some 
of this demand weakness may have materialized early 
in 2014 (and hence already be reflected in the Octo-
ber 2014 WEO), with its impact on oil prices initially 
muted by an increase in precautionary demand, result-
ing from rising geopolitical tensions. Declines in prices 
of other commodities (such as industrial metals) also 
suggest some weakening in demand. 
But several facts point to important contributions 
from other factors (see Box 1.1 for a discussion). For 
instance, oil prices have declined much more sharply 
than prices of other commodities in recent months, 
suggesting that factors specific to the oil market—as 
opposed to global demand—have played an important 
role. These factors include greater-than-expected supply 
as well as some weakness in the demand for oil driven 
by improvements in energy efficiency rather than by 
weak global aggregate demand. 
Supply factors include the steady rise in production 
in countries not belonging to the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), especially 
the United States; the faster-than-expected recovery 
of production in some stressed OPEC producers (for 
example, Iraq); and especially OPEC’s November 2014 
decision to maintain production levels despite the 
sharp decline in prices.
With regard to oil-specific demand, reports by the 
International Energy Agency suggest that, even with 
–15
–10
–5
0
5
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
–4
–2
0
2
4
6
8
–12
–6
0
6
12
18
24
2005 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
10
20
14
20
15
20
14
20
15
20
14
20
15
20
14
20
15
20
14
20
15
20
14
20
15
20
14
20
15
20
14
20
15
20
14
20
15
20
14
20
15
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
2005 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
APSP Food
Metal
30
32
34
36
38
40
2005 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
Figure 1.4.  Commodity and Oil Markets
Oil prices have declined by about 45 percent since September owing to a variety of
factors. Unexpected demand weakness in some major economies, in particular
emerging market economies, has clearly played a role. However, a sharper decline
in oil prices relative to other commodities suggests that factors specific to the oil
market—as opposed to global aggregate demand—are also at work. These
include greater-than-expected oil supply as well as some weakness in oil demand
driven by improvements in energy efficiency.
1. Real Commodity Price Indices
    (Deflated using U.S. consumer price index; index, 2014 = 100)
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; and IMF staff
estimates.
Note: APSP = average petroleum spot price; CIS = Commonwealth of
Independent States; LAC = Latin American and the Caribbean; MENA = Middle
East and North Africa; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.
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aggregate demand developments taken into account, 
oil demand has fallen short of expectations. 
The global impact of lower oil prices depends largely 
on how persistent they are expected to be. Oil futures 
prices point to a partial recovery in oil prices in com-
ing years, consistent with the expected negative impact 
of lower oil prices on investment and future capacity 
growth in the oil sector (see the Special Feature), but 
prices are expected to remain well below the Octo-
ber 2014 WEO baseline into the medium term (for 
instance, projected prices for 2019 declined from $93 
to $73 a barrel). At the same time, uncertainty about 
the future path of oil prices has increased, as discussed 
further in the “Risks” section later in this chapter. 
To highlight the implications of lower oil prices 
for the global outlook, the chapter presents Scenario 
Box 1, which builds on Arezki and Blanchard 2014. 
The model underlying the scenario assumes that the 
oil price path is in line with futures prices, and for 
simplicity, that the decline in prices is entirely driven 
by higher supply. In this regard, the model’s results are 
an upper bound on the global stimulus provided by 
lower oil prices. 
The model simulations take into account differences 
across countries in energy intensity and oil produc-
tion and in the size of the oil price decline in domestic 
currency, in light of the sharp currency movements 
discussed further later in the chapter, as well as differ-
ences in the pass-through of lower oil prices to private 
sector consumers and producers due to changes in 
government policy (such as changes in subsidies). Spe-
cifically, many countries, especially emerging market 
and developing economies and oil producers, control 
the prices of petroleum products through a variety of 
instruments, including subsidies, tariffs, and pricing 
formulas. These mechanisms typically translate into an 
incomplete pass-through from international to domes-
tic prices. The model simulations use an indicator 
that ranges between 0 and 1 for each of the countries 
included, with 1 denoting fully managed prices and 0 
denoting market-based prices. The simulations assess 
the extent of the pass-through in a particular country 
based on the petroleum product pricing mechanism in 
place in that country before the oil price slump.1
1The information regarding the pricing mechanism is based on an 
update of Kojima 2013 for emerging market and developing econo-
mies and assumes that advanced economies have full pass-through 
from international to domestic prices.
Overall, the model implies that the oil shock would 
provide a sizable boost to economic activity, with 
global output being higher by about 1 percentage 
point by 2016 in the case of full pass-through from 
international to domestic prices, reflecting in particular 
higher demand in large oil importers. If the pass-
through of lower oil prices to consumers and producers 
is incomplete (as assumed in the WEO baseline), the 
expansionary effect in some large emerging markets 
would be dampened, but global output would still 
rise by more than ½ percentage point over the same 
horizon. 
Two factors could imply a weaker boost to global 
activity than suggested by the model simulations. 
First, declines in global demand have affected oil 
prices to some extent. And second, macroeconomic 
distress in large oil exporters could extend beyond the 
pure impact of the terms-of-trade loss captured in the 
model, given interaction with other shocks or initial 
conditions.
Large Exchange Rate Movements
Exchange rate movements in recent months have 
been sizable, reflecting—arguably with some delay—
changes in expectations about growth and monetary 
policy across major economies as well as the large 
decline in oil prices (see “External Sector Develop-
ments” later in the chapter for further discussion). 
Among major currencies, as of February 2015, the 
U.S. dollar had appreciated by about 10 percent in 
real effective terms relative to the values used in the 
October 2014 WEO, with a particularly marked real 
appreciation (14 percent) against the currencies of 
major advanced economies.2 The strengthening of the 
U.S. currency implies that most countries experienced 
a somewhat smaller decline in oil prices relative to the 
headline U.S. dollar figure. The renminbi, which has 
remained broadly stable against the dollar, had appreci-
ated by about 11 percent in real effective terms as of 
February. Among other major currencies, the euro 
and the yen had both depreciated by about 7 percent. 
And since the abandonment of the exchange rate floor 
relative to the euro on January 15, the Swiss franc has 
appreciated substantially. 
The currencies of major oil exporters with float-
ing exchange rates had depreciated as of Febru-
ary 2015. The decline was particularly sharp for 
2The real effective exchange rate figures are based on relative 
consumer prices.
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Two simulations of the IMF’s G20 Model are used 
in this scenario to explore the potential impact on 
global activity of the decline in the expected price of 
oil since August 2014, as depicted in Scenario Figure 
1. Relative to the path expected for global oil prices 
at the time of the October 2014 World Economic 
Outlook, expected oil prices are now roughly 40 
percent lower for 2015, with that decline expected to 
moderate gradually to roughly 20 percent by 2020. 
For simplicity, the simulations assume that an increase 
in oil supply drives the full decline in the oil price 
path. Consequently, the simulations do not account 
for the implications of the decline in demand for oil 
that underlies a portion of the actual fall in oil prices. 
In addition, each country’s domestic-currency price 
of oil has been adjusted to reflect the change in its 
bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate since August 2014; 
however, the simulations do not include implications 
of the exchange rate changes for any other parts of the 
economy. 
The first simulation (blue lines in Scenario Figure 
1) assumes that the decline in oil prices is passed on 
fully to households and firms in all countries. The 
second simulation (red lines) accounts for the fact that 
in some countries included in the simulations (such as 
Brazil, China, India, and Russia), domestic oil prices 
are managed to some extent.
In these countries, the difference between the man-
aged domestic price and the global price accrues to the 
fiscal authority. With global oil prices falling and only 
some of that decline passing through to final domestic 
prices, fiscal or quasi-fiscal revenues rise in the case of 
the oil importers among these price-managing coun-
tries and fall in the case of the oil exporters among 
them.
It is assumed that for the first two years, the fiscal 
authorities in the oil importers save the additional 
revenue, but after two years, it is used to increase 
transfers to households. In the case of the oil export-
ers among these price-managing countries, the loss in 
revenue is offset in part by lower subsidies. 
To summarize the results of the simulations: if this 
decline in global oil prices were to be fully passed 
through to final prices, the model estimates sug-
gest that global GDP, excluding those countries in 
which oil supply is increasing, would rise by roughly 
1 percent by 2016. If on the other hand the decline 
in oil prices were not to be fully passed through and 
the resulting increase in fiscal revenue were to be 
saved, the increase in global GDP would be reduced 
Scenario Box 1. The Global Impact of Lower Oil Prices
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Scenario Figure 1.  Potential Impact of the
Decline in Oil Prices since August 2014
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1Excluding other oil exporters: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, 
Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Chad, Republic of Congo, Ecuador, 
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Venezuela, and Yemen.
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the Russian ruble (a depreciation of 30 percent in 
real effective terms). Among advanced economies’ 
currencies, the Canadian dollar and the Norwegian 
krone had depreciated by 8 percent and 7 percent, 
respectively. Among the remaining major emerg-
ing markets, India—a major oil importer—saw its 
currency strengthen by close to 10 percent in real 
effective terms, whereas the Brazilian real had depreci-
ated by 9 percent, reflecting a weaker outlook. More 
generally, movements in real effective exchange rates 
in recent months have broadly reflected changes in 
growth forecasts as well as differences in the exposure 
to lower oil prices—as discussed further in “External 
Sector Developments.”
In principle, exchange rate movements redistribute 
demand across countries and hence primarily affect 
relative economic prospects, as opposed to global 
growth. But these changes should help support the 
global recovery for a couple of reasons: 
 • To the extent that they redistribute demand toward 
countries that would want to ease monetary policy 
but are constrained by the zero lower bound on 
policy interest rates and away from countries that 
can ease monetary policy, these exchange rate 
movements can imply a boost to global demand. 
This boost would occur because those countries 
constrained by the zero lower bound would not 
raise rates in response to a depreciation, while those 
countries able to do so would ease monetary policy 
relative to the baseline in response to an apprecia-
tion. An additional benefit for countries with depre-
ciating currencies and inflation below target would 
be higher domestic prices.
 • Relatedly, a redistribution of demand toward coun-
tries experiencing more difficult macroeconomic 
conditions can be beneficial because it can reduce 
risks of more severe distress in these economies and 
its possible spillovers.
On the other hand, sharp exchange rate movements 
can also cause disruptions—for example, such move-
ments could lead to rapid increases in the value of 
foreign- currency debt for countries whose currencies 
are depreciating. This concern is of particular relevance 
for countries that have seen a large increase in cor-
porate foreign-currency exposures in recent years, as 
discussed in the April 2015 Global Financial Stability 
Report (GFSR). These issues are discussed further in 
the “Risks” section of this chapter. 
Scenario Box 2 explores the implications of these 
exchange rate movements for the global outlook. To 
isolate the impact of these movements, and in line 
with the notion that at least part of the exchange 
rate adjustment reflects a delayed response to differ-
ences in economic prospects and expected monetary 
policy stance, the scenario assumes that the change in 
exchange rates is generated by a “portfolio preference 
shock”—in other words, an increased willingness by 
international investors to hold financial instruments 
issued by the countries with appreciating currencies 
and vice versa.3 Under this scenario, global GDP is 
boosted by about ½ percentage point, for the reasons 
discussed earlier, with an expansionary boost to coun-
tries and regions with depreciating currencies (such 
as the euro area and Japan) and weaker growth in 
countries with appreciating currencies (such as China 
and the United States). The peak impact on activity is 
found to be somewhat muted in the case of delayed 
response of trade flows to exchange rate fluctuations.
Lower Long-Term Interest Rates, More 
Accommodative Financial Conditions
Long-term government bond yields have declined 
further in major advanced economies (Figure 1.5). 
This decline reflects in part lower inflation expecta-
tions, resulting from continuing weakness in inflation 
3The simulations can be augmented with shifts in relative pros-
pects for aggregate demand. Because these shifts typically result in 
relatively modest exchange rate movements, the impact on activity 
can be gauged by roughly adding such shifts in demand to the 
impact on activity of the portfolio preference shift. 
by almost half. This outcome reflects a notably more 
modest boost to real activity in countries with man-
aged prices. The impact on output of more limited 
pass-through elsewhere in advanced economies with 
market-based oil prices (for example, the euro area 
and the United States) would be limited to the spill-
overs from weaker activity in countries with man-
aged prices. More limited pass-through would also 
moderate the impact of the decline in oil prices on 
global inflation.
Scenario Box 1 (continued)
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Two simulations of the IMF’s G20 Model are used in 
this scenario to examine the potential macroeconomic 
impact of the shifts in real exchange rates since August 
2014, as depicted in Scenario Figure 2. Both simulations 
replicate all bilateral changes in Group of 20 countries’ 
real exchange rates relative to the U.S. dollar between 
August 2014 and February 2015 using shocks that 
represent changes in investor preferences for U.S.-dollar-
denominated assets. The exchange rate shifts are assumed 
to be persistent, dissipating only gradually during the 
next five years. One simulation uses the base case version 
of the model (solid line in Scenario Figure 2), and the 
other uses a version of the model in which trade responds 
more gradually to the exchange rate movements (dashed 
line) to capture the possibility that lags in the transmis-
sion of exchange rates to trade have lengthened with the 
fragmentation of production chains.
The impact on GDP under the simulations is nega-
tive for countries whose currencies are appreciating (for 
example, China and the United States) and positive 
for countries whose currencies are depreciating (for 
example, the euro area and Japan). The magnitudes of 
the impact depend on the extent of the exchange rate 
shift, the degree of openness of the country’s economy, 
and the responsiveness of trade volumes to the changes 
in relative international prices. To the extent that 
conventional monetary policy space is available, coun-
tries experiencing an appreciation respond by easing 
monetary policy to help support output. Except for the 
euro area and Japan, countries experiencing expansions 
owing to depreciating currencies respond by tightening 
monetary policy. Baseline cycle positions in the euro 
area and Japan allow the expansions generated by the 
depreciations to be accommodated, and thus monetary 
policy is not tightened.
With monetary policy rates unchanged and inflation 
rising in the euro area and Japan, falling real interest rates 
help support domestic demand and amplify the expan-
sions. Because the euro area and Japan are able to accom-
modate their expansions, while China and the United 
States are able to ease monetary policy, these exchange 
rate shifts generate a mild expansion of global GDP. 
In the simulation in which trade volumes respond 
more gradually to the change in international relative 
prices than in the base case (dashed lines), the initial 
declines in output in appreciating countries are milder, 
while the expansions in depreciating countries are 
more modest. The more gradual response of trade 
volumes has a minimal impact on global GDP relative 
to the first simulation.
Scenario Box 2. Global Implications of Exchange Rate Movements
Source: IMF, G-20 Model simulations.
Note: Solid lines denote base case trade response; dashed
lines denote gradual trade response. CPI = consumer price
index.
Scenario Figure 2.  Impact of Exchange 
Rate Shifts since August 2014
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outcomes, the sharp decline in oil prices, and (in 
the euro area and especially in Japan) weak domes-
tic demand. But the decline in long-term nominal 
interest rates appears to reflect primarily a decline in 
real interest rates, including a compression of term 
premiums and reductions in the expected short-term 
neutral rate (see the April 2015 GFSR). Very accom-
modative monetary conditions have clearly played a 
role in the reduction in term premiums—in Octo-
ber 2014 the Bank of Japan expanded its quantitative 
and qualitative monetary easing framework, and in 
January of this year the ECB announced a larger-
than-expected program of asset purchases, includ-
ing government bonds. And although in the United 
States the Federal Reserve wound down its asset 
purchases in late 2014 and the country’s economic 
recovery has been stronger than expected, increased 
demand for U.S. assets, as reflected in a sharp appre-
ciation of the dollar, as well as subdued inflation 
pressure, has exerted downward pressure on long-term 
Treasury yields (with the 10-year yield falling 80 basis 
points between October and January). 
With declining bond yields and easier financial 
conditions in advanced economies, monetary policy 
conditions have also eased in several emerging market 
oil importers, which have reduced policy rates as lower 
oil prices and slowing demand pressures have reduced 
inflation rates (Figure 1.6). In contrast, policy rates 
have been raised sharply in Russia, which is facing 
pressure on the ruble, and monetary policy has been 
tightened in Brazil as well. More generally, risk spreads 
have risen and currencies have depreciated in a number 
of commodity exporters, and risk spreads on high-yield 
bonds and other products exposed to energy prices 
have also widened. 
Overall, the decline in long-term interest rates, 
looser monetary policy conditions, and compressed 
spreads in advanced economies are supportive of 
economic recovery and have favorable impacts on 
debt dynamics. But they also raise some concerns, 
as discussed in the “Risks” section. Low inflation 
expectations, particularly in the euro area and Japan, 
highlight the risk of a disanchoring of such expecta-
tions. Financial stability concerns associated with 
a protracted period of low interest rates remain 
salient—particularly in advanced economies with 
modest slack. Insurance companies and pension 
funds face difficult challenges in this respect. And 
compressed term premiums imply a potential risk of 
Long-term government bond yields have declined further in major advanced
economies, reflecting lower inflation expectations, the drop in oil prices, weak
domestic demand in some cases, and lower expected short-term neutral rates.
Very accommodative monetary conditions have also played a role by reducing
term premiums.
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a sharp increase in long-term rates, with significant 
spillovers to emerging markets. 
The Forecast
Policy Assumptions
Fiscal consolidation is projected to moderate in 
advanced economies over the forecast horizon (Fig-
ure 1.7). In emerging markets, the fiscal policy stance 
is projected to remain broadly unchanged—albeit with 
marked differences across countries and regions, as dis-
cussed in the April 2015 Fiscal Monitor. On the monetary 
policy front, U.S. policy rates are expected to increase 
beginning in the second half of the year (see Figure 1.3). 
Monetary policy normalization in the United Kingdom is 
projected not to begin before mid-2016. In the euro area, 
where monthly purchases of government bonds started 
on March 9, 2015, as well as Japan, very accommoda-
tive policy stances are expected to remain in place. Policy 
rates are generally expected to be on hold in a number of 
emerging market economies until rate increases start in 
the United States (Figures 1.5 and 1.8). 
Other Assumptions
Global financial conditions are assumed to remain 
accommodative, with some gradual tightening reflected 
in, among other things, rising 10-year yields on 
U.S. Treasury bonds as the expected date for liftoff from 
the zero bound in the United States approaches. The 
process of normalizing monetary policy in the United 
Kingdom and the United States is assumed to proceed 
smoothly, without large and protracted increases in 
financial market volatility or sharp movements in long-
term interest rates. Fuel prices are projected to increase 
gradually over the forecast horizon, from an average of 
$51 a barrel in 2015 to about $64 a barrel in 2017. 
In contrast, nonfuel commodity prices are expected to 
stabilize at lower levels after recent declines in both food 
and metals prices. Geopolitical tensions are assumed to 
stay elevated, with the situation in Russia and Ukraine 
remaining difficult and strife continuing in some coun-
tries in the Middle East. These tensions are generally 
assumed to ease, allowing for a gradual recovery in the 
most severely affected economies in 2016–17.
Global Outlook for 2015–16
Global growth is projected to increase slightly 
from 3.4 percent in 2014 to 3.5 percent in 2015 and 
As financial conditions have eased in advanced economies, financial conditions
have also eased in several emerging market oil importers, which have reduced
policy rates as lower oil prices and slowing demand pressures have lowered
inflation. Brazil and Russia are notable exceptions where policy rates have instead 
risen. More generally, risk spreads have risen and currencies have depreciated in
a number of commodity exporters, and risk spreads on high-yield bonds and
other products exposed to energy prices have also widened.
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Fiscal consolidation is projected to moderate in advanced economies over the 
forecast horizon. In emerging markets, the fiscal policy stance is projected to remain 
broadly unchanged—albeit with marked differences across countries and regions.
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Figure 1.8.  Monetary Policies and Credit in Emerging
Market Economies
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then to pick up further in 2016 to an annual rate of 
3.8 percent (see Table 1.1). The increase in growth 
in 2015 will be driven by a rebound in advanced 
economies, supported by the decline in oil prices, with 
the United States playing the most important role 
(Figure 1.9). This rebound will contribute to reducing 
still-sizable output gaps.
In emerging markets, in contrast, growth is pro-
jected to decline in 2015—for the fifth year in a row. A 
variety of factors explain this decline: sharp downward 
revisions to growth for oil exporters, especially coun-
tries facing difficult initial conditions in addition to the 
oil price shock (for example, Russia and Venezuela); a 
slowdown in China that reflects a move toward a more 
sustainable pattern of growth that is less reliant on 
investment; and a continued weakening of the outlook 
for Latin America resulting from a softening of other 
commodity prices. As discussed earlier, in emerging 
market oil importers, a more limited pass-through to 
consumers of the windfall gains from lower oil prices is 
expected to mute the attendant boost to growth, with 
lower prices assumed to accrue in part to governments 
(for example, in the form of savings from lower energy 
subsidies—see the April 2015 Fiscal Monitor), where 
they may be used to shore up public finances.
 • A pickup in emerging markets is assumed to drive 
the global growth rebound in 2016, primarily 
reflecting a partial waning of setbacks to domestic 
demand and production (including from geopoliti-
cal tensions) in a number of economies, including 
Brazil and Russia.
The outlook for 2015 is broadly in line with the 
one in the January 2015 WEO Update. Relative to the 
October 2014 WEO, global growth has been revised 
downward by 0.3 percentage point in 2015 and 0.2 
percentage point in 2016, entirely reflecting weaker 
projected growth in emerging markets. (Growth forecast 
comparisons in the remainder of this WEO report are 
made in relation to those in the October 2014 WEO.) 
Global Outlook for the Medium Term
Global growth is forecast to increase marginally 
beyond 2016, reflecting a further pickup in growth 
in emerging market and developing economies that 
would offset more modest growth in advanced econo-
mies. This pickup primarily reflects the assumption 
of a gradual return to more “normal” rates of growth 
in countries and regions under stress or growing well 
below potential in 2015–16 (such as Russia, Brazil, 
the rest of Latin America, and parts of the Middle 
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Figure 1.9.  GDP Growth Forecasts
(Annualized quarterly percent change)
Global growth is projected to increase slightly to 3.5 percent in 2015 and then to
rise further in 2016 to 3.7 percent. The increase in 2015 will be driven by a
rebound in advanced economies, supported by the decline in oil prices, with the
United States playing the most important role. In emerging markets, in contrast,
growth is projected to decline in 2015, reflecting downward revisions for oil
exporters, a slowdown in China that reflects a move toward more sustainable
growth that is less reliant on investment, and a weaker outlook for Latin America
resulting from a softening of other commodity prices.
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East). On the other hand, advanced economies are 
projected to grow at more modest rates from 2017 
onward, reflecting the gradual closure of output 
gaps—particularly in the euro area and the United 
States (where the persistence of crisis legacies and 
policy uncertainty play a role)—as well as the effects 
of demographics on labor supply and hence on poten-
tial output (Chapter 3). 
Growth Outlook for Individual Countries and 
Regions
 • A solid recovery is expected to continue in the 
United States, where growth averaged about 4 per-
cent in the last three quarters of 2014. Conditions 
remain in place for robust economic performance 
in 2015. Markedly lower energy prices, tame 
inflation, reduced fiscal drag, strengthened bal-
ance sheets, and an improving housing market are 
expected to sustain the momentum of the past 
three quarters. These forces are expected to more 
than offset the drag on net exports coming from 
the strengthening of the dollar. As a result, growth 
is projected to reach 3.1 percent in 2015 as well as 
2016, in line with the October forecast. However, 
the picture over a longer horizon is less upbeat, with 
potential growth estimated to be only about 2 per-
cent, weighed down by an aging population and 
weaker total factor productivity growth.
 • The euro area continued to recover during the past 
year, but private investment remained weak, with 
Ireland, Spain, and Germany being notable excep-
tions. Lower oil prices, lower interest rates, and 
euro depreciation, as well as the shift to a broadly 
neutral fiscal stance, are projected to boost activity 
in 2015–16. At the same time, potential growth 
remains weak—a result of crisis legacies, but also 
demographics and a slowdown in total factor 
productivity that predates the crisis (see Chapter 
3). Hence the outlook is for moderate growth and 
subdued inflation. Specifically, growth is expected 
to increase from 0.9 percent in 2014 to 1.5 percent 
this year and 1.6 percent in 2016, slightly stronger 
in 2015 than envisioned last October. Growth is 
forecast to pick up for 2015 and 2016 in Germany 
(1.6 percent in 2015 and 1.7 percent in 2016), 
in France (1.2 percent in 2015 and 1.5 percent in 
2016), in Italy (0.5 percent in 2015 and 1.1 percent 
in 2016), and especially in Spain (2.5 percent in 
2015 and 2 percent in 2016).
 • Activity in Japan disappointed following the 
April 2014 consumption tax hike, which caused a 
sharper-than-predicted contraction in consumption. 
GDP growth is projected to rise from –0.1 per-
cent in 2014 to 1 percent in 2015 and 1.2 percent 
in 2016, a slight upward revision relative to the 
October 2014 WEO. The gradual pickup reflects 
support from the weaker yen, higher real wages, 
and higher equity prices due to the Bank of Japan’s 
additional quantitative and qualitative easing, as well 
as lower oil and commodity prices. 
 • In other advanced economies, growth is gener-
ally expected to be solid. In the United Kingdom, 
continued steady growth is expected (2.7 per-
cent in 2015), supported by lower oil prices and 
improved financial market conditions. Canada’s 
growth of 2.2 percent this year will be supported 
by the strength of the U.S. recovery. Australia’s 
projected growth of 2.8 percent in 2015 is broadly 
unchanged from the October prediction, as lower 
commodity prices and resource-related invest-
ment are offset by supportive monetary policy 
and a somewhat weaker exchange rate. The robust 
recovery in Sweden (2.7 percent growth projected 
in 2015) is supported by consumption and double-
digit housing investment. But in Switzerland, the 
sharp exchange rate appreciation is likely to weigh 
on growth in the near term, with 2015 growth 
projected to be 0.8 percent, a downward revision 
of 0.8 percentage point. And lower oil prices will 
weigh on Norway, where GDP is projected to grow 
by 1 percent this year, a downward revision of 
about 0.9 percentage point.
 • Growth in China is expected to decline to 6.8 per-
cent this year and 6.3 percent in 2016. These 
projections have been revised downward by ¼ 
and ½ percentage point, respectively, as previ-
ous excesses in real estate, credit, and investment 
continue to unwind. The Chinese authorities are 
now expected to put greater weight on reducing 
vulnerabilities from recent rapid credit and invest-
ment growth, and hence the forecast assumes less 
of a policy response to the underlying moderation. 
Ongoing implementation of structural reforms and 
lower oil and commodity prices are expected to 
expand consumer-oriented activities, partly buffer-
ing the slowdown.
 • Elsewhere in emerging and developing Asia, India’s 
growth is expected to strengthen from 7.2 percent 
C H A P T E R 1 R E C E N T D E V E LO P M E N TS A N D P R O S P E C TS
 International Monetary Fund | April 2015 15
last year to 7.5 percent this year and next.4 Growth 
will benefit from recent policy reforms, a conse-
quent pickup in investment, and lower oil prices. 
Trends within the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations–5 will continue to diverge. Malaysia’s 
growth is expected to slow markedly to 4.8 percent 
this year (a downward revision of 0.4 percent-
age point) on weaker terms of trade. But growth 
is expected to pick up in Thailand, as a result of 
reduced policy uncertainty, and in the Philippines, 
owing to stronger consumption resulting from the 
oil price windfall. Indonesia’s growth forecast of 
5.2 percent this year is broadly in line with last 
year’s growth. 
 • Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean declined 
for the fourth consecutive year to 1.3 percent last 
year. With no apparent impulse for a near-term 
pickup in activity, lower commodity prices, and 
reduced policy space in many economies, regional 
growth is projected at 0.9 percent this year (1.3 per-
centage points less than previously projected and 
well below the 4.2 percent average growth observed 
in 2004–13) before recovering to 2 percent in 2016. 
Downward revisions are concentrated among South 
American commodity exporters. Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru have all seen down-
ward revisions to their 2015 growth projections 
of ½ to 2 percentage points. Brazil’s economy is 
projected to contract by 1 percent this year—more 
than 2 percentage points below the October 2014 
forecast. Private sector sentiment remains stub-
bornly weak because of unaddressed competitive-
ness challenges, the risk of near-term electricity and 
water rationing, and the fallout from the Petrobras 
investigation; greater-than-expected need for fis-
cal tightening also plays a role in the downward 
revisions. Mexico’s projected growth of 3 percent 
this year is a ½ percentage point downward revi-
sion. Argentina’s economic prospects for 2015 have 
improved relative to October as balance of payments 
pressures have moderated, but GDP is still expected 
to contract slightly (–0.3 percent). In Venezuela 
activity is projected to contract sharply (–7 percent) 
as the oil price decline has compounded an already 
difficult situation. 
4Following a revision of national accounts statistics, now using fis-
cal year 2011/12 as the base year, India’s GDP growth rate at market 
prices in 2013 and 2014 was revised upward substantially. 
 • Economies in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States slowed further in the latter half of 2014, and 
the outlook for the region has deteriorated mark-
edly. The downward revisions are driven by Russia, 
whose economy is now expected to contract by 
3.8 percent this year, more than 4 percentage points 
below the previous forecast, and by 1.1 percent 
in 2016. Falling oil prices and international sanc-
tions have compounded the country’s underlying 
structural weaknesses and have undermined con-
fidence, resulting in a significant depreciation of 
the ruble. The remainder of the CIS is projected to 
grow at 0.4 percent in 2015, 3.6 percentage points 
below the previous forecast. Ukraine’s economy is 
expected to bottom out in 2015 as activity stabilizes 
with the beginning of reconstruction work, but the 
economy is still projected to contract by 5.5 percent. 
Elsewhere in the region, lower commodity prices 
and spillovers from Russia (through trade, foreign 
direct investment, and especially remittances) are 
also dampening the outlook, particularly in light of 
existing structural vulnerabilities, resulting in large 
downward revisions to 2015 growth projections for 
Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, and Kazakhstan, among 
others.
 • Growth in emerging and developing Europe is 
projected to rise slightly from 2.8 percent last 
year to 2.9 percent this year (unchanged from the 
previous forecast) and to 3.2 percent in 2016. 
Lower oil prices and the gradual recovery in the 
euro area are expected to provide a lift to the 
region, offsetting the effects of the contraction 
in Russia and still-elevated corporate debt levels. 
Turkey is projected to grow by 3.1 percent this 
year, up from 2.3 percent last year and a 0.1 per-
centage point upward revision, as consumption 
will be boosted by lower energy prices. Growth 
in Hungary is projected to decline this year to 
2.7 percent on account of lower investment 
growth and less supportive fiscal conditions. 
Growth in Poland is projected to increase to 3.5 
percent in 2015, supported by domestic demand 
and improved conditions in trading partners.
 • Growth remained tepid across the Middle East, 
North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan last year, and 
only a modest strengthening is expected this year. 
Growth is projected to rise from 2.6 percent in 2014 
to 2.9 percent this year and to 3.8 percent in 2016. 
This year’s projected growth is 1 percentage point 
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below the previous projection, with the region’s oil-
exporting economies accounting for all of the down-
ward revision, mostly due to the decline in oil prices. 
Saudi Arabia’s growth forecast of 3 percent this year 
is a downward revision of 1½ percentage points, 
although nearly half of this revision is due to a rebas-
ing of real GDP data. Other oil exporters, including 
Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the United 
Arab Emirates, have also seen substantial downward 
revisions to their growth forecasts. Growth in the 
region’s oil importers is expected to strengthen from 
3 percent last year to 4 percent this year and to 
4.4 percent in 2016, as domestic demand is expected 
to strengthen with improved confidence, monetary 
easing, lower oil prices, and reduced fiscal drag.
 • Growth in sub-Saharan Africa remains strong but 
is expected to slow this year to 4.5 percent (from 
5 percent in 2014 and a substantial downward 
revision of 1¼ percentage points) in the face of 
headwinds from declining commodity prices and the 
epidemic in Ebola-affected countries. The oil price 
decline will have a severe impact on the region’s 
oil exporters, including Nigeria, with 2015 growth 
for those countries marked down by more than 
2½ percentage points. In contrast, projected growth 
in the region’s oil importers is broadly unchanged, as 
the favorable impact of lower oil prices is offset to a 
large extent by lower prices of commodity exports. 
South Africa’s growth is expected to rise to 2 percent 
this year, a 0.3 percentage point revision downward, 
and 2.1 percent in 2016, reflecting more binding 
electricity supply constraints and a tighter fiscal 
stance in 2016 than previously expected.
Global Inflation
Inflation is projected to decline in 2015 in both 
advanced economies and most emerging market and 
developing economies, reflecting primarily the impact 
of the decline in oil prices. The pass-through of lower 
oil prices into core inflation is expected to remain 
moderate, in line with recent episodes of large changes 
in commodity prices: 
 • In advanced economies, inflation is projected to 
rise in 2016 and thereafter, but to remain generally 
below central bank targets. 
 • In the euro area, headline inflation turned nega-
tive in December 2014, and medium-term infla-
tion expectations have dropped substantially since 
mid-2014, although they have stabilized somewhat 
after the ECB’s recent actions. The projected mod-
est pickup in economic activity, together with the 
partial recovery in oil prices and the impact of the 
euro depreciation, is assumed to imply an increase 
in both headline and core inflation starting in the 
second quarter of 2015, but both measures of price 
increases are expected to remain below the ECB’s 
medium-term price stability objective.
 • In Japan, the projected modest pickup in growth 
and the waning downward pressure on prices from 
lower commodity prices as well as higher real 
wage growth on tight labor market conditions are 
expected to help push up underlying prices next 
year, but under current policies and constant real 
exchange rates, inflation is projected to rise only 
gradually to about 1½ percent in the medium term. 
 • In the United States, annual inflation in 2015 
is projected to decline to 0.4 percent, increasing 
gradually beginning in midyear as the effects of 
the oil price decline wear off, while the effects of 
dollar appreciation and muted wage dynamics act 
as a headwind. Inflation is then projected to rise 
gradually toward the Federal Reserve’s longer-term 
objective of 2 percent.
 • Inflation is projected to remain well below target in 
a number of other smaller advanced economies—
especially in Europe. Consumer prices are projected 
to decline in both 2015 and 2016 in Switzerland, 
following the sharp appreciation of the currency in 
January, and to remain subdued elsewhere, notably 
in the Czech Republic and Sweden.
In emerging market economies the decline in oil 
prices and a slowdown in activity are expected to con-
tribute to lower inflation in 2015, even though not all 
the decline in the price of oil will be passed on to end-
user prices. Countries that experienced large nominal 
exchange rate depreciations are a notable exception to 
this trend. In subsequent years the effect of lower oil 
prices is expected to be phased out, but this effect is 
projected to be offset by a gradual decline in underly-
ing inflation toward medium-term inflation targets. 
 • In China, consumer price index inflation is forecast 
to be 1.2 percent in 2015, reflecting the decline in 
commodity prices, the sharp appreciation of the ren-
minbi, and some weakening in domestic demand, 
but to increase gradually thereafter. 
 • In India, inflation is expected to remain close to 
target in 2015. In Brazil, inflation is expected to 
rise above the ceiling of the tolerance band this year, 
reflecting an adjustment of regulated prices and 
exchange rate depreciation, and to converge toward 
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the 4.5 percent target over the following two years. 
In contrast, inflation is projected to spike to about 
18 percent in 2015 in Russia, reflecting the large 
depreciation of the ruble, and to decline to about 
10 percent next year.
 • A few emerging markets, especially some in Europe, 
are projected to experience headline inflation 
well below target in 2015, with modest increases 
in 2016. These economies include Poland and a 
number of smaller countries whose currencies are 
tightly linked to the euro.
External Sector Developments
Preliminary data suggest a further slowdown in 
global trade in 2014 (Figure 1.10), reflecting to an 
important extent weaker trade dynamics in emerging 
market and developing economies. Part of this slow-
down is related to weaker-than-expected GDP growth, 
but the growth in trade volumes remains relatively 
modest even after developments in overall economic 
activity are taken into account. Box 1.2 discusses the 
extent to which cyclical and structural factors can 
account for the more subdued pace of trade growth. 
The evidence indicates that both cyclical and structural 
factors are important—the cyclical weakness in (trade-
intensive) investment clearly plays a role, but the long-
term relationship between world trade and GDP is also 
changing, possibly reflecting a more modest pace in 
the fragmentation of global production processes (value 
chains) after years of rapid change.
Capital flows to and from advanced economies have 
remained relatively subdued, in line with the postcrisis 
pattern. And capital flows to emerging markets slowed 
in the second half of 2014 after a strong first half of 
the year (Figure 1.6), also reflecting the increase in geo-
political tensions and concerns about weaker growth 
prospects, particularly for commodity exporters. Global 
current account imbalances remained broadly stable 
in 2014, after several years of contraction. Changes 
in current account balances relative to GDP in 2014 
generally went in the direction of narrowing the 
current account gaps for 2013 discussed in the 2014 
Pilot External Sector Report (IMF 2014) (Figure 1.10, 
panel 4). These gaps measure deviations of current 
account balances from a level consistent with underly-
ing fundamentals and desirable policies. Movements in 
real effective exchange rates in 2014 relative to 2013 
were also consistent with a reduction of the exchange 
rate gaps identified for 2013 by the 2014 Pilot External 
Sector Report (Figure 1.11, panel 1). Exchange rate 
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changes have been particularly large across a broad set 
of currencies since fall 2014. As shown in Figure 1.11, 
for countries with floating exchange rates, these move-
ments are strongly correlated with shifts in underlying 
fundamentals: their dependence on oil, proxied by the 
size of their oil balance in relation to GDP (panel 2), 
and revisions in the outlook for domestic demand rela-
tive to external demand during this period (panel 3).5 
These exchange rate changes, together with the large 
oil price changes, are projected to imply shifts in global 
current account balances in 2015. The most notable 
development in this respect is the projected disappear-
ance of the aggregate current account surplus in fuel 
exporters in 2015, for the first time since 1998. Oil 
exporters are projected to return to current account sur-
pluses with the recovery in oil prices, but these surpluses 
are expected to be smaller than during the past decade. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the decline in oil 
prices and the real exchange rate changes occurring in 
recent months have been supportive of the recovery. 
Their overall impact on global current account imbal-
ances is, however, mixed. The oil price and real exchange 
rate changes of the past few months help rebalancing 
in countries that would benefit from a strengthening of 
their external positions (such as Spain) but also tend to 
further boost surpluses in other countries in Europe with 
large initial surpluses (such as Germany and the Nether-
lands). For both China and the United States, exchange 
rate movements weaken the current account balance, 
whereas the decline in oil prices strengthens it, with pro-
jections showing a slight widening in the Chinese surplus 
and in the U.S. deficit. Overall, WEO projections—
which are based on stable real effective exchange rates at 
levels prevailing in early 2015—suggest broadly stable 
current account imbalances as a share of global GDP for 
the next five years (Figure 1.12, panel 2).
Risks
The distribution of risks to global growth is more 
balanced than that presented in the October 2014 
WEO but is still tilted to the downside. A greater boost 
to demand from lower oil prices is an important upside 
risk. And downside risks have moderated given a lower 
baseline path for growth in emerging market economies. 
5For the same set of countries, however, the correlation of 
exchange rate changes between February and August 2014 with 
these variables is in contrast virtually zero, further highlighting the 
difficulty of systematically explaining short-term exchange rate move-
ments using macroeconomic fundamentals.
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In particular, after a series of downward revisions to the 
baseline growth forecasts, risks of a sharper slowdown in 
China and still-lower potential output growth in emerg-
ing market economies have decreased. The most salient 
downside risks identified in the October 2014 WEO 
remain relevant, including geopolitical risks, disruptive 
asset price shifts in financial markets, and risks of stag-
nation and low inflation in advanced economies. 
Oil also presents new downside risks, because prices 
could rise faster than expected. Similarly, the recent 
exchange rate realignment is helpful in raising demand 
in economies that have faced weaker activity, but there 
are balance sheet and funding risks, especially in emerg-
ing market economies, if dollar appreciation continues. 
Global GDP Forecast
The fan chart for the global GDP forecast suggests 
a broadly symmetric confidence interval around the 
projected path for global growth (Figure 1.12, panel 
1), consistent with the view that the risks are now 
more balanced. The width of the interval, however, 
has increased compared with the October WEO. This 
means that the likelihood of either substantially higher 
growth or a global recession is higher now than in 
October. 
Two factors explain the implied higher uncertainty 
around the forecast, on both the upside and the 
downside:
 • First, baseline uncertainty has increased because 
the forecast horizon for the current and next year 
is longer compared with October, when more data 
affecting both current- and next-year outcomes were 
already known.6 
 • Second, the underlying indicators for oil-price- and, 
to a lesser extent, inflation-related risks suggest 
increases in uncertainty. For both variables, the dis-
persion in related Consensus Economics Consensus 
Forecasts has increased (Figure 1.12, panel 4). For oil 
prices, the implied volatility in oil futures options 
has also risen (Figure 1.12, panel 4). These increases 
are indicative of greater divergence in views about 
underlying prospects—clearly affected by substantial 
surprises in both variables during the past year. 
The greater divergence in views about key variables 
that could affect growth outcomes does not necessar-
6The forecast errors for both current- and next-year forecasts tend 
to be larger for the April than for the October WEO reports. See 
Timmermann 2006 for a discussion.
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with the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 for 2016 are based on options contracts for
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3GDP measures the purchasing-power-parity-weighted average dispersion of GDP
growth forecasts for the G7 economies (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
United Kingdom, United States), Brazil, China, India, and Mexico. VIX is the CBOE
S&P 500 Implied Volatility Index. Term spread measures the average dispersion of
term spreads implicit in interest rate forecasts for Germany, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Oil is the CBOE crude oil volatility index. Forecasts
are from Consensus Economics surveys. Dashed lines represent the average
values from 2000 to the present.
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ily imply larger forecast errors for the WEO baseline 
projections in the period ahead. Indeed, simulations 
using the IMF’s Global Projection Model, which 
draw on past shocks over a longer horizon, suggest a 
decrease in the probability of a recession in the major 
advanced economies over a four-quarter horizon rela-
tive to October 2014 (Figure 1.13). However, the risk 
of a recession is now higher in Latin America and the 
“other countries” group, reflecting weaker initial condi-
tions for their forecasts.  
Immediate and Short-Term Risks 
Low oil prices: Oil prices present a two-sided risk. 
One concerns the oil price path, which presents 
downside risks to global growth. The other concerns 
the growth impact of the oil price change under the 
baseline, which offers upside risks. 
 • On the upside, the impact on domestic demand of 
sizable real income gains due to the oil price wind-
fall could be stronger than currently incorporated 
in the baseline (see Scenario Box 1). The forecasts 
are relatively conservative, and for a number of 
large emerging market oil importers, they assume 
limited pass-through to domestic end users and 
higher public or public sector savings. But these 
savings could be lower than the forecasts assume if 
governments instead use the windfall to fund other 
reforms, including, for example, higher infrastruc-
ture spending. 
 • On the downside, oil prices could rebound faster 
than expected for at least two reasons (not related to 
a stronger pickup in global demand, which would 
support global growth). The first is a correction for 
an earlier overreaction as market participants decide 
that the price path currently embedded in futures 
contracts is too low given forecasts of demand and 
supply. The second is a stronger negative sup-
ply response to lower prices, which would mean a 
shorter-lived and smaller boost to global demand. 
Disruptive asset price shifts and financial market turmoil: 
These remain a downside risk, as elaborated in the 
April 2015 GFSR. Two reasons underpin this risk. First, 
term premiums and risk premiums in bond markets are 
still very low (see the earlier discussion on low long-
term interest rates). At the same time, financial market 
volatility, although slightly higher than six months ago, 
has also been low from a historical perspective. Second, 
the context underlying this asset price configuration—in 
particular, very accommodative monetary policies in the 
major advanced economies—is expected to start changing 
in 2015. News that changes expectations about these fault 
lines and unexpected portfolio shifts more broadly could 
trigger turmoil, as relative risks and returns would change. 
The unexpected end to the Swiss National Bank’s floor for 
the Swiss franc–euro exchange rate is a case in point. 
A particular concern in this respect are surprises about 
the first interest rate increase in the United States after 
a long period of very accommodative monetary policy. 
Market expectations of the pace of interest rate increases 
in the United States (as measured by the rates implied 
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The IMF staff’s Global Projection Model suggests a decrease in the probability of a
recession in many major economies and regions over a four-quarter horizon
compared with the October 2014 WEO. The decrease largely reflects stronger
growth starting points. The probablility of a recession has, however, increased for
Latin America and the rest of the world. Deflation risks are primarily a concern for
the euro area, where the probabilities are still high despite some decline. In other
economies and regions, they are well below 10 percent.
Source: IMF staff estimates.
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quarter indicated in the chart.
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by federal funds futures contracts) incorporate a much 
slower pace of interest rate normalization relative to the 
median interest rate forecast of members of the Federal 
Open Market Committee, even though market forecasts 
for economic growth appear to be broadly in line with 
those of committee members. 
Emerging market economies are particularly 
exposed: they could face a reversal in capital flows, 
particularly if U.S. long-term interest rates increase 
rapidly, as they did during May–August 2013. Given 
the sharp fall in oil prices, oil exporters have become 
more vulnerable to these risks, in light of their higher 
external and balance sheet vulnerabilities, whereas 
many oil importers have gained buffers. 
In addition, financial stress in the euro area triggered 
by policy uncertainty associated with Greece or politi-
cal turbulence in the euro area could reemerge and 
reintensify the links between banks and sovereigns and 
the real economy. 
A further sizable strengthening of the U.S. dollar: 
This also represents a risk. Recent dollar appreciation 
largely reflects changing fundamentals and policies, as 
discussed earlier, including relative domestic demand 
strength, expected monetary policy divergence among 
major advanced economies, and changing external 
positions with lower oil prices. U.S. dollar appreciation 
against most currencies could possibly continue, caus-
ing a lasting upswing in the dollar, as has happened 
previously. If this risk were to materialize, balance sheet 
and funding strains for dollar debtors could potentially 
more than offset trade benefits from real deprecia-
tion in some economies. This concern is particularly 
relevant for emerging market economies with high 
degrees of international financial integration, in which, 
as discussed in the April 2015 GFSR, foreign-currency 
corporate debt has increased substantially over the past 
few years. An important part of the increase has been 
in the energy sector, in which much of the revenue 
is in U.S. dollars, a natural hedge against deprecia-
tion (but not against declines in energy prices in dol-
lars). But foreign-currency debt has also increased in 
firms operating in other sectors, with some of them, 
especially in the nontradables sectors, lacking natural 
revenue hedges. The balance sheet shock generated by 
the sudden large appreciation of the Swiss franc on 
some countries in central and eastern Europe with siz-
able domestic mortgage lending denominated in that 
currency highlights the nature of these risks.
Protracted low inflation or deflation: The impact 
on activity of protracted low inflation or outright 
deflation in advanced economies with high public or 
private debt continues to be an important concern. 
The oil price decline has led to further declines in 
headline inflation, accentuating the undershooting of 
the target in many advanced economies. As discussed 
in earlier WEO reports, the problem is the combina-
tion of protracted undershooting and constraints on 
monetary policy at the zero lower bound for nominal 
interest rates.7 If the undershooting sets off a down-
ward drift in medium-term inflation expectations, 
longer-term real interest rates would start rising, 
hampering the recovery and potentially exacerbating 
debt overhang problems. In this regard, the decline of 
some indicators for such expectations in the second 
half of 2014 (for example, the break-even inflation 
rate implied by five-year five-year-forward inflation 
swaps) is a concern, even though these indicators 
have stabilized this year. And persistently low infla-
tion in the euro area would have spillovers onto a 
number of smaller European countries whose curren-
cies are closely tied to the euro. 
But in principle, two factors should mitigate such 
concerns. First, to the extent that further declines 
in inflation (or price-level declines) primarily reflect 
the fall in oil prices, the effect on inflation (price-
level effect) should be temporary, unless the second-
round effects, which experience from the recent 
commodity price boom suggests should be small, 
instead turn out to be sizable. Second, in oil import-
ers the effects of oil prices on inflation tend to be 
strongest for consumer prices, given the substantial 
weight of imported energy in those prices, and 
much smaller for the price of domestic value added, 
as measured by the GDP deflator, since the latter 
includes only second-round effects on wages and 
other domestic factors. As the GDP deflator is the 
more relevant price measure for real interest rates 
for firms (and obviously the relevant measure for the 
public-debt-to-GDP ratio), the potentially negative 
impact on debt ratios from the oil price fall should 
be smaller. 
Deflation probabilities from the IMF’s Global Pro-
jection Model indicate that risks of deflation, defined 
as a price-level decline in a four-quarter window, dur-
ing the period from the third quarter of 2015 through 
the second quarter of 2016 are primarily a concern 
7Some central banks, including the ECB, have opted for slightly 
negative interest rates on bank deposits, and yields on government 
bonds of countries such as Germany and Switzerland have turned 
negative even at longer maturities. 
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for the euro area (Figure 1.13), but the probability has 
decreased below 30 percent. In other economies and 
regions, they are well below 10 percent. The model’s 
probabilities for a price-level decline during the 
period exclude temporary disinflationary effects due 
to lower oil prices and thus reflect only the risks from 
other shocks to activity. 
Geopolitical risks: Ongoing events in Russia and 
Ukraine, the Middle East, and parts of Africa could 
lead to escalation in tensions and increased disruptions 
in global trade and financial transactions. Disruptions 
in energy and other commodity markets remain a 
particular concern, given the possibility of sharp price 
spikes, which, depending on their duration, could sub-
stantially lower real incomes and demand in importers. 
More generally, an escalation of such tensions could 
take a toll on confidence. 
Near-term growth risks in China: Investment growth 
slowed in China in 2014, including in the real estate 
sector, after a boom in 2009–12. Some further 
slowdown is already factored into the baseline, but it 
could be stronger than expected, as striking a balance 
between reducing vulnerabilities, supporting growth, 
and implementing reforms remains challenging. 
Moreover, the impact of slowing investment on aggre-
gate demand has been cushioned by policy stimulus, 
but the Chinese authorities are now expected to put 
greater weight on reducing vulnerabilities from recent 
rapid credit and investment growth. As a result, 
investors might be more concerned about risks of 
a further slowdown, which could feed into current 
investment. 
Medium-Term Risks
Low potential growth in advanced economies: As dis-
cussed in Chapter 3, potential growth is likely to be 
lower than it was before the crisis, reflecting predict-
able effects from demographics—such as aging and 
declining fertility rates—as well as protracted crisis 
effects, notably lower growth in the capital stock (see 
also Chapter 4). Despite considerable two-sided risks 
to projections of potential output, crisis legacies—
notably financial sector weakness, still-high public 
debt ratios, and private debt overhang—remain an 
important concern in some economies, particularly 
in the euro area, and could continue to negatively 
affect investment for longer if they are not addressed. 
In turn, a protracted period of large negative output 
gaps and high and increasingly long-term unemploy-
ment could lead to higher permanent losses in skills 
and labor force participation. 
Secular stagnation in advanced economies: The risk of 
secular stagnation (discussed in more detail in a sce-
nario analysis in the October 2014 WEO) will remain 
as long as demand is weak and inflation is expected to 
stay below target for an extended period, amid con-
straints on monetary policy at the zero lower bound. 
After six years of demand weakness, the likelihood of 
damage to potential output is increasingly a concern, 
and the considerations previously presented apply. 
Lower potential growth in emerging market economies: 
As noted in Chapter 3, potential growth in major 
emerging market economies has been decreasing since 
the global financial crisis. A sequence of downward 
revisions to medium-term growth forecasts for many 
economies during the past three years indicates that 
this has been a broader development. The baseline pro-
jections already incorporate some decline in potential 
growth, in part due to demographic factors. 
Risks to potential growth stem from two sources. 
Capital growth could slow further, especially if relevant 
structural constraints are not addressed or if commod-
ity prices continue to fall. Total factor productivity 
growth could fall more than expected under current 
convergence expectations. Other macroeconomic fac-
tors, notably a tightening of financial conditions in 
emerging market economies, if protracted, could also 
lead to lower potential growth as discussed earlier. 
Hard landing in China: Since the policy stimulus 
deployed during the global financial crisis, booming 
credit and investment have been key sources of growth 
in China, and vulnerabilities have been building. This 
is a medium-term risk because the Chinese govern-
ment still has sufficient buffers to prevent a sharp 
growth slowdown by using public resources and state 
influence. The current reform effort to rebalance the 
economy is important to reduce this risk, since with-
out reforms to change the pattern of growth, vulner-
abilities will continue to increase, and the available 
policy space will shrink.
Policies
Global growth is expected to strengthen modestly 
in 2015–16, helped in part by the boost to global 
demand from lower oil prices and policy changes. But 
the recovery remains fragile in a number of advanced 
economies, marked by weak investment, and medium-
term growth is low in many economies. Raising actual 
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and potential output therefore continues to be a gen-
eral policy priority. 
Macroeconomic policy requirements vary from 
country group to country group and among individual 
countries. In many advanced economies, accommoda-
tive monetary policy remains essential to prevent real 
interest rates from rising prematurely, given persistent 
and sizable output gaps as well as strong disinflation 
dynamics and associated risks (Figure 1.14). A strong 
case can be made for increasing infrastructure invest-
ment in some economies. In many emerging market 
economies, macroeconomic policy space to support 
growth remains constrained. With limited fiscal space, 
a general rebalancing of fiscal policy through budget-
neutral tax changes and reprioritization of spending 
can help support growth. In oil importers, lower oil 
prices will reduce the burden on monetary policy to 
deal with inflation pressure and external vulnerabilities 
and, in the case of economies with oil subsidies, may 
provide some fiscal space. Oil exporters have to absorb 
a large terms-of-trade shock and face greater fiscal and 
external vulnerabilities. 
There is a broad need for structural reforms in many 
economies, advanced and emerging market alike. In 
this regard, lower oil prices also offer an opportunity to 
reform energy subsidies and taxes in many oil exporters 
and importers. 
Continuing to Fight Low Inflation in Advanced 
Economies
Lower oil prices provide a welcome boost to demand 
in most advanced economies, but by lowering oil-
related consumer prices, they contribute temporar-
ily to further downward pressure on inflation. This 
is primarily a problem in advanced Europe, notably 
the euro area, and in Japan. With policy rates at the 
zero lower bound, monetary policy must stay accom-
modative through unconventional measures (includ-
ing large-scale asset purchases) to prevent real interest 
rates from rising. Monetary policy efforts should be 
accompanied by a cleanup of bank balance sheets to 
improve credit supply. Complementary fiscal policy 
action in countries with fiscal space is also needed, as 
are demand-supporting structural reforms, in particular 
to improve productivity and stimulate investment. And 
as discussed in the April 2015 Fiscal Monitor, dealing 
with high public debt in a low-growth and low-
inflation environment remains a key challenge in many 
advanced economies.
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Economic activity across the main countries and regions remains uneven. In
advanced economies, the brakes placed on growth by high public and private debt 
are coming off, but at different rates across countries, and unemployment levels 
and output gaps are still high in some cases. Medium-term growth prospects
have also been revised downward in many economies, particularly among major 
emerging markets, compared to the projections made in the September 2011 WEO.
Figure 1.14.  Capacity, Unemployment, and Output Trends
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Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States; EDA = emerging and
developing Asia; EDE = emerging and developing Europe; EMDEs = emerging
market and developing economies; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean;
MENAP = Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
1Sub-Saharan Africa is omitted because of data limitations.
2Relative to the September 2011 WEO.
–4
–3
–2
–1
0
1
Advanced 
economies
United States Euro area Japan Other advanced 
economies
1. 2014 Output Gap
    (Percent of potential GDP)
3. Contribution to Reduction in Emerging Market and Developing
    Economy Medium-Term Output2
China India
Russia Brazil
South Africa Rest of EMDEs
EMDEs
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Euro area Japan United 
States
CIS EDA EDE LAC MENAP
2. Unemployment Rates1
2007
2011
2014
WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: UNEVEN GROWTH—SHORT- AND LONG-TERM FACTORS
24 International Monetary Fund | April 2015
Within these broad contours, challenges differ con-
siderably across countries. 
In the euro area, notwithstanding the pickup in 
activity, the recovery remains fragile and uneven, 
with sizable output gaps and euro-area-wide inflation 
expected to remain substantially below target beyond 
normal monetary policy horizons. Hence, further pol-
icy action is needed to ensure a stronger euro-area-wide 
recovery, especially in private investment (Chapter 4). 
On the monetary policy front, the ECB’s decision 
to expand its asset purchase program through sovereign 
asset purchases until the path of inflation is consis-
tent with achieving the ECB’s price stability target 
is welcome. These monetary policy efforts should be 
supported by measures that aim to strengthen bank 
balance sheets, which would help to improve monetary 
policy transmission and credit market conditions. 
Stricter regulation of nonperforming loans and mea-
sures to improve insolvency and foreclosure procedures 
are a priority in this regard. 
On the fiscal policy front, the broadly neutral euro-
area-wide fiscal policy stance in 2015–16 strikes a better 
balance between supporting demand and improving debt 
sustainability. Nevertheless, countries with fiscal space, 
notably Germany, could do more to encourage growth, 
especially by undertaking much-needed public invest-
ment. Countries with limited fiscal space should use the 
new flexibility under the Stability and Growth Pact to 
undertake public investment and structural reforms and 
rebalance their economies. Should activity and inflation 
disappoint, threatening a descent into a bad deflationary 
equilibrium, additional fiscal support should be consid-
ered to complement further monetary easing. 
In Japan, economic activity has rebounded after 
a short recession in mid-2014. Inflation has started 
to decline again, however, and oil prices will add to 
downward pressure on prices, while medium-term 
inflation expectations are stuck substantially below the 
2 percent inflation target. At the same time, potential 
output growth remains low. 
On the monetary policy front, the Bank of Japan 
should consider strengthening its policies along two 
dimensions as necessary to the attainment of the 2 per-
cent inflation target. First, the portfolio-rebalancing 
effects of its asset purchases could be strengthened by 
increasing the share of private assets in purchases and 
extending the program to longer-maturity government 
bonds. Second, more forecast-oriented monetary policy 
communication would increase the transparency of its 
assessment of inflation prospects and signal its com-
mitment to the inflation target, mainly through the 
discussion of envisaged policy changes if inflation is not 
on track. 
On the fiscal front, the stronger-than-expected 
contraction in consumption after the consumption tax 
increase last April highlights that it is critical for fiscal 
policy consolidation to be attuned to economic condi-
tions and prospects. But risks to public debt sustain-
ability remain a key concern given high public debt 
ratios, and a credible medium-term strategy for fiscal 
adjustment with specific measures is urgently needed 
to maintain market confidence.
In the United States, growth rebounded strongly 
in much of 2014 and is expected to run above trend 
in 2015–16. The main near-term policy issue is the 
appropriate timing and pace of monetary policy 
normalization. On one hand, although uncertainty 
remains about the extent of underlying labor market 
slack, particularly in light of the decline in labor force 
participation, a broad range of other labor market 
indicators suggests a notable improvement in the labor 
market. On the other, the appreciation of the dollar 
will put some downward pressure on GDP growth by 
dampening external demand, and there is little evi-
dence of meaningful wage and price pressures so far. 
The Federal Reserve has communicated that the 
timing for the liftoff of interest rates will depend on 
progress toward its goals of maximum employment and 
2 percent inflation and that interest rate normalization 
will be gradual. After the liftoff—expected later this 
year—market participants generally expect an even more 
gradual rate increase to a lower natural rate than forecast 
by Federal Open Market Committee members, as noted 
in the “Risks” discussion. At the same time, long-term 
U.S. interest rates have fallen further as a result of still-
weak conditions in many other major economies, strong 
demand for safe U.S. assets, and expectations of future 
dollar strength, and there is potential for a rapid increase 
in those long-term rates. This divergence in expectations 
carries the possibility of surprises and disruptive market 
adjustments and further underscores the importance of 
an effective policy communication strategy. 
On the fiscal policy front, the priority remains to 
agree on a credible medium-term fiscal consolidation 
plan to prepare for rising aging-related fiscal costs; this 
plan will need to include higher tax revenue. 
Boosting Potential Output
As discussed in Chapter 3, potential output growth 
in advanced economies is expected to strengthen 
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only very moderately in 2015–20 even though crisis 
legacies are slowly waning. The main reason for the 
subdued forecast is population aging, which underlies 
the projected low growth and possible decline in trend 
employment under current policies affecting labor 
force participation. This picture highlights the general 
need for structural policies to strengthen both labor 
force participation and trend employment. 
 • In Japan, where female labor force participation 
is below average, removing tax disincentives and 
improving child care options would increase incen-
tives for women to work. 
 • In the euro area, where structural, long-term, and 
youth unemployment are high in many economies, 
an important concern is skill erosion and its effect 
on trend employment. In addition to macroeco-
nomic policies to address protracted low demand, 
priorities include fewer tax disincentives to employ-
ment, among them lowering the labor tax wedge, as 
well as better-targeted training programs and active 
labor market policies. 
 • In the United States, removing tax disincentives and 
providing targeted support to low-income families for 
child care would help raise labor force participation. 
As discussed in the October 2014 WEO, in a num-
ber of advanced economies (including several countries 
in the euro area as well as the United States) there is 
a strong case for greater infrastructure investment. In 
addition to boosting medium-term potential output, 
such investment would also provide much-needed 
short-term support to domestic demand in some of 
these economies.
In other areas, priorities for spurring medium-term 
growth vary considerably:
 • In euro area economies, lowering barriers to entry 
in product markets and reforming labor market 
regulations that hamper adjustment are critical. In 
debtor economies, these changes would strengthen 
external competitiveness and help sustain gains 
in external adjustment while economies recover, 
whereas in creditor economies, they would primar-
ily strengthen investment and employment. Fur-
ther progress should also be made in implementing 
the European Union Services Directive, advancing 
free trade agreements, and integrating energy mar-
kets. And as mentioned earlier, reforms tackling 
legacy debt overhang (for instance, through resolv-
ing nonperforming loans, facilitating out-of-court 
settlement, and improving insolvency frameworks) 
would help credit demand and supply to recover.
 • In Japan, more forceful structural reforms (the 
third arrow of Abenomics) should be the priority. 
Measures to increase labor force participation are 
essential, as previously discussed, but there is also 
scope for raising productivity in the services sector 
through deregulation, invigorating labor productiv-
ity by reducing labor market duality, and supporting 
investment through corporate governance reform as 
well as improvements to the provision of risk capital 
by the financial system. 
Emerging Market and Developing Economies
Growth in emerging market economies has fallen 
short of expectations during the past few years after 
a decade of very rapid growth. The shortfall reflects 
in part weak growth in advanced economy trading 
partners since the global financial crisis and the growth 
moderation in China, but a variety of country-specific 
factors are also at play.8 Efforts to rebalance growth 
toward domestic sources in recent years have supported 
domestic activity, but they have also increased macro-
economic vulnerabilities and reduced policy space in 
some economies. Several countries have experienced 
inflation above target or weaker fiscal positions than 
before the crisis—or both. 
Reducing vulnerabilities against the backdrop of 
still-high risks of capital flow reversals must remain 
an important policy goal. Macroeconomic weak-
nesses would be costly if this risk materialized. In 
particular, stronger growth in advanced economies 
and the expected normalization of monetary policy in 
the United States later this year could lead to a more 
persistent reversal of the substantial capital flows to 
emerging market economies in search of higher returns 
since the crisis—reversals so far have been short lived 
and with limited reductions in flows, especially to 
Latin America (see Figure 1.6). 
In this context, the sharp oil price decline in the sec-
ond half of 2014 has mitigated external vulnerabilities 
in oil importers. But the decline has also introduced 
new growth challenges and increased external and fiscal 
vulnerabilities in oil exporters: 
 • Many oil importers have successfully lowered their 
vulnerability to adverse shocks during the past year 
by adopting tighter macroeconomic policies to 
reduce inflation and narrow external current account 
deficits. Lower oil prices will further alleviate infla-
8See Chapter 4 in the April 2014 WEO for details.
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tion pressure and reduce external vulnerabilities with 
lower bills for oil imports. The trade-off between 
supporting demand if there is economic slack and 
reducing macroeconomic vulnerabilities has become 
less pronounced as a result, which may allow some 
central banks in economies with slack to reduce 
policy rates. 
 • In oil importers in which external borrowing has 
risen strongly over the past few years and exposure 
to external funding risks remains high, efforts to 
strengthen public finances and raise domestic sav-
ings must continue. In economies with oil subsi-
dies, windfall gains from lower oil prices will lead 
to higher public sector savings, except where some 
or all of the gains are used to increase spending 
or reduce taxes. Whether all the gains should be 
saved depends on the extent of economic slack in 
a particular economy, the strength of its fiscal posi-
tion, and its needs. In particular, these gains may 
provide an opportunity to finance critical structural 
reforms, notably energy subsidy reforms, or growth- 
enhancing spending, including on infrastructure. 
In oil exporters, addressing higher external and fis-
cal vulnerabilities has become a priority, although the 
urgency varies considerably across countries. Some oil 
exporters increased fiscal savings while oil prices were 
high and accumulated funds that can now be used to 
smooth the adjustment in public spending to lower 
prices. Nevertheless, with some of the oil price decline 
expected to be permanent, it will be important not 
to delay such adjustment, to ensure intergenerational 
equity in using oil wealth and preserve some policy 
space for future shocks. In oil exporters with limited 
policy space, allowing substantial exchange rate depre-
ciation will be the main avenue available to cushion 
the impact of the shock on their economies. Some will 
have to strengthen their monetary frameworks to fore-
stall the risk that depreciation will lead to persistently 
higher inflation and further depreciation pressures. 
More broadly, emerging market and developing 
economies not relying on exchange rate pegs should be 
ready to respond to external financial shocks by allow-
ing more exchange rate flexibility, complemented with 
other measures such as foreign exchange intervention 
to limit excessive market volatility. This may require 
strengthening the credibility of the macroeconomic 
policy framework in some, and the macropruden-
tial policy framework must be ready to keep balance 
sheet exposures to foreign exchange risks manageable 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey). Enforcing or (if needed) 
strengthening prudential regulation and supervision 
as well as macroprudential frameworks will also be 
important in economies in which rapid recent credit 
growth and increased private sector leverage have led 
to sharply higher credit-to-GDP ratios and higher 
credit-related vulnerabilities (including Brazil, China, 
Thailand, and Turkey; see also Figure 1.8). 
In China, rebalancing toward domestic demand has 
so far been driven primarily by rapid growth in invest-
ment and credit, an unsustainable pattern of growth 
that has led to rising vulnerabilities in the corporate, 
financial, and government sectors. To avoid a further 
buildup of attendant risks, policies need to be carefully 
calibrated to simultaneously contain vulnerabilities, 
manage the corresponding slowdown, and unleash 
sustainable sources of growth. In this light, implement-
ing the authorities’ structural reforms to give market 
mechanisms a more decisive role, eliminate distortions, 
and strengthen institutions is crucial. Implementing 
these reforms should help achieve more efficient use of 
resources and hence faster productivity growth, as well 
as boost living standards across the income spectrum. 
Examples include financial sector reforms to strengthen 
regulation and supervision, liberalize deposit rates, 
increase the reliance on interest rates as an instrument 
of monetary policy, and eliminate widespread implicit 
guarantees; fiscal and social security reforms; and 
reforms of state-owned enterprises, including level-
ing the playing field between the public and private 
sectors. 
Several years of downgraded medium-term growth 
prospects suggest that it is also time for major emerg-
ing market economies to turn to important structural 
reforms to raise productivity and growth in a lasting 
way. Although the slowing in estimated total factor 
productivity growth in major emerging market econo-
mies is partly a natural implication of recent progress 
in convergence, as discussed in Chapter 3, the concern 
is that potential output growth has become too depen-
dent on factor accumulation in some economies. 
The structural reform agenda naturally differs across 
countries, but it includes removing infrastructure 
bottlenecks in the power sector (India, Indonesia, 
South Africa); easing limits on trade and investment 
and improving business conditions (Indonesia, Rus-
sia); and implementing reforms to education, labor, 
and product markets to raise competitiveness and 
productivity (Brazil, China, India, South Africa) and 
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government services delivery (South Africa). In India, 
the postelection recovery of confidence and lower oil 
prices offer an opportunity to pursue such structural 
reforms. 
Navigating the Risks Posed by Lower Commodity 
Prices in Low-Income Countries
Growth in low-income countries as a group has 
stayed high while growth in advanced and emerging 
market economies has weakened. But growth chal-
lenges and vulnerabilities have increased as a result 
of weaker activity in advanced and emerging market 
economies and lower commodity prices. And greater 
access to foreign market financing has increased some 
low-income countries’ exposure to volatility in interna-
tional financial markets. 
Near-term growth prospects have already been 
revised downward for low-income countries as a group 
during the past year as a result, albeit less so than for 
other country groups. In a number of these countries, 
fiscal deficits have increased and public debt ratios have 
risen. The sharp drop in oil prices has amplified the 
growth challenge for low-income oil exporters. Main-
taining sound fiscal and external positions will also 
become more challenging, given the strain on budget 
revenues and foreign exchange earnings. 
Policies must respond to increased challenges and 
vulnerabilities. In some countries, fiscal positions must 
be improved against the backdrop of lower commodity 
and other export-related revenue and the possibility of 
some future growth moderation. Specific requirements 
vary from country to country, but general priori-
ties include the broadening of the revenue base and 
adjusting nonessential expenditure while maintaining 
essential investment to address infrastructure gaps and 
social spending. 
In many low-income countries, allowing for exchange 
rate flexibility will help the adjustment to less favorable 
external demand and financial conditions. But such flex-
ibility may require steps to tighten the macroeconomic 
policy stance and to strengthen the monetary policy 
framework to limit damaging second-round effects on 
domestic prices. And for those oil exporters with limited 
buffers, fiscal adjustment will be both inevitable and 
urgent. It will also be critical to manage foreign-currency 
exposures in balance sheets carefully. 
Low-income countries also need to make progress in 
meeting the Sustainable Development Goals, which are 
set to replace the Millennium Development Goals in 
September 2015. Despite strong growth in a majority 
of these countries, progress in attaining the Millen-
nium Development Goals was uneven, and the global 
financial crisis set back the hard-won gains in many 
cases. The poorest states, fragile states, and conflict-
affected states continue to face severe challenges in 
meeting their development priorities. 
Measures to address the increased growth challenges 
and vulnerabilities discussed earlier will be important 
for progress on these development goals. In addition, 
policies will need to focus on sustainable resource 
mobilization to boost growth. Priorities vary across 
countries but broadly include measures to strengthen 
fiscal revenue, promote financial deepening, and 
attract foreign capital flows. The international com-
munity, including advanced and systemically important 
emerging market economies, will also need to play an 
important supportive role in maintaining an enabling 
external environment. Priorities include further trade 
liberalization, providing development aid and techni-
cal assistance, completing the global regulatory reform 
agenda, and cooperating on international taxation and 
climate change issues.
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Commodity prices have fallen markedly since the release of 
the October 2014 World Economic Outlook (WEO), 
led by a dramatic drop in crude oil prices driven by both 
supply and demand factors. Metal prices have fallen 
because of slowing demand growth in China and signifi-
cant increases in the supply of most metals. Food prices 
have declined mostly on account of favorable harvests. 
Commodity prices have declined 28 percent since 
September 2014, mainly owing to a 38 percent drop in 
energy prices (Figure 1.SF.1). Much of that decline is 
the result of a 43 percent decrease in crude oil prices; 
natural gas and coal prices declined by less, partly 
because contracts are indexed to oil prices with a lag. 
Nonfuel commodity prices also fell: those for metals by 
15 percent and those for agricultural commodities by 
6 percent. 
The large fall in oil prices was driven by both 
demand and supply factors, as discussed in Arezki and 
Blanchard 2014 (see also Box 1.1). On the supply side, 
three factors were particularly relevant:
 • Surprise increases in oil production of the Organiza-
tion of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): 
These increases resulted in part from the faster-than-
expected recovery of oil production in some OPEC 
members, including Iraq and, at times, Libya, after 
earlier outages and declines (Figure 1.SF.2). 
 • Production increases outside OPEC: Although these 
increases were broadly in line with expectations in 
the second half of 2014, they surpassed expectations 
in 2013 and early 2014. Overall, production outside 
OPEC rose by nearly 1.3 million barrels a day (mbd) 
in 2013 and more than 2.0 mbd in 2014. Most of 
the supply increases reflect growing production in 
North America, led by shale oil in the United States. 
 • An unexpected shift in the OPEC supply function: In 
November 2014, OPEC members decided not to 
lower production in response to the emergence of 
a positive net flow supply (the difference between 
global production and global consumption). Instead, 
they decided to maintain their collective production 
target of 30 mbd, despite increasing oil inventories 
(associated with the positive net flow supply). 
Global growth in oil consumption slowed signifi-
cantly during 2014 to about 0.7 mbd (a 0.7 percent 
increase from 2013), about half the growth recorded 
in 2012–13. The slowdown primarily reflects renewed 
consumption declines in Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries 
(mainly in Europe and the Pacific) after an unusual 
increase in consumption in 2013 (OECD oil demand 
has generally been declining since 2005). Oil con-
sumption growth in emerging market economies 
remained low at about 1.1 mbd (2.5 percent increase 
from previous year) but accounted for the entire net 
growth in consumption. 
With supply running well ahead of demand, OECD 
crude oil inventories have increased, particularly in 
North America. Stocks at Cushing, Oklahoma, the 
pricing point of New York Mercantile Exchange West 
Texas Intermediate (WTI) futures, have surged this 
The authors of this feature are Rabah Arezki (team leader), Akito 
Matsumoto, Shane Streifel, and Hongyan Zhao with research assis-
tance from Vanessa Diaz Montelongo and Rachel Fan. The authors 
are grateful to Rystad Energy and Per Magnus Nysveen in particular 
for kindly providing proprietary data on capital expenditures and 
cost structures.
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year, and WTI is again trading at a large discount to 
internationally traded Brent.1 The inventory buildup 
at Cushing has resulted from continuing increases 
in U.S. production and Canadian imports, a decline 
in refinery activity because of maintenance, and the 
seasonal drop in oil consumption with the approach of 
spring. According to the International Energy Agency 
(IEA), OECD oil inventories may approach all-time 
highs in mid-2015, but global oil balances are expected 
to tighten in the second half of the year and into 2016. 
 Prices of oil futures point to rising prices (Figure  
1.SF.3). The baseline assumptions for the IMF’s average 
petroleum spot price, which are based on futures prices, 
suggest average annual prices of $58.10 a barrel in 2015, 
$65.70 in 2016, and $69.20 in 2017 (Figure 1.SF.4). 
This pattern of increases likely reflects market percep-
tions that production growth will slow as weak oil prices 
dampen incentives for oil investment and drilling. 
There is substantial uncertainty around the baseline 
assumptions for oil prices. On the upside, changes to 
1Incidentally, the U.S. Department of Energy recently announced 
that it will resume Strategic Petroleum Reserve purchases.
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OPEC policy could be a major factor. In addition, oil 
demand could be somewhat higher with stronger eco-
nomic growth after the oil price decline in 2014. Geo-
political risks remain ever present, with added stress 
for troubled oil-producing countries arising from lower 
oil export revenues. Risks to the downside include 
a prolonged surplus due to more subdued aggregate 
demand growth and sustained oil production growth. 
Should the industry adjust more quickly than antici-
pated to lower oil prices and reduce costs, production 
may exceed expectations, and the market could remain 
in surplus into 2016.  
A key factor in the oil market adjustment to lower 
prices is the response of investment and, in turn, 
future oil production. Capital expenditures on oil 
development have already started to fall. According 
to Rystad Energy, overall capital expenditure among 
major oil companies was 7 percent lower in the third 
quarter of 2014 compared with average quarterly levels 
in 2013. Projections from the same source indicate 
that such capital expenditures will fall markedly 
throughout 2017. Moreover, production from some 
high-cost sources of supply may not be sustained if 
current oil prices do not cover variable costs. The 
second part of this special feature is dedicated to the 
response of investment to low oil prices. 
Metal prices have declined 15 percent since Sep-
tember 2014 following slower demand growth in 
China and substantial supply increases for most metals, 
notably iron ore. The higher supply reflects additional 
increases on top of an already substantial increase in 
capacity during the past few years, and metal prices are 
now 44 percent below their 2011 peak. The slow-
down in growth in China is occurring in most sectors, 
but most notably in construction. China consumes 
about 47 percent of the world’s base metals (up from 
13 percent in 2000) and accounted for the bulk of 
global consumption growth during 2000–14. Global 
metal consumption is expected to continue growing 
moderately, with slowing growth in China partly offset 
by higher demand growth in the rest of the world as 
economic activity recovers. Average annual metal prices 
are expected to decline 17 percent in 2015, largely on 
account of the decreases in the second half of 2014, 
and then fall slightly in 2016. Subsequently, prices 
are expected to broadly stabilize as markets rebalance, 
mainly from the supply side. The largest price decline 
in 2015 is expected for iron ore, which has seen the 
greatest increase in production capacity from Australia 
and Brazil. 
Prices of agricultural commodities have declined by 
6 percent overall. Food prices have decreased 7 percent 
relative to September 2014, with declines in all main 
indices except that for seafood, which increased slightly. 
Relative to their 2011 peak, food prices have declined 
by 23 percent following record or near-record harvests 
for major crops. Prices of beverages and agricultural raw 
materials are also down relative to September 2014 and 
their highs in 2011. A notable exception is tea prices, 
which have climbed because of dry-weather concerns in 
Kenya. Arabica coffee prices rose sharply in 2014 as a 
result of weather-related supply shortfalls in Brazil, but 
production is expected to rebound this year, and prices 
have moderated. Meat prices also jumped last year on 
tight supply in the United States but have since dropped 
because of the impact on demand and with expected 
expansion of herds.
Annual food prices are projected to decline by 16 
percent in 2015 and 3 percent in 2016 with expected 
further improvement in supply conditions for many 
food commodities—assuming favorable weather. Large 
declines are expected for principal cereal and vegetable 
oil prices, particularly those for wheat and soybeans. 
Lower fuel costs will also improve agricultural producer 
profitability and curb demand for biofuels, particularly 
for biodiesel from sugar and palm oil. Ethanol produc-
tion from corn in the United States is largely driven by 
government mandates. The one exception to the other-
wise downward price trajectory is for meat prices, which 
are expected to rise moderately during the forecast 
period on strong demand and relatively tight supply.
Investment in an Era of Lower Oil Prices 
Against the backdrop of lower oil prices, global 
investment in the oil sector—in which oil is an 
output—has decreased noticeably during the past 
nine months, reflecting lower investment in oil sands, 
deepwater oil, and to a lesser extent shale oil.2 Low 
oil prices render exploration and extraction activities 
less profitable and, at times, not economical, lead-
ing to a reduction in investment. Growth in global 
oil production is expected to decline moderately, but 
with a significant delay. In some instances, oil produc-
tion could be halted in fields with marginal costs that 
exceed oil prices—a possibility for some oil sand and 
2The analysis presented in this subsection focuses on crude oil 
production and excludes natural gas liquids and condensate and 
refinery gains.
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deepwater oil production. Low oil prices are, neverthe-
less, expected to lead to significant efficiency gains that 
will bring down costs and limit somewhat the adjust-
ment in investment and production. 
Understanding the dynamic response of investment 
in the oil sector to the fall in oil prices is important 
for at least two reasons. First, at the global level, the 
response of oil investment conditions the response of 
oil production and in turn feeds back into oil prices. 
Given the expected delayed response of oil production, 
oil prices will, all else equal, rebound to higher levels—
but only gradually. Second, for selected countries, 
investment in the oil sector can be a large portion of 
total investment and may have important macroeco-
nomic consequences.
In the non-oil sector—in which oil is an input—
lower oil prices translate into lower costs, boosting 
profits and investment. Obviously, the more energy 
intensive the non-oil sector in a particular country, the 
bigger the boost for that country. For instance, oil con-
sumption as a share of GDP is 3.7 percent in Japan, 
whereas it is 12.4 percent in Thailand. This implies 
that the Thai economy might benefit more from lower 
oil prices than might the Japanese economy. Chapter 
4 covers the issue in more depth. Notwithstanding the 
policy response to the fall in international oil prices, 
the economic structure of any given country will 
determine the relative strength of the consumption and 
investment channels. 
The next subsection addresses the following 
questions:
 • How does investment in the oil sector respond to 
the decline in oil prices? 
 • How does oil production respond to the decline in 
oil prices?
Investment in the Oil Sector
Investment in the oil sector has fallen as a result of 
the recent oil price slump. Press reports since Septem-
ber 2014 indicate that firms in the upstream sector 
around the world are cutting back on capital expendi-
tures and laying off workers. In the United States, the 
number of oil rigs—apparatuses for on-land oil drill-
ing—in use has fallen markedly since September 2014, 
albeit by far less than the increase in the number 
of rigs during the past few years (Figure 1.SF.5). A 
cursory exploration of these data suggests that the 
lag between the onset of the fall in oil prices and the 
change in rig count is between three and six months. 
Historically, global investment in the oil sector has 
closely followed oil price developments (Figure  
1.SF.6).3 The increase in global capital expenditure 
in the oil sector in the 2000s is unprecedented and 
reflects a prolonged era of high oil prices. Indeed, 
the rapid increase in oil demand, especially from 
large emerging market economies such as China and 
India, has driven up oil prices and encouraged further 
investment in tight oil formations that were previously 
uneconomical at lower oil prices.4
During previous episodes of dramatic price declines, 
investment in the oil sector has plummeted—par-
ticularly in the 1980s, when Saudi Arabia voluntarily 
stopped being the swing producer, which sent oil 
prices plunging from $27 to $14 a barrel.5 At the 
outset of that episode, exploration spending, a risky 
activity, dropped more than nonexploration expendi-
3Investment and oil price series are deflated using a price index 
for private fixed investment in mining and oil field machinery in 
the United States obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
website.
4See, for instance, Blanchard and Galí 2009, Hamilton 2003, 
Kilian 2009, and Cashin and others 2014 for systematic investiga-
tions of the relative role of demand and supply factors in oil prices. 
See Aastveit, Bjørnland, and Thorsrud, forthcoming, for a study 
focusing on the role of demand from emerging markets.
5A swing producer is a supplier that adjusts production with the 
aim of achieving a target price for a particular commodity. 
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ture. Another dramatic (but more transitory) decline in 
prices occurred in late 2008 during the global finan-
cial crisis. Oil investment dropped markedly then but 
rebounded sharply the following year.
An empirical investigation using annual and histori-
cal data from Rystad for the period 1970 to 2014 
including 41 countries—representing more than 90 
percent of the world’s oil investment and production—
confirms the rapid and quantitatively large effect of 
lower oil prices on investment in the oil sector. Results 
are obtained from a simple panel distributed-lag regres-
sion that includes the growth rate of real investment 
as the dependent variable and the growth rate of the 
price of crude oil among the explanatory variables 
(Figure 1.SF.7). According to the estimates, a 1 percent 
reduction in the price of crude oil is associated with 
a decrease of more than 0.6 percent in the deviation 
from trend investment after three years. These results 
suggest that the impact of lower oil prices on invest-
ment is felt within one year,6 confirming that the 
6These estimates imply that the decline in oil prices in the WEO 
baseline would be associated with a 14 percent decline in invest-
recent decline in oil prices is already having a marked 
impact on investment in the oil sector.7 
Uncertainty about the future course of oil prices has 
also increased. Documenting increased uncertainty is 
not easy, but a basic measure of uncertainty based on 
information derived from oil futures options between 
July 2014 and January 2015 suggests that in recent 
months, markets have anticipated a significantly higher 
probability of extremes in oil prices.8 This increased 
uncertainty may reduce investment growth in the oil 
sector and could even limit investment growth in non-oil 
ment relative to trend in the first year and cumulative declines of 30 
percent over three years and 20 percent over five years. 
7This specification controls for country-specific fixed effects, which 
in turn control for time-invariant characteristics such as cross-
country differences in oil endowment and institutions. For instance, 
Deacon and Bohn (2000) present empirical evidence that owner-
ship risk slows resource use in some circumstances. The regression 
thus relies solely on variation in oil prices to explain within-country 
variation in investment. The results should be interpreted with some 
caution, however, given that they represent correlations rather than a 
causal relationship.
8Other measures of uncertainty about oil prices include indices 
of oil volatility, which have recently increased sharply, even though 
the increase is in part mechanical and has resulted from the fall in 
oil prices.
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Figure 1.SF.7.  Response of Oil Investment to Oil Prices
(Percent change; years forward on x-axis)
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: The figure shows the deviation of oil investment from trend in response to a 
change in oil prices. The computed cumulative response is based on the regression 
of the first difference in the logs of oil investment on the distributed lags (10) of the 
first difference in the logs of oil prices after country fixed effects are controlled for. 
Shaded areas correspond to 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Empirical evidence—from the same sample of 
41 countries for the period 1970–2014 referred to 
earlier—confirms the slow response of production to 
the fall in investment in the oil sector. Results from a 
simple panel distributed-lag regression including oil 
production as a dependent variable and oil investment 
as an explanatory variable suggest that a 1 percent 
reduction in investment is associated with a 0.4 per-
cent downward deviation in production from its 
trend, but only after five years (Figure 1.SF.8).13 There 
are caveats to interpreting these results as reflecting 
a causal relationship, although investment changes 
naturally precede changes in production. The impli-
cations of lower oil prices for investment and future 
production are already reflected in market participants’ 
expectations; the oil futures curve is upward slop-
ing, which implies higher expected future spot prices. 
The IEA also lowered its forecasts for non-OPEC 
which declines as oil is extracted. The model incorporates a modified 
Hotelling rule for drilling revenues net of costs and explains why 
production is typically constrained. 
13These estimates imply that the fall in investment induced by the 
decline in oil prices in the WEO baseline would be associated with 
a 4.4 percent decline in production relative to trend over three years 
and a decline of more than 10 percent over five years.
sectors that use oil intensively.9 The effect of uncertainty is 
compounded by the largely irreversible nature of invest-
ment in the conventional oil sector.10 The literature on 
aggregate investment has documented, both theoretically 
and empirically, the importance of uncertainty in raising 
the option value of waiting to invest, especially in a con-
text of partial irreversibility (see, for instance, Bertola and 
Caballero 1994; Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen 2007). 
There is also direct evidence that uncertainty reduces 
investment in the oil sector.11 
This special feature now turns to the impact that 
reduced investment in the oil sector may have on oil 
production.
Production in the Oil Sector
Growth in oil production is not expected to slow 
significantly in the short term as a result of the recent 
oil price slump. Historically, episodes of falling oil 
prices and, in turn, falling oil investment have not 
been immediately followed by a decrease in produc-
tion. The response of oil production is typically 
delayed because of the long gestation period involved 
in translating new investment into production. More 
precisely, falling oil prices do little to change the incen-
tives of producers that have already installed their pro-
duction capacity. Instead, lower oil prices affect future 
production through lower exploration expenditures 
and less investment in the development of new fields.12
9For an investigation into the effect of oil price uncertainty on 
world real economic activity, see, for instance, Soojin 2014 and Elder 
and Serletis 2010. The latter suggests that the effect of uncertainty is 
both economically and statistically significant, even though method-
ological challenges remain in the measurement of uncertainty and in 
determining its impact independent of lower oil prices. 
10Unconventional oil production, in particular tight oil produc-
tion, requires less in the way of sunk costs and thus may be less 
subject to uncertainty about future oil prices.
11For instance, Kellogg (2014) estimates the response of invest-
ment to changes in uncertainty using data on oil drilling in Texas 
and the expected volatility of the future price of oil. The author finds 
that drilling activity responds to changes in price volatility on a scale 
consistent with the optimal response prescribed in theory and that 
the cost of failing to respond to volatility shocks is economically 
significant.
12Anderson, Kellogg, and Salant (2014) document empirically 
that changes in oil prices affect producers’ incentives at the extensive 
margin rather than at the intensive margin. In other words, changes 
in oil prices affect exploration expenditures and the decision to invest 
in new fields but do not substantially affect production from existing 
fields. To explain these facts, Anderson, Kellogg, and Salant (2014) 
reformulate Hotelling’s (1931) classic model of exhaustible resource 
extraction as a drilling problem: firms choose when to drill, but 
production from existing wells is constrained by reservoir pressure, 
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Figure 1.SF.8.  Response of Oil Production to Oil Investment
(Percent change; years forward on x-axis)
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: The figure shows the deviation of oil production from trend in response to a 
change in oil investment. The computed cumulative response is based on the 
regression of the first difference in the logs of oil production on the distributed lags 
(10) of the first difference in the logs of oil investment after country fixed effects 
are controlled for. Shaded areas correspond to 95 percent confidence intervals.
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oil production—as a result of reductions in capital 
expenditure growth—in its latest Medium-Term Oil 
Market Report (IEA 2015), although sizable changes in 
future production are not expected for a few years. For 
the near term, the IEA raised its production forecast 
for 2015; however, production growth is expected to 
slow noticeably in North America.
The production of OPEC members and in particu-
lar of Saudi Arabia—the biggest oil producer within 
OPEC—is also guided by strategic considerations. 
OPEC has explicitly sought to influence oil prices, 
which suggests that the oil market is not a fully com-
petitive market in which producers are atomistic and 
take prices as given. For example, faced with the increase 
in production from non-OPEC sources in the 1980s, 
Saudi Arabia reduced production significantly during 
the course of a few years (Figure 1.SF.9). The production 
cuts were not sufficient to curb the fall in oil prices, and 
Saudi Arabia changed course in 1986, which led to a 
further decline in oil prices (see Gately 1986). A similar 
situation seems to have played out with the increase in 
production in unconventional oil from North America 
(Figure 1.SF.10). In the past few months, Saudi Arabia 
has openly stated that it will not cut production in the 
face of growing production from non-OPEC countries 
and in turn lower oil prices, despite pressures from other 
OPEC members. Some commentators have argued 
that this strategy is aimed at easing relatively costlier oil 
extraction activities out of the market. As discussed later 
in this subsection, U.S. oil production will be somewhat 
affected by oil prices at their current lower levels but less 
so than some non-OPEC production.
There is a possibility that oil production may respond 
more quickly to lower prices than it has in the past. 
The evolution of global break-even prices—oil prices at 
which it becomes worthwhile to extract—shows that 
prices during the 2000s were hovering well above break-
even prices until the recent slump, when it became 
unprofitable for some fields to operate (Figure 1.SF.11). 
Despite relatively large decommissioning costs, the 
sizable gap that has emerged between current (approxi-
mately $52 a barrel as of March 2015) and break-even 
oil prices will eventually lead to a halt in production 
in some fields that are no longer profitable. Of course, 
active cost-reduction measures and other efficiency 
gains, including from consolidation in the oil industry, 
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Figure 1.SF.9.  OPEC and Non-OPEC Oil Production and 
Investment
Sources: Rystad Energy research and analysis; and IMF staff calculations. 
Note: mbd = million barrels a day; OPEC = Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries.
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Figure 1.SF.10.  Conventional and Unconventional Oil 
Production and Investment
Sources: Rystad Energy research and analysis; and IMF staff calculations. 
Note: mbd = million barrels a day.
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will limit the effect of lower oil prices on oil investment 
and, in turn, on oil production. In addition, average 
production costs for shale oil, which has been driving 
global production growth, are now likely to be closer 
to marginal costs because field depletion rates tend to 
be higher than those of conventional oil. The spatial 
distribution of operating costs per barrel suggests that 
Canada, the North Sea, and the United Kingdom are 
among the most expensive places to operate oil fields 
(Figure 1.SF.12).14 As a result, the oil price slump will 
affect production in those locations earlier and more 
intensely than in other locations. A detailed investiga-
tion of the cost structure associated with U.S. shale oil 
production suggests that shale oil production has expe-
rienced rapid efficiency gains, considering that it is still 
relatively early in the investment cycle. Projections from 
Rystad show that lower oil prices are expected to have a 
smaller impact on production of shale oil in the United 
States than on deepwater and oil sand production, espe-
cially in Brazil, Canada, and the United Kingdom.
14Shale oil production in the United States appears to be more 
resilient to falling oil prices, considering growing efficiency gains. 
Rates of return will be significantly lower, however, and some highly 
leveraged firms that did not hedge against lower prices are already 
under financial stress and have been cutting their capital expendi-
tures significantly and laying off substantial numbers of workers.
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Sources: IMF, Primary Commodity Price System; Rystad Energy research and 
analysis; and IMF staff calculations. 
Note: APSP = average petroleum spot price—average of U.K. Brent, Dubai, and 
West Texas Intermediate, equally weighted.
Figure 1.SF.11.  Evolution of Break-Even Prices
(Constant 2010 U.S. dollars a barrel) 
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Figure 1.SF.12. Oil Production and Operating Costs by Country
Sources: Rystad Energy research and analysis; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes.
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Oil prices fell by half between June and Decem-
ber 2014. The implications of this decline for the 
global economy depend crucially on the underlying 
factors. If the decline was driven by increased oil 
supply, it would boost global growth through sev-
eral channels—particularly by raising real incomes 
of oil consumers. If, however, it was driven by lower 
economic activity, the price decline would merely be a 
symptom of weaker global demand. 
Identifying the shocks underlying the decline is 
challenging. Crude oil is a storable good, and as such, a 
real asset: its current price depends not only on current 
demand and supply conditions, but also on expectations 
of future market conditions. These expectations in turn 
depend on many factors, including global economic 
prospects, but they also affect prospects (for instance, 
pessimism about future oil supply would lead to higher 
prices and hence lower activity). This box discusses 
two useful approaches to disentangling the supply and 
demand shocks behind the oil price collapse in 2014. 
Since identification of the shocks depends on the under-
lying model, the two sets of results present a broad 
picture of the likely factors behind the oil price collapse 
rather than a precise quantitative assessment. 
The first approach disentangles oil demand and 
supply shocks by examining the comovement of oil 
prices and stock prices. Specifically, it estimates a vec-
tor autoregression (VAR) model with daily data on oil 
prices (Brent crude oil variety prices) and global stock 
prices (Morgan Stanley Capital International [MSCI] 
All Country World Index) from January 2, 1991, 
to January 5, 2015. Demand and oil supply shocks 
are identified by assuming that a positive (negative) 
demand shock is associated with an increase (decrease) 
in both stock and oil prices, whereas a supply shock 
has opposite effects on oil and stock prices: higher 
(lower) oil supply reduces (increases) oil prices and 
increases (reduces) stock prices.1 
The results indicate that the sharp decline in oil prices 
since mid-2014 has been driven by both demand and 
supply shocks, with the relative contribution of these 
factors changing over time. Whereas the fall in oil prices 
between July and mid-October 2014 can be explained 
mostly by weak demand (Figure 1.1.1, panel 1), higher 
The authors of this box are Samya Beidas-Strom and Carolina 
Osorio Buitron.
1The methodology for identification through contemporane-
ous sign restrictions follows Matheson and Stavrev 2014.
oil supply was the largest contributor during the mid-
October 2014 to early January 2015 period, accounting 
for about 64 percent of the oil price decline during that 
time (Figure 1.1.1, panel 2).2 
2Estimates based on an alternative stock price index, the 
MSCI World Index for advanced economies, are broadly 
unchanged relative to the benchmark. The relative contributions 
of demand and supply factors change somewhat if U.S. stock 
prices (Standard & Poor’s [S&P] 500) are used to capture oil 
demand shocks, but the results are qualitatively similar. The 
results are also robust to excluding energy stocks. Fluctuations in 
energy stock prices need not be related to demand shocks in the 
oil market, as they may reflect changes in expectations about the 
profitability of companies in this sector. Hence, the identifica-
tion is enhanced by focusing on non–energy stock prices in the 
Box 1.1. The Oil Price Collapse: Demand or Supply?
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Figure 1.1.1.  Drivers of Oil Prices: Daily 
Two-Variable Model, July 2014–January 2015
(Cumulative change in log oil prices in percent)
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 A look at past episodes suggests that the oil price 
collapse during the global financial crisis is mostly 
explained by demand shocks (Figure 1.1.2, panel 1), 
whereas in 1986 the collapse was driven predomi-
nantly by supply shocks (Figure 1.1.2, panel 2).3 This 
difference is consistent with the fact that in the 1986 
episode, members of the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) decided to raise produc-
tion to increase their market share (Gately 1986).
The second approach is based on a structural VAR 
model for the global oil market, estimated with quar-
terly data from 1985 to 2014. It includes four variables: 
global industrial production (as a proxy for global 
demand conditions), global oil production, Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development 
member countries’ oil inventories, and the real price 
of oil.4 The identification method is similar to the one 
in the previous approach, with additional restrictions.5 
Prices and global demand move together when there 
are shocks to demand; they move in opposite directions 
for supply shocks. In addition, if inventory demand 
rises (driven, for instance, by precautionary motives), oil 
prices, inventories, and oil supply will move together, 
while global demand will move in the other direction. 
The results suggest that contemporaneous and past 
supply and demand surprises explain roughly two-thirds 
of the oil price decline between the second and fourth 
quarters of 2014, with supply accounting for a larger 
share of that two-thirds (Figure 1.1.3, panel 1). Shocks 
to inventory demand do not appear to explain the fall 
in prices during that period. Instead, a positive shock to 
inventory demand explains much of the observed actual 
increase in oil prices in the second quarter of 2014, 
plausibly as a result of increased geopolitical tensions 
in the Middle East and elsewhere at the time. Such 
positive shocks to inventory demand persisted through 
United States (U.S. non–energy stock prices are used because of 
the lack of sectoral data for global stock prices). The results are 
very similar to those obtained with the S&P 500. 
3The 1986 episode is based on estimates of the model using 
the MSCI World Index, for which data are available before 1991. 
4The real oil price is defined here as U.S. refiners’ acquisi-
tion cost of imported crude oil as reported by the U.S. Energy 
Information Agency. 
5The identification scheme is based on sign restrictions and 
follows Kilian and Murphy 2014. The VAR results are updated 
estimates of the VAR model specification in Beidas-Strom and 
Pescatori 2014. For alternative approaches using a global vector 
autoregression (GVAR) model, see Cashin and others 2014.
the remainder of the year, providing some offset to the 
negative price effects of other shocks.
The sizable unexplained component (a residual shock 
in the model) during 2014 is consistent with the view 
that the oil price collapse reflected in part expected 
changes in oil market fundamentals. The model does 
not capture such expectations if they involve changes in 
patterns relative to those captured by past data.6
6The surge in shale and tight oil production in North America, 
the change in OPEC’s supply function and consequent oil price 
regime, expectations of production disruptions, backstop technolo-
gies reducing oil intensity, and changes in world real interest rates, 
among others, were not fully predictable using past patterns in the 
data. See Beidas-Strom and Pescatori 2014 for more details.
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Shock decompositions for past episodes of oil price 
declines based on the second approach are in line with 
conventional narratives. Specifically, the model identi-
fies positive supply shocks as the main factor explain-
ing the oil price decline in 1986, and demand shocks 
as the main factor explaining the collapse in prices 
during 2008 and early 2009 (Figure 1.1.3, panels 2 
and 3).
In sum, the results of the two approaches suggest 
that both demand and supply factors played a role 
in the oil price collapse in 2014. They also suggest 
that current market conditions do not explain all of 
the decline. Indeed, Baumeister and Kilian (2015) 
emphasize the contributions of oil-market-specific 
developments before June 2014 to the oil price col-
lapse, whereas the second approach presented here 
would suggest that changes in expectations also 
played a role. It is difficult to disentangle supply and 
demand factors in expectations, but recent revisions 
to the global growth outlook for 2015–20 alone seem 
too small to justify a predominant role of demand in 
those changes in expectations. Standard estimates of 
short- and medium-term price elasticities of demand 
and supply would have required larger revisions to the 
growth forecasts.
Box 1.1 (continued)
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Global trade growth has been weak since the global 
financial crisis, outside of an initial rebound in 2010 
(Figure 1.2.1). Weak economic growth during this 
period, especially in advanced economies, is widely 
seen as a key explanatory factor. Indeed, growth fore-
cast errors for global trade and global GDP are highly 
correlated. Nevertheless, the ratio of trade growth to 
GDP growth, the so-called income elasticity of trade, 
has also been declining. Indeed, this trend started 
before the crisis—the income elasticity of trade was 
slightly above 2 in 1986–2000 but stood at only 1.3 
in 2001–14.
This box aims to shed light on the factors contrib-
uting to the slowdown in trade by analyzing cyclical 
factors—focusing on the 2012–14 period—as well as 
structural factors, taking a longer-term view. Quantify-
ing the contributions of these factors is important to 
developing an understanding of prospects for global 
trade when global growth strengthens, as is currently 
projected. 
Cyclical Factors 
Highly synchronized output contractions took place 
across advanced economies during the global financial 
crisis. Contractions were larger in deficit economies in 
which external adjustment resulted from expenditure 
reduction, as is shown in Chapter 4 in the Octo-
ber 2014 World Economic Outlook. Sharp collapses in 
domestic demand and output in these deficit econo-
mies led to declines in their imports. 
To quantify the impact of weak demand on imports, 
a standard econometric model is employed to link 
import volumes to domestic GDP, using data for a 
panel of 18 Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries through the sec-
ond quarter of 2014.1 Figure 1.2.2 shows actual trade 
volumes, the model’s predictions, and the predictions 
of a linear trend. Dating the beginning of the recent 
slowdown in trade at the end of 2011 shows cumula-
tive 4.6 percent real import growth. The linear trend 
fitted for the 1985–2014 period predicts cumulative 
13.2 percent real import growth—almost three times 
what is observed in the data. The standard import 
The authors of this box are Emine Boz and Michele Ruta.
1The estimated model is ∆ln(Mc,t) = δc + βD ∆ln(Dc,t) + βP∆ln(Pc,t) + εc,t, in which Mc,t, Dc,t, and Pc,t denote real 
imports, real aggregate demand, and relative import prices, 
respectively. Aggregate demand is measured using GDP in this 
standard empirical import equation. 
Box 1.2. Understanding the Role of Cyclical and Structural Factors in the Global Trade Slowdown
Figure 1.2.1.  Growth in Real GDP and
Volume of Imports
(Percent)
Source: IMF staff calculations.
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model accounts for a little more than one-third of the 
slowdown: it predicts cumulative import growth of 
10 percent for the same period.
In addition to weak economic activity and slow 
global trade growth, the past few years have also been 
characterized by weak investment. The slowdowns in 
import growth and in investment and export growth 
may be interconnected. Investment and exports tend 
to have high import components, so weaker demand 
for those elements of expenditure may lead to weaker 
demand for imports. 
Bussière and others (2013) construct an import-
intensity-adjusted demand (IAD) measure that weights 
the components of GDP according to their relative 
trade intensity computed from input-output tables.2 
2Boz, Bussière, and Marsilli (2014) use this approach to tease 
out the role of the compositional shifts in aggregate demand 
in the recent period of weak trade growth. Import-intensity-
adjusted demand is formally defined as ln(IADt) = ωC,t ln(Ct) + 
As shown in Figure 1.2.2, the IAD model, which takes 
into account not only weakness in demand but also 
shifts in expenditures toward less-import-intensive 
components, predicts import growth for 2012–14 
of 8.6 percent, accounting for about half of the gap 
between observed import growth and what is implied 
by the linear trend. Hence, compositional shifts alone 
contributed 1.4 percentage points to the slowdown, a 
significant magnitude given that imports grew by only 
4.6 percent in that period. Nevertheless, about half of 
the slowdown in OECD imports during the past three 
years remains unexplained; therefore, the analysis turns 
to exploring structural factors. 
Structural Factors
Although cyclical factors explain part of the global 
trade slowdown, the changing long-term relationship 
between world trade and GDP may also be at play. 
The growth rate of world trade volumes was roughly 
double that of real income growth, which is usually 
proxied by global real GDP growth for 1986–2000. 
This period, dubbed the “long 1990s,” appears to have 
been exceptional when compared with the preceding 
and subsequent periods, when trade volumes grew 
only slightly faster than real GDP. 
The relationship between trade and income is 
examined here by using an error correction model to 
estimate the long-term income elasticity of trade (trade 
elasticity).3        
The results suggest that during 1970–2013, long-
term trade elasticity was 1.7. Within that period, how-
ever, trade elasticity varied considerably (Figure 1.2.3). 
In the period 1986–2000, a 1 percent increase in 
world real GDP was associated with a 2.2 percent 
increase in the volume of world trade. This elasticity is 
substantially higher than that in either the preceding 
(1970–85) or the subsequent (2001–13) periods, when 
trade elasticity was 1.3. 
Further decomposition of global trade into compo-
nents—manufacturing goods, commodities, and ser-
ωG,t ln(Gt) + ωI,t ln(It) + ωX,t ln(Xt), in which ω is the weight 
capturing the import content of the corresponding component 
of final demand expenditure. 
3 This analysis draws on Constantinescu, Mattoo, and Ruta 
2015, which estimates the following equation: ∆ ln (Mt) = α +  β ∆ ln (Yt) + γ ln (Mt–1) + δ ln (Yt–1) + εt , in which M and Y are 
real imports and real GDP, respectively, and ε is an error term. 
The approach follows Irwin 2002 and Escaith, Lindenberg, and 
Miroudot 2010. 
Box 1.2 (continued)
Figure 1.2.2.  Cumulative Import Volumes: 
Data, Model, and Linear Trend
(Index, 2011:Q4 = 100)
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vices—suggests that the main force underlying lower 
world trade elasticity was the decline in trade elasticity 
for goods in the 2000s, which was driven by manufac-
turing trade. The factors behind the decline in trade 
elasticity, particularly of manufacturing trade, could 
range from protectionism to the changing structure 
of trade or aggregate demand. The evidence provided 
in this box suggests that an important explanation 
lies in changes in international vertical specialization. 
The long-term trade elasticity increased during the 
long 1990s as production fragmented internationally 
into global supply chains, and decreased in the 2000s 
as the pace of this process decelerated. 
China offers a good illustration of these changing 
international production relationships. To a large extent, 
the manufacturing supply chain between China and 
the advanced economies consisted of China’s importa-
tion of parts and components that were then assembled 
into final goods exported to advanced economies. The 
share of imports of parts and components in China’s 
merchandise exports declined from a peak of 60 percent 
in the mid-1990s to the current share of approximately 
35 percent. The lower share of imported parts and 
components reflects the replacement of foreign with 
domestic inputs by Chinese firms, a finding corrobo-
rated by evidence of increasing domestic value added in 
Chinese firms (Kee and Tang 2014).
To analyze the impact of global supply chains more 
systematically, the long-term elasticities of value-added 
trade with respect to income are estimated on a seven-
year rolling basis and compared with those of gross 
trade calculated in the same way.4 Intuitively, if the 
slower expansion of global supply chains is a contrib-
uting factor to the trade slowdown, the gap between 
the gross and value-added trade elasticities would be 
expected to close over time, with the former con-
verging to the value of the latter. Figure 1.2.4 shows 
that the world long-term elasticities of gross trade to 
GDP did indeed decrease over time, approaching the 
4Data on world domestic value added and foreign value added 
in gross exports from the Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development–World Trade Organization (OECD-
WTO) data set are available only beginning in 1995 and for 
selected years. The regressions use a time series Duval and others 
(2014) developed by interpolating the OECD-WTO data. 
Box 1.2 (continued)
Figure 1.2.3.  Long-Term Elasticity
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lower and more stable estimates of value-added trade 
elasticities.
Overall, both cyclical and structural factors seem to 
have played a role in the recent slowdown in trade. A 
combination of weak economic activity and compo-
sitional shifts in demand toward less-import-intensive 
goods can account for roughly half of the observed 
slowdown. Global supply chains’ slower expan-
sion, evident in the decline in the long-term income 
elasticity of trade, appears to have contributed to the 
slowdown as well. 
Other factors not analyzed in this box may also have 
contributed to the trade slowdown. These include a 
slower pace of trade liberalization as well as narrow-
ing wage differentials between advanced and emerging 
market economies. Finally, uncertainty about the accu-
racy of trade data, particularly for the services sector, 
complicates the task of drawing definitive conclusions 
about the true size of the trade slowdown.
Box 1.2 (continued)
C H A P T E R 1 R E C E N T D E V E LO P M E N TS A N D P R O S P E C TS
 International Monetary Fund | April 2015 43
References
Aastveit, Knut Are, Hilde C. Bjørnland, and Leif Anders 
Thorsrud. Forthcoming. “What Drives Oil Prices? Emerging 
versus Developed Economies.” Journal of Applied Econometrics.
Anderson, Soren T., Ryan Kellogg, and Stephen W. Salant. 
2014. “Hotelling under Pressure.” NBER Working Paper 
20280, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.
Arezki, Rabah, and Olivier J. Blanchard. 2014. “Seven Questions 
about the Recent Oil Price Slump,” iMFdirect (blog),  
International Monetary Fund, December 22. http://blog- 
imfdirect.imf.org/2014/12/22/seven-questions-about-the- 
recent-oil-price-slump.
Baumeister, Christiane, and Lutz Kilian. 2015. “Understanding 
the Decline in the Price of Oil since June 2014.” CFS Work-
ing Paper 501, Center for Financial Studies (CFS), Goethe 
University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.
Beidas-Strom, Samya, and Andrea Pescatori. 2014. “Oil Price 
Volatility and the Role of Speculation.” IMF Working Paper 
14/218, International Monetary Fund, Washington.
Bertola, Giuseppe, and Ricardo J. Caballero. 1994. “Irrevers-
ibility and Aggregate Investment.” Review of Economic Studies 
61 (2): 223–46.
Blanchard, Olivier J., and Jordi Galí. 2009. “The Macroeco-
nomic Effects of Oil Price Shocks: Why Are the 2000s So 
Different from the 1970s?” In International Dimensions 
of Monetary Policy, edited by Jordi Galí and M. Gertler, 
373–428. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bloom, Nick, Stephen Bond, and John Van Reenen. 2007. 
“Uncertainty and Investment Dynamics.” Review of Economic 
Studies 74 (2): 391–415.
Boz, Emine, Matthieu Bussière, and Clément Marsilli. 2014. 
“Recent Slowdown in Global Trade: Cyclical or Structural.” 
VoxEU, November 12.
Bussière, Matthieu, Giovanni Callegari, Fabio Ghironi, Giulia 
Sestieri, and Norihiko Yamano. 2013. “Estimating Trade 
Elasticities: Demand Composition and the Trade Collapse of 
2008–09.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 5 (3): 
118–51.
Cashin, Paul, Kamiar Mohaddes, Maziar Raissi, and Mehdi 
Raissi. 2014. “The Differential Effects of Oil Demand and 
Supply Shocks on the Global Economy.” Energy Economics 44 
(July): 113–34.
Constantinescu, Cristina, Aaditya Mattoo, and Michele Ruta. 
2015. “The Global Trade Slowdown: Cyclical or Structural?” 
IMF Working Paper 15/6, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington.
Deacon, Robert T., and Henning Bohn. 2000. “Ownership Risk, 
Investment, and the Use of Natural Resources.” American 
Economic Review 90 (3): 526–49.
Duval, Romain, Kevin Cheng, Kum Hwa Oh, Richa Saraf, and 
Dulani Seneviratne. 2014. “Trade Integration and Business 
Cycle Synchronization: A Reappraisal with Focus on Asia.” 
IMF Working Paper 14/52, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington.
Elder, John, and Apostolos Serletis. 2010. “Oil Price Uncertainty.” 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 42 (6): 1137–59.
Escaith, Hubert, Nannette Lindenberg, and Sébastien Miroudot. 
2010. “International Supply Chains and Trade Elasticity in 
Times of Global Crisis.” WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-
2010-08, World Trade Organization, Geneva.
Gately, Dermot. 1986. “Lessons from the 1986 Oil Price Col-
lapse.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 17 (2): 237–84.
Hamilton, James D. 2003. “What Is an Oil Shock?” Journal of 
Econometrics 113 (2): 363–98.
Hotelling, Harold. 1931. “The Economics of Exhaustible 
Resources.” Journal of Political Economy 39 (2): 137–75.
International Energy Agency (IEA). 2015. Oil: Medium-Term 
Oil Market Report 2015—Market Analysis and Forecasts to 
2020. Paris.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2014. 2014 Pilot External 
Sector Report. Washington.
Irwin, Douglas. 2002. “Long-Run Trends in World Trade and 
Income.” World Trade Review 1 (1): 89–100. 
Kee, Hiau Looi, and Heiwai Tang. 2014. “Domestic Value 
Added in Exports: Theory and Firm Evidence from China.” 
Unpublished, World Bank, Washington.
Kellogg, Ryan. 2014. “The Effect of Uncertainty on Investment: 
Evidence from Texas Oil Drilling.” American Economic Review 
104 (6): 1698–734.
Kilian, Lutz. 2009. “Not All Oil Price Shocks Are Alike: 
Disentangling Demand and Supply Shocks in the Crude Oil 
Market.” American Economic Review 99 (3): 1053–69.
———, and Daniel P. Murphy. 2014. “The Role of Inventories 
and Speculative Trading in the Global Market for Crude Oil.” 
Journal of Applied Econometrics 29 (3): 454–78. 
Kojima, Masami. 2013. “Petroleum Product Pricing and Com-
plementary Policies: Experience of 65 Developing Countries 
since 2009.” Policy Research Working Paper 6396, World 
Bank, Washington.
Matheson, Troy, and Emil Stavrev. 2014. “News and Monetary 
Shocks at a High Frequency: A Simple Approach.” Economics 
Letters 125 (2): 282–86.
Soojin, Jo. 2014. “The Effects of Oil Price Uncertainty on 
Global Real Economic Activity.” Journal of Money, Credit, and 
Banking 46 (6): 1113–35.
Timmermann, Allan. 2006. “An Evaluation of the World 
Economic Outlook Forecasts.” IMF Working Paper 06/59, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington.

1CHAPTER
 International Monetary Fund | April 2015 45
2CHAPTER COUNTRY AND REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES
Global growth is forecast at 3.5 percent in 2015 and 3.8 
percent in 2016, with uneven prospects across the main 
countries and regions. Growth in emerging market econo-
mies is softening, reflecting an adjustment to diminished 
medium-term growth expectations and lower revenues from 
commodity exports, as well as country-specific factors. The 
outlook for advanced economies is showing signs of improve-
ment, owing to the boost to disposable incomes from lower 
oil prices, continued support from accommodative monetary 
policy stances, and more moderate fiscal adjustment. The 
distribution of risks to near-term global growth has become 
more balanced relative to October 2014 but is still tilted to 
the downside. The decline in oil prices could boost activ-
ity more than expected. Geopolitical tensions continue to 
pose threats, and risks of disruptive shifts in asset prices 
remain relevant. In some advanced economies, protracted 
low inflation or deflation also pose risks to activity.
D
uring the global fi nancial crisis and in the 
years that followed, the principal global 
shocks—the 2008–09 subprime and 
Lehman Brothers crisis and the 2011–12 
euro area crisis—had similar eff ects on all regions, 
albeit to varying degrees. But the forces that are now 
shaping the global outlook—most notably declin-
ing oil and commodity prices—are more redistribu-
tive in nature, benefi ting some regions and countries 
while hurting others (Figure 2.1). Growth divergences 
among the major economies, and the resulting interest 
rate and currency adjustments, are also having varying 
eff ects across regions. Th ese forces provide the back-
drop for this chapter’s regional perspectives:
 • Recent sharp declines in oil (and to a lesser extent, 
commodity) prices, although a net positive for 
the global economy and for oil- and commodity-
importing regions, are weighing on the commodity-
exporting countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, the Middle East and North Africa, and sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 • The diverging trajectories of the major economies—
robust growth in the United States, the weaker 
recoveries progressing in the euro area and Japan, 
and slowing growth in China—also have varying 
implications across regions and countries, boosting 
those with strong trade links with the United States, 
but hurting those more tightly linked with the other 
major economies.
 • The strengthening of the U.S. dollar and the weak-
ening of the euro and yen are also having a redis-
tributive effect. Most obviously, they are a welcome 
boost to the tepid recoveries in the euro area and 
Japan and are a (so far manageable) headwind to the 
U.S. recovery. But they are also generating tensions 
between financial stability and competitiveness in 
regions and countries that have seen rising dollar-
denominated indebtedness in recent years.
The United States and Canada: A Solid Recovery
Growth in the United States and Canada remains 
solid. However, while lower energy prices have boosted 
growth momentum in the United States, they pose 
downside risks to the Canadian economy owing to the 
relatively large size of its energy sector. In the United 
States, labor markets and business and consumer confi-
dence have shown solid improvements. The economy has 
also so far been resilient to the weaker external conditions 
and the strengthening dollar. The next prominent policy 
challenge will be a smooth normalization of monetary 
policy. Building political consensus around a medium-
term fiscal consolidation plan and supply-side reforms to 
boost medium-term growth—including simplifying the 
tax system, investing in infrastructure and human capital, 
and immigration reform—will continue to be a challenge. 
In Canada, continued monetary policy accommoda-
tion and gradual fiscal consolidation would help achieve 
growth that is more balanced and more broadly based.
Growth in the United States has been energetic, 
averaging 3.9 percent annualized in the last three 
quarters of 2014. Consumption—the main engine 
of growth—has benefi ted from steady job creation 
and income growth, lower oil prices, and improved 
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Figure 2.1.  2015 GDP Growth Forecasts and the Effects of an Oil Supply Shock
1. 2015 GDP Growth Forecasts1
    (Percent)
2. Oil Trade Balance, Pure Price Effects2
    (Percent of GDP)
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Source: IMF staff estimates.
1Data for Syria are excluded because of the uncertain political situation.
2The map shows the impact on the oil trade balance (as a percentage of GDP) of the projected decline in oil prices in 2015 relative to the oil price assumption underlying 
the October 2014 World Economic Outlook projections. The calculations assume unchanged volumes of oil exports and imports relative to projections in October. 
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consumer confidence. The unemployment rate reached 
5.5 percent in February, 1.2 percentage points below 
its level of a year ago (Figure 2.2). Overall, nonresiden-
tial investment has supported growth, although lower 
oil prices have had a negative impact on energy sector 
investment.
Despite the recovery, there is little evidence of 
meaningful price and wage pressures. The core personal 
consumption expenditure price index in February 
was only 1.4 percent higher than a year before, with 
headline inflation even lower at 0.2 percent, largely 
reflecting falling energy prices. Real wages grew less 
than 1 percent in 2014, even as the labor market 
steadily strengthened. 
Asset purchases by the Federal Reserve ended in 
October 2014, and the liftoff of policy interest rates 
from the zero bound is expected in the third quarter 
of this year, but policy rates are expected to rise only 
slowly. The Federal Reserve has clearly communicated 
that the timing of the liftoff will depend on progress 
toward its goals of maximum employment and 2 
percent inflation. Long-term interest rates have further 
declined, mainly reflecting weaker external conditions, 
excess demand for safe assets, and expectations of 
future dollar strength. 
Conditions remain in place for robust U.S. eco-
nomic performance in 2015. Markedly lower energy 
prices; tame inflation; an accommodative monetary 
policy stance; favorable financial conditions; reduced 
fiscal drag; strengthened household, corporate, and 
bank balance sheets; and an improving housing market 
will combine to maintain solid growth momentum. 
These forces are expected to more than offset the 
strengthening of the dollar. Growth is projected to 
reach 3.1 percent in 2015—as was projected in the 
October 2014 World Economic Outlook (WEO)—and 
to remain at 3.1 percent in 2016 (Table 2.1). 
However, the picture over a longer horizon is less 
upbeat. Potential growth is estimated to be only about 
2.0 percent, weighed down by an aging population and 
weak innovation and productivity growth (see Chapter 
3).
Addressing the issue of potential growth will require 
implementation of an ambitious agenda of supply-side 
policies in a fractious political environment. Forging 
agreement on a credible medium-term fiscal consolida-
tion plan is a high priority, to ensure that debt does 
not rise again with aging-related fiscal costs. Keeping 
debt in check will require efforts to lower the growth 
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Figure 2.2.  United States and Canada: A Solid Recovery
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In the United States, underlying growth is solid. Consumption is growing at a 
healthy pace, as improvements in labor markets have been strong, but investment 
still has much room to recover. Wage and price pressures remain subdued, partly 
because of lower energy prices. Canada’s growth slowed in the first quarter of 
2014 but rebounded strongly in the next two quarters, with exports benefiting 
from the U.S. recovery and a weaker currency. Housing market risks and the 
unfolding effects of the oil shock call for continued vigilance in Canada.
Sources: Canadian Real Estate Association; Central Bank of Canada (BoC); Duke/ 
CFO Magazine Global Business Outlook Survey; Haver Analytics; Statistics Canada; 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; and IMF staff 
estimates.
Note: Cons. = consumption; Fed = U.S. Federal Reserve; inv. = investment; FHFA = 
Federal Housing Finance Agency; HPI = Housing Price Index; MLS = Multiple 
Listing Service; nonres. = nonresidential; priv. = private; PCE = personal 
consumption expenditure; res. = residential; S&P = Standard & Poor’s; thous. = 
thousands; TSX = Toronto Stock Exchange.
1Year-over-year percent change for house prices; index, January 2005 = 100 for 
S&P and TSX.
2Percent of GDP for the non-oil and oil trade balances; trade-weighted index, 
January 1997 = 100, for the exchange rate.
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of health care costs, reform social security, and increase 
tax revenues. Policies should also be targeted toward 
raising labor force participation (including remov-
ing disincentives in the tax system, providing child 
care support, and enacting skills-based immigration 
reform), encouraging innovation, strengthening pro-
ductivity, and tackling poverty and long-term unem-
ployment. The October 2014 WEO made a clear case 
that key infrastructure investments could be made in 
the United States at relatively modest near-term costs 
but with important benefits for long-term output. 
The risks to the near-term outlook are broadly 
balanced. On the downside, a stronger dollar could 
suppress exports, and low oil prices could suppress 
investment in the oil sector by more than is currently 
projected. Moreover, the recent compression of term 
premiums could unwind, which would tighten lending 
conditions and jeopardize the housing market recovery. 
Uncertainty about fiscal prospects linked to political 
brinkmanship over the debt limit or the 2016 budget 
could also undermine confidence and damage growth. 
On the upside, lower energy prices could have a bigger 
effect than currently expected on consumption or on 
non-oil corporate investment. And labor markets could 
recover at a faster pace, boosting household incomes 
and confidence. Finally, improvements in mortgage 
availability resulting from recent policy efforts could 
catalyze a faster housing market recovery.
Canada’s recent growth performance has been solid, 
alongside a stronger recovery in the United States, 
exchange rate depreciation, and high energy demand. 
These developments have led to a welcome pickup in 
exports but have yet to translate into strong invest-
ment and hiring. The economy is expected to grow 2.2 
percent in 2015 (broadly unchanged from the Octo-
ber WEO forecast), helped by a strengthening U.S. 
economy. But risks are tilted to the downside because 
the unusually large fall in oil prices could further 
weaken business investment in the energy sector and 
lower employment growth. 
The Bank of Canada took preemptive action and cut 
its policy rate by 25 basis points in January as insur-
ance against adverse effects of the oil price shock on 
the economy. Overall, maintaining monetary accom-
modation along with gradual fiscal consolidation at 
the general government level would be conducive to 
rebalancing growth away from household consump-
tion and toward business investment to generate a 
broader, more durable recovery. Targeted macropru-
dential policies would help address high housing sector 
vulnerabilities.
Europe 
Advanced Europe: Spillovers from a Fragile Euro Area 
Recovery
There are signs of a pickup and some positive momen-
tum in the euro area, reflecting lower oil prices and 
supportive financial conditions, but risks of prolonged 
low growth and low inflation remain. The priority is 
to boost growth and inflation through a comprehensive 
approach that, in addition to quantitative easing, features 
the use of available fiscal space, especially for investment; 
productivity-enhancing structural reforms; and steps to 
Table 2.1. Advanced Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment
(Annual percent change, unless noted otherwise)
Real GDP Consumer Prices1 Current Account Balance2 Unemployment3
Projections Projections Projections Projections
2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016
Advanced Economies 1.8 2.4 2.4 1.4 0.4 1.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 7.3 6.9 6.6
United States 2.4 3.1 3.1 1.6 0.1 1.5 –2.4 –2.3 –2.4 6.2 5.5 5.1
Euro Area4,5 0.9 1.5 1.6 0.4 0.1 1.0 2.3 3.3 3.1 11.6 11.1 10.6
Japan –0.1 1.0 1.2 2.7 1.0 0.9 0.5 1.9 2.0 3.6 3.7 3.7
United Kingdom4 2.6 2.7 2.3 1.5 0.1 1.7 –5.5 –4.8 –4.6 6.2 5.4 5.4
Canada 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.9 0.9 2.0 –2.2 –2.6 –2.3 6.9 7.0 6.9
Other Advanced Economies6 2.8 2.8 3.1 1.4 1.1 1.9 4.8 4.9 4.3 4.7 4.7 4.6
Note: Data for some countries are based on fiscal years. Please refer to Table F in the Statistical Appendix for a list of economies with exceptional reporting periods.
1Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. Year-end to year-end changes can be found in Table A6 in the Statistical Appendix.
2Percent of GDP.
3Percent. National definitions of unemployment may differ.
4Based on Eurostat’s harmonized index of consumer prices.
5Excludes Lithuania. Current account position corrected for reporting discrepancies in intra-area transactions. 
6Excludes the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) and euro area countries but includes Lithuania.
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strengthen bank balance sheets. Growth is more robust in 
European advanced economies outside the euro area, but 
some of these economies may need to tighten macropru-
dential policies if housing-related risks do not subside. 
In the euro area, activity was weaker than expected in 
the middle part of 2014 as private investment remained 
weak, except in Ireland, Spain, and Germany. Growth 
was stronger than expected in the fourth quarter, but 
uneven across countries. The slowdown in investment 
derives from persistent economic slack, declining growth 
expectations, ongoing political and policy uncertainty, 
geopolitical tensions, and tight credit conditions. In 
contrast, a smaller fiscal drag and improving consump-
tion have benefited growth, as have net exports. 
The European Central Bank (ECB) announced a 
decisive asset purchase program, including purchases 
of sovereign bonds, to address persistently low infla-
tion in the euro area. Both core and headline inflation 
have been well below the ECB’s medium-term price 
stability objective for some time (Figure 2.3), with 
headline inflation turning negative in December 2014. 
The larger-than-expected ECB asset purchase pro-
gram has contributed to the depreciation of the euro, 
mainly against the U.S. dollar. In real effective terms, 
the exchange rate has depreciated more than 5 percent 
since October. Preliminary indications are that ECB 
action has stalled the decline in inflation expectations 
and led to even more supportive financial conditions. 
A push forward on policies since late 2014 has 
included completion of the comprehensive assessment 
of banks, launch of the Single Supervisory Mecha-
nism, announcement of plans for a European Fund 
for Strategic Investments using existing European 
Union funds and country contributions to catalyze 
private investment, and issuance of new guidance to 
enhance flexibility under the Stability and Growth 
Pact for countries undertaking structural reforms or 
investment. But there has been modest progress in key 
core economies with respect to a more accommodative 
fiscal stance and bringing down large current account 
surpluses. 
The outlook for the euro area is broadly unchanged 
relative to the October 2014 WEO. Growth is 
expected to increase to 1.5 percent in 2015 from 0.9 
percent in 2014. The higher growth in 2015 reflects 
stronger growth momentum at the end of 2014, sup-
portive wage increases, a near-term boost from lower 
oil prices, and the ECB’s actions that have helped 
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improve financial conditions. Beyond 2015, euro 
area growth is expected to hover around 1½ percent, 
reflecting both demand- and supply-side constraints. 
Inflation is forecast to be about 0.1 percent in 2015 
and is expected to remain below the ECB’s medium-
term price stability objective during the forecast period 
because of persistent slack.
The medium-term outlook of modest growth and 
subdued inflation in the euro area is driven largely by 
crisis legacies, notwithstanding the positive effects of 
the ECB’s actions. High real debt burdens, impaired 
balance sheets, high unemployment, and investor 
pessimism about prospects for a robust recovery will 
continue to weigh on demand. The comprehensive 
assessment improved the transparency of bank balance 
sheets and confidence, but credit flows are likely to 
remain weak until bank balance sheets are strength-
ened and credit demand recovers. Uncertainty and pes-
simism regarding the euro area’s resolve to address its 
economic challenges are likely to dampen confidence, 
as will national and global political developments (such 
as recent developments in Greece and in Russia and 
Ukraine). Despite some progress, deep-seated obstacles 
to productivity and competitiveness are likely to weigh 
on the region’s medium-term growth potential. 
Output growth is expected to be more robust in most 
other advanced European economies (Table 2.2). In the 
United Kingdom, lower oil prices and improved finan-
cial market conditions are expected to support contin-
ued steady growth. The robust recovery and outlook in 
Sweden are supported by consumption and double-digit 
housing investment. In Switzerland, however, the sharp 
exchange rate appreciation is likely to weigh on growth 
in the near term. Inflation has softened in all countries 
as a result of the oil price decline and—to varying 
degrees—because of the decline in euro area inflation. 
These countries have introduced macroprudential mea-
sures to mitigate financial stability concerns arising from 
their housing markets, but whether existing measures 
will be sufficient to contain risks is not yet clear. 
For all advanced European economies, risks to 
the outlook are more balanced than in the October 
2014 WEO. The most important downside risk stems 
from the possibility of stagnation and persistently low 
inflation in the euro area, which has been weighing 
on growth and inflation elsewhere in Europe. Eco-
nomic shocks—from slower global growth, geopolitical 
events, faltering euro area reforms, political and policy 
uncertainty, and policy reversals—could lower infla-
tion expectations and trigger a debt deflation dynamic. 
Upside risks could come from a larger positive impact 
of lower oil prices and the ECB’s actions. For Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, containing 
financial stability risks from housing and mortgage 
markets remains important. 
A comprehensive strategy is needed to reverse low 
inflation in the euro area and guard against stagnation. 
Such a strategy will require simultaneous action on 
many fronts, in addition to the ECB’s actions to expand 
its balance sheet through sovereign asset purchases until 
there is a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation. 
 • Concerted efforts to address high nonperforming 
loans are vital to strengthening bank balance sheets 
and improving monetary transmission and credit 
growth. Stricter regulations on nonperforming loans 
and improvements to insolvency and foreclosure pro-
cedures would provide banks with stronger incentives 
to accelerate the disposal of these loans.
 • A broadly neutral overall fiscal policy stance strikes 
a balance between supporting growth and fostering 
debt sustainability, but countries with fiscal space 
should do more to boost growth, including via infra-
structure investment. Countries with limited space 
should use the new flexibility under the Stability and 
Growth Pact to undertake investments and structural 
reforms and pursue growth-friendly fiscal policies. 
 • Structural reforms must be implemented to raise 
productivity and medium-term growth, revive 
investment, encourage hiring, and promote rebal-
ancing. The priorities include greater labor and 
product market flexibility, deregulation to remove 
barriers to investment, and progress toward a more 
integrated common market. 
In other advanced European economies, policies 
should focus on sustaining the recovery while ensuring 
financial stability. In the United Kingdom, monetary 
policy should stay accommodative for now, given cur-
rently weak inflation pressures. Some countries should 
consider further easing, including through foreign asset 
purchases (Switzerland) and additional quantitative easing 
(Sweden). Bank capital should be strengthened to miti-
gate financial sector vulnerabilities, and macroprudential 
measures should be tightened if housing-related risks are 
not checked. Should these measures prove insufficient, 
interest rate increases could be contemplated, with care-
ful consideration given to the trade-off between damage 
to the real economy and the ultimate costs of financial 
vulnerabilities. Measures to increase housing supply are a 
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priority in Sweden and the United Kingdom. Internation-
ally, the broader financial sector reform agenda should 
be completed, including reforms dealing with large and 
systemically important banks and those enhancing cross-
border resolution mechanisms. Labor market reforms are 
needed in Sweden to accelerate and sustain the transition 
of vulnerable groups to employment. 
Emerging and Developing Europe: Slower Growth amid 
Weak External Demand
Economic activity softened in emerging and devel-
oping Europe last year, and more countries slipped 
into deflation. Lower oil prices this year will boost 
growth somewhat but will add to disinflation pres-
Table 2.2. European Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment
(Annual percent change, unless noted otherwise)
Real GDP Consumer Prices1 Current Account Balance2 Unemployment3
Projections Projections Projections Projections
2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016
Europe 1.5 1.9 2.1 1.1 0.5 1.6 1.8 2.2 1.9 . . . . . . . . .
Advanced Europe 1.3 1.7 1.8 0.6 0.1 1.1 2.2 2.6 2.4 10.2 9.7 9.3
Euro Area4,5 0.9 1.5 1.6 0.4 0.1 1.0 2.3 3.3 3.1 11.6 11.1 10.6
Germany 1.6 1.6 1.7 0.8 0.2 1.3 7.5 8.4 7.9 5.0 4.9 4.8
France 0.4 1.2 1.5 0.6 0.1 0.8 –1.1 –0.1 –0.3 10.2 10.1 9.9
Italy –0.4 0.5 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.8 1.8 2.6 2.5 12.8 12.6 12.3
Spain 1.4 2.5 2.0 –0.2 –0.7 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.4 24.5 22.6 21.1
Netherlands 0.9 1.6 1.6 0.3 –0.1 0.9 10.3 10.4 10.1 7.4 7.2 7.0
Belgium 1.0 1.3 1.5 0.5 0.1 0.9 1.6 2.3 2.4 8.5 8.4 8.2
Austria 0.3 0.9 1.6 1.5 1.1 1.5 1.8 1.9 1.8 5.0 5.1 5.0
Greece 0.8 2.5 3.7 –1.4 –0.3 0.3 0.9 1.4 1.1 26.5 24.8 22.1
Portugal 0.9 1.6 1.5 –0.2 0.6 1.3 0.6 1.4 1.0 13.9 13.1 12.6
Ireland 4.8 3.9 3.3 0.3 0.2 1.5 6.2 4.9 4.8 11.3 9.8 8.8
Finland –0.1 0.8 1.4 1.2 0.6 1.6 –0.6 –0.3 –0.3 8.6 8.7 8.5
Slovak Republic 2.4 2.9 3.3 –0.1 0.0 1.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 13.2 12.4 11.7
Lithuania 2.9 2.8 3.2 0.2 –0.3 2.0 –0.4 0.2 –0.8 10.7 10.6 10.5
Slovenia 2.6 2.1 1.9 0.2 –0.4 0.7 5.8 7.1 6.5 9.8 9.0 8.3
Luxembourg 2.9 2.5 2.3 0.7 0.5 1.6 5.2 4.7 4.6 7.1 6.9 6.7
Latvia 2.4 2.3 3.3 0.7 0.5 1.7 –3.1 –2.2 –3.0 10.8 10.4 10.2
Estonia 2.1 2.5 3.4 0.5 0.4 1.7 –0.1 –0.4 –0.7 7.0 7.0 6.8
Cyprus –2.3 0.2 1.4 –0.3 –1.0 0.9 –1.9 –1.9 –1.4 16.2 15.9 14.9
Malta 3.5 3.2 2.7 0.8 1.1 1.4 2.7 3.1 3.1 5.9 6.1 6.3
United Kingdom5 2.6 2.7 2.3 1.5 0.1 1.7 –5.5 –4.8 –4.6 6.2 5.4 5.4
Switzerland 2.0 0.8 1.2 0.0 –1.2 –0.4 7.0 5.8 5.5 3.2 3.4 3.6
Sweden 2.1 2.7 2.8 –0.2 0.2 1.1 6.3 6.3 6.3 7.9 7.7 7.6
Norway 2.2 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.3 2.2 8.5 7.6 7.0 3.5 3.8 3.9
Czech Republic 2.0 2.5 2.7 0.4 –0.1 1.3 0.6 1.6 0.9 6.1 6.1 5.7
Denmark 1.0 1.6 2.0 0.6 0.8 1.6 6.3 6.1 5.5 6.5 6.2 5.5
Iceland 1.8 3.5 3.2 2.0 0.9 2.1 4.7 6.1 4.7 5.0 4.0 4.0
San Marino –1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.4 0.9 . . . . . . . . . 8.7 8.4 7.9
Emerging and Developing Europe6 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.8 2.7 3.7 –2.9 –2.4 –3.0 . . . . . . . . .
Turkey 2.9 3.1 3.6 8.9 6.6 6.5 –5.7 –4.2 –4.8 9.9 11.4 11.6
Poland 3.3 3.5 3.5 0.0 –0.8 1.2 –1.2 –1.8 –2.4 9.0 8.0 7.7
Romania 2.9 2.7 2.9 1.1 1.0 2.4 –0.5 –1.1 –1.5 6.8 6.7 6.7
Hungary 3.6 2.7 2.3 –0.3 0.0 2.3 4.2 4.8 4.1 7.8 7.6 7.4
Bulgaria5 1.7 1.2 1.5 –1.6 –1.0 0.6 0.0 0.2 –0.8 11.5 10.9 10.3
Serbia –1.8 –0.5 1.5 2.1 2.7 4.0 –6.0 –4.7 –4.7 19.7 20.7 22.0
Croatia –0.4 0.5 1.0 –0.2 –0.9 0.9 0.7 2.2 2.0 17.1 17.3 16.9
Note: Data for some countries are based on fiscal years. Please refer to Table F in the Statistical Appendix for a list of economies with exceptional reporting periods.
1Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. Year-end to year-end changes can be found in Tables A6 and A7 in the Statistical Appendix.
2Percent of GDP.
3Percent. National definitions of unemployment may differ.
4Excludes Lithuania. Current account position corrected for reporting discrepancies in intra-area transactions. 
5Based on Eurostat’s harmonized index of consumer prices.
6Includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, and Montenegro.
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sures. External demand remains subdued, and high 
corporate debt continues to weigh on investment. 
Monetary policy space, where available, should be 
used to support domestic demand, while countries 
with weak fiscal positions should shore up sustain-
ability to counter risks of potential market volatility.
Economic growth slowed in Turkey and southeast-
ern Europe (where some countries entered recession) 
last year, but remained strong in Hungary and Poland 
(Figure 2.4). Growth was generally driven by domestic 
demand (except in Turkey), largely reflecting stron-
ger private consumption as labor market conditions 
improved and real wages rose with lower imported 
inflation. 
Headline and core inflation continued to decline 
on account of very low inflation in the euro area, 
lower food and energy prices, and economic slack. 
Hungary and Poland joined other countries in defla-
tion, but inflation remained high in Turkey as a result 
of exchange rate depreciation, monetary easing, and 
increased domestic food prices. 
Lower oil prices are expected to provide a lift to the 
region, offsetting the effects of weak euro area growth, 
recession in Russia, and still-elevated corporate debt 
(Table 2.2):
 • Growth in Hungary is forecast to soften in 2015 to 
2.7 percent, on account of lower investment growth 
and less supportive fiscal conditions. Growth in 
Poland is projected to increase to 3.5 percent in 
2015, supported by domestic demand and improved 
economic conditions in trading partners.
 • Turkey’s growth is expected to average 3.1 percent 
in 2015–16, up from 2.9 percent in 2014, as private 
consumption gets a lift from lower energy prices. The 
current account deficit will narrow further thanks to a 
substantial fall in the value of energy imports.
 • Growth in southeastern Europe is projected to 
improve in 2015–16, driven by rebuilding of flood-
damaged areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Serbia, and by employment gains elsewhere.
Risks remain tilted to the downside. A deeper reces-
sion in Russia or a slowdown in the euro area poses 
external demand risks, while sudden increases in the 
U.S. term premium and U.S. dollar fluctuations could 
trigger market volatility in countries whose fiscal and 
external deficits are still sizable. The ECB’s quantitative 
easing could have a more positive effect if the impact 
on euro area growth and inflation is larger. Tailwinds 
from lower oil prices pose some upside risks to activity.
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Economic activity slowed in 2014, but it remained solid in Hungary and Poland, 
with private consumption becoming the key growth driver amid improving labor 
market conditions. Inflation declined further, except in Turkey, on low euro area 
inflation, remaining economic slack, and lower energy and food prices.
Sources: Bloomberg, L.P.; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development;
Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Southeastern Europe (SEE) includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia,
wherever data are available. All country group aggregates are weighted by GDP
valued at purchasing power parity as a share of group GDP, unless noted
otherwise. Data labels in the figure use International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) country codes. CPI = consumer price index; EMBIG = J.P.
Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global; FDI = foreign direct investment; 
inv. = investment.; VIX = Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index.
1Data are through March 27, 2015.
2Data for 2014:Q4 include Bulgaria, Hungary, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland 
(monthly), Romania, and Serbia.
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Supporting domestic demand remains a priority, 
especially in countries with strong links to the euro 
area. Many economies need to maintain easy monetary 
conditions while fiscal buffers are gradually rebuilt.
 • Monetary policy should remain accommodative in 
Poland and Romania, given the benign inflation 
outlook and quantitative easing in the euro area. 
Hungary, with output still below potential and per-
sistent disinflation pressures, has scope for further 
cautious monetary policy easing. In Turkey, further 
easing of monetary conditions should be considered 
only once inflation expectations are anchored at the 
target rate and the real interest rate is clearly in posi-
tive territory.
 • In a number of countries, elevated public debt 
and high fiscal deficits highlight the need for fis-
cal consolidation, including via spending restraint 
(Hungary, Serbia) and restructuring of key state-
owned enterprises (Serbia). Public investment can 
be brought forward to offset the drag from planned 
near-term fiscal tightening, as envisaged in Poland 
and Romania, supported by higher absorption of 
European Union funds. A tighter fiscal stance in 
Turkey—as envisaged in the new medium-term 
program—will contribute to gradually narrowing 
external imbalances and will reduce pressure on 
monetary policy.
 • Making progress in tackling the large stock of 
nonperforming loans is a priority for most countries. 
Improving legal and tax treatment of loan write-
offs—as recently adopted in Albania—and further 
strengthening debt restructuring and bank resolu-
tion frameworks are crucial.
Asia and Pacific: Moderating but Still 
Outperforming Other Regions
Asia’s growth is forecast to hold steady in 2015, and 
the region is expected to continue outperforming the rest 
of the world over the medium term. While the Chinese 
economy is shifting to a more sustainable pace, growth 
is projected to pick up elsewhere in the region. This 
reflects the boost from lower world oil prices, strengthen-
ing external demand, and still-accommodative finan-
cial conditions despite some recent tightening. Risks 
are two sided, but downside risks dominate. Elevated 
household and corporate debt amid higher real inter-
est rates and a strong U.S. dollar could amplify shocks. 
Growth risks from within the region are also on the 
rise, and realignments of the major reserve currencies 
could create an uncomfortable trade-off between finan-
cial stability and competitiveness. Policymakers should 
maintain prudent frameworks and build buffers to 
enhance resilience, and implement reforms to support 
demand rebalancing and relieve bottlenecks to growth. 
Although the Asia and Pacific region remained the 
world’s growth leader, activity in the region slowed 
modestly in 2014, responding to the drag from within 
and outside the region. Growth decelerated last year to 
5.6 percent, from 5.9 percent in 2013. While growth 
picked up across much of the region, slowdowns in 
several large economies, including China, Indonesia, 
and Japan, provided a counterweight. Export volume 
growth declined, reflecting soft demand in China, the 
euro area, and Japan, which more than offset buoy-
ancy in the United States (Figure 2.5). Investment was 
generally slower, especially in China, where the correc-
tion in real estate gathered pace. Consumption, which 
remained relatively robust except in Japan, was the 
primary growth driver across most of the region. 
In 2015, the sharp fall in world commodity prices 
will support GDP growth across the region. With the 
region being a net oil importer, the drop in oil prices will 
generate a windfall spur to purchasing power of about 
1.7 percent of regional GDP in 2015, providing sup-
port to domestic spending and raising current accounts. 
Exporters of commodities (Australia, Indonesia, Malay-
sia, New Zealand) will see a drop in foreign earnings 
and a drag on growth, although currency depreciation 
will offer some cushion. Headline inflation—already 
on a downward trend on cooling growth and stronger 
trade-weighted exchange rates—is expected to moderate 
further as the recent oil price decline is felt at the pump, 
although core inflation has eased only modestly.
Accommodative financial conditions have begun 
to tighten. Private-credit-to-GDP ratios are signifi-
cantly above trend in some countries. Sizable portfolio 
outflows, slower corporate debt issuance (especially in 
emerging Asia), and rising short-term market inter-
est rates since the last quarter of 2014 are in line with 
global trends and reflect expectations of higher policy 
rates in the United States. In addition, real short-term 
interest rates have risen marginally with easing core 
inflation, while U.S. dollar appreciation has increased 
debt service costs for the region’s unhedged issuers of 
foreign-exchange-denominated corporate bonds. For 
households, higher real debt service costs could crimp 
consumption spending. Bank lending is expanding at 
a somewhat slower pace (albeit a still-buoyant one in 
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major economies), with rising loan-to-deposit ratios 
possibly portending additional slowing. 
Despite the tailwind from oil prices, Asia’s near-term 
growth outlook has been marked down slightly. Down-
ward growth revisions for major emerging markets 
outside Asia will soften the external contribution to 
Asia’s growth, as will the further tightening of interna-
tional financial conditions. A slower but more sustain-
able growth path in China will exert additional drag. 
Relative to the October 2014 WEO, Asia’s growth 
forecast has been trimmed very modestly to 5.6 and 
5.5 percent in 2015 and 2016, respectively, but with 
diverse performances across the region (Table 2.3): 
 • In China, growth fell to 7.4 percent in 2014 and 
is expected to fall further to 6.8 percent in 2015 
(0.3 percentage point lower than the October 2014 
WEO forecast) as previous excesses in real estate, 
credit, and investment continue to unwind. Ongo-
ing implementation of structural reforms and lower 
commodity prices are expected to expand consumer-
oriented activities, partially buffering the slowdown.
 • In Japan, activity disappointed following the mid-
2014 consumption tax hike, which caused a sharper-
than-predicted contraction in consumption. GDP 
growth is projected to pick up to 1 percent in 2015 
(above potential and broadly unchanged from the 
October 2014 WEO forecast) from –0.1 percent in 
2014. This increase reflects support from the weaker 
yen, higher real wages, and higher equity prices 
due to the Bank of Japan’s additional quantitative 
and qualitative easing, as well as lower commodity 
prices. By 2016, with output above potential, the 
pace of growth is expected to help push up underly-
ing price and wage inflation. 
 • India’s growth is expected to strengthen from 7.2 
percent in 2014 to 7.5 percent in 2015. Growth will 
benefit from recent policy reforms, a consequent 
pickup in investment, and lower oil prices. Lower 
oil prices will raise real disposable incomes, particu-
larly among poorer households, and help drive down 
inflation.
 • The downturn in the global commodity cycle is 
continuing to hit Australia’s economy, exacerbat-
ing the long-anticipated decline in resource-related 
investment. However, supportive monetary policy 
and a somewhat weaker exchange rate will underpin 
nonresource activity, with growth gradually rising in 
2015–16 to about 3 percent (broadly as projected in 
the October 2014 WEO).
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Figure 2.5.  Asia and Pacific: Moderating but Still
Outperforming
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Asia is forecast to remain the global growth leader, although the region’s growth 
momentum is moderating. Financial conditions have only recently started to tighten 
and have supported domestic demand, but exports have slowed. Inflation has 
dropped on the back of lower fuel and food prices, and high-frequency indicators 
point to a moderation in growth.
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 • Korea’s growth momentum has stalled somewhat, 
reflecting fragile household and investor sentiment. 
The projected growth of 3.3 percent this year rests 
on the assumption that supportive monetary and 
macroprudential policies and more favorable terms 
of trade spur a rebound in aggregate demand. 
 • Trends within the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations will continue to diverge. Indonesia’s 
growth is forecast to remain broadly unchanged 
in 2015 (though this is lower than previously 
projected), but to rise in 2016 as reforms are 
implemented. Malaysia’s growth is expected to 
slow this year (to 4.8 percent) on weaker terms of 
trade. Thailand’s outlook is expected to improve on 
greater clarity on near-term policies, and growth 
in the Philippines has been revised upward to 6.7 
percent in 2015 on stronger consumption from the 
oil price windfall. 
 • As a group, Asia’s other emerging and developing 
economies are projected to see a pickup in growth, but 
with variation across countries. In Papua New Guinea, 
the coming on stream of a large natural gas project 
will provide a one-time boost to growth. Activity in 
the Pacific island countries and other small states is 
also expected to be robust. On the other hand, low 
commodity prices will curtail Mongolia’s growth. 
Downside risks continue to dominate the growth 
outlook, including the following: 
 • Slower growth in China and Japan—Significantly 
slower growth than currently projected for China or 
Japan would also affect the rest of the region and the 
world economy given these economies’ large size and 
deep trade and financial linkages with other nations. 
For China, the main risk is failure to implement the 
reform agenda to address financial risks, rebalance the 
economy, and tap new sources of growth. In Japan, 
the challenge is to implement structural reforms to 
boost medium-term growth prospects while balancing 
near-term fiscal stimulus with a convincing medium-
term consolidation plan. Asia’s medium-term growth 
Table 2.3. Asian and Pacific Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment
(Annual percent change, unless noted otherwise) 
Real GDP Consumer Prices1 Current Account Balance2 Unemployment3
Projections Projections Projections Projections
2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016
Asia 5.6 5.6 5.5 3.2 2.6 2.8 1.6 2.4 2.2 . . . . . . . . .
Advanced Asia 1.6 2.2 2.4 2.2 1.2 1.6 2.2 3.1 2.8 3.8 3.9 3.9
Japan –0.1 1.0 1.2 2.7 1.0 0.9 0.5 1.9 2.0 3.6 3.7 3.7
Korea 3.3 3.3 3.5 1.3 1.5 2.5 6.3 7.1 5.2 3.5 3.6 3.5
Australia 2.7 2.8 3.2 2.5 2.0 2.3 –2.8 –4.0 –3.7 6.1 6.4 6.2
Taiwan Province of China 3.7 3.8 4.1 1.2 0.7 1.3 12.3 12.4 11.7 4.0 4.0 4.0
Singapore 2.9 3.0 3.0 1.0 0.0 1.7 19.1 20.7 18.8 2.0 2.0 2.0
Hong Kong SAR 2.3 2.8 3.1 4.4 3.2 3.4 1.6 2.0 2.2 3.2 3.2 3.1
New Zealand 3.2 2.9 2.7 1.2 0.8 2.1 –3.5 –4.8 –5.2 5.4 5.3 5.2
Emerging and Developing Asia 6.8 6.6 6.4 3.5 3.0 3.1 1.3 2.1 2.0 . . . . . . . . .
China 7.4 6.8 6.3 2.0 1.2 1.5 2.0 3.2 3.2 4.1 4.1 4.1
India 7.2 7.5 7.5 6.0 6.1 5.7 –1.4 –1.3 –1.6 . . . . . . . . .
ASEAN-5 4.6 5.2 5.3 4.7 4.1 4.2 1.3 1.1 0.6 . . . . . . . . .
Indonesia 5.0 5.2 5.5 6.4 6.8 5.8 –3.0 –3.0 –2.9 6.1 5.8 5.6
Thailand 0.7 3.7 4.0 1.9 0.3 2.4 3.8 4.4 2.4 0.8 0.8 0.8
Malaysia 6.0 4.8 4.9 3.1 2.7 3.0 4.6 2.1 1.4 2.9 3.0 3.0
Philippines 6.1 6.7 6.3 4.2 2.1 2.8 4.4 5.5 5.0 6.8 6.2 6.0
Vietnam 6.0 6.0 5.8 4.1 2.5 3.2 5.4 4.8 4.9 2.5 2.5 2.5
Other Emerging and Developing Asia4 6.4 6.7 6.7 5.9 5.5 5.7 –2.5 –2.7 –2.7 . . . . . . . . .
Memorandum
Emerging Asia5 6.8 6.6 6.4 3.4 2.9 3.0 1.4 2.2 2.1 . . . . . . . . .
Note: Data for some countries are based on fiscal years. Please refer to Table F in the Statistical Appendix for a list of economies with exceptional reporting periods.
1Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. Year-end to year-end changes can be found in Tables A6 and A7 in the Statistical Appendix.
2Percent of GDP.
3Percent. National definitions of unemployment may differ. 
4Other Emerging and Developing Asia comprises Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Fiji, Kiribati, Lao P.D.R., Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, 
Nepal, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
5Emerging Asia comprises the ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam) economies, China, and India.
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prospects are also critically dependent on the success 
of these reform strategies.
 • Persistent U.S. dollar strength against the euro and 
yen—Sustained realignments of the major reserve 
currencies brought about by asynchronous monetary 
policies could pose a growth risk to Asia through 
trade and balance sheet channels. Asian emerg-
ing markets whose firms borrowed heavily in U.S. 
dollars may need to find an appropriate balance 
between preserving financial stability (via moving 
their currency in tandem with the U.S. dollar) and 
maintaining external competitiveness (by stabiliz-
ing their exchange rate against major trade partners 
and competitors). This process could also trigger a 
cascade of disruptive adjustments.
 • Side effects from global financial conditions—
Increased leverage by households and firms within 
Asia spurred by accommodative global financial 
conditions increases sensitivity to changes in mon-
etary policy abroad. Higher debt-servicing costs and 
reduced rollover rates would affect corporate profit-
ability and investment and could pose a significant 
drag on household consumption, particularly if 
accompanied by a drop in house prices. 
Policies should remain focused on maintaining pru-
dent frameworks and boosting resilience and potential 
growth: 
 • Monetary policy should not respond to the decline 
in headline inflation from the drop in oil prices. 
However, loosening is called for if the effect of 
lower oil prices is transmitted to core inflation 
or inflation expectations. To date, moderating 
prices are apparent only in narrow categories of 
the consumer basket. However, in economies in 
which output gaps are currently negative (Australia, 
Japan, Korea, Thailand), policymakers may need 
to act to prevent a persistent decline in inflation 
expectations. 
 • On the fiscal policy front, and following the lead 
of India, Indonesia, and Malaysia, countries should 
seize the opportunity provided by the current low 
fuel and food prices to further reform or phase out 
subsidies, which tend to be poorly targeted. Doing 
so would improve spending efficiency and shield 
public spending from future oil price fluctuations. 
Countries with elevated public debt (Japan, Malay-
sia) should continue to consolidate, with the con-
duct of fiscal policy attuned to economic conditions 
and prospects. Asian emerging markets with large 
infrastructure gaps should consider giving public 
investment spending priority over easing monetary 
policy.
 • Exchange rates should be permitted to respond to 
shifts in balance of payments flows due to changes 
in commodity prices and capital flows, including 
from asynchronous monetary policies in advanced 
economies. Foreign exchange intervention should 
remain in the toolkit to address disorderly market 
conditions, especially in cases in which overshooting 
threatens financial stability.
 • In addition to strong regulation and supervision, 
protecting financial stability may also require proac-
tive use of macroprudential policies to tame the 
effects of the financial cycle on asset prices, credit, 
and aggregate demand. 
 • Structural reforms are needed to restart produc-
tivity gains across the region. In China, financial 
and state-owned enterprise reforms are needed 
to increase the efficiency of resource allocation. 
Reforms in the pension system and other social 
safety net areas will help shift the composition of 
growth toward domestic consumption, which is 
likely to prove more sustainable in the long term. In 
Japan, policy initiatives to raise services productiv-
ity and labor force participation should be further 
implemented. For other countries, including India, 
members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, and most other emerging market and 
developing economies, addressing supply bottlenecks 
by expanding essential infrastructure and raising 
productivity would increase near-term demand 
and support resilience to realignments of reserve 
currencies.
Latin America and the Caribbean: Another Year 
of Subpar Growth
Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean slowed 
to 1.3 percent in 2014 and is projected to soften to 
an even lower rate in 2015. The downturn in global 
commodity markets remains the main drag on activity 
in South America, even though lower oil prices and a 
solid U.S. recovery provide a boost to other parts of the 
region. Low business and consumer confidence in Brazil 
and the intensifying economic crisis in Venezuela weigh 
further on the near-term outlook. Flexible exchange rates 
can play a critical role in adapting to tougher external 
conditions, but policymakers will also need to ensure 
prudent fiscal positions are in place and catch up on 
structural reforms to raise investment and productivity.
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Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean 
declined for the fourth consecutive year, to 1.3 percent 
in 2014, coming close to the October 2014 WEO pro-
jection (Figure 2.6). Investment continued to lead the 
downturn, as subdued external demand and worsen-
ing terms of trade caused companies to curtail capital 
budgets, notably in South America. In some countries, 
policy uncertainties intensified weak private sector sen-
timent. Falling commodity prices also prompted further 
widening of external current account deficits in most 
commodity-exporting economies, although net import-
ers benefited from the sharp decline in oil prices.
Currencies in countries with flexible exchange rates 
reacted quickly to the shifting external outlook and 
weaker domestic conditions, depreciating by about 10 
percent on average in trade-weighted terms since the 
end of August 2014 and in some cases by as much as 
15–20 percent. Equity markets fell and external credit 
spreads widened. Corporate bond issuance generally 
held up, but companies exposed to the commodity 
market have started to face tighter financing condi-
tions. Credit growth has continued to slow.
With no apparent impulse for a near-term pickup 
in activity and the prospect of persistently lower 
commodity prices and reduced policy space in many 
economies, regional growth is now projected to dip 
below 1 percent in 2015 (about 1¼ percentage points 
lower than projected in the October 2014 WEO), well 
below the 4.1 percent average growth observed during 
2004–13 (Table 2.4). Downward revisions are concen-
trated among South American commodity exporters. 
Meanwhile, output remains close to potential, as evi-
denced by still-low unemployment in many economies. 
 • Brazil’s economy is projected to contract by 1 per-
cent in 2015—almost 2½ percentage points below 
the October 2014 WEO forecast. Private sector 
sentiment has remained stubbornly weak, even since 
election-related uncertainty dissipated, reflecting 
the risk of near-term electricity and water rationing, 
unaddressed competitiveness challenges, and fallout 
from the Petrobras investigation. The Brazilian 
authorities’ renewed commitment to rein in the fis-
cal deficit and reduce inflation will help restore con-
fidence in Brazil’s macroeconomic policy framework, 
but it will further curb near-term demand. 
 • Projections for the Andean economies are com-
paratively favorable but have also been pared down 
since October—projected growth this year for Chile, 
Colombia, and Peru is ½ to 1.3 percentage points 
lower than in October. In Chile, uncertainty over 
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Sources: Bloomberg, L.P.; Haver Analytics; national authorities; and IMF staff 
estimates.
Note: CPI = consumer price index; LA6 = Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, 
Uruguay. Country group aggregates are weighted by purchasing-power-parity GDP 
as a share of group GDP, unless noted otherwise. Data labels in the figure use 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes.
1Seasonally adjusted, purchasing-power-parity-weighted average. Inventories 
include statistical discrepancies.
2Data for Bolivia include natural gas exports. Simple average for Central America 
(Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama); 
Caribbean, commodity exporters (Guyana, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago); and 
Caribbean, tourism dependent (The Bahamas, Barbados, Eastern Caribbean 
Currency Union countries, Jamaica).
3Yield on external bonds is based on the J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index 
for Latin America. Equity index is the MSCI Emerging Markets Latin America equity 
local net total return index. Currency index is the Bloomberg J.P. Morgan Latin 
America Currency Index. Both indices are rebased to January 2, 2013 = 100. Data 
are through March 26, 2015.
4Net commodity price index is based on Gruss 2014. Data are through the end of 
February 2015.
Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean has slowed further as falling commodity 
prices have hit the region’s commodity exporters. External current account deficits 
have continued to widen in most countries in the region, although the recent 
collapse in oil prices has provided relief to net importers, notably in Central America 
and the Caribbean. Lower oil prices should also assist disinflation, but their effects 
will be partly offset by weaker exchange rates, which are playing a crucial role in 
facilitating external adjustment.
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the impact of policy reforms appears to be weighing 
on investment, although there are signs that growth 
has started to recover. In the case of Peru, weak 
exports and investment caused a sharp slowdown in 
2014, but concerted policy action and new mining 
operations should support a rebound this year. In 
Colombia, lower oil prices will cause growth to dip 
below 4 percent.
 • Argentina’s growth is projected to be slightly nega-
tive in 2015, with stronger public spending and 
higher private consumption partly offsetting falling 
investment and exports. In Venezuela, the oil price 
collapse has compounded an already difficult situ-
ation. Pervasive administrative controls and other 
policy distortions have intensified shortages of basic 
goods, driven up inflation to above 60 percent in 
2014, and caused a deep recession. 
 • Mexico’s economy is projected to grow by 3 percent 
this year—a solid prospect, though lower than previ-
ously expected, as lingering sluggishness in domestic 
demand and a tighter fiscal stance dampen the posi-
tive spillovers from stronger U.S. growth.
Table 2.4. Western Hemisphere Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment
(Annual percent change, unless noted otherwise) 
Real GDP Consumer Prices1 Current Account Balance2 Unemployment3
Projections Projections Projections Projections
2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016
North America 2.4 3.0 3.0 1.9 0.5 1.7 –2.3 –2.3 –2.4 . . . . . . . . .
United States 2.4 3.1 3.1 1.6 0.1 1.5 –2.4 –2.3 –2.4 6.2 5.5 5.1
Canada 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.9 0.9 2.0 –2.2 –2.6 –2.3 6.9 7.0 6.9
Mexico 2.1 3.0 3.3 4.0 3.2 3.0 –2.1 –2.2 –2.2 4.8 4.3 4.0
South America4 0.7 –0.2 1.3 . . . . . . . . . –2.9 –3.5 –3.2 . . . . . . . . .
Brazil 0.1 –1.0 1.0 6.3 7.8 5.9 –3.9 –3.7 –3.4 4.8 5.9 6.3
Argentina5,6 0.5 –0.3 0.1 . . . 18.6 23.2 –0.9 –1.7 –1.8 7.3 7.0 8.1
Colombia 4.6 3.4 3.7 2.9 3.4 3.0 –5.0 –5.8 –4.9 9.1 9.0 8.9
Venezuela –4.0 –7.0 –4.0 62.2 96.8 83.7 4.3 –4.7 –0.8 8.0 12.8 16.1
Chile 1.8 2.7 3.3 4.4 3.0 3.0 –1.2 –1.2 –2.0 6.4 7.2 7.0
Peru 2.4 3.8 5.0 3.2 2.5 2.0 –4.1 –4.6 –4.3 6.0 6.0 6.0
Ecuador 3.6 1.9 3.6 3.6 3.2 3.0 –0.8 –3.3 –3.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Bolivia 5.4 4.3 4.3 5.8 5.1 5.0 0.7 –2.8 –4.2 4.0 4.0 4.0
Uruguay 3.3 2.8 2.9 8.9 7.9 7.5 –4.7 –3.8 –4.1 6.5 6.8 7.0
Paraguay 4.4 4.0 4.0 5.0 3.6 4.5 0.1 –1.7 –2.2 5.5 5.5 5.5
Central America7 4.0 4.2 4.3 3.4 2.6 3.3 –5.9 –5.0 –5.2 . . . . . . . . .
Caribbean8 4.7 3.7 3.5 4.0 3.3 4.2 –3.1 –2.4 –2.7 . . . . . . . . .
Memorandum
Latin America and the Caribbean9 1.3 0.9 2.0 . . . . . . . . . –2.8 –3.2 –3.0 . . . . . . . . .
Excluding Argentina 1.4 1.0 2.2 7.9 9.0 7.6 –3.0 –3.4 –3.1 . . . . . . . . .
Eastern Caribbean Currency Union10 1.7 2.0 2.1 0.8 0.7 1.6 –15.8 –13.9 –14.5 . . . . . . . . .
Note: Data for some countries are based on fiscal years. Please refer to Table F in the Statistical Appendix for a list of economies with exceptional reporting periods.
1Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. Year-end to year-end changes can be found in Tables A6 and A7 in the Statistical Appendix.
2Percent of GDP.
3Percent. National definitions of unemployment may differ. 
4Includes Guyana and Suriname. See note 6 regarding consumer prices.
5The GDP data for Argentina are officially reported data as revised in May 2014. On February 1, 2013, the IMF issued a declaration of censure, and in December 2013 called on Argentina 
to implement specified actions to address the quality of its official GDP data according to a specified timetable. On December 15, 2014, the Executive Board recognized the implementation 
of the specified actions it had called for by end-September 2014 and the initial steps taken by the Argentine authorities to remedy the inaccurate provision of data. The Executive Board will 
review this issue again as per the calendar specified in December 2013 and in line with the procedures set forth in the Fund’s legal framework.
6Consumer price data from December 2013 onwards reflect the new national CPI (IPCNu), which differs substantively from the preceding CPI (the CPI for the Greater Buenos Aires Area, 
CPI-GBA). Because of the differences in geographical coverage, weights, sampling, and methodology, the IPCNu data cannot be directly compared to the earlier CPI-GBA data. Because of 
this structural break in the data, the average CPI inflation for 2014 is not reported in the April 2015 World Economic Outlook. Following a declaration of censure by the IMF on February 1, 
2013, the public release of a new national CPI by end-March 2014 was one of the specified actions in the IMF Executive Board’s December 2013 decision calling on Argentina to address 
the quality of its official CPI data. On December 15, 2014, the Executive Board recognized the implementation of the specified actions it had called for by end-September 2014 and the steps 
taken by the Argentine authorities to remedy the inaccurate provision of data. The Executive Board will review this issue again as per the calendar specified in December 2013 and in line 
with the procedures set forth in the Fund’s legal framework.
7Central America comprises Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.
8The Caribbean comprises Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.
9Latin America and the Caribbean comprises Mexico and economies from the Caribbean, Central America, and South America. See also note 6.
10Eastern Caribbean Currency Union comprises Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines as well as Anguilla and Mont-
serrat, which are not IMF members.
C H A P T E R 2 CO U N T RY A N D R E G I O N A L P E R S P E C T I V E S
 International Monetary Fund | April 2015 59
 • On the bright side, lower oil prices and the robust 
U.S. recovery have improved the outlook for Central 
America. Remittances grew 9 percent in 2014 
and, together with stronger exports, will continue 
to underpin domestic activity and facilitate the 
important task of strengthening fiscal positions in a 
number of countries. 
 • Similarly, the tourism-dependent economies of the 
Caribbean have started to see a recovery in tourist 
arrivals. Nonetheless, long-standing competitiveness 
gaps, high public debt, and financial sector fragilities 
remain pressing concerns.
Risks around this subdued outlook are considerable 
and somewhat weighed to the downside. Activity in 
the region’s commodity exporters might weaken further 
in the face of adverse shocks, notably a sharper-than-
expected investment slowdown in China. To be sure, 
further declines in commodity prices would bolster 
net importers, especially in Central America and the 
Caribbean. The caveat is that many of these economies 
currently obtain concessional financing from Venezuela 
on part of their oil imports. A possible curtailment of 
this Petrocaribe support could put pressure on public 
finances in some of these countries.
Lackluster economic prospects, along with an 
impending rise in U.S. interest rates, might also restrict 
the availability of external funding and cause further 
corrections in financial markets. This scenario could 
put strains on some corporate borrowers, especially in 
sectors facing sharply lower earnings and elevated lever-
age. On the upside, strong U.S. growth could provide 
a larger-than-expected lift to trading partners in the 
region.
A key risk in the medium term is protracted weak-
ness in investment that would further reduce the 
region’s potential growth. Misguided efforts to address 
the current slowdown with excessive policy stimulus, 
rather than by tackling supply-side bottlenecks and 
competitiveness problems, could also undermine coun-
tries’ hard-won macroeconomic stability.
The principal challenge for the region, therefore, is 
to manage the adjustment to a new external environ-
ment while preserving sound fundamentals and raising 
potential growth.
Exchange rate flexibility can play a critical role in 
absorbing adverse terms-of-trade shocks and rebalanc-
ing demand. The room for easing monetary policy is 
limited: inflation generally exceeds midpoint targets, 
and depreciating currencies will at least partly offset 
the benign effect of lower commodity prices. Nonethe-
less, countries with well-anchored inflation expecta-
tions still have some flexibility to fine-tune their policy 
stances in response to weak incoming data.
The weakening of public finances since the global 
financial crisis constrains fiscal policy options in many 
of the region’s countries. Commodity exporters with 
solid buffers can still afford to smooth the ongoing 
slowdown but will also need to avoid a lasting rise in 
deficits. Many commodity importers, in turn, have 
gained relief from declining fuel subsidy burdens and 
should seize the opportunity to secure these gains by 
moving toward market-based pricing. 
Beyond such adjustments, the difficult current out-
look underscores the urgency of supply-side reforms. 
Enhancing growth prospects and sustaining poverty 
reduction in a more challenging external environment 
will require determined efforts to improve the business 
environment, raise productivity, and increase saving 
and investment.
Commonwealth of Independent States: Oil 
Price Slump Worsens Outlook
The Commonwealth of Independent States region is 
projected to slide into recession in 2015. For oil export-
ers, sharply lower oil prices and the significant contrac-
tion in Russia imply a much weaker outlook. For oil 
importers, the benefits from lower oil prices will likely 
be more than offset by domestic economic weaknesses 
and spillovers from the contraction in Russia through 
remittances, trade, and foreign direct investment. 
The European economies of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States slowed further in the second 
half of 2014, with the contribution from private 
consumption turning negative (Figure 2.7). Falling 
oil prices on top of international sanctions com-
pounded Russia’s underlying structural weaknesses, 
undermining confidence and resulting in a significant 
depreciation of the ruble, which added to inflation 
pressures. In response, the Central Bank of Russia 
hiked its policy rate by 750 basis points to 17 percent 
in December, and the Russian authorities announced 
various measures to normalize market conditions. 
Contagion from ruble depreciation also spread to 
other Commonwealth of Independent States coun-
tries. The recession in Ukraine deepened in 2014, 
largely reflecting the economic impact of the con-
flict in the east. Since last October, pressure on the 
hryvnia has increased substantially, contributing to 
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a drop in foreign exchange reserves and accelerating 
inflation. 
The outlook for the Commonwealth of Independent 
States has deteriorated markedly, with a 2.6 percent 
contraction now projected in 2015 (about 4 percent-
age points below the October 2014 WEO forecast) 
and double-digit inflation projected in many countries 
(Table 2.5). Growth in the Caucasus and Central Asia 
is also expected to drop—from 5.3 percent in 2014 
to 3.2 percent in 2015, a downward revision of 2.4 
percentage points relative to the October 2014 WEO. 
The decline is projected as a result of spillovers from 
Russia (through remittances, trade, and foreign direct 
investment) and lower export prices for oil, metals, and 
minerals. 
 • The oil price slump, tighter financial conditions, 
international sanctions, and weaker confidence are 
projected to result in a recession in Russia in 2015. 
Output is expected to contract by 3.8 percent, a 
downward revision of about 4¼ percentage points 
compared with the October WEO forecast. In 2016, 
the output contraction is projected to ease to 1.1 
percent as falling inflation and some import substi-
tution contribute to a modest recovery in demand. 
 • Despite a recently announced government stimu-
lus in Kazakhstan, lower oil prices and production 
delays in the Kashagan oil field, as well as weak-
ness in the global economy, are expected to keep 
growth at 2.0 percent in 2015 (a downward revision 
of almost 3 percentage points) and 3.1 percent in 
2016.
 • Ukraine’s economy is expected to bottom out in 2015 
as activity stabilizes with the recovery in consumer and 
investor confidence and the commencement of recon-
struction work. Output is still projected to decline 
by 5.5 percent in 2015, marking some improvement 
from the 6.8 percent contraction in 2014. 
 • Armenia and Belarus are projected to enter into 
recession in 2015, and Georgia’s growth will slow. 
In all three economies, the downward turns reflect 
spillovers from Russia. In Moldova, lower credit 
growth together with lower exports and remittances 
will result in a small GDP contraction this year. 
Risks to the outlook are largely on the downside. A 
prolonged period of uncertainty and the imposition 
of more sanctions on Russia could further weaken 
investment. Deterioration in bank and corporate bal-
ance sheets owing to the recent sharp depreciation of 
national currencies across the region could pose finan-
cial stability risks. An earlier-than-expected rebound 
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Figure 2.7.  Commonwealth of Independent States: Coping
with Geopolitical Risks and Lower Oil Prices
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Russia and Ukraine are entering into recession amid high inflation as geopolitical 
tensions and the oil price slump take their toll. Other Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) economies are also experiencing slowing growth and a 
deteriorating fiscal stance on account of negative spillovers, particularly from
Russia.
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in oil prices confers some upside risks for oil export-
ers and also, via the beneficial impact on the Russian 
economy, for oil importers in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States.
With worsening economic conditions and significant 
downside risks, a key priority is to preserve macroeco-
nomic stability. For Russia, monetary policy tightening 
and the central bank’s move to a floating exchange 
rate regime ahead of schedule were appropriate. With 
monetary policy constrained by above-target inflation 
and financial stability concerns, and in light of Russia’s 
large fiscal buffers, a limited loosening of the non-oil 
structural balance in 2015 would be warranted. For 
Ukraine, bolstering reserves and a tighter fiscal stance 
remain appropriate. For Belarus, greater exchange rate 
flexibility combined with tight macroeconomic policies 
and deep structural reforms is needed to durably curb 
inflation and reduce external imbalances. 
Faced with adverse spillovers from Russia, countries 
in the Caucasus and Central Asia should implement 
countercyclical fiscal policy if fiscal space, available 
financing, and the external position permit. These 
countries should generally allow greater exchange rate 
flexibility supported by appropriate macroeconomic and 
structural policies and, if necessary, further depreciation 
to minimize loss of reserves and the erosion of competi-
tiveness. Increased exchange rate flexibility over time 
would also help economies adjust to adverse shocks. 
Tighter monetary policy may be needed to address infla-
tion pressure resulting from currency depreciation. 
In the medium term, most oil exporters will need to 
recalibrate their fiscal consolidation plans, since the oil 
shock is expected to persist. Priority should go to reining 
in hard-to-reverse current expenditures, widening tax 
bases, and strengthening tax administration. Growth-
enhancing spending on infrastructure, health, and 
education as well as targeted social assistance should be 
preserved where possible. Oil importers should resume 
fiscal consolidation to rebuild buffers as soon as cyclical 
conditions allow. Structural reforms in governance, cor-
Table 2.5. Commonwealth of Independent States Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and 
Unemployment
(Annual percent change, unless noted otherwise)
Real GDP Consumer Prices1 Current Account Balance2 Unemployment3
2014
Projections
2014
Projections
2014
Projections
2014
Projections
2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016
Commonwealth of Independent States4 1.0 –2.6 0.3 8.1 16.8 9.4 2.2 2.5 3.7 . . . . . . . . .
Net Energy Exporters 1.5 –2.4 0.1 7.5 15.6 9.1 3.1 3.4 4.6 . . . . . . . . .
Russia 0.6 –3.8 –1.1 7.8 17.9 9.8 3.1 5.4 6.3 5.1 6.5 6.5
Kazakhstan 4.3 2.0 3.1 6.7 5.2 5.5 1.6 –4.1 –3.1 5.2 5.2 5.2
Uzbekistan 8.1 6.2 6.5 8.4 9.5 9.8 0.1 0.2 0.2 . . . . . . . . .
Azerbaijan 2.8 0.6 2.5 1.4 7.9 6.2 15.3 5.3 8.2 6.0 6.0 6.0
Turkmenistan 10.3 9.0 9.2 6.0 7.7 6.6 –5.9 –11.1 –6.7 . . . . . . . . .
Net Energy Importers –2.6 –3.7 1.6 12.3 25.2 11.4 –5.7 –5.2 –4.2 . . . . . . . . .
Ukraine5 –6.8 –5.5 2.0 12.1 33.5 10.6 –4.0 –1.4 –1.3 10.5 11.5 11.0
Belarus 1.6 –2.3 –0.1 18.1 22.1 17.4 –6.1 –7.0 –4.2 0.5 0.5 0.5
Georgia 4.7 2.0 3.0 3.1 3.0 5.0 –9.6 –11.5 –12.0 . . . . . . . . .
Armenia 3.4 –1.0 . . . 3.1 6.4 4.0 –9.2 –8.6 –8.6 18.0 17.9 17.7
Tajikistan 6.7 3.0 4.1 6.1 12.8 6.3 –9.1 –7.1 –5.8 . . . . . . . . .
Kyrgyz Republic 3.6 1.7 3.4 7.5 10.7 8.6 –13.7 –17.0 –15.2 7.6 7.5 7.4
Moldova 4.6 –1.0 3.0 5.1 7.5 6.3 –5.5 –4.5 –5.4 4.0 4.5 4.3
Memorandum
Caucasus and Central Asia6 5.3 3.2 4.2 5.8 6.9 6.6 1.7 –3.4 –2.0 . . . . . . . . .
Low-Income CIS Countries7 6.7 4.2 5.0 6.9 8.7 8.2 –4.2 –3.8 –3.6 . . . . . . . . .
Net Energy Exporters Excluding Russia 5.4 3.4 4.4 5.9 6.9 6.7 3.0 –2.6 –1.2 . . . . . . . . .
Note: Data for some countries are based on fiscal years. Please refer to Table F in the Statistical Appendix for a list of economies with exceptional reporting periods.
1Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. Year-end to year-end changes can be found in Table A7 in the Statistical Appendix.
2Percent of GDP.
3Percent. National definitions of unemployment may differ.
4Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), are included in this group for reasons of geography and 
similarity in economic structure.
5Starting in 2014 data exclude Crimea and Sevastopol.
6Caucasus and Central Asia comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
7Low-Income CIS Countries comprise Armenia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
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ruption, education, and the fi nancial sector need to be 
stepped up to diversify economies, improve the business 
climate, and enhance fi nancial intermediation.
The Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan: Oil, Confl icts, and Transitions
Growth remained tepid across the Middle East, North 
Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (MENAP) in 2014 
amid declining oil prices, raging conflicts, and continued 
policy uncertainty. Only modest strengthening is expected 
this year, and substantial downward revisions to regional 
growth projections can be traced to the region’s oil export-
ers. Risks remain to the downside. Faced with large losses 
from lower oil prices, most oil exporters need to recalibrate 
their medium-term fiscal consolidation plans. Across the 
region, lower oil prices create conditions for continu-
ing subsidy reforms to build fiscal space for growth-
enhancing spending. Structural reforms are also needed 
to raise prospects in a sustainable and inclusive manner.
Oil-Exporting Economies
As a result of the steep decline in oil prices, oil 
exporters in MENAP are experiencing large losses of 
export and fi scal revenues (Figure 2.8). Most of the 
region’s oil exporters are expected to avoid sharp cuts 
in spending by drawing on their large buff ers and 
using available fi nancing. 
Growth is now projected to remain broadly 
unchanged in 2015, at 2.4 percent, refl ecting a down-
ward revision of 1½ percentage points relative to the 
October 2014 WEO, and pick up to 3.5 percent in 
2016 (Table 2.6). More specifi cally:
 • Growth forecasts for Saudi Arabia have been marked 
down to 3.0 percent in 2015, 1½ percentage points 
downward relative to the October 2014 WEO, and 
to 2.7 percent in 2016. About half of the revisions 
are due to a rebasing of real GDP data.1 With the 
decline in oil prices, the fiscal balance in Saudi 
Arabia will move into substantial deficit in 2015 
and 2016.
 • Growth in the Islamic Republic of Iran is projected 
to be 0.6 percent in 2015 and 1.3 percent in 2016, 
a downward revision from the October 2014 WEO 
1Th e rebasing to 2010 has resulted in a higher share of oil GDP 
(43 percent compared with 21 percent previously) and, conse-
quently, lower real GDP growth rates in 2013–14, when oil GDP 
growth was subdued. 
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Figure 2.8.  Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan: Oil, Conflicts, and Transitions
6. MENAPOI: Expenditure
    (Percent of GDP; average)
4. MENAPOE: Pretax Fuel
    Subsidies, 20152
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3. External Gains and Losses 
    from Lower Oil Prices, 
    20151 (Percent of GDP)
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Growth remained tepid across the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan (MENAP) in 2014 amid declining oil prices, intensifying conflicts, and 
continued policy uncertainty. The steep decline in oil prices has weakened the 
external and fiscal balances of the region’s oil exporters, while providing much-
needed breathing room for the oil importers. Across the region, lower oil prices 
provide an opportunity for structural and subsidy reforms, which would create 
fiscal space for growth-enhancing investments, improve competitiveness, and 
support jobs and inclusive growth.
1. Overall Real GDP Growth
    (Percent change)
2. MENAPOE: Fiscal Balances
    (Percent of GDP; dashed
    lines are from the October
    2014 WEO)
GCC
Non-GCC
5. MENAPOE: Fiscal
    Breakeven Prices, 2015
    (U.S. dollars a barrel) Subsidies and transfers
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World oil price
Wages Other
Sources: Haver Analytics; IMF, Information Notice System; International Energy 
Agency; national authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) = Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates; MENAP oil exporters (MENAPOE) = Algeria, Bahrain, Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, Yemen; MENAP oil importers (MENAPOI) = Afghanistan, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia. Data labels 
in the figure use International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes. 
Data from 2011 onward exclude Syria.
1External losses (gains) from lower oil prices are calculated as the projected 
difference in the U.S. dollar value of net oil exports in 2015, using the 2015 oil price 
assumptions in the April 2015 and October 2014 World Economic Outlooks, and the 
volume of net oil exports in the latter, with adjustments for idiosyncratic 
country-specific factors.
2The size of the subsidy bill is estimated using 2013 data. Calculations are based on 
a price-gap analysis following Clements and others 2013 and Sdralevich and others 
2014.
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of about 1½ percentage points and 1 percentage 
point, respectively. The revisions reflect the impact 
of lower oil prices and continued uncertainty regard-
ing progress toward a full agreement with the P5+1.2 
 • Growth in Iraq is projected to be 1.3 percent in 
2015, supported by increased oil production, but 
non-oil activity is expected to stay flat because of 
difficult security conditions and fiscal spending cuts 
in response to lower oil prices. 
 • Growth in Algeria is expected to slow from 4.1 
percent in 2014 to 2.6 percent in 2015, as lower oil 
prices exacerbate the economy’s existing fiscal and 
external vulnerabilities.
Oil production and prices, as well as continued 
conflicts in the region, constitute important risks to 
2The P5+1 are the five permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council and Germany.
the outlook. Heightened uncertainty in the oil market 
persists, with oil price volatility at historically high 
levels and risks for oil production skewed to the down-
side. Downside risks to non-oil growth also arise from 
the possibility that fiscal adjustment will be stronger 
than currently expected or private investment will be 
affected by declining confidence. Deepening conflicts 
and security disruptions in a number of oil-exporting 
countries could further undermine economic activity, 
delay reforms, and dampen confidence.
Policymakers need to prepare for a sustained period 
of lower oil prices and reassess their medium-term 
spending plans accordingly. Countries need to address 
fiscal vulnerabilities from rapidly eroding buffers 
and high break-even oil prices and to save equitable 
amounts of their nonrenewable oil wealth for future 
generations. To limit the drag on growth, fiscal con-
solidation plans should focus on reining in current 
Table 2.6. Middle East and North African Economies, Afghanistan, and Pakistan: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current 
Account Balance, and Unemployment
(Annual percent change, unless noted otherwise)
Real GDP Consumer Prices1 Current Account Balance2 Unemployment3
2014
Projections
2014
Projections
2014
Projections
2014
Projections
2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, 
and Pakistan 2.6 2.9 3.8 6.7 6.1 6.2 6.4 –1.9 –0.1 . . . . . . . . .
Oil Exporters4 2.4 2.4 3.5 5.6 5.6 6.0 10.0 –1.0 1.7 . . . . . . . . .
Saudi Arabia 3.6 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.0 2.5 14.1 –1.0 3.7 5.5 . . . . . .
Iran 3.0 0.6 1.3 15.5 16.5 17.0 3.8 0.8 1.2 11.2 12.3 13.2
United Arab Emirates 3.6 3.2 3.2 2.3 2.1 2.3 12.1 5.3 7.2 . . . . . . . . .
Algeria 4.1 2.6 3.9 2.9 4.0 4.0 –4.3 –15.7 –13.2 10.6 11.8 11.9
Iraq –2.4 1.3 7.6 2.2 3.0 3.0 –3.5 –9.6 –3.6 . . . . . . . . .
Qatar 6.1 7.1 6.5 3.0 1.8 2.7 25.1 8.4 5.0 . . . . . . . . .
Kuwait 1.3 1.7 1.8 2.9 3.3 3.6 35.3 15.7 19.3 2.1 2.1 2.1
Oil Importers5 3.0 4.0 4.4 9.2 7.0 6.6 –4.0 –4.2 –4.5 . . . . . . . . .
Egypt 2.2 4.0 4.3 10.1 10.3 10.5 –0.8 –3.3 –4.3 13.4 13.1 12.5
Pakistan 4.1 4.3 4.7 8.6 4.7 4.5 –1.2 –1.3 –1.4 6.7 6.5 6.1
Morocco 2.9 4.4 5.0 0.4 1.5 2.0 –5.8 –3.4 –3.3 9.1 9.0 8.9
Sudan 3.4 3.3 3.9 36.9 19.0 10.5 –5.2 –4.2 –3.9 13.6 13.3 13.0
Tunisia 2.3 3.0 3.8 4.9 5.0 4.1 –8.9 –6.4 –5.2 15.3 15.0 14.0
Lebanon 2.0 2.5 2.5 1.9 1.1 2.8 –24.9 –22.2 –21.7 . . . . . . . . .
Jordan 3.1 3.8 4.5 2.9 1.2 2.5 –7.0 –7.6 –6.6 11.9 . . . . . .
Memorandum
Middle East and North Africa 2.4 2.7 3.7 6.5 6.2 6.4 7.0 –2.0 0.0 . . . . . . . . .
Israel6 2.8 3.5 3.3 0.5 –0.2 2.1 3.0 4.5 4.4 6.0 5.5 5.3
Maghreb7 1.0 3.3 5.6 2.5 3.3 3.6 –8.1 –14.6 –11.6 . . . . . . . . .
Mashreq8 2.2 3.9 4.2 8.9 8.9 9.3 –4.7 –6.2 –6.8 . . . . . . . . .
Note: Data for some countries are based on fiscal years. Please refer to Table F in the Statistical Appendix for a list of economies with exceptional reporting periods.
1Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. Year-end to year-end changes can be found in Tables A6 and A7 in the Statistical Appendix.
2Percent of GDP.
3Percent. National definitions of unemployment may differ. 
4Includes Bahrain, Libya, Oman, and Yemen. 
5Includes Afghanistan, Djibouti, and Mauritania. Excludes Syria because of the uncertain political situation.
6Israel, which is not a member of the economic region, is included for reasons of geography. Note that Israel is not included in the regional aggregates.
7The Maghreb comprises Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. 
8The Mashreq comprises Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. Syria is excluded because of the uncertain political situation.
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expenditures, including by limiting growth of public 
wage bills and reducing generalized energy subsidies, 
which remain large in many countries despite lower 
oil prices. Prioritizing capital expenditure and raising 
non-oil revenue collection should accompany efforts to 
contain spending. 
In tandem with fiscal consolidation, significant 
structural reforms are needed to move away from 
past growth models driven by oil-backed government 
spending and raise productivity in the non-oil private 
sector. The challenge will be to promote diversification 
toward tradable activities and enable the private sector 
to become a more self-reliant engine of growth, while 
encouraging private sector job creation. 
Oil-Importing Economies
In the region’s oil importers, a weak recovery con-
tinued in 2014. The impetus provided by increased 
political stability and initial reforms was dampened by 
intensified regional conflicts and continued sociopoliti-
cal and security tensions. Weak growth in the euro area 
and deteriorating competitiveness from a strengthening 
U.S. dollar (against which some countries peg their 
exchange rates) also weighed on economic activity. 
However, signs of nascent improvement in confidence 
have emerged, reflected, among other things, in a 
rating upgrade for Egypt’s and Pakistan’s first interna-
tional bond issues in seven years.
Growth is expected to rise from 3.0 percent last 
year to 4.0 percent in 2015 and 4.4 percent in 2016 
(Table 2.6). Domestic demand should strengthen with 
improved confidence, monetary easing, and reduced 
fiscal drag. Recovery in Europe will support export 
growth, offsetting adverse effects from slower growth 
in the oil-exporting countries of the region. Lower oil 
prices are reducing vulnerabilities, but their growth 
impact is limited as governments will save much of the 
oil windfalls. Moreover, intensified security challenges 
and regional spillovers will constrain reform prospects. 
Country-specific factors are also at play:
 • Egypt’s macroeconomic stabilization plans and 
wide-ranging structural reforms are expected to 
increase confidence, and growth is expected to rise 
to 4 percent this year.3 Nevertheless, continued fiscal 
consolidation, steady implementation of reforms, 
3 Projections do not incorporate the potential impact of the 
investment agreements reached at the March 2015 Egypt Economic 
Development Conference.
and external financing are needed to maintain mac-
roeconomic stability and generate sustainable growth 
and jobs.
 • In Morocco, steadfast policy implementation 
(including elimination of energy subsidies) has 
helped stabilize the economy. Improved external 
demand, strengthened domestic confidence, and 
recovery of agricultural production should boost 
growth to 4.4 percent in 2015 and 5 percent in 
2016, but continued structural reforms, including 
to the business environment, are needed to improve 
competitiveness and employment.
 • Pakistan’s economy has stabilized, with a 4.3 percent 
growth forecast for 2015 and gradually improving 
fiscal and external positions. Further bold reforms 
are critical to solidify this progress and counter 
adverse effects on economic activity of falling cotton 
prices and security and political tensions. 
 • Confidence and growth in Tunisia are expected to 
return with the completion of the political transi-
tion, but widening external imbalances, lingering 
banking vulnerabilities, and security tensions will 
weigh on economic activity. In Jordan, lower oil 
prices and further reforms should contribute to 
higher growth this year. Lebanon’s economy is 
weighed down by the political impasse and spill-
overs from the conflict in Syria. And Sudan is still 
adjusting to lower oil revenues due to the secession 
of South Sudan, in the context of a volatile regional 
environment, sanctions, and a heavy debt burden. 
Risks to the outlook for the region are tilted to the 
downside. Intensified tensions and setbacks in political 
transitions could further undermine trade, confidence, 
reform efforts, and macroeconomic stability. Lower-
than-expected growth in Europe, the member coun-
tries of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of 
the Gulf, or emerging markets could slow tourism and 
exports, and with some lag, remittances and financing 
support. On the upside, greater-than-expected wind-
falls from lower oil prices could further bolster growth.
Increasing economic prospects and job creation will 
require multifaceted structural reforms. Business cli-
mate and governance reforms, better access to finance, 
and improved labor market efficiency and infrastruc-
ture are critical to lowering firms’ operating costs and 
creating new jobs. Fostering worker talent through 
education aligned with private sector needs, adopting 
the latest technologies and management techniques, 
striving for greater trade integration, and recalibrating 
the role of the government toward supporting the pri-
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vate sector will promote productivity and innovation. 
International support through financing, access to key 
export markets, technical assistance, and policy advice 
would bolster these reform efforts.
Macroeconomic policies can support these growth- 
and equity-enhancing reforms while ensuring mac-
roeconomic stability. The decline in oil prices creates 
favorable conditions for accelerating subsidy reforms 
and increasing energy taxes. Where fiscal and external 
sustainability is a concern, windfall gains should be 
saved. Where there is space, freed resources could be 
spent on growth-enhancing infrastructure, health care, 
and education. Given uncertainties surrounding the 
persistence of the oil price decline, countries should 
avoid entering into irreversible spending commitments, 
including increases in public sector wage spending. 
Increased reserves and low inflation provide an oppor-
tunity to enhance exchange rate flexibility to improve 
competitiveness—especially following the appreciation 
of the U.S. dollar—and the ability to adjust to shocks. 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Resilience in the Face of 
Headwinds
Growth in sub-Saharan Africa remains strong, 
although it is expected to slow in 2015 in the face of 
headwinds from declining commodity prices and the 
epidemic in Ebola-affected countries. Key downside risks 
include further downgrades to growth in major trade part-
ners, a sharper-than-expected tightening of global financ-
ing conditions, and mounting domestic security threats 
and policy uncertainty ahead of elections. Oil-exporting 
countries should enact prompt fiscal adjustments, while 
oil importers’ policy stances should strike the right balance 
between promoting growth and preserving stability.
Sub-Saharan African growth for 2014 as a whole 
remained solid at 5.0 percent, albeit lower than the 
5.2 percent growth in 2013. Growth in South Africa 
fell from 2.2 percent in 2013 to 1.5 percent in 2014, 
on account of mining strikes and electricity supply 
constraints. Elsewhere in the region, growth, driven 
by strong investment in mining and infrastructure 
and by private consumption, held up well, especially 
in the region’s low-income countries. Exceptions were 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, where growth 
declined sharply as a result of the Ebola epidemic, 
which caused severe disruptions in agriculture and 
services and the postponement of mining development 
projects.
The region’s oil-exporting countries, especially 
those with limited buffers (Chad, Nigeria), started 
to adjust to the decline in oil prices. This adjustment 
led to lower growth than was previously expected. By 
contrast, growth in the region’s oil-importing countries 
was broadly in line with previous projections, although 
with considerable variation across countries. 
Fiscal and current account balances worsened signifi-
cantly in the region’s oil-exporting countries, reflecting 
ambitious infrastructure investment agendas financed 
with shrinking oil revenues (Figure 2.9). Fiscal balances 
also deteriorated in other parts of the region, reflecting 
continued fiscal strains in the Ebola-affected countries 
and strong exceptional spending in Mozambique. By 
contrast, consolidation efforts led to improvement in 
fiscal balances in Ghana and Zambia. Weak oil and 
food prices have helped reinforce the region’s gener-
ally low-inflation environment, which could allow 
countries dealing with lower growth to adopt more 
accommodative monetary policy stances. The dollar 
has appreciated recently, and this could undermine 
the competitiveness of some countries that are broadly 
pegged to the dollar. 
Favorable global financing conditions for most of 
the year encouraged a surge in sovereign bond issuance 
from $6.5 billion in 2013 to $8.7 billion in 2014, 
with maiden issuances by Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and 
Kenya. However, financing conditions have tightened 
considerably since December, and yields on the region’s 
bonds have been trending up, especially in Ghana 
(owing to a high fiscal deficit) and Gabon and Nigeria 
(owing to lower oil prices).
Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to experience solid 
growth in 2015–16, but given the weaker global 
outlook, its economic prospects have been revised 
downward relative to earlier expectations (Table 2.7). 
In 2015, growth in sub-Saharan Africa is projected to 
fall to 4.5 percent—a substantial downward revision 
of 1¼ percentage points relative to the October 2014 
WEO—before rebounding to 5.1 percent in 2016. Oil 
exporters in the region will be severely affected, with 
growth in 2015 marked down by almost 2½ percent-
age points. By contrast, growth in the region’s oil 
importers in 2015–16 is expected to average 4¾ per-
cent, a downward revision of 0.3 percentage point 
relative to the October 2014 WEO prediction, as the 
favorable impact of lower oil prices will be offset to a 
large extent by lower commodity export prices.
This outlook for the region is subject to significant 
downside risks. Recent episodes of volatility sug-
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gest that frontier market economies and oil export-
ers planning to cover their financing needs through 
international markets could be vulnerable to a reversal 
in investor sentiment, especially in a tighter U.S. 
monetary policy environment. Further weakening of 
growth in Europe or in emerging markets, in particular 
in China, could reduce demand for exports, further 
depress commodity prices, and curtail foreign direct 
investment in mining and infrastructure. Failure to 
implement appropriate policies, most notably where 
large fiscal adjustments are needed, could also weaken 
macroeconomic stability. Risks originating within 
the region include stronger persistence and regional 
impact of the Ebola epidemic, rising security concerns, 
and political uncertainty ahead of key elections (for 
example, in Nigeria and Tanzania). 
In view of their limited buffers, most oil export-
ers in the region will need to undertake prompt fiscal 
adjustment to address the persistent terms-of-trade 
shock that they are facing. Where feasible, such adjust-
ment should be combined with increased exchange 
rate flexibility. Elsewhere, to sustain high and inclusive 
growth, policies will need to continue to strike the 
right balance between scaling up public investment 
and preserving debt sustainability and rebuilding fiscal 
buffers. The current environment of low oil prices 
provides a unique opportunity to undertake politically 
difficult reforms to eliminate remaining fuel subsidies. 
In anticipation of possible surges in the volatility of 
exchange rates and capital flows, countries should also 
carefully monitor their financial sectors, and those 
planning Eurobond issues may need to prepare contin-
gency plans.
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Sub-Saharan African growth will remain solid notwithstanding a significant 
adverse shock from the decline in oil prices. Oil exporters will be faced with a 
formidable challenge to cope with the shock. For the rest of the region, lower oil 
prices represent a favorable development, which will be offset in some cases, 
however, by lower prices for other commodity exports.
Sources: EPFR Global; Haver Analytics; IMF, International Financial Statistics 
database; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: LIC = low-income country (SSA); MIC = middle-income country (SSA); SSA = 
sub-Saharan Africa. Oil exporters refer only to SSA oil exporters. See Table 2.7 for 
country groupings and the Statistical Appendix for country group aggregation 
methodology.
1General government includes the central government, state governments, local 
governments, and social security funds.
2Because of data limitations, Eritrea is excluded from LICs, Zimbabwe from LICs 
before December 2009, and South Sudan from oil exporters before June 2012.
3Bond and equity data refer to cumulative flows since January 2013 in billions of 
U.S. dollars. Frontier economies = Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe. 
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Table 2.7. Sub-Saharan African Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment
(Annual percent change, unless noted otherwise)
Real GDP Consumer Prices1 Current Account Balance2 Unemployment3
2014
Projections
2014
Projections
2014
Projections
2014
Projections
2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.0 4.5 5.1 6.3 6.6 7.0 –3.3 –4.6 –4.1 . . . . . . . . .
Oil Exporters4 5.8 4.5 5.2 7.3 9.2 9.6 1.2 –1.5 –0.3 . . . . . . . . .
Nigeria 6.3 4.8 5.0 8.1 9.6 10.7 2.2 0.7 1.3 . . . . . . . . .
Angola 4.2 4.5 3.9 7.3 8.4 8.5 –0.8 –6.3 –4.2 . . . . . . . . .
Gabon 5.1 4.4 5.5 4.5 2.5 2.5 11.2 –2.3 0.9 . . . . . . . . .
Chad 6.9 7.6 4.9 1.7 3.2 2.9 –8.7 –10.5 –8.3 . . . . . . . . .
Republic of Congo 6.0 5.2 7.5 0.9 3.0 2.9 –6.2 –11.3 –3.1 . . . . . . . . .
Middle-Income Countries5 2.9 3.2 3.6 6.0 4.8 5.3 –4.8 –4.0 –4.1 . . . . . . . . .
South Africa 1.5 2.0 2.1 6.1 4.5 5.6 –5.4 –4.6 –4.7 25.1 25.1 24.9
Ghana 4.2 3.5 6.4 15.5 12.2 10.2 –9.2 –7.0 –6.2 . . . . . . . . .
Côte d'Ivoire 7.5 7.7 7.8 0.4 1.2 1.5 –3.3 –2.3 –1.7 . . . . . . . . .
Cameroon 5.1 5.0 5.0 1.9 2.0 2.1 –4.2 –4.8 –4.8 . . . . . . . . .
Zambia 5.4 6.7 6.9 7.9 7.7 6.5 –0.2 0.3 0.9 . . . . . . . . .
Senegal 4.5 4.6 5.1 –0.5 1.5 1.4 –10.3 –7.6 –7.3 . . . . . . . . .
Low-Income Countries6 6.5 6.3 6.9 5.1 4.8 5.2 –11.0 –11.1 –11.0 . . . . . . . . .
Ethiopia 10.3 8.6 8.5 7.4 6.8 8.2 –9.0 –6.6 –6.3 . . . . . . . . .
Kenya 5.3 6.9 7.2 6.9 5.1 5.0 –9.2 –7.7 –7.4 . . . . . . . . .
Tanzania 7.2 7.2 7.1 6.1 4.2 4.5 –10.2 –10.0 –9.5 . . . . . . . . .
Uganda 4.9 5.4 5.6 4.7 4.9 4.8 –7.5 –8.8 –9.0 . . . . . . . . .
Madagascar 3.0 5.0 5.0 6.1 7.6 6.9 –2.3 –3.2 –3.4 . . . . . . . . .
Democratic Republic of the Congo 9.1 9.2 8.4 1.0 2.4 3.5 –9.6 –10.7 –9.5 . . . . . . . . .
Memorandum
Sub-Saharan Africa Excluding South 
Sudan 5.0 4.5 5.0 6.4 6.4 7.0 –3.3 –4.5 –4.1 . . . . . . . . .
Note: Data for some countries are based on fiscal years. Please refer to Table F in the Statistical Appendix for a list of economies with exceptional reporting periods.
1Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. Year-end to year-end changes can be found in Table  A7 in the Statistical Appendix.
2Percent of GDP. 
3Percent. National definitions of unemployment may differ. 
4Includes Equatorial Guinea and South Sudan.
5Includes Botswana, Cabo Verde, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, and Swaziland.
6Includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Comoros, Eritrea, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, 
Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Zimbabwe.
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3CHAPTER WHERE ARE WE HEADED? PERSPECTIVES ON POTENTIAL OUTPUT
This chapter finds that potential output growth across 
advanced and emerging market economies has declined in 
recent years. In advanced economies, this decline started 
as far back as the early 2000s and worsened with the 
global financial crisis. In emerging market economies, 
in contrast, it began only after the crisis. The chapter’s 
analysis suggests that potential output growth in advanced 
economies is likely to increase slightly from current rates 
as some crisis-related effects wear off, but to remain 
below precrisis rates in the medium term. The main 
reasons are aging populations and the gradual increase in 
capital growth from current rates as output and invest-
ment recover from the crisis. In contrast, in emerging 
market economies, potential output growth is expected 
to decline further, owing to aging populations, weaker 
investment, and lower total factor productivity growth as 
these economies catch up to the technological frontier.
Introduction
Output across advanced and emerging market 
economies remains much lower than was expected 
in 2008, just before the onset of the global fi nancial 
crisis, and its growth path has also been lower (Figure 
3.1). Indeed, medium-term (fi ve-year-ahead) growth 
expectations have been steadily revised downward since 
2011 for both advanced and emerging market econo-
mies (Figure 3.2).
Th e repeated downward revisions to medium-term 
growth forecasts highlight the uncertainties surround-
ing prospects for the growth rate of potential output 
(potential growth). In advanced economies, the appar-
ent decline in potential growth seems to have started 
as far back as the early 2000s and was worsened by the 
crisis.1 In emerging market economies, on the other 
Th e authors of this chapter are Patrick Blagrave, Mai Dao, Davide 
Furceri (team leader), Roberto Garcia-Saltos, Sinem Kilic Celik, 
Annika Schnücker, Juan Yépez Albornoz, and Fan Zhang, with sup-
port from Rachel Szymanski. 
1Fernald (2012, 2014a, 2014b) shows that the slowdown in U.S. 
total factor productivity growth started well before the crisis (in 
the early 2000s). Balakrishnan and others (2015) fi nd that for the 
United States, demographic trends explain about half of the decline 
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Figure 3.1.  Output Compared to Precrisis Expectations
(Index, 2007 = 100)
1. World
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: The index is created using real GDP growth rates and their WEO forecasts. 
Economy groups are defined in Annex 3.1.
80
90
100
110
120
2001 03 05 07 09 11 13
2. Advanced Economies
60
80
100
120
140
160
2001 03 05 07 09 11 13
3. Emerging Market Economies
Fall 2007 Fall 2008 Fall 2014
Output across advanced and emerging market economies remains much lower 
than was expected before the onset of the global financial crisis, and its growth 
path has also been lower.
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hand, the decline in both potential output and its 
growth rate appears to have emerged only in the wake 
of the crisis.
Assessing the medium-term trajectory of potential 
output is critical for the conduct of monetary and fis-
cal policy. A better understanding of how the compo-
nents of potential growth—labor, capital accumulation, 
and total factor productivity—contribute to the overall 
slowdown can help inform the discussion on policies 
needed to raise it. 
To contribute to the debate on prospects for poten-
tial output, this chapter constructs estimates of poten-
tial output for 16 major economies—members of the 
Group of Twenty (G20)—which accounted for about 
three-fourths of world GDP in 2014.2 In this context, 
it seeks to answer the following questions:
in the labor force participation rate during the crisis. Chapter 3 in 
the April 2014 World Economic Outlook (WEO) and Chapter 4 of 
this WEO report find that the crisis has contributed to the decline 
in capital accumulation growth in advanced economies.
2The 10 advanced and 6 emerging market economies are Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
 • Before the crisis: How did potential output and its 
components evolve from the mid-1990s until the 
crisis?
 • During the crisis: What happened to the level and 
growth rate of potential output and its components 
during the crisis?
 • Where are we headed? What is the likely trajectory 
of potential output in the medium term (2015–20)? 
What are the policy implications? 
The chapter starts with an overview of the concept 
and measurement of potential output used in the analy-
sis. The subsequent sections then address each question 
in turn. The chapter’s main findings are as follows:
 • Before the crisis, potential growth began to decline 
in advanced economies while it increased in emerg-
ing market economies. In both cases, these dynamics 
were attributable mostly to changes in total factor 
productivity growth. In advanced economies, the 
decline reflected mainly a slowdown following a 
period of exceptional growth due to innovations in 
information technology, whereas in emerging market 
economies, the increase reflected mainly structural 
transformation. 
 • In the aftermath of the crisis, potential growth 
declined in both advanced and emerging market 
economies. Unlike previous financial crises, the 
global financial crisis is associated not only with a 
reduction in the level of potential output, but also 
with a reduction in its growth rate. In advanced 
economies, potential growth declined by about ½ 
percentage point, owing to reduced capital growth—
particularly in the euro area countries analyzed in 
the chapter—and demographic factors not related to 
the crisis. In emerging market economies, potential 
growth declined by about 2 percentage points, with 
lower total factor productivity growth accounting 
for the entire decline. 
 • Looking forward, potential growth in advanced 
economies is expected to increase slightly, from an 
average of about 1.3 percent during 2008–14 to 
1.6 percent during 2015–20. This growth is well 
below precrisis rates (2¼ percent during 2001–07) 
and stems from the negative effect of demographic 
factors on potential employment growth and the 
Mexico, Russia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. See Annex 3.1 for details. Data limitations preclude the 
analysis for Argentina, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. 
Estimates for the European Union—the 20th economy in the 
G20—and the euro area are based on individual country estimates 
for France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.
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Figure 3.2.  WEO Medium-Term Growth Projections
(Percent)
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Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: WEO medium-term growth projections are five-year-ahead growth forecasts.
Economy groups are defined in Annex 3.1.
Medium-term growth expectations have steadily been revised downward since 
2011 for both advanced and emerging market economies.
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gradual increase in capital growth from current rates 
as output and investment recover from the crisis. 
In emerging market economies, potential growth 
is expected to decline further, from an average of 
about 6.5 percent during 2008–14 to 5.2 percent 
during 2015–20. The decline is the result of popula-
tion aging, structural constraints affecting capital 
growth, and lower total factor productivity growth 
as these economies get closer to the technological 
frontier. 
Reduced prospects for potential growth in the 
medium term have important implications for policy. 
In advanced economies, lower potential growth will 
make it more difficult to reduce high public and 
private debt ratios. It is also likely to be associated 
with low equilibrium real interest rates, meaning that 
monetary policy in advanced economies may again be 
confronted with the problem of the zero lower bound 
if adverse growth shocks materialize. In emerging 
market economies, lower potential growth will make it 
more challenging to rebuild fiscal buffers. 
This chapter’s findings suggest that increasing 
potential output will need to be a policy priority in 
major advanced and emerging market economies. The 
reforms needed to achieve this objective vary across 
countries. In advanced economies, continued demand 
support is needed to offset the effects of protracted 
weak demand on investment and capital growth as well 
as on structural unemployment. In addition, poli-
cies and reforms that can increase supply should be 
adopted, such as product market reforms and higher 
spending on research and development, education, 
infrastructure, and policies to improve labor supply 
incentives. In emerging market economies, higher 
infrastructure spending is needed to remove critical 
bottlenecks, and structural reforms must be directed at 
business conditions, product markets, and education. 
Potential Output: A Primer 
Potential output is defined as the level of output 
consistent with stable inflation (no inflationary or 
deflationary pressure). In the short term, actual output 
will deviate temporarily from potential as shocks hit 
the economy. These deviations reflect the slow adjust-
ment in wages and prices to shocks, which means that 
the reversion of output to its potential level is gradual. 
This slow adjustment due to “sticky” wages and prices 
is a key tenet of the New Keynesian macroeconomic 
framework used in this chapter. 
The short-term divergence of actual from potential 
output is referred to as the output gap, or economic 
slack, and is an important concept for policymakers 
seeking to stabilize an economy. For example, output 
below potential (a negative output gap) implies that 
there is underemployment (excess supply) of capital 
and labor, which would prompt a looser macroeco-
nomic policy stance, all else equal.
The economic definition of potential output differs 
from the widely used concept of trend output, because 
it relies on an explicit framework based on economic 
theory. Trend output, in contrast, is derived from 
simple statistical data filtering using various forms of 
moving averages or deterministic trends. This is equiva-
lent to smoothing actual GDP over time, based on the 
implicit assumption that an economy is, on average, in 
a state of full capacity, without incorporating informa-
tion from variables such as inflation or unemployment. 
Central banks and other policy institutions typically 
rely on the economic definition of potential output 
because the underlying economic framework allows pol-
icymakers to gauge the short-term trade-offs between 
output, inflation, and slack in the labor market. 
The economic definition also differs from the con-
cept of “sustainable” output, which seeks to capture 
macroeconomic stability more broadly. More specifi-
cally, output can be at potential (that is, without gen-
erating inflationary or deflationary pressure) but still 
not be sustainable. As discussed in more detail in Box 
3.1, the reason is the possible presence of domestic or 
external macroeconomic imbalances (such as excessive 
credit growth).3 These imbalances may subsequently 
lead to a sharp decline in potential output once they 
are corrected. However, assessing these imbalances in 
real time has proven to be difficult. 
The definition of potential output used in this 
chapter is implemented empirically using multivari-
ate filtering techniques (Blagrave and others 2015). 
These techniques feature a simple model that incorpo-
rates information on the relationship between cycli-
cal unemployment—defined as the deviation of the 
unemployment rate from the structural unemployment 
rate or, more specifically, the nonaccelerating infla-
tion rate of unemployment (NAIRU)—and inflation 
3The concept of sustainable output is related to external sustain-
ability, especially in the context of small open economies. For 
example, rapid credit growth can be fueled by capital inflows and 
current account deficits. The policy norms specified in the context of 
the IMF External Balance Assessment reflect some of these consider-
ations (IMF 2013).
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(Phillips curve) on one hand and between cyclical 
unemployment and the output gap (Okun’s law) on 
the other. These relationships are given by the follow-
ing equations:
pt = pet + dut + etp, (3.1)
ut = tyt + etu, (3.2)
in which pt is inflation, yt is the output gap, ut is cyclical 
unemployment, pet is inflation expectations, and etp and 
et
u are shock, or disturbance, terms. The parameters in 
these equations (d, t)—or equivalently the strength of 
the aforementioned economic relationships—are esti-
mated separately for each country, and together with data 
on actual output growth, inflation, and unemployment 
they provide an economic basis for identifying potential 
output and the NAIRU, which are unobserved.4 In addi-
tion, the analysis uses Consensus Economics forecasts for 
both growth and inflation to help pin down the model’s 
expectations for these variables: for example, if consensus 
expectations are for higher growth, the model-consistent 
expectation for growth would also tend to be higher, 
all else equal (see Annex 3.2 for complete details on the 
multivariate filtering framework). 
Two situations help illustrate how the multivariate 
filtering framework uses the information from eco-
nomic data to estimate potential. First, if at a point in 
time, actual inflation is below inflation expectations and 
unemployment is above the estimated equilibrium rate, 
the framework will identify a situation of excess supply 
(a negative output gap), all else equal. Second, consider 
a more complicated situation in which inflation rises 
sharply in one year but with no corresponding decrease in 
unemployment: these conflicting signals suggest a shock 
to inflation rather than excess demand (a positive output 
gap). In the second case, the multivariate filtering frame-
work will assign a lower positive output gap than would 
otherwise be the case, especially if the rise in inflation 
in a given year unwinds in the following year—which is 
not uncommon following a sharp change in commodity 
prices or an increase in the value-added-tax rate.
In sum, the multivariate filtering framework speci-
fied in this chapter strikes a balance between statistical 
4Although the estimated parameters are not time varying, recent 
evidence suggests that a great deal of the flattening of the Phillips 
curve relationship, which links inflation to cyclical unemployment 
(the parameter d in equation 3.1), likely occurred before 1995, 
suggesting that the estimated parameters in this analysis should be 
broadly stable over the estimation period 1996–2014 (Chapter 3 in 
the April 2013 World Economic Outlook).
filters, which are easily applicable to a wide range of 
countries but are atheoretical, and structural models of 
potential output, which offer greater theoretical rigor 
but are difficult to construct and apply broadly. 
As a caveat, it should be noted that potential output 
is not directly observable. Therefore, the estimates are 
subject to statistical and model uncertainty. The latter 
implies that the estimates tend to vary depending on 
the underlying methodology. In practice, however, the 
different methodologies deliver qualitatively similar 
results regarding the trajectory of potential output in 
advanced and emerging market economies, which is 
the focus of this chapter (see Annex 3.2).
With the estimates of potential output and the NAIRU 
in hand, the analysis proceeds to investigate the drivers of 
potential growth using a growth accounting framework. 
This framework describes how the economy’s potential 
output is determined by the basic factor inputs (capital, 
labor) and productivity (total factor productivity). Specifi-
cally, the growth accounting framework is based on a 
standard Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y‒t = A
‒
t KtaL
‒
t
1–a,  (3.3)
in which Y‒t is potential output, Kt is the stock of 
productive capital, L‒t is potential employment, A
‒
t is 
potential total factor productivity—which includes 
human capital—and is measured as a residual, and a 
is the share of capital in potential output.5 Potential 
employment is then decomposed into the NAIRU, 
the working-age population, and the trend labor force 
participation rate:
L‒t = (1 – U
‒
t) WtLF
‒PR‒t, (3.4)
in which U‒t is the NAIRU as estimated in the multi-
variate filter, Wt is the working-age population, and 
LF‒PR‒t is the trend labor force participation rate. The 
decomposition of potential employment also shows 
how demographic factors affect potential growth. Two 
variables play a key role in this regard: working-age 
population and trend labor force participation rates. 
The former is a function of the same variables as 
population growth more broadly. For example, declines 
in fertility rates slow future working-age population 
5The measure of productive capital is consistent with the approach 
of estimating capital services (that is, excluding housing). See Beffy 
and others 2006 for a detailed discussion.
The residual is likely also to include utilization of the inputs of 
production (labor and capital)—such as hours worked and capacity 
utilization, labor quality (that is, human capital accumulation), and 
possible measurement errors in the inputs of production.
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growth. The second demographic dimension is the age 
composition of the working-age population, which 
affects the aggregate participation rate, since the pro-
pensity to participate in the labor force starts declining 
steeply beyond a particular age threshold, typically in 
the early 50s. An increased share of older people in the 
population therefore lowers the average participation 
rate and thereby potential employment.6
Trend labor force participation rates are estimated 
using cohort-based models of participation. The cohort 
model allows for the estimation of trend labor force 
participation for each age-gender group, accounting for 
observables as well as age-gender-specific and birth-year-
specific unobservable determinants of labor supply. For 
example, the labor force participation decision of youths 
typically depends on school enrollment rates, while that 
of prime-age women depends on educational attain-
ment, marital status, and fertility rates. Older work-
ers’ labor force participation typically increases with 
higher life expectancy but decreases with the generosity 
of social security systems. Across all ages, particularly 
among women, participation is strongly influenced by 
cultural and institutional factors that evolve slowly and 
can shift the lifetime participation profile of different 
cohorts. For each country, group-specific trend partici-
pation rates are obtained based on these determinants, 
after the cyclical effects are purged. These estimates are 
then combined with data on the demographic distribu-
tion to compute the aggregate trend labor force partici-
pation rate (see Annex 3.3 for details). 
Looking Back: How Did Potential 
Growth Evolve before the Crisis? 
From the early 2000s until the global financial crisis, 
world potential growth was rising, but this masked 
a divergence across economies. Potential growth was 
actually declining in advanced economies, while it was 
increasing in emerging market economies (Figure 3.3). 
These patterns held for most countries within each group 
(Figure 3.4).7 The following analysis shows that in both 
country groups the changes in potential growth were 
attributable mostly to changes in total factor productivity 
growth. Given the marked differences in the direction of 
changes and the underlying drivers, the results are pre-
sented separately for the two groups of economies.
6Demographic factors may also affect productivity (see, for exam-
ple, Feyrer 2007) and investment (see, for example, Higgins 1998).
7A notable exception is Russia, where potential growth declined 
during 2001–07, from about 6.0 percent to about 5.1 percent.
Advanced Economies 
In advanced economies, potential growth declined 
during the period, from about 2.4 percent to about  
1.9 percent (Figure 3.5, panel 1). A drop in total factor 
productivity growth from about 0.9 percent to about 
0.5 percent accounted for most of the decline. Poten-
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Figure 3.3.  Precrisis Potential Output Growth Evolution
(Percent)
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Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: Economy groups are defined in Annex 3.1.
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From the late 1990s until the global financial crisis, world potential growth was 
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tial employment growth fell only slightly, while capital 
growth remained broadly stable. 
Total Factor Productivity Growth
Several developments may explain the decline in 
total factor productivity growth. First, in the United 
States, whose technological development is com-
monly regarded as representing the world frontier, the 
growth in total factor productivity started to decline 
in 2003. This decline seems to reflect the waning of 
the exceptional growth effects of information and 
communications technology as a general purpose 
technology observed in the late 1990s to early 2000s 
(Fernald 2014a, 2014b).8 In particular, industry-level 
data suggest that the slowdown in U.S. total factor 
8The reduced dynamism of the U.S. economy—as measured by 
rates of firm entry and job creation and destruction—may have also 
contributed to the observed decline (Decker and others 2013). 
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Figure 3.5.  Determinants of Potential Output Growth in 
Advanced Economies
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In advanced economies, potential growth declined in 2001–07 because of lower 
total factor productivity growth, resulting in part from a decline in human capital 
growth. Potential employment growth fell only slightly as a result of demographic 
factors. Growth in the capital stock remained stable.
Sources: Barro and Lee 2010; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: Human capital is measured as the percentage of people in the population over 
15 years old who have secondary education or higher. Advanced economies are 
defined in Annex 3.1. Cap. gr. = capital growth; LFPR = labor force participation 
rate; NAIRU = nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment; pot. emp. gr. = 
potential employment growth; pot. output gr. = potential output growth; TFP gr. = 
total factor productivity growth (including human capital growth); WAP = working- 
age population.
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productivity growth occurred mainly in sectors that 
produce or intensively use information and commu-
nications technology. The decline in U.S. total factor 
productivity growth may, in turn, have spilled over to 
other advanced economies (Box 3.2). Second, total fac-
tor productivity growth in many advanced economies 
declined as a result of a shift of resources away from 
sectors with high productivity (such as manufactur-
ing and information and communications technology) 
toward those with low productivity (such as personal 
services, construction, and nonmarket services) (Box 
3.3; Dabla-Norris and others, forthcoming).
In addition, human capital growth—which is a 
component of total factor productivity growth as used 
in this chapter—declined during 2001–07, from about 
1.1 percent to about 0.6 percent (Figure 3.5, panel 2).9 
This decline partly reflects a reduction in the marginal 
return to additional education as educational attain-
ment in these economies increases (Johansson and 
others 2013; Riosmena and others 2008).10
Potential Employment Growth
Potential employment growth fell slightly during 
2001–07, from about 0.9 percent to about 0.6 percent 
(Figure 3.5, panel 3). The cause was demographic 
factors, which reduced the growth rate of the working-
age population and the trend labor force participation 
rate.11 
On average, the growth in the working-age popula-
tion (ages 15 and older) declined slightly during the 
period: the effect of smaller young cohorts (because 
of reduced fertility in most advanced economies) was 
partly offset by the maturing of postwar baby boom 
cohorts. In some European countries, including Italy 
and Spain, increased immigration spurred working-age 
population growth. In Japan and Korea, working-age 
population growth has been on a steep downward 
9Human capital is measured by the formal level of schooling 
obtained, given limited data availability of measures of educational 
quality, including skills acquired—such as the PISA (Programme 
for International Study Assessment)—for some emerging market 
economies analyzed in the chapter. Specifically, human capital 
accumulation is measured as the percentage of secondary and tertiary 
schooling in a population (Barro and Lee 2010). Using other indica-
tors of human capital accumulation, such as the number of years of 
schooling, produces a similar pattern.
10This measure of human capital is, in practice, bounded, with the 
maximum given by the entire population having tertiary schooling. 
This implies a limit to human capital growth in the long term.
11See Annex Figure 3.3.1 for the evolution of demographic pro-
files in advanced economies.
trend because of the absence of immigration and 
declining birth rates since the 1980s. 
Another outcome of this demographic transition is 
the increasing average age of the population. People 
older than the prime working age (that is, older than 
54) have a lower propensity to participate in the labor 
force. Therefore, population aging has been lowering 
trend participation rates, which on average has lowered 
employment growth by about 0.2 percentage point a 
year. At the same time, higher rates of female partici-
pation in the labor force in most advanced economies 
increased the average labor force participation rate by 
roughly the same amount as aging reduced it, leading 
to only a modest decline in overall potential employ-
ment growth. Two notable cases in which potential 
employment growth has been slowing more markedly 
are the United States—where the rate of female partici-
pation has flattened—and Japan, where aging pressures 
have been too strong to be offset by the modest rise in 
the rate of female participation.
Capital Growth
Growth in the capital stock remained stable during 
the period (Figure 3.5, panel 1) as the modest increase 
in the investment-to-capital ratio was offset by the 
increase in capital depreciation (Figure 3.5, panel 4).12 
Emerging Market Economies 
In emerging market economies, potential growth 
increased from about 6.1 percent to about 7.4 percent 
during 2001–07 (Figure 3.6, panel 1). While this 
exceptional growth was partly driven by China’s strong 
performance, potential growth also increased substan-
tially in other emerging market economies during this 
period, from about 3.7 percent to about 5.2 percent 
(Figure 3.3, panel 3). 
The acceleration in total factor productivity explains 
the bulk of the increase in potential growth in emerg-
ing market economies during the period. In addition, a 
sustained increase in investment-to-capital ratios drove 
the increase in capital accumulation growth. In con-
trast, potential employment growth declined because 
of demographic factors. 
Total Factor Productivity Growth
Total factor productivity growth increased from about 
3.2 percent to 4.2 percent in the period ( Figure 3.6, 
12The investment-to-output ratio followed a similar pattern.
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panel 1). Possible explanations for this increase include 
(1) an expansion of global and regional value chains, 
which stimulates technology and knowledge transfers 
(Dabla-Norris and others 2013); (2) shifts of resources 
to higher-productivity sectors, particularly in China, 
India, Mexico, and Turkey (McMillan and Rodrik 
2011); (3) greater diversification, which tends to con-
centrate exports in sectors characterized by technology 
spillovers and upgrading of product quality (Papageor-
giou and Spatafora 2012; Henn, Papageorgiou, and 
Spatafora 2014); and (4) productivity gains associated 
with structural reforms (Cubeddu and others 2014). 
Human capital growth declined from about 2.3 
percent to about 1.9 percent in the period (Figure 3.6, 
panel 2), with the notable exception of Turkey, where 
it increased. As for advanced economies, this decline 
partly reflects a lower marginal return to additional 
education as attainment increases.
Potential Employment Growth
Demographic factors contributed to a decline in poten-
tial employment growth, from about 1.5 percent to about 
1.0 percent during the period (Figure 3.6, panel 3).13 
Decreases in fertility (generally associated with 
higher incomes) markedly reduced the growth rate of 
the working-age population during the period, though 
from much higher levels than in advanced econo-
mies.14 The growth slowdown was sharpest in China, 
where the rate declined by half, from about 2 percent 
to 1 percent during the five years starting in 2003. In 
other emerging market economies, particularly Mexico, 
working-age population growth was stable at about 2 
percent. In addition, participation rates of young and 
prime-age workers in China, India, and Turkey have 
been trending downward, reflecting wealth effects and 
increased pursuit of education.
Rising life expectancy and falling fertility also led to 
an overall aging of the working-age population during 
the period, which in turn exerted downward pressure 
on average participation rates. These forces, which 
were strongest in China and Russia, lowered potential 
employment growth during 2001–07 by 0.2 percent-
age point a year on average. 
Capital Growth
Capital growth increased, from about 5.9 percent to 
about 8.2 percent, during 2001–07 (Figure 3.6, panel 
4), contributing about 0.7 percentage point to the 
increase in potential growth (Figure 3.6, panel 1). This 
acceleration in capital accumulation was driven by the 
strong increase in the investment-to-capital ratio during 
the period—from about 11.6 percent to about 14.1 
percent (Figure 3.6, panel 4). The ratio was boosted by 
strong growth in the terms of trade and more favorable 
13See Annex Figure 3.3.1 for the evolution of demographic pro-
files in emerging market economies.
14Various theories have been put forward in the demographic and 
growth literature about the factors driving the demographic transi-
tion of falling fertility associated with higher income. One causal 
channel that has received empirical support is the reduction in child 
and infant mortality. See Kalemli-Ozcan 2002 for a review of the 
literature.
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In emerging market economies, potential growth increased in 2001–07 on the 
back of strong total factor productivity growth—despite a marked decline in 
human capital growth—and capital growth. In contrast, demographic factors 
contributed to the decline in potential employment growth. 
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financing conditions, including lower interest rates in 
advanced economies (Cubeddu and others 2014). 
How Did Potential Growth 
Evolve during the Crisis? 
The previous section shows that potential output 
growth in advanced economies was slowing even 
before the global financial crisis, whereas it was rising 
in emerging market economies. Shortly after the crisis 
hit in September 2008, economic activity collapsed, 
and more than six years after the crisis, growth is 
still weaker than was expected before the crisis. The 
protracted weakness in economic activity suggests that 
it partly relates to weaker potential output, not just 
cyclical factors. A key question is whether persistent 
lower growth reflects mostly temporary effects from 
crisis-related changes in the level of potential output 
or whether this crisis, unlike earlier ones, has also 
triggered a decline in potential growth. This section 
examines this question theoretically and empirically.
How Can Financial Crises Affect Potential Growth? A 
Theoretical Framework
Financial crises may permanently reduce the level of 
potential output through a number of channels: invest-
ment in productive capital, potential employment, 
total factor productivity, and sectoral reallocation of 
resources. Declines in the level of potential output 
will also temporarily reduce potential growth, but it 
is harder to make the case on theoretical grounds that 
financial crises permanently reduce potential growth, as 
the following discussion illustrates.
 • Investment in productive capital: Financial crises can 
lower potential output through their negative effects 
on investment in productive capital. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the collapse in economic activity during 
the global financial crisis can explain much of the 
decline in investment, and financial factors are an 
important transmission channel. For example, as 
the supply of credit becomes more limited, firms 
may face less advantageous financing terms and 
tighter lending standards for an extended period 
(Claessens and Kose 2013).15 Moreover, financial 
crises weaken firms’ incentives to invest because 
15Financial crises differ from other types of recessions in that they 
are often associated with “creditless recoveries” (Claessens and Ter-
rones 2012; Claessens and Kose 2013).
risks and uncertainty about expected returns tend 
to increase (Pindyck 1991; Pindyck and Solimano 
1993). Financial crises may permanently reduce 
the level of potential output and have long-lasting 
effects on potential growth if investment-to-capital 
ratios remain depressed for an extended period.16 As 
output and investment recover from crises, capital 
will return to its equilibrium growth path, but more 
gradually since it is a slow-moving variable.17
 • Structural unemployment: Severe financial crises, 
which tend to be followed by long and deep reces-
sions, may lead to a permanent decline in the level 
of potential output by increasing structural unem-
ployment or the NAIRU as a result of hysteresis 
effects (Blanchard and Summers 1986; Ball 2009). 
This is particularly the case for economies with 
rigid labor market institutions (Blanchard and 
Wolfers 2000; Bassanini and Duval 2006; Bernal-
Verdugo, Furceri, and Guillaume 2013). Increases 
in the NAIRU will lead to a temporary decline in 
the growth rate of potential employment and thus 
potential output, but such growth effects will vanish 
in the medium term as the NAIRU stabilizes. 
 • Labor force participation rates: Financial crises may 
also reduce the level of potential output by lead-
ing to a persistent or even a permanent reduction 
in participation rates. High unemployment rates 
may discourage workers from searching for jobs 
(discouraged-worker effect) and force them to exit 
the labor force (Elmeskov and Pichelman 1993). 
This is particularly the case for older workers and 
in countries where social transfer programs provide 
early retirement incentives (Nickell and Van Ours 
2000; Autor and Duggan 2003; Coile and Levine 
2007, 2009). Again, while this channel can lead to 
16Capital stock growth is equal to the ratio of investment to the 
previous year’s capital minus the depreciation rate: 
DKt/Kt–1 = It/Kt–1 – dt,
in which K is the stock of capital, I the level of investment, and d 
denotes capital depreciation. Moreover, the ratio of investment to 
the previous year’s capital can be further decomposed as
It/Kt–1 = (1 + g) × It–1/Kt–1,
in which g is the growth rate of investment. This identity shows 
that as investment growth picks up, capital growth will increase, 
but more gradually, since its evolution depends also on the lagged 
investment-to-capital ratio (It–1/Kt–1). 
17In balanced growth, the capital-to-output ratio is constant. After 
a shock, the ratio will eventually return to its equilibrium growth 
path because of the economy’s mean reversion tendencies. Hall 
(2014) argues that the recovery from the shortfall in U.S. capital 
may take place only gradually over a decade or more.
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temporarily lower potential output growth, it will 
ultimately have only level effects.
 • Sectoral reallocation: Financial crises may also 
increase the level of structural unemployment 
through sectoral reallocation, to the extent that job 
separations are associated with substantial realloca-
tion costs (Loungani and Rogerson 1989; Figura 
and Wascher 2010; Reifschneider, Wascher, and 
Wilcox 2013). Sectoral reallocation may also affect 
the level of potential output by reducing productiv-
ity levels if the displaced capital is highly specific 
to the affected sector (Ramey and Shapiro 2001). 
However, sectoral reallocation has an uncertain 
effect on aggregate productivity because labor may 
reallocate from high- to low-productivity sectors 
and vice versa.18 Possible damage to productivity 
could persist and could reduce potential growth for 
an extended period given sufficiently long-lasting 
reallocation.
 • Total factor productivity: Financial crises can have 
conflicting effects on total factor productivity, and 
the net effect is impossible to specify in advance. 
On one hand, financial crises may lower total factor 
productivity by reducing investment in innovation 
through research and development, which is highly 
procyclical. On the other hand, such crises may also 
tend to raise total factor productivity to the extent 
that they give firms a stronger incentive to improve 
their efficiency and by leading to “creative destruc-
tion” or Schumpeterian growth (Aghion and Howitt 
2006).
The specific effect of financial crises on the human 
capital component of total factor productivity (as 
used in this chapter) is also ambiguous. On one hand, 
human capital accumulation can be countercycli-
cal because, during downturns, firms have more of 
an incentive to reorganize and retrain (Aghion and 
Saint-Paul 1998b) and because individuals may spend 
more time learning given the lower returns to work-
ing (Aghion and Saint-Paul 1998a; Blackburn and 
Galindev 2003). On the other hand, human capital 
accumulation may decrease during recessions because 
of reduced “learning by doing” (Martin and Rogers 
1997, 2000). 
18Data availability limitations preclude an examination of this 
channel for the global financial crisis, but Box 3.4 shows that it 
has played a significant role in explaining the adverse effect of past 
financial crises on overall productivity.
In sum, while possible adverse effects of financial 
crises may permanently reduce the level of total factor 
productivity and therefore lead to temporary declines 
in its growth rate, they are unlikely to have long-term 
effects on growth (Hall 2014). 
Potential Growth in the Aftermath of the Global 
Financial Crisis
This section examines the evolution of potential 
growth in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 
advanced and emerging market economies and assesses 
whether the theoretical considerations regarding the 
transmission channels are borne out in the data. 
The analysis presented in the section shows that 
potential growth has declined in both advanced and 
emerging market economies in the aftermath of the 
crisis.19 This decline was sharpest immediately after 
the crisis (2008–10), but potential growth had not yet 
recovered to precrisis rates as of 2014. This suggests 
the possibility of persistent effects on growth, which 
distinguishes the global financial crisis from other 
financial crises: previous work examining earlier crises 
has not found that these episodes affect the growth rate 
of potential output (Cerra and Saxena 2008; October 
2009 World Economic Outlook, Chapter 4; Furceri and 
Mourougane 2012). However, the results of the analy-
sis also highlight that some of the decline in poten-
tial growth should not be attributed to the crisis. In 
advanced economies, there are continued effects from 
demographic trends. In emerging market economies, 
the factors responsible for this decline are more dif-
ficult to identify and could include developments not 
related to the crisis, such as convergence of total factor 
productivity to the technological frontier and reduced 
growth in input utilization—such as hours worked 
and capacity utilization—and in the stock of human 
capital.
Advanced Economies
In advanced economies, potential growth fell from 
slightly less than 2 percent in the precrisis period 
(2006–07) to about 1½ percent during 2013–14. 
The decline was larger in euro area economies (about 
½ percentage point) than in the United States and in 
other advanced economies (about ⅓ percentage point).
19See Annex 3.4 for an econometric analysis of the possible effects 
of the crisis on the levels and the growth rates of potential output in 
advanced and emerging market economies. 
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For advanced economies as a whole, the decline 
in potential growth can be attributed to an impor-
tant extent to the effect of the global financial crisis 
on investment (see Chapter 4) and thus on capital 
growth (Figure 3.7, panels 1–4). In particular, capital 
growth declined by about 0.8 percentage point in the 
aftermath of the crisis, contributing to a reduction in 
potential growth of about ¼ percentage point dur-
ing the same period. This effect is larger for euro area 
countries (0.4 percentage point)—possibly because 
of tighter financial conditions—than for the United 
States (about ¼ percentage point) and other advanced 
economies (0.15 percentage point). 
Potential employment growth also declined, from 
about 0.8 percent to about 0.4 percent over this 
period, contributing to a reduction in potential growth 
of about ¼ percentage point (Figure 3.7, panels 5–8). 
The decline in potential employment growth was larger 
in euro area economies (0.6 percentage point) than 
in the United States (0.3 percentage point) and other 
advanced economies (0.4 percentage point). How-
ever, it appears that this persistent decline in potential 
employment growth is not associated with scars from 
the crisis (namely, the change in the NAIRU and 
in labor force participation rates). Specifically, the 
temporary effects on growth from crisis-related changes 
in the NAIRU and labor force participation rates had 
worn off as of 2014. Instead, the persistent decline 
is attributable to demographic factors that negatively 
affected the growth of the working-age population and 
labor participation rates. 
Similarly, the short-term effects of the crisis on total 
factor productivity growth observed during 2008–09 
have already completely unwound.20 In 2014, total fac-
tor productivity growth is estimated to have returned 
to the rates observed immediately before the crisis. 
Emerging Market Economies
In emerging market economies, potential growth 
declined from about 7½ percent in the precrisis period 
(2006–07) to about 5½ percent during 2013–14 
(Figure 3.8, panel 1). Although this decline was driven 
by the significant reduction in potential growth in 
China (about 3 percentage points) (Figure 3.8, panel 
2), potential growth also declined substantially in 
other emerging market economies during this period, 
20This result is consistent with previous evidence on the effect of 
the crisis on U.S. total factor productivity growth (Fernald 2014a, 
2014b; Hall 2014).
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: Economy groups are defined in Annex 3.1. LFPR = labor force participation 
rate; NAIRU = nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment.
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In advanced economies, the decline in potential growth during the global financial 
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explained by demographic factors. The effect of the global financial crisis on total 
factor productivity has completely unwound.
Figure 3.7.  Components of Potential Output Growth during the 
Global Financial Crisis in Advanced Economies
(Percent)
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from about 5½ percent to 3½ percent (Figure 3.8, 
panel 3). For emerging market economies as a group, 
the decline in total factor productivity growth—from 
about 4¼ percent to about 2¼ percent during this 
period—accounted for the entire decline in potential 
growth (Figure 3.8, panel 1). In contrast, potential 
employment growth remained broadly stable, and 
capital growth was not affected by the crisis and actu-
ally increased temporarily—likely because of some 
countries’ efforts to counter the effects of the crisis by 
adopting investment stimulus measures.
The fact that almost all of the decline in post-
crisis potential output growth in emerging market 
economies results from a decline in total factor 
productivity growth—measured as a residual in the 
growth- accounting framework—does not fit easily 
with theoretical predictions. Although this decline may 
partly reflect the higher volatility in measured total 
factor productivity in emerging market economies—
which in turn might reflect greater measurement errors 
(Cubeddu and others 2014)—other factors could be at 
work. These factors could include a gradual slowdown 
in convergence to the technological frontier after rapid 
catchup in the decade before the crisis, reduced growth 
in input utilization, and lower human capital growth.21 
Where Are We Headed? 
What is the likely trajectory of potential output in 
the medium term? To answer this question, this section 
considers prospects for the components of potential 
growth—labor, capital, and total factor productivity—
in the medium term, which is defined here as the six-
year period from 2015 to 2020. The scenario presented 
in the section builds on the previous analysis of the 
evolution of potential growth until now and extends it, 
based on projected demographic patterns and the expe-
rience from past financial crises.22 This scenario should 
be considered as illustrative, given the considerable 
uncertainty surrounding many elements of the analysis, 
including possible errors in demographic projections, 
alongside the wide variations in the experience with 
previous crises.
21In emerging market economies, human capital growth declined 
by about 1 percentage point during the crisis (see Annex Figure 
3.5.1).
22Demographic projections are based on estimates of fertility and 
mortality rates, and net migration flows. See the UN World Popula-
tion Prospects: The 2012 Revision (http://esa.un.org/wpp/) for details.
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In emerging market economies, the decline of potential growth during the global 
financial crisis is mainly explained by a reduction in total factor productivity growth. 
Potential employment and capital growth were not affected by the crisis.
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Advanced Economies
The medium-term outlook for potential growth is 
constructed by considering the prospects for each of its 
components:
 • Potential employment growth is expected to decline 
further compared with precrisis rates. This decline 
entirely reflects demographic factors, which nega-
tively affect both the growth of the working-age 
population and trend labor force participation rates 
(Figure 3.9, panel 1). The negative growth effects 
from crisis-related changes in the levels of structural 
unemployment and labor force participation rates 
have already worn off, as discussed previously.
Working-age population growth is likely to decline 
significantly in most advanced economies, particularly 
Germany and Japan, where it will reach about –0.2 
percent a year by 2020.23 At the same time, rapid aging 
is expected to further decrease average trend labor 
force participation rates, offsetting the positive effect of 
continued population increases on overall labor supply. 
This decline is projected to be strongest in Canada, 
where aging alone should reduce the overall partici-
pation rate by more than 2 percentage points in the 
medium term. Overall, potential employment growth 
in advanced economies is expected to decline by about 
0.2 percentage point compared with precrisis rates.
 • Capital growth is likely to remain below precrisis 
rates through 2020. 
As discussed in the theoretical framework, if 
 investment-to-capital ratios remain below precrisis lev-
els for an extended period, capital growth will return 
to its equilibrium growth path only very gradually. 
In other words, the contribution of capital growth to 
potential output may stay low for a long time. The key 
question, therefore, is what the experience from past 
financial crises suggests about the likely trajectory of 
the investment-to-capital ratio—which determines the 
rate of capital stock growth, given depreciation rates—
in the medium term.24
The evidence from the aftermath of previous finan-
cial crises suggests that full reversal of the decline in 
the investment-to-capital ratio by 2020 is unlikely. 
Econometric estimates suggest that there are significant 
and long-lasting declines in the investment-to-capital 
23In the case of Germany, this decline could be partly offset if 
recent exceptional net immigration flows persist and exceed those 
projected in the 2012 revision of the UN World Population Prospects. 
24Capital stock growth is equal to the investment-to-capital ratio 
minus the depreciation rate.
–0.6
–0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.9
1.2
2002–07 08–14 15–20
Figure 3.9.  Effect of Demographics on Employment Growth
(Percent)
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Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: Economy groups are defined in Annex 3.1.
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Net effect
Potential employment growth is expected to decline further in both advanced and 
emerging market economies compared to precrisis rates. This is a result of 
demographic factors negatively affecting both the growth of the working-age 
population and trend labor force participation rates.
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ratio after financial crises (Figure 3.10, panel 1). Typi-
cally, the decline in this ratio is about 1.7 percentage 
points six years after the crisis. This estimated medium-
term effect matches the estimated postcrisis decline in 
the investment-to-capital ratio in advanced economies 
up to 2014.25 Part of the decline may also reflect firms’ 
responses to lower labor force growth, which makes it 
possible to maintain the capital-per-worker ratio with 
less investment. If investment ratios in advanced econ-
omies remain low for as long as they have in previous 
financial crises, capital stock growth will remain below 
precrisis rates—at about 1¾ percent. This, in turn, will 
lower potential growth by about 0.2 percentage point 
compared with precrisis rates.
 • The deceleration in total factor productivity levels 
observed before the crisis is likely to be lasting, 
implying that total factor productivity growth will 
return to rates seen immediately before the crisis, 
but not higher. 
The findings of this chapter suggest that trend total fac-
tor productivity growth began declining before the crisis. 
Even though the effect of the crisis has faded, total factor 
productivity growth is unlikely to return rapidly to the 
exceptionally high rates observed in the early 2000s—
although this possibility cannot be dismissed—especially 
in regard to the many European countries without siz-
able information and communications technology sectors 
(European Commission 2014).26 In addition, human 
capital growth—a component of total factor productiv-
ity growth as used in the chapter—is also expected to 
slow down as the marginal return to additional education 
decreases (see Annex Figure 3.5.1, panel 1).
Emerging Market Economies
The prospects for evolution of the components of 
potential growth in emerging market economies are as 
follows:
 • Potential employment growth is expected to decline 
further in the medium term. As in advanced econo-
mies, this reflects demographic factors’ drag on both 
the growth of the working-age population and trend 
25These results are in line with the permanent effect of financial 
crises on the investment-to-output ratio found in previous studies 
(Furceri and Mourougane 2012; April 2014 World Economic Out-
look, Chapter 3).
26As illustrated by Byrne, Oliner, and Sichel (2013), views about 
the future pace of total factor productivity growth vary considerably. 
See Gordon 2012, Gordon 2014, and Mokyr 2014 for a debate 
about long-term perspectives on productivity in the United States. 
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Figure 3.10.  Investment-to-Capital Ratio
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In both advanced and emerging market economies, the investment-to-capital ratio 
is likely to remain below precrisis rates over the medium term.
Sources: Laeven and Valencia 2014; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: In panel 1, the blue line represents the effect of the global financial crisis, and 
red lines represent the effect of previous financial crises (based on Laeven and 
Valencia 2014), on the investment-to-capital ratio. Dashed red lines denote 90 
percent confidence bands. Economy groups are defined in Annex 3.1.
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labor force participation rates (Figure 3.9, panels 2 
and 3). 
Working-age population growth is likely to slow faster, 
most sharply in China, and remain negative in Russia. 
Aging is expected to accelerate, lowering trend labor 
force participation rates and, together with slower popu-
lation growth, reducing potential employment growth 
from 0.5 percent to 0.1 percent a year in the medium 
term. Again, this effect should be strongest in China, but 
it should also be strong in Brazil, particularly if growth 
in female participation rates remains at levels observed 
in recent years. Overall, potential employment growth in 
emerging market economies is expected to decline fur-
ther by about 0.6 percentage point in the medium term.
 • Capital growth is expected to slow further from cur-
rent rates, following a gradual decline in investment 
after the boom years of the 2000s (see Box 4.1).
Investment-to-capital ratios have already fallen by 1.2 
percentage points since 2011, leading to a reduction 
in capital growth of about 0.15 percentage point for 
the same period (Figure 3.10, panels 2 and 3), and are 
likely to remain below precrisis rates. This is because 
of less favorable external financing conditions, softer 
or flat commodity prices, and infrastructure bottle-
necks. In the case of China, the investment-to-capital 
ratio—and hence capital growth—may continue to 
decline because of a rebalancing of growth away from 
investment and toward consumption. In particular, 
if investment-to-capital ratios remain at the rates 
observed in 2014 in emerging markets excluding 
China, and gradually decline in China in the medium 
term as a result of rebalancing, capital growth will 
remain ½ percentage point below precrisis rates.
 • Total factor productivity growth is expected to remain 
below its precrisis rates for the next five years. 
Total factor productivity growth is likely to rise moder-
ately in the medium term as some crisis-related factors 
wear off. However, it is assumed to regress toward its 
historical mean rate (Pritchett and Summers 2014) 
and remain below precrisis rates as these economies 
approach the technological frontier. Taking China as an 
example, if total factor productivity growth follows the 
typical convergence process, starting from the country’s 
current level of income, it may decline in the medium 
term by about ¾ percentage point compared with its 
precrisis rates (Nabar and N’Diaye 2013).27 Further-
more, the reduction in emerging market total factor 
27This decline may be partly mitigated if the shift away from 
investment-led growth leads to a more efficient allocation of resources.
productivity growth may be amplified by the reduction 
in total factor productivity growth in the United States 
observed since the mid-2000s through technological 
spillovers. Finally, as for advanced economies, human 
capital growth is also likely to decline gradually as edu-
cational attainment increases toward advanced econo-
mies’ levels (see Annex Figure 3.5.1, panels 2–3). 
Putting It All Together
These scenarios for the components imply that 
potential growth in advanced and emerging market 
economies is likely to remain below precrisis rates. In 
particular, in advanced economies, potential growth is 
expected to increase only slightly from current rates—
from an average of about 1.3 percent during 2008–14 
to about 1.6 percent during 2015–20. In emerging 
market economies, potential growth is likely to decline 
even further, from an average of about 6.5 percent 
during 2008–14 to about 5.2 percent during 2015–20. 
In China, the decline could be even larger because of 
the rebalancing of growth away from investment and 
toward consumption (Figure 3.11).28
These scenarios are subject to significant uncertainty. 
In some advanced economies, especially in the euro 
area and Japan, a protracted period of weak demand 
could further erode labor supply and investment and 
thus potential growth. In emerging market economies, 
28These scenarios are based on the following assumptions: 
For advanced economies: (1) potential employment grows in line 
with demographic factors, adjusted for medium-term NAIRU 
estimates obtained using the multivariate filter, which suggest a 
decline in NAIRU of about 3.3 percentage points by 2020; (2) 
the investment-to-capital output ratio remains at 2014 rates in the 
medium term; and (3) total factor productivity growth remains at 
the precrisis (2003–07) average in the medium term. 
For China: (1) potential employment grows in line with 
demographic factors, adjusted for medium-term NAIRU estimates 
obtained using the multivariate filter, which suggest a decline in the 
NAIRU of about 1.1 percentage points by 2020; (2) the investment-
to-capital output ratio declines by about 1.5 percentage points 
by 2020 as a result of growth rebalancing, consistent with WEO 
projections; and (3) total factor productivity growth increases gradu-
ally from its 2014 value (by 0.2 percentage point by 2020) because 
of growth rebalancing—consistent with WEO projections—while 
remaining below its historical average. 
For other emerging market economies: (1) potential employment 
growth is in line with demographic factors, adjusted for medium-
term NAIRU estimates obtained using the multivariate filter, which 
suggest a decline in the NAIRU of about 4.8 percentage points by 
2020; (2) the investment-to-capital output ratio remains at 2014 
rates in the medium term; and (3) total factor productivity growth 
converges to historical (2001–14) averages in the medium term 
(2015–20).
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a number of country-specific factors could influence 
potential growth. In particular, geopolitical risks could 
affect potential growth in Russia. In addition, potential 
growth prospects for commodity exporters such as Bra-
zil and Russia depend on the evolution of commodity 
prices, as the latter is likely to affect investment and 
capital growth. In China, potential growth prospects 
will depend crucially on the growth-rebalancing 
process. And in both advanced and emerging market 
economies, substantial uncertainty remains about the 
evolution of total factor productivity growth in the 
medium term. Finally, these scenarios do not assume 
policy changes that could boost potential growth in the 
medium term.
Summary Findings and Policy Implications 
From the early 2000s to 2007 (the year before the 
onset of the global financial crisis), potential output 
was accelerating strongly in emerging market econo-
mies but decelerating in advanced economies. 
The crisis was associated with a reduction in poten-
tial growth for both groups of economies. The findings 
of this chapter suggest that potential growth declined 
in advanced and emerging market economies by ½ and 
2 percentage points, respectively, following the crisis. 
The chapter’s analysis also suggests that in advanced 
economies, potential growth is likely to increase only 
slightly from current rates, but to remain below pre-
crisis rates in the medium term. In particular, employ-
ment growth has declined and is likely to decline 
further because of demographic factors, and capital 
growth is likely to remain below precrisis rates even as 
output and investment recover from the crisis. 
In emerging market economies, potential growth 
is likely to decline further, as potential employment 
growth is expected to slow. Because of less favorable 
external financing conditions and structural constraints, 
capital accumulation growth is likely to remain below 
precrisis rates in these economies, especially in China, 
where it may decline further as growth shifts toward 
consumption. And without policy changes, the growth 
of total factor productivity is not likely to return to its 
high precrisis rates in emerging market economies, given 
the expected further movement of these economies 
toward the technological frontier. 
Reduced prospects for potential growth in the medium 
term have important implications for policy. In advanced 
economies, lower potential growth makes it more difficult 
to reduce still-high public and private debt. It is also likely 
to be associated with low equilibrium real interest rates, 
meaning that monetary policy in advanced economies 
may again be confronted with the problem of the zero 
lower bound if adverse growth shocks materialize. In 
emerging market economies, lower potential growth 
makes it more challenging to rebuild fiscal buffers. For 
all economies, a total factor productivity growth rate that 
remains below precrisis rates will slow the rise in living 
standards relative to the precrisis years.
These difficulties imply that raising potential output 
is a priority for policymakers. The reforms needed 
to achieve this objective vary across countries. In 
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In advanced economies, potential output growth is expected to increase only 
slightly from current rates as some crisis-related factors wear off, but to remain 
below precrisis rates. In emerging market economies, potential output growth is 
expected to decline even further as a result of lower total factor productivity 
growth and potential employment growth.
C H A P T E R 3 W H E R E A R E W E H E A D E D? P E R S P E C T I V E S O N P OT E N T I A L O U T P U T
 International Monetary Fund | April 2015 85
advanced economies, there is a need for continued 
demand support to boost investment and thus capital 
growth (Chapter 4) and for adoption of policies and 
reforms that can permanently boost the level of poten-
tial output, as well as its growth rate in the medium 
term. These policies would involve product market 
reforms, greater support for research and develop-
ment—including strengthening patent systems and 
adopting well-designed tax incentives and subsidies in 
countries where they are low—and more intensive use 
of high-skilled labor and information and communica-
tions technology capital inputs to tackle low produc-
tivity growth (Box 3.5; OECD 2010); infrastructure 
investment to boost physical capital (Chapter 3 in the 
October 2014 World Economic Outlook); and better 
designed tax and expenditure policies to boost labor 
force participation, particularly for women and older 
workers (IMF 2012). 
In emerging market economies, the important 
structural reforms to improve productivity include 
removing infrastructure bottlenecks, improving busi-
ness conditions and product markets, and hastening 
education reform. In particular, removing excessively 
restrictive regulatory barriers in product and labor 
markets, liberalizing foreign direct investment, and 
improving education quality and secondary and ter-
tiary attainment can have large productivity payoffs in 
many emerging market economies (Dabla-Norris and 
others 2013). In addition, in some of these economies, 
there is scope to address distortions from high labor 
tax wedges and inefficient pension design (IMF 2012).
Annex 3.1. Data Sources and Country Groupings
Country Groupings
In Figures 3.1 and 3.2, “World” encompasses 
the 189 economies that form the statistical basis of 
the World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. 
“Advanced economies” comprises the 36 economies 
listed in Table B of the Statistical Appendix. “Emerg-
ing market economies” refers to the economies listed 
in Table E of the Statistical Appendix, excluding those 
noted there as low-income developing countries.29
For the rest of the figures, the members of the 
advanced and emerging market economy groupings in 
the chapter’s analyses are shown in Annex Table 3.1.1. 
These include 10 advanced economies and 6 emerging 
29See the Statistical Appendix for further information on the 
WEO’s classification of countries into economy groups.
market economies from the Group of Twenty (G20); 
these 16 economies accounted for about three-fourths 
of world GDP in 2014. Data limitations preclude the 
analysis for three G20 economies—Argentina, Indone-
sia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. Estimates for the 
European Union—the 20th economy in the G20—
and the euro area are based on individual country 
estimates for France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.
Data Sources
The primary data sources for the chapter are the 
WEO database and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) database. All 
data sources used in the analysis are listed in Annex 
Table 3.1.2. 
Annex 3.2. Multivariate Filter Methodology
Baseline Approach
The estimates of potential output presented in this 
chapter are computed using a small macroeconomic 
model, referred to as a multivariate filter. The structure 
of the model is as follows:30
The output gap is defined as the deviation of actual 
(log) real output from (log) potential output (Y‒ ):
y = Y − Y‒ . (A3.2.1)
The stochastic process for output (measured by real 
GDP) comprises three equations:
Y‒t = Y
‒
t–1 + Gt + etY
‒, (A3.2.2)
Gt = qGSS + (1 – q)Gt–1 + etG, (A3.2.3)
yt = fyt–1 + ety. (A3.2.4)
30Further details are available in Blagrave and others 2015.
Annex Table 3.1.1. Countries Included in the 
Analysis
Advanced Economies
Australia Japan
Canada Korea
France Spain
Germany United Kingdom
Italy United States
Emerging Market Economies
Brazil Mexico
China Russia
India Turkey
WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: UNEVEN GROWTH—SHORT- AND LONG-TERM FACTORS
86 International Monetary Fund | April 2015
The level of potential output (Y‒t) evolves according 
to potential growth (Gt ) and a level-shock term (etY
‒), 
which can be interpreted as supply-side shocks. Poten-
tial growth is also subject to shocks (etG), with their 
impact fading gradually according to the parameter q 
(with lower values entailing a slower reversion to the 
steady-state growth rate following a shock). Finally, 
the output gap is also subject to shocks (ety), which are 
effectively demand shocks. 
To help identify the three aforementioned output 
shock terms (etY
‒, etG, and ety), a Phillips curve equation 
for inflation is added, which links the evolution of the 
output gap (an unobservable variable) to observable 
data on inflation. In this way, the filter’s estimates of 
the output gap are, in part, determined by inflation 
outcomes:31
pt = lpt+1 + (1 – l)pt–1 + byt + etp. (A3.2.5)
In addition, equations describing the evolution of 
unemployment are included to provide further identi-
31The degree to which inflation outcomes influence estimates of 
the output gap in a given country depends on the estimated strength 
of the relationship between the two (b) and the persistence of any 
deviation of inflation from target (since a short-lived deviation of 
inflation from target tends, all else equal, to be interpreted by the fil-
ter as an inflation shock rather than being associated with an output 
gap). Recent evidence (see Chapter 3 in the April 2013 WEO) sug-
gests that there has been considerable flattening in the Phillips curve 
during the past several decades, but that much of this flattening took 
place before the start of the sample period, which begins in 1996.
fying information for the estimation of the aforemen-
tioned output shocks and output gap:
U‒t = t4U
‒SS + (1 – t4)U
‒
t–1 + gU
‒
t + etU
‒, (A3.2.6)
gU‒t = (1 – t3)gU
‒
t–1 + etgU
‒, (A3.2.7)
ut = t2ut–1 + t1yt + etu, (A3.2.8)
ut = U
‒
t − Ut. (A3.2.9)
In these equations, U‒t is the equilibrium value of 
the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment 
(NAIRU), which is time varying and subject to shocks 
(etU
‒) and variation in the trend (gU‒t), which is itself 
also subject to shocks (etgU
‒)—this specification allows 
for persistent deviations of the NAIRU from its 
steady-state value. Most important, equation (A3.2.8) 
is an Okun’s (1970) law relationship, in which the gap 
between actual unemployment (Ut) and its equilibrium 
process (U‒t) is a function of the amount of slack in the 
economy ( yt). As such, this equation behaves in much 
the same way as equation (A3.2.5): it dictates that 
estimates of the output gap are, in part, determined 
by deviations of the unemployment rate from the 
NAIRU. 
The empirical implementation of the filter requires 
data on just three observable variables: real GDP 
growth, consumer price index inflation, and the unem-
ployment rate. Annual data are used for these variables 
for the 16 countries considered. Parameter values and 
Annex Table 3.1.2. Data Sources
Indicator Source
Potential Output Growth and Its Components
Potential output growth IMF staff estimates using multivariate filter
Capital OECD, Economic Outlook: Statistics and Projections database
Working-age population UN, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision 
Labor force participation
OECD, Labour Force Statistics database; and International Labour 
Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Market database
Nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment IMF staff estimates using multivariate filter
Indicators Used in the Potential Output Growth and Cohort Model Estimations
Inflation expectations Consensus Economics
Gross domestic product growth expectations (constant prices) Consensus Economics
Life expectancy UN, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision 
Fertility UN, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision 
Years of schooling Barro and Lee 2010
Investment OECD, Economic Outlook: Statistics and Projections database
Depreciation rate OECD, Economic Outlook: Statistics and Projections database
Others
Gross domestic product (constant prices) IMF, World Economic Outlook database
Inflation IMF, World Economic Outlook database
Unemployment IMF, World Economic Outlook database
Human capital accumulation Barro and Lee 2010
Financial crises Laeven and Valencia 2014
Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; UN = United Nations.
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the standard errors for the variances of shock terms for 
these equations are estimated using Bayesian estima-
tion techniques.32
Data on growth and inflation expectations are 
added to the model’s core structure, in part to help 
identify shocks during the sample period, but mainly 
to improve the accuracy of estimates at the end of the 
sample period:
pCt+j = pt+j + ep
C
t+j,  j = 0, 1, (A3.2.10)
GROWTHCt+j = GROWTHt+j + et+jGROWTH
C,  
 j = 0, . . . , 5,  (A3.2.11)
in which pCt+j and GROWTHCt+j are Consensus Eco-
nomics forecasts of inflation and GDP growth, 
respectively. The addition of these equations imparts 
some additional stability to the filter’s model-consis-
tent growth and inflation expectations estimates. In 
particular, the inclusion of the epCt+j and et+jGROWTH
C 
terms allows Consensus Economics forecasts to influ-
ence, but not override, the model’s own expectations 
process (which is dictated by the model’s estimates of 
slack in the economy) when potential output is being 
estimated. 
Alternative Approaches
Estimates of potential output are inherently uncer-
tain—because this variable is not observable—and 
may vary across different estimation methodologies. To 
illustrate the possible sensitivity of estimates of poten-
tial output to different statistical techniques, this sec-
tion compares the baseline results with those obtained 
using (1) the Hodrick-Prescott statistical filter, and  
(2) for emerging market economies, a modified version 
of the multivariate filter excluding the Okun’s (1970) 
law relationship (that is, equations A3.2.6–A3.2.9). 
This second alternative approach seeks to reduce 
possible measurement errors stemming from limited 
unemployment data quality.
The results in Annex Figure 3.2.1 suggest that these 
alternative methodologies produce qualitatively similar 
findings to those presented in the chapter text. In par-
ticular, in advanced economies, the decline in potential 
growth started in the early 2000s and was worsened by 
32See Hamilton 1994 for a general discussion of the Kalman filter, 
which is used to obtain estimates of the unobservable variables as 
part of the estimation process. Estimates for each country are avail-
able in Blagrave and others 2015.
the global financial crisis. In emerging market econo-
mies, in contrast, it began only after the crisis.
Annex 3.3. Estimating Trend Labor 
Force Participation Rates 
This annex describes the methodology used to estimate 
trend labor force participation rates for the 16 advanced 
and emerging market economies considered in the chap-
ter (see Annex 3.1) from 1980 to 2013. The methodol-
ogy relies on a cohort-based model—as, for example, in 
Aaronson and others 2014 and Balleer, Gomez-Salvador, 
and Turunen 2014—to decompose the aggregate partici-
pation rate into the participation rates of disaggregated 
age-gender groups and estimate their determinants. 
Model
For each age group a, gender g, in year t, the time 
series of group-wise labor force participation rates 
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Annex Figure 3.2.1.  Potential Output Growth
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Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: Economy groups are defined in Annex 3.1. HP = Hodrick-Prescott filter 
with smoothing parameter equal to 6.25; MVF = multivariate filter.
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(in logs) is estimated according to the following 
specification:33
 1 1988
log LFPa,g,t = aa,g + —    ∑    bb,g Ia,t(t – a = b) na b=1920
 2
+ ∑ g la,gcyclet–l + la,gXa,g,t + ea,g,t. (A3.3.1) l=0
This specification is estimated separately for each coun-
try. Group-specific labor force participation rates have 
four main categories of determinants: 
 • An age-gender-specific intercept captures the average 
labor force participation rate for each age group to 
reflect the life cycle (bell-shaped) pattern of labor 
supply: low for youth, increasing and flattening 
during prime age, and decreasing as retirement age 
approaches. This life cycle pattern can differ for men 
and women. 
 • Slowly evolving cultural and behavioral changes can 
shift the whole life cycle participation profile up 
or down, depending on the birth year of an entire 
cohort. Such unobservable cohort effects have been 
widely documented for women born during the 
baby boom years in the United States (for example, 
Aaronson and others 2014), and similar evolu-
tions are taking place in many European and Asian 
countries. These cohort effects are captured by a 
fixed effect (I) for each birth year b (depending on 
data availability for a particular country; the analysis 
accounts for cohorts born between 1920 and 1988). 
To obtain the average cohort effect for a given age 
group, the cohort coefficient is divided by the num-
ber of cohorts included in an age group na. 
 • The business cycle can have a different effect on 
the participation decisions of different age-gender 
groups. For example, the labor supply of young 
people is often more sensitive to cyclical condi-
tions than is that of mature prime-age workers. The 
coefficient g captures the cyclical sensitivity of each 
group’s labor force participation rate while allow-
ing for a partially delayed response of participation 
rates to cyclical conditions, consistent with existing 
evidence (see, for example, Balakrishnan and oth-
ers 2015). The cyclical position is proxied by the 
employment gap (that is, the deviation of current 
employment from its trend).
33The model is estimated in logs to ensure that the level labor 
force participation rate is bounded between zero and one.
 • The model includes structural factors that can have 
an impact on the trend labor force participation 
rate of particular age groups (vector X). For young 
people, the participation decision depends on educa-
tion enrollment status. For women, the participa-
tion decision is positively related to educational 
attainment and, during early prime working age, 
negatively correlated with fertility and marriage 
status. For workers close to statutory retirement 
age, increasing life expectancy is expected to lead to 
higher participation rates. 
Data and Estimation
For advanced economies, the sample consists of 
11 age groups (with four-year intervals), separated by 
gender, from 1980 to 2013; hence there are 11 equa-
tions that are jointly estimated for each gender using 
cross-equation equality restrictions on the cohort coef-
ficients. For emerging market economies, data avail-
ability is reduced by both age group granularity (only 
five age groups for each gender) and period coverage 
(1990–2013). 
Not all cohorts are observed for the same number of 
years, and in fact, no cohort is observed for the whole 
life cycle. In particular, cohorts born after 1990 entered 
the labor force only during or after the global finan-
cial crisis, making it hard to distinguish the negative 
effect of the crisis (beyond the average cyclical impact) 
from any potential cohort-specific trends. To mitigate 
this end-point problem (and a similar starting-point 
problem for the oldest cohorts), no cohort effect is 
estimated beyond 1988 or before 1920. An alterna-
tive version of the model is also estimated that allows 
the cohort effect of those born after 1988 and before 
1920 to equal the average of that for the adjacent 
five cohorts. The results are robust to this alternative 
specification. 
The effects of the other structural determinants for 
women, young people, and workers older than 54 
are explicitly estimated for advanced economies for 
which such data are available. It is well documented 
that the labor force participation rate for prime-age 
men in advanced economies has been trending down 
for the past several decades (see, for example, Aaron-
son and others 2014 and Balleer, Gomez-Salvador, 
and Turunen 2014), but there is no clear explanation 
regarding the factors behind this decline. This trend is 
captured by allowing for linear and quadratic deter-
ministic trends in the labor force participation rate 
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equation for prime-age men. For emerging market 
economies, because of data restrictions, the group 
trends are obtained by estimating a linear and qua-
dratic trend separately for each group. 
The analysis then evaluates each age-gender group’s 
labor force participation rate at the predicted trend 
rate with a zero cyclical gap and then weights each 
group by its respective population share to obtain the 
aggregate trend rate in each year. For the medium-term 
projection, existing cohorts are allowed to transition 
through the age distribution according to the estimated 
cohort age profile, with the assumption that enter-
ing cohorts do not experience any systematic shifts in 
their lifetime participation profiles relative to the last 
estimated cohort. Future values for structural variables 
in X are obtained by using life expectancy, fertility, and 
population projections from the UN Population and 
Development Database (medium-fertility scenario), 
linearly extrapolating the educational attainment vari-
ables, and keeping all other deterministic trends flat at 
the last observed level.
Finally, these estimates are then combined with data 
on demographic distributions to compute the aggregate 
trend labor force participation rate (Annex Figure 3.3.1).
Annex 3.4. Potential Output in the 
Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis 
The analysis presented in the chapter text shows that 
potential growth has declined in both advanced and 
emerging market economies in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis. The factors behind this decline 
are a reduction in capital growth and demographic 
trends in advanced economies and lower total factor 
productivity growth in emerging market economies. 
This annex tries to identify the effect of the crisis on 
the level and the growth rate of potential output using 
an econometric framework that controls for precrisis 
trends, common factors affecting the evolution of 
potential output in the aftermath of the crisis, and 
lagged potential output growth.34
The analysis follows the approach proposed by 
Jordà (2005) and expanded by Teulings and Zubanov 
(2014) by tracing out potential output’s evolution in 
the aftermath of the crisis (identified with a dummy 
34Although including lagged potential output helps control for 
various country-specific factors that influence potential output in the 
near term—since determinants affecting potential output are typi-
cally serially correlated—the methodology is not able to control for 
medium-term country-specific factors.
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that takes the value of 1 for 2008 and 0 otherwise). 
This approach has been advocated by Stock and 
Watson (2007) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 
(2013), among others, as a flexible alternative that 
does not impose dynamic restrictions embedded in 
vector autoregression (autoregressive distributed lag) 
specifications. 
Specifically, the method consists of estimating 
separate regressions for potential output at different 
horizons. More formally, the following econometric 
specification is estimated:
yi,t+k – yi,t–1 = aik + gtk + Slj=1 djkDyi,t–j
 + bkDt + Slj=1 qjkDt–j 
 + Skj –=10 rjkDt+k–j + eki,t+k , (A3.4.1)
in which the i subscripts index countries, the t sub-
scripts index time, and k denotes the horizon (years 
after time t) being considered; y denotes the (log) level 
of potential output; D is a crisis dummy that takes the 
value of 1 for 2008 and 0 otherwise; and ai and gt are 
country and time dummies, respectively.35 As sug-
gested by Teulings and Zubanov (2014), the specifica-
tion includes the forward leads of the crisis dummy 
between time 0 and the end of the forecast horizon to 
correct the impulse response bias inherent in local pro-
jection methods. The effects of the crisis on potential 
output growth are estimated by expressing the left side 
of equation (A3.4.1) in first differences ( yi,t+k – yi,t+k–1).
The model is estimated for each k. Impulse 
response functions are computed using the estimated 
coefficients bk. The confidence bands associated with 
the estimated impulse response functions are obtained 
using the estimated standard deviations of the coef-
ficients bk. The lag length (l ) for potential output 
and the crisis variable is determined to be equal to 
two years using standard selection criteria. Equation 
(A3.4.1) is estimated using heteroscedasticity- and 
autocorrelation-robust standard errors. A possible 
concern in the estimation of equation (A3.4.1) is 
reverse causality, because changes in potential output 
may affect the probability of occurrence of the global 
financial crisis. However, this empirical strategy 
partly addresses this concern by estimating changes in 
potential output in the aftermath of the crisis. More-
35The year dummy for 2008 is not included as a control.
over, robustness checks for reverse causality confirm 
the validity of the results.36 
Advanced Economies
The econometric estimates suggest that the global 
financial crisis was associated with a reduction in 
potential output in advanced economies of about 6½ 
percent, on average (Annex Figure 3.4.1, panel 1). 
The reduction in the euro area economies was about 
7¾ percent, that in the United States about 7 percent, 
and that in the other advanced economies about 5½ 
percent, although these differences from the aver-
age are not statistically significant. These findings are 
consistent with those of previous studies on the global 
financial crisis (for example, Ball 2014). In addition, 
the results suggest that six years after the crisis, about 
60 percent of the cumulative loss of actual output in 
advanced economies, on average, can be attributed to a 
decline in potential output—this share holds for most 
of the economies in the group—while the remaining 
part can be imputed to the cumulative loss in output 
gaps. In particular, by 2014, output gaps remain nega-
tive for most advanced economies.37
The persistent and increasing decline in the level 
of potential output also implies a reduction in its 
growth rate, of about 1.2 percentage points, on aver-
age (Annex Figure 3.4.1, panel 2). The differences in 
the loss of potential growth within the group mirror 
those for the level of potential output: for euro area 
economies, potential growth dropped by about 1.4 
percentage points, that for the United States by 
about 1.2 percentage points, and that for the other 
advanced economies by about 1 percentage point, 
and again the differences are not statistically signifi-
cant. These estimates are lower than those presented 
in the chapter text, as they capture the reduction in 
potential growth compared with precrisis averages 
rather than deviations from the 2006–07 period, 
when potential growth was already declining.
36Empirical tests suggest that the probability of the occurrence 
of the global financial crisis is not affected by past evolution of 
potential output. Similar results are also obtained using a two-step 
generalized-method-of-moments system estimator. 
37The average output gap for the sample of advanced economies in 
2014 is about –1.8 percent. 
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Emerging Market Economies
Results suggest that the global financial crisis was 
associated with a reduction in potential output in 
emerging market economies of about 5 percent, on 
average (Annex Figure 3.4.2, panel 1). As was observed 
for advanced economies, the results also suggest that 
much (about 70 percent) of the cumulative loss of 
actual output across emerging market economies can 
be attributed to a decline in potential output, with 
only small differences among these economies, while 
the remaining part can be imputed to the cumulative 
loss in output gaps. In particular, by 2014, output gaps 
remain slightly negative for most emerging market 
economies.38 
The crisis was also associated with a reduction 
in potential growth of about 1.6 percentage points 
(Annex Figure 3.4.2, panel 2), with a smaller decline 
38The average output gap for the sample of emerging market 
economies is about –0.7 percent. 
for China (1.2 percentage points) than for other 
emerging market economies (1.6 percentage points). 
Although these results are similar to those presented 
in the chapter text, the econometric estimates pre-
sented here identify deviations from precrisis averages, 
whereas the analysis presented in the chapter is based 
on deviations of potential growth from the record-high 
growth rates in 2006 and 2007.
Annex 3.5. Human Capital Growth Projections 
Human capital growth assumptions are based on 
the educational attainment projections using a cohort 
model by KC and others (2010). These projections are 
based on estimates of fertility and mortality rates and 
net migration flows, as well as education transition 
dynamics by five-year age groups. This last variable is 
projected on the assumption that the country’s future 
educational attainment expands based on global his-
torical trends. 
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Based on these assumptions, human capital growth 
is expected to decline in the medium term in both 
advanced and emerging market economies (Annex 
Figure 3.5.1). In particular, in advanced economies 
human capital growth is projected to decline by about 
¼ percentage point by 2020. The projected decline is 
larger in emerging market economies, from about 6½ 
percent in 2015 to about 5½ percent in 2020.
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Sustainable output is a theoretical benchmark intended 
to estimate an economy’s position in the absence of 
imbalances. Defined in this way, it seeks to identify finan-
cial or other macroeconomic imbalances and thereby 
signal the risk of a future disorderly adjustment. Recent 
examples of such imbalances are the credit and house 
price booms experienced by some of Europe’s crisis-hit 
economies. With the introduction of the euro, investor 
risk appetite rose and risk premiums fell, boosting credit, 
house prices, and growth. In hindsight it seems clear that 
GDP growth rates were above their sustainable levels and 
a correction was likely. The opposite held when the boom 
went bust during the Great Recession.
Assessing sustainable output is crucial for policymak-
ers. From a fiscal sustainability point of view, a reliable 
estimate of sustainable fiscal positions that are not 
perturbed by large shocks such as financial booms and 
busts will help prevent debt bias. For example, if the 
revenue flows linked to a booming housing sector can 
be correctly identified in real time as temporary, govern-
ment spending is less likely to be adjusted upward, and 
fiscal buffers can be built. In addition, a robust measure 
of sustainable output will also make it easier to assess 
the impact of structural reform on medium- and long-
term growth. Policymakers aiming to avoid sudden ups 
and downs of the economy—and the accompanying 
periods of high unemployment—might draw on sus-
tainable output as another indicator to signal the need 
for stabilization through fiscal or monetary policy. 
In this context, a measure of sustainable output 
incorporating financial variables may be particularly 
useful in formulating macroprudential policy. For 
instance, if taking into account financial variables 
would lead policymakers to believe that credit and 
house price growth was associated with a higher 
degree of overheating than suggested by conventional 
measures based on consumer price inflation, monetary 
policy might not be the most effective instrument 
to address the boom. Although higher interest rates 
can help, they can also be harmful for the rest of the 
economy. In such a case, more stringent macropruden-
tial policy measures might be even more useful and 
should, therefore, be launched first.1 
The authors of this box are Helge Berger, Mico Mrkaic, Pau 
Rabanal, and Marzie Taheri Sanjani. The analysis presented here 
draws on Berger and others, forthcoming.
1See, for example, Benes, Kumhof, and Laxton 2014, which 
assesses vulnerabilities associated with excessive credit expansions 
and asset price bubbles and the consequences of various macro-
A multivariate filter augmented with financial variables 
may help identify episodes of particularly high or low 
GDP growth that are unlikely to last. Whereas conven-
tional measures rely solely on the relationship between 
output and prices, these approaches add financial (and 
other) variables—in the model used here, the deviations 
of credit, house prices, and inflation from their own 
longer-term trends. The approach lets the data speak. 
If wide swings in output tend to occur along with wide 
swings in credit (or another variable), the filter’s estimates 
of sustainable output will ignore the former when deter-
mining the finance-neutral sustainable output. However, 
if credit provides little additional information, the model 
will produce results in line with conventional approaches.
For multivariate filter models augmented with financial 
variables to work and reduce the risk of misinterpret-
ing permanent shifts as temporary, it is important to 
exclude credit expansions associated with sound eco-
nomic fundamentals (for example, a higher level of credit 
growth due to financial deepening). The admittedly crude 
approach taken here is to restrict the information from 
financial variables to business cycle and higher frequen-
cies.2 Another challenge with such approaches is properly 
identifying episodes of unsustainable growth in real time. 
At the beginning of a credit expansion, it is extremely 
difficult for policymakers to diagnose whether the episode 
is associated with sound economic fundamentals or will 
develop into an unsustainable boom. In practice, while 
this methodology is capable of signaling possible risks 
of future disorderly adjustments, it is best used as a “fire 
alarm”: when the finance-neutral gap deviates from a con-
ventional output gap, policymakers should scrutinize the 
underlying reasons to reach a more conclusive diagnosis. 
The results of analysis employing the multivariate filter 
augmented with financial variables suggest that conven-
tional estimates may overestimate sustainable output dur-
ing credit and housing booms and underestimate it during 
busts. For example, in the case of some euro area econo-
mies with high borrowing spreads during the 2010–11 
sovereign debt crisis (notably Greece, Ireland, and Spain), 
the difference between actual and sustainable output when 
credit dynamics are taken into account—the finance-
neutral output gap—tends to be higher (lower) than the 
output gap derived from the relationship of inflation and 
prudential policies. Quint and Rabanal (2014) study the role of 
country-specific macroprudential policies in a currency union.
2The approach is close to that of Borio, Disyatat, and Juselius 
(2013) but differs in its estimation approach and the treatment of 
longer-term trends. See Berger and others, forthcoming, for details.
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output alone during episodes of high (low) credit growth 
(Figure 3.1.1).
A two-region dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium model with financial frictions at the household 
level and housing can be used to further assess the 
findings of the augmented multivariate filter for the 
euro area.3 The model incorporates an explicit role for 
leverage and credit risk. In this setting, it is possible 
to distinguish sustainable changes in output linked 
to a reduction in financial friction from credit-fueled 
growth. Seen through the lens of the model, the 
introduction of the euro led to a persistent decline in 
risk premiums, reduced financial friction, and lifted 
3See Rabanal and Taheri Sanjani, forthcoming, for details. The 
work builds on Furlanetto, Gelain, and Taheri Sanjani 2014 and 
Quint and Rabanal 2014.
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both GDP and sustainable output in the euro area 
economies with high borrowing spreads during the 
2010–11 sovereign debt crisis (Figure 3.1.2). However, 
by the mid-2000s, a housing and credit boom had 
taken hold in some euro area economies with high 
borrowing spreads during the 2010–11 sovereign debt 
crisis (notably Greece, Ireland, and Spain) that let 
actual GDP rise significantly above sustainable output. 
The crisis reversed most of this expansion after 2007, 
leading to an increase in country and housing risk pre-
miums, a credit bust, and a large output contraction.
Overall, the evidence discussed here suggests that 
financial variables can inform estimates of sustainable 
output—but more work is needed. The augmented 
multivariate filter approach lets the data speak but still 
requires numerous practical decisions that affect find-
ings and deserve further scrutiny. Real-time identifica-
tion of sustainable output also remains a challenge. 
Although dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
models may help identify the drivers of sustainable and 
potential output in a coherent way, their underlying 
structural assumptions also affect the results. Finally, 
more work is needed to link augmented multivariate 
filter estimates of sustainable output more rigorously to 
the flexible-price concept of potential output used in 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models.
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The growth in total factor productivity in the 
United States—whose technological development 
is commonly regarded as representing the world 
frontier—started to decline in 2003 as the exceptional 
growth effects of information and communications 
technology as a general-purpose technology observed 
in the late 1990s to the early 2000s began to wane 
(Fernald 2014a). Did the decline in U.S. total factor 
productivity spill over to other advanced econo-
mies? To answer this question, this box uses a novel 
approach to compute total factor productivity and 
takes an empirical look at spillovers from the United 
States to other advanced economies. 
Measuring total factor productivity growth is chal-
lenging. Typical measures of such growth are commonly 
estimated using the so-called Solow residual, or the 
part of actual output growth that is not accounted for 
by growth in factor inputs such as labor and capital. 
Unfortunately, these residual-based measures tend to 
include unobserved input utilization, which is highly 
procyclical. As a result, spillover analysis based on the 
Solow residual measure is likely to capture business 
cycle comovements rather than true total factor produc-
tivity spillovers. In the analysis presented in this box, a 
refined measure of total factor productivity is con-
structed using the procedure proposed by Basu, Fernald, 
and Kimball (2006) and Fernald (2014a, 2014b) to 
control for unobserved utilization in capital and labor.1 
Adjusted total factor productivity series are constructed 
using industry-level data for an unbalanced panel of 16 
advanced economies, for the period 1970–2007.2
In particular, the following production function is 
estimated for each industry i for each country:
dyi,t = gi dxi,t + bj dui,t + dtfpi,t, (3.2.1)
in which dy is output growth; dx is growth in observed 
input, defined as a linear combination of growth in 
capital, labor, and material input; du is growth in 
The authors of this box are Davide Furceri, Sinem Kilic Celik, 
and Annika Schnücker.
1Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) show that unobserved 
input utilization (labor effort and workweek of capital) can be 
proxied by observed input utilization (hours per worker).
2The included countries are Australia, Austria, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States for an unbalanced period between 1970 
and 2007. Data availability limitations preclude the analysis 
for recent years. The data sources are EU KLEMS and World 
KLEMS.
unobserved inputs measured by hours worked; and 
dtfp is total factor productivity growth.3 
The aggregate total factor productivity measure is 
then computed as the difference between the aggregate 
Solow residual and the aggregate utilization measure:4 
dtfp = dtfpsolow – du. (3.2.2)
As discussed in Basu, Fernald, and Kimball 2006, 
adjusted total factor productivity has three noteworthy 
features compared with the simple Solow residual: 
(1) there is limited contemporaneous comovement 
between output and adjusted total factor productivity 
growth, (2) hours worked is more negatively correlated 
with adjusted total factor productivity, and (3) the 
estimated factor utilization is negatively correlated 
with adjusted total factor productivity (Table 3.2.1).
Two econometric specifications are used to assess 
total factor productivity spillovers. The first establishes 
whether total factor productivity shocks in the United 
States materially affect total factor productivity in 
other advanced economies and is estimated as follows: 
tfpi,t+k – tfpi,t–1 
   = ai + bkdtfpUS,t + d(L)dtfpit + eit, (3.2.3)
3Specifically, growth in observed input is computed as dxi,t = 
sLidli + sKidki + sMi dmi, in which dl, dk, and dm are growth in 
employment, capital, and material input, respectively, and sA is 
the ratio of payments to input A in total cost.
The industries are grouped into three main sectors: nondurable 
manufacturing, durable manufacturing, and nonmanufacturing.
4The aggregate Solow residual and input utilization are 
 wicomputed as dtfpsolow = ∑i ——— (dyi – dxi) and du =  (1 – smi) 
 wi∑i ——–— gidtfpi , in which wi is the value-added share of each  (1 – smi)
industry in aggregate output.
Box 3.2. U.S. Total Factor Productivity Spillovers
Table 3.2.1. Properties of Adjusted Total Factor 
Productivity Compared with Solow Residual, 
Advanced Economies, 1970–2007
Solow 
Residual 
Utilization-
Adjusted TFP 
Correlation with Output 
Growth 
0.70 0.34
Correlation with Hours 
Worked 
–0.07 –0.15
Correlation with Factor 
Utilization 
0.13 –0.39
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: TFP = total factor productivity.
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in which tfp is the log of adjusted total factor pro-
ductivity, ai are country fixed effects, and dtfp is the 
growth rate of adjusted total factor productivity. The 
coefficient bk  measures the spillover effect of a 1 per-
cent change in the U.S. adjusted total factor produc-
tivity growth.
The second specification assesses the transmission 
channels of spillovers by allowing the response to vary 
with country-specific characteristics and the strength 
of trade linkages between each country and the United 
States and is estimated as follows:
tfpi,t+k – tfpi,t–1 = ai + gt + bk dtfpUS,t X–i–US 
 + d(L)dtfpit + eit, (3.2.4)
in which gt are time fixed effects; X
–
i–US are country-
specific characteristics including the country’s relative 
distance from the technological frontier—defined as 
the gap between its total factor productivity and that 
of the United States—and its trade and financial open-
ness vis-à-vis the United States.5 
The results suggest that changes in U.S. total fac-
tor productivity growth tend to spill over to other 
advanced economies. In particular, the econometric 
estimates imply that a 1 percent change in (shock to) 
U.S. total factor productivity growth leads to a 0.4 
percentage point increase in total factor productivity 
growth in other advanced economies in the medium 
term (Figure 3.2.1), with the effect reaching a peak 
four years after the shock.6 
The results also suggest that total factor productivity 
spillovers are larger in countries with higher foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflows from the United 
States and in countries that are technologically more 
removed from the United States (Table 3.2.2).7 In par-
5These variables have been typically found in the literature to 
be key transmission channels (for example, Coe and Helpman 
1995; Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister 2009; Rondeau and 
Pommier 2012). 
6As a robustness check, and to disentangle the spillover effects 
from U.S. total factor productivity growth from those associ-
ated with global factors affecting world total factor productivity 
growth, the average world (excluding the United States) total 
factor productivity was included in the analysis. The results, not 
reported here, are qualitatively similar and not statistically differ-
ent from those shown in Figure 3.2.1.
7Openness is measured by FDI (FDI inflows received by a 
country from the United States as a share of total FDI outflows 
from the United States) and distance from the technological 
ticular, the increase in total factor productivity growth 
in a country that is relatively strongly linked with the 
United States as measured by FDI flows (at the 75th 
percentile) is about 0.09–0.14 percentage point higher 
than in a country that has relatively low linkages (at 
the 25th percentile). The differential spillover effect on 
a country that is technologically more distant from the 
United States (at the 75th percentile) compared with 
a country that is less distant (at the 25th percentile) 
is about 0.13 percentage point. Other variables, such 
as trade openness, human capital accumulation, the 
stock of FDI, and research and development spending 
as a share of GDP, are found not to have statistically 
significant effects.
frontier by its total factor productivity gap with respect to the 
United States ((dtfpi,t – dtfpUS,t)/dtfpUS,t).
Box 3.2 (continued)
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Figure 3.2.1.  U.S. Total Factor Productivity 
Spillovers to Other Advanced Economies
(Percentage points; years on x-axis)
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: t = 0 is the year of the shock. Dashed lines denote 90 
percent confidence intervals. Impulse response functions are 
estimated using local projection and bias correction following 
Teulings and Zubanov 2014 with an unbalanced sample 
between 1970 and 2007.  
WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: UNEVEN GROWTH—SHORT- AND LONG-TERM FACTORS
98 International Monetary Fund | April 2015
Table 3.2.2. Transmission Channels
Linkages (1) (2) (3)
FDI to the United States 0.02***
(3.18)
0.03***
(3.29)
TFP Gap with Respect to the United States  0.01*
(1.92)
0.01***
(4.04)
R2 0.18 0.19 0.19
Number of Observations 365 365 365
FDI—Differential in TFP (percentage points) 0.09 0.14
TFP Gap—Differential in TFP (percentage points) 0.13 0.13
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are robust for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation within panels. All regressions include 
country and time fixed effects. The differential in TFP (in percentage points) measures the TFP effect of the shock in a country at the 75th percentile 
level of the variable examined compared with a country at the 25th percentile level. FDI = foreign direct investment; TFP = total factor productivity.
*p < .10; ***p < .01.
Box 3.2 (continued)
C H A P T E R 3 W H E R E A R E W E H E A D E D? P E R S P E C T I V E S O N P OT E N T I A L O U T P U T
 International Monetary Fund | April 2015 99
Patterns of total factor productivity growth at the 
aggregate (economy-wide) level can be indicative of 
structural changes, a falling pace of sector-specific inno-
vation, and waning impact of past reforms. This box 
examines sectoral patterns of total factor productivity 
growth to assess the drivers of aggregate performance in 
the years leading up to the global financial crisis.
The three decades leading up to the crisis saw the 
continued reallocation of factors out of agriculture and 
manufacturing and into services: indeed, by 2007, more 
than 75 percent of employment (by hours worked) in 
advanced economies was in services (Figure 3.3.1). This 
trend reflected technological change within industries, 
changes in domestic demand, and international trade 
that drove a process of structural transformation in 
which labor, capital, and intermediate inputs were 
reallocated toward services (Herrendorf, Rogerson, and 
Valentinyi 2013). Labor shares fell in fast-growing sec-
tors such as manufacturing and information and com-
munications technology (ICT) goods and services and 
rose in slower-growing sectors such as finance, personal 
services (for example, hotels and restaurants), nonmar-
ket services (for example, government administration, 
health, and education), and construction. This struc-
tural transformation also led to lower economy-wide 
total factor productivity growth: in many service sectors, 
productivity growth is much lower than in the rest of 
the economy because of limited scope for innovation 
and technical change (Baumol, Blackman, and Wolff 
1985) (Figure 3.3.2, panels 1 and 2). Indeed, sectoral 
reallocation contributed to a decline in economy-wide 
total factor productivity from about 0.11 during the 
1990–2007 period (Figure 3.3.2, panel 3).1 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, the ICT goods 
and services sector was a particularly bright spot in an 
otherwise gloomy landscape of declining total factor 
The authors of this box are Era Dabla-Norris and Kevin 
Wiseman. The analysis draws from Dabla-Norris and others, 
forthcoming.
1The contribution of sectoral reallocation to total factor pro-
ductivity is estimated by disaggregating total factor productivity 
growth into within and between sectoral total factor productivity 
changes applying the methodology by McMillan and Rodrik 
(2011) using the following specification: 
tfpt – tfpt–1 = ∑iωi,t–1(tfpi,t – tfpi,t–1) + ∑i tfpi,t (ωi,t – ωi,t–1),
in which tfp and tfpi refer to economy-wide and sectoral total 
factor productivity, respectively, and ωi is the value-added share of 
sector i in aggregate output. The contribution of sectoral realloca-
tion is then measured by between sectoral total factor productivity 
changes, which correspond to the second term in the equation.
productivity growth. Indeed, the explosion in total 
factor productivity growth in ICT-producing sectors 
in the United States spilled over into ICT-intensive 
sectors, fueling greater ICT capital deepening and a 
rise in total factor productivity in these sectors as well 
(Fernald 2014a, 2014b). However, by the early to 
mid-2000s, elevated total factor productivity growth in 
ICT production appeared to have run its course. Pro-
duction and capital deepening in the sector declined 
markedly in the years leading up to the global financial 
crisis, and total factor productivity growth in ICT-
intensive sectors followed suit, albeit with a slight lag 
(Figure 3.3.3). These dynamics may partly explain the 
Box 3.3. Total Factor Productivity Growth in Advanced Economies: A Look into Sectoral Patterns
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Figure 3.3.1.  Employment and Value Added, 
1980–2007
(Percent; PPP weighted)
1980 2007
Sources: EU KLEMS; World KLEMS; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: ICTGS = information and communications technology 
goods and services; PPP = purchasing power parity.
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estimated slowdown in U.S. total factor productivity 
growth in the years leading up to the crisis. In other 
advanced economies, ICT capital deepening played a 
smaller role, but the dynamics and timing were simi-
lar, with a comparable rise through the 1990s giving 
way to a subsequent slowdown.
Evidence from the distribution sector, which has 
seen the highest rate of total factor productivity 
growth within the services sectors, supports this view. 
Cumulative advances in ICT were diff used through 
the sector, with the rise of fi rms such as Walmart 
and Amazon (Lewis 2005) catalyzing high sectoral 
Box 3.3 (continued)
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Sources: EU KLEMS; World KLEMS; Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Bubble size denotes sectoral share in value added. In 
panel 1, “Other” refers to the agricultural, utilities, 
construction, and mining sectors. E = core Europe; H = euro 
area economies (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) with 
high borrowing spreads during the 2010–11 sovereign debt 
crisis; ICTG = information and communications technology 
goods; J = Japan; N = natural resource producers; PPP = 
purchasing power parity; TFP = total factor productivity; UK = 
United Kingdom; US = United States. 
Figure 3.3.2.  Selected Country Groups: Total 
Factor Productivity Growth in Goods and 
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Figure 3.3.3.  Information and 
Communications Technology Productivity 
Growth and Spillovers
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Sources: Corrado and others 2012; Fernald 2014a; Research 
Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan Industrial 
Productivity Database; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: ICT = information and communications technology.
1Euro area economies (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) 
with high borrowing spreads during the 2010–11 sovereign 
debt crisis.
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productivity growth. Some commentators have noted 
that these advances had been largely exploited by the 
precrisis 2000s and that productivity growth in the 
distribution sector was slowing across advanced econo-
mies (Figure 3.3.2, panel 2). The losses in productivity 
growth were partially offset by gains in “euphoric” sec-
tors such as finance in some economies; the postcrisis 
durability of these sectors remains to be seen.
Box 3.3 (continued)
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Financial crises can affect economy-wide labor 
productivity in two ways: (1) through their impact on 
labor productivity within each economic sector and 
(2) by inducing sectoral reallocations of labor. The 
effect of financial crises through the second channel 
(sectoral reallocation) is ambiguous, because labor can 
be reallocated between various high- and low-produc-
tivity sectors, with an unclear net effect on aggregate 
labor productivity. 
This box examines empirically the effect of financial 
crises on labor productivity, by estimating the role of 
each of these two transmission channels. Since data 
availability limitations do not allow an examination of 
these channels for the global financial crisis, the analy-
sis presented here is based on past financial crises.
The approach used to decompose aggregate pro-
ductivity into within- and between-sector productivity 
effects follows the methodology proposed by McMil-
lan and Rodrik (2011):
yt+k – yt–1 = ∑Ii=1 ωi,t–1( yi,t+k – yi,t–1) 
 + ∑Ii=1 yi,t+k(ωi,t+k – ωi,t–1), (3.4.1)
in which yt and yi,t refer to economy-wide and sectoral 
labor productivity levels, respectively, and ωi,t is the 
share of employment in sector i. The first term in the 
decomposition is the weighted sum of productivity 
growth within each sector, in which the weights are 
the employment share of each sector at time t. This 
term captures the within component of productivity 
growth. The second term is the part of labor produc-
tivity resulting from the reallocation of resources across 
different sectors and captures the between component 
of productivity growth. 
The analysis follows the approach proposed by Jordà 
(2005) by tracing the evolution of productivity growth 
in the aftermath of a financial crisis. It controls for 
precrisis trends, common factors affecting the evolu-
tion of productivity growth in the aftermath of the 
crisis, and lagged productivity growth. In particular, 
the following econometric specification is estimated:
xi,t+k – xi,t–1 = ack + gtk + ∑2j=1 djk ∆yt–j + bkDt 
 + ∑2j=1 qjk Dt–j + ∑jk=–01 rjk Dt+k–j 
 + eki,t+k,  (3.4.2)
in which xi,t denotes either the within or between 
effect of sectoral productivity growth for sector i at 
time t; y is economy-wide productivity growth; D is a 
crisis dummy that takes a value of 1 for crisis years, as 
identified by Laeven and Valencia (2014); and ac and 
gt are country and time fixed effects, respectively. The 
econometric specification also controls for lagged crisis 
effects and includes the bias correction suggested by 
Teulings and Zubanov (2014). 
Equation (3.4.2) is estimated for eight sectors in 
24 advanced economies during 1970–2007 for  
k = 0, . . . 5. The econometric estimates imply that 
financial crises typically have a statistically significant 
negative effect on labor productivity (Figure 3.4.1, 
panel 1). Specifically, labor productivity is estimated to 
decline on impact by about 2 percent, on average, and 
remain about 1½ percent below its precrisis rate five 
years after the crisis. Sectoral reallocation (the between 
Box 3.4. The Effects of Financial Crises on Labor Productivity: The Role of Sectoral Reallocation
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The author of this box is Juan Yépez Albornoz.
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effect) explains roughly half of the medium-term 
decline in labor productivity. This is because displaced 
labor in relatively high-productivity sectors—such 
as manufacturing and finance, and to a lesser extent 
construction—tends to move to low-productivity sec-
tors—such as personal services and nonmarket services 
(Figure 3.4.1, panel 2). 
These results are consistent with empirical evidence in 
previous studies (for example, Aaronson, Rissman, and 
Sullivan 2004) suggesting that finance and manufactur-
ing tend to contract more than other sectors during 
downturns, while employment in nonmarket services 
tends to be more resilient to changes in economic activ-
ity (for example, Kopelman and Rosen 2014). 
Box 3.4 (continued)
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This box examines the impact of structural reforms 
on sectoral total factor productivity. It relies on the con-
ceptual framework of “distance from the technological 
frontier” (Aghion and Howitt 2006, 2009; Acemoglu, 
Zilibotti, and Aghion 2006) to assess empirically the 
relative importance of a range of policy and structural 
factors across different industries and countries. Accord-
ing to this framework, the set of policies aimed at sus-
taining productivity growth in different industries and 
sectors can vary depending on the industry or sector’s 
distance from the technological frontier.
Two econometric specifications are used to assess the 
effect of structural reforms on total factor productivity. 
The first establishes whether changes in structural indica-
tors have a material impact on total factor productivity 
and whether the impact depends on the distance from the 
technological frontier. This specification controls for coun-
try- and industry-specific characteristics and common 
factors affecting total factor productivity, as well as for the 
total factor productivity gap with respect to the “global 
frontier”—defined as the highest level of total factor pro-
ductivity in the particular industry in a given year.1 
Because policy reforms and structural shocks can 
result in adjustment costs, particularly in a weak-
demand environment, it is useful to assess their pro-
ductivity impacts over time. Consequently, the second 
specification focuses on assessing the dynamic (short- 
and medium-term) impact of structural shocks—
identified by episodes of large changes in structural 
The authors of this box are Minsuk Kim and Aleksandra 
Zdzienicka. The analysis presented here draws on Dabla-Norris 
and others, forthcoming. 
1In particular, the econometric specification is estimated as 
follows:
∆yijt = b0 + b1∆yLjt + b2( yijt–1 – yLjt–1) + bk ∑k Xkijt–1 
 + bl ∑k Xlijt–1 ( yijt–1 – yLjt–1) + a1Di + a2Dj 
 + a3Dt + eijt,
in which subscripts i, j, and t denote country, industry, and year, 
respectively; subscript L denotes the country with the highest 
level of total factor productivity in industry j in a given year t 
(the global frontier); and ∆yijt is total factor productivity growth, 
which is regressed on the following explanatory variables: (1) the 
total factor productivity growth in the global frontier (∆yLjt); 
(2) the total factor productivity level gap with respect to the 
global frontier, measured by (yijt–1 – yLjt–1); (3) a set of policy and 
structural variables (Xkijt–1) and the interaction terms with the 
total factor productivity gap; and (4) country, industry, and year 
dummy variables. See Dabla-Norris and others, forthcoming, for 
details.
indicators—on total factor productivity.2 The analysis 
follows the approach proposed by Jordà (2005) by 
tracing the response of total factor productivity in the 
aftermath of these reforms. This is done by control-
ling for precrisis trends as well as for country- and 
industry-specific characteristics and common factors 
affecting the evolution of total factor productivity in 
the aftermath of the reforms.3 For both specifications, 
the sample consists of industry-level annual data from 
EU KLEMS, covering 23 market industries in 11 
advanced economies during 1970–2007.
 This box examines how institutional and product 
and labor market regulations affect efficiency and 
convergence to the frontier,4 which is important because 
more stringent regulations could curb total factor 
productivity growth by hindering efficient reallocation 
of resources across plants, firms, and industries. The 
regressions also include other industry-specific factors 
that drive expansion of the technological frontier and 
facilitate technology adoption, such as education (share 
of high-skilled labor in total labor), innovation (research 
and development [R&D] expenditure as a share of 
industry value added), and information and communi-
cations technology (ICT) use (ICT capital share of total 
capital), all from the EU KLEMS data set.
Econometric estimates obtained using the first specifi-
cation suggest that lower product market regulation and 
more intense use of high-skilled labor and ICT capital 
2See Dabla-Norris and others, forthcoming, for details. More-
over, the overall productivity gains are likely to depend on the 
magnitude of reforms and structural shocks.
3In particular, the econometric specification is estimated as 
follows:
tfpi,j,t+k – tfpi,j,t = b0k + b1kSi,j,t + b2kSi,j,ttfpgapi,j,t + b3k tfpgapi,j,t 
 + b4k∆tfpL,j,t + b5k ′Xit + a1kDi + a2kDj 
 + a3kDt + ei,j,t,
in which tfpijt is the log of real total factor productivity in coun-
try i, industry j, and year t and Sijt denotes reform dummies; 
the log of real total factor productivity at frontier industry j and 
the technological gap with respect to the frontier are indicated 
by tfpLjt and tfpgapijt , respectively; Di, Dj, and Dt are country, 
industry, and time dummies, respectively; Xit is a set of control 
variables, including recession and financial crisis dummies and 
GDP growth; and the estimated coefficients b1 and b2 capture 
the unconditional and conditional (given technological gaps) 
effects of reform at horizon k. See Dabla-Norris and others, 
forthcoming, for details.
4Both variables are taken from the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (Regimpact indicator and 
employment protection legislation index).
Box 3.5. The Effects of Structural Reforms on Total Factor Productivity
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inputs, as well as higher spending on R&D activities, 
contribute positively and with statistical significance to 
total factor productivity (Tables 3.5.1 and 3.5.2). The 
effects vary across sectors and are typically larger the 
closer the sector is to the technological frontier. For 
example, product market deregulation has larger posi-
tive total productivity effects in the services sector, but 
high-skilled labor and R&D expenditure have the stron-
gest effects in ICT-related sectors. To put these results 
in economic terms and provide a specific example, the 
estimates suggest that if Austria were to reduce its ser-
vices sector regulations to bring them in line with those 
of the Netherlands, the average total factor productivity 
growth gain across all industries could amount to about 
0.2 percentage point a year, and about 0.6 percentage 
point in the services sector. In contrast, labor market 
regulation is not found to have statistically significant 
effects on total factor productivity, possibly owing to 
difficulty in measuring the degree of labor market flex-
ibility across countries. Finally, the results from the first 
specification present evidence of productivity-enhancing 
knowledge spillovers from the frontier (captured by the 
coefficient of total factor productivity growth at the 
frontier) and a catchup convergence effect in “follower” 
countries (measured by the coefficient on the total fac-
tor productivity gap). 
The econometric estimates from the second speci-
fication confirm the results presented in Tables 3.5.1 
and 3.5.2 and suggest that reforms are typically associ-
ated with higher total factor productivity in both the 
short and the medium term (Figure 3.5.1). Overall, 
the results suggest a cumulative medium-term increase 
in the average total factor productivity levels across 
all industries following the implementation of key 
reforms, with the effect depending on the particular 
reform.5 The largest gains in total factor productiv-
5These increases represent 0.05 to 2 standard deviations of the 
average cumulative five-year change in the total factor productiv-
ity level in the sample.
Box 3.5 (continued)
Table 3.5.1. Impact of Product and Labor Market Frictions on Total Factor Productivity Growth
All Industries Manufacturing ICT-Related1 Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Annual TFP growth rate (Percent)
TFP Growth Rate at the Frontier 0.053
(0.014)***
0.052
(0.014)***
0.115
(0.031)***
0.025
(0.013)*
0.013
(0.011)
TFP Gap with Respect to the Frontier –0.110
(0.023)***
–0.099
(0.027)***
–0.093
(0.037)**
–0.053
(0.029)*
–0.060
(0.026)**
Product Market Regulation 0.717
(0.460)
0.945
(0.516)*
0.892
(0.786)
–0.199
(0.776)
–1.315
(0.445)***
Labor Market Regulation 0.825
(0.569)
0.645
(0.624)
0.895
(0.954)
0.395
(0.814)
0.451
(0.640)
Product Market Regulation
X TFP Gap
0.006
(0.007)
–0.006
(0.008)
–0.010
(0.010)
–0.017
(0.005)***
Labor Market Regulation
X TFP Gap
–0.008
(0.008)
–0.007
(0.012)
–0.014
(0.011)
–0.012
(0.011)
Product Market Regulation
X Manufacturing Dummy
–0.638
(0.424)
–1.255
(0.536)**
Product Market Regulation
X Service Dummy
–0.537
(0.192)***
–1.461
(0.366)***
Product Market Regulation
X TFP Gap X Manufacturing Dummy
–0.014
(0.012)
Product Market Regulation
X TFP Gap X Service Dummy
–0.021
(0.007)***
Number of Observations 4,646 4,646 2,424 1,616 1,414
Adjusted R 2 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.29 0.21
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: p-values are in parentheses. ICT = information and communications technology; TFP = total factor productivity.
1 Industries that produce ICT goods intensively.
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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Box 3.5 (continued)
Table 3.5.2. Impact of Information and Communications Technology, Human Capital, and Research and 
Development
All Industries Manufacturing ICT-Related1 Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Annual TFP growth rate (Percent)
TFP Growth Rate at the Frontier 0.043
(0.013)***
0.046
(0.013)***
0.089
(0.030)***
0.028
(0.016)*
0.005
(0.012)
TFP Gap with Respect to the Frontier –0.008
(0.005)
–0.026
(0.007)***
–0.043
(0.010)***
–0.076
(0.016)***
–0.038
(0.014)***
ICT Capital 0.024
(0.014)**
0.023
(0.022)
0.146
(0.053)***
0.000
(0.037)
–0.063
(0.037)*
High-Skilled Labor 0.047
(0.024)*
0.120
(0.028)***
0.077
(0.053)
0.183
(0.041)***
0.236
(0.057)***
R&D Expenditure 0.084
(0.048)*
0.195
(0.056)***
0.100
(0.082)
0.480
(0.119)***
0.387
(0.731)
ICT Capital
X TFP Gap
0.000
(0.000)
0.002
(0.001)**
0.000
(0.001)
–0.002
(0.001)**
High-Skilled Labor
X TFP Gap
0.002
(0.001)***
0.002
(0.001)
0.003
(0.001)***
0.003
(0.001)***
R&D Expenditure
X TFP Gap
0.002
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.006
(0.002)***
0.013
(0.013)
Number of Observations 2,685 2,685 1,707 849 487
Adjusted R 2 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.24
Source: IMF staff estimates
Note: p-values are in parentheses. ICT = information and communications technology; R&D = research and development; TFP = total factor productivity.
1 Industries that produce ICT goods intensively.
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
Manufacturing Other 
production
Finance and 
business
ICT Distribution Personal 
services
Total
ST MT ST MT ST MT ST MT ST MT ST MT ST MT
Product market 
regulation
0.05 0.05 0 0 0 0 -0.05 0.1 0.05 0.05 -0.05 0.1 0.05 0.05
Labor market 
regulation
0 0 0 0 -0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.01 0
Labor tax wedge 0.05 0.05 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.1 0 0 -0.05 0 0.05 0.05
High-skilled labor 0.05 0.05 0 0.15 0 0 0 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0
Research and 
development
0.05 0.15 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.15 0 0.15 0 0 0.05 0.15
ICT capital 0.15 0.15 0 0 0 0 0 0.15 0 0 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.15
Infrastructure 0 0 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.05 0 0 -0.05 -0.05 0.05 0.05
Figure 3.5.1.  Short- and Medium-Term Impact of Structural Reforms on Total Factor Productivity Growth
(Percent; average technological gap)
Between –.05 and 0 Between 0 and .05 Between .05 and .10 Greater than .10 No impact
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: “Other production” includes agriculture; forestry; fishing; mining; quarrying; and electricity-, gas-, and water-related industries. ICT = 
information and communications technology; MT = medium term (five years); ST = short term (three years).
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ity levels are associated with increasing R&D and 
ICT capital. The results also suggest that an increase 
in infrastructure capital has a positive impact on 
productivity over a longer horizon. This is a result of 
economies of scale, the existence of network externali-
ties, and competition-enhancing mechanisms.
The effects vary across sectors and reforms. For 
example, total factor productivity gains associated with 
product market liberalization are highest in the ICT, per-
sonal services, and finance and business services sectors, 
but higher R&D spending and education reforms pro-
duce larger effects in the manufacturing and ICT sectors.
The impact of reforms also depends on initial 
(prereform) settings and business cycle conditions. 
For example, the effect of product market reforms is 
greater in highly regulated services sectors (Bourlès and 
others 2013) and during periods of expansion. Some 
differences, however, can be gleaned across industries, 
especially those in ICT and personal services, where 
productivity gains tend to be higher when initial levels 
of R&D and ICT capital use are low. Conversely, 
infrastructure shocks are associated with larger produc-
tivity gains during periods of economic downturn (see 
also Abiad, Furceri, and Topalova, forthcoming).
Finally, reforms can also have short-term negative 
impacts on total factor productivity (for example, the 
effect of product market deregulation on total factor 
productivity in ICT and personal services), possibly 
reflecting adjustment costs during the reform process 
(Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003). 
Box 3.5 (continued)
WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: UNEVEN GROWTH—SHORT- AND LONG-TERM FACTORS
108 International Monetary Fund | April 2015
References
Aaronson, Daniel, Ellen R. Rissman, and Daniel G. Sullivan. 
2004. “Can Sectoral Reallocation Explain the Jobless Recov-
ery?” Economic Perspectives [Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago] 
(28) 2: 36–49.
Aaronson, Stephanie, Tomaz Cajner, Bruce Fallick, Felix 
Galbis-Reig, Christopher L. Smith, and William L. Wascher. 
2014. “Labor Force Participation: Recent Developments and 
Future Prospects.” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 
2014-64, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Washington.
Abiad, Abdul, Davide Furceri, and Petia Topalova. Forthcoming. 
“The Macroeconomic Effects of Public Investment: Evidence 
from Advanced Economies.” IMF Working Paper, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, Washington.
Acemoglu, Daron, Fabrizio Zilibotti, and Philippe Aghion. 
2006. “Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic 
Growth.” Journal of the European Economic Association 4 
(1): 37–74.
Aghion, Philippe, and Peter Howitt. 2006. “Joseph Schumpeter 
Lecture—Appropriate Growth Policy: A Unifying Frame-
work.” Journal of the European Economic Association 4 (2–3): 
269–314.
———. 2009. The Economics of Growth. Cambridge, Massachu-
setts: MIT Press.
Aghion, Philippe, and Gilles Saint-Paul. 1998a. “Uncovering 
Some Causal Relationships between Productivity Growth and 
the Structure of Economic Fluctuations: A Tentative Survey.” 
Labour 12 (2): 279–303.
———. 1998b. “On the Virtue of Bad Times: An Analysis of 
the Interaction between Economic Fluctuations and Produc-
tivity Growth.” Macroeconomic Dynamics 2 (3): 322–44.
Auerbach, Alan, and Yuriy Gorodnichenko. 2013. “Measuring 
the Output Responses to Fiscal Policy.” American Economic 
Journal: Economic Policy 4 (2): 1–27.
Autor, David H., and Mark G. Duggan. 2003. “The Rise in 
the Disability Payrolls and the Decline in Unemployment.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (1): 157–205. 
Balakrishnan, Ravi, Mai Dao, Juan Sole, and Jeremy Zook. 
2015. “Recent U.S. Labor Force Participation Dynamics: 
Reversible or Not?” IMF Working Paper 15/76, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington.
Ball, Laurence M. 2009. “Hysteresis in Unemployment: Old 
and New Evidence.” NBER Working Paper 14818, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
———. 2014. “Long-Term Damage from the Great Reces-
sion in OECD Countries.” NBER Working Paper 20185, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
Balleer, Almut, Ramon Gomez-Salvador, and Jarkko Turunen. 
2014. “Labour Force Participation across Europe: A Cohort-
Based Analysis.” Empirical Economics 46 (4): 1385–415.
Barro, Robert, and Jong-Wha Lee. 2010. “A New Data Set of 
Educational Attainment in the World, 1950–2010.” Journal 
of Development Economics 104 (September): 184–98.
Bassanini, Andrea, and Romain Duval. 2006. “Employment 
Patterns in OECD Countries: Reassessing the Role of Policies 
and Institutions.” OECD Working Paper 486, Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris. 
Basu, Susanto, John G. Fernald, and Miles S. Kimball. 2006. 
“Are Technology Improvements Contractionary?” American 
Economic Review 96 (5): 1418–48.
Baumol, William J., Sue Anne Batey Blackman, and Edward 
N. Wolff. 1985. “Unbalanced Growth Revisited: Asymptotic 
Stagnancy and New Evidence.” American Economic Review 75 
(4): 806–17.
Beffy, Pierre-Olivier, Patrice Ollivaud, Pete Richardson, and 
Franck Sédillot. 2006. “New OECD Methods for Supply-
Side and Medium-Term Assessments: A Capital Services 
Approach.” OECD Working Paper 482, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris. 
Benes, Jaromir, Michael Kumhof, and Douglas Laxton. 2014. 
“Financial Crises in DSGE Models: A Prototype Model.” 
IMF Working Paper 14/57, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington.
Berger, Helge, Tom Dowling, Sergi Lanau, Weicheng Lian, Mico 
Mrkaic, Marzie Taheri Sanjani, and Pau Rabanal. Forthcom-
ing. “Steady As She Goes—Estimating Potential during 
Financial ‘Booms and Busts.’” IMF Working Paper, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, Washington.
Bernal-Verdugo, Lorenzo E., Davide Furceri, and Dominique 
Guillaume. 2013. “Banking Crises, Labor Reforms, and Unem-
ployment.” Journal of Comparative Economics 41 (4): 1202–19.
Blackburn, Keith, and Ragchaasuren Galindev. 2003. “Growth, 
Volatility and Learning.” Economics Letters 79 (3): 417–21.
Blagrave, Patrick, Roberto Garcia-Saltos, Douglas Laxton, and 
Fan Zhang. 2015. “A Simple Multivariate Filter for Estimat-
ing Potential Output.” IMF Working Paper 15/79, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, Washington.
Blanchard, Olivier J., and Francesco Giavazzi. 2003. “Macro-
economic Effects of Regulation and Deregulation in Goods 
and Labor Markets.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (3): 
879–907.
Blanchard, Olivier J., and Lawrence Summers. 1986. “Hysteresis 
and the European Unemployment Problem.” In NBER Mac-
roeconomics Annual 1986, Vol. 1, edited by Stanley Fischer. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
Blanchard, Olivier J., and Justin Wolfers. 2000. “The Role of 
Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemploy-
ment: The Aggregate Evidence.” Economic Journal 110 (462): 
1–33.
Borio, Claudio, Piti Disyatat, and Mikael Juselius. 2013. 
“Rethinking Potential Output: Embedding Information about 
the Financial Cycle.” Working Paper 404, Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, Basel.
C H A P T E R 3 W H E R E A R E W E H E A D E D? P E R S P E C T I V E S O N P OT E N T I A L O U T P U T
 International Monetary Fund | April 2015 109
Bourlès, Renaud, Gilbert Cette, Jimmy Lopez, Jacques Mairesse, 
and Giuseppe Nicoletti. 2013. “Do Product Market Regula-
tions in Upstream Sectors Curb Productivity Growth? Panel 
Data Evidence for OECD Countries.” Review of Economics 
and Statistics 95 (5): 1750–68.
Byrne, David M., Steven D. Oliner, and Daniel E. Sichel. 2013. 
“Is the Information Technology Revolution Over?” Interna-
tional Productivity Monitor 25 (1): 20–36.
Cerra, Valerie, and Sweta Saxena. 2008. “Growth Dynamics: The 
Myth of Economic Recovery.” American Economic Review 98 
(1): 439–57.
Claessens, Stijn, and M. Ayhan Kose. 2013. “Financial Crises: 
Explanations, Types, and Implications.” IMF Working Paper 
13/28, International Monetary Fund, Washington.
Claessens, Stijn, and Marco E. Terrones. 2012. “How Do Busi-
ness and Financial Cycles Interact?” Journal of International 
Economics 87 (1): 178–90.  
Coe, David T., and Elhanan Helpman. 1995. “International 
R&D Spillovers.” European Economic Review 39 (5): 859–87.
———, and Alexander W. Hoffmaister. 2009. “International 
R&D Spillovers and Institutions.” European Economic Review 
53 (7): 723–41.
Coile, Courtney C., and Phillip B. Levine. 2007. “Labor Market 
Shocks and Retirement: Do Government Programs Matter?” 
Journal of Public Economics 91 (10): 1902–19.
———. 2009. “The Market Crash and Mass Layoffs: How the 
Current Economic Crisis May Affect Retirement.” NBER 
Working Paper 15395, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Corrado, Carol, Jonathan Haskel, Cecilia Jona-Lasinio, and 
Massimiliano Iommi. 2012. “Intangible Capital and Growth 
in Advanced Economies: Measurement Methods and Com-
parative Results.” IZA Discussion Paper 6733, Institute for 
the Study of Labor, Bonn.
Cubeddu, Luis, Alex Culiuc, Ghada Fayad, Yuan Gao, Kalpana 
Kochhar, Annette Kyobe, Ceyda Oner, Roberto Perrelli, 
Sarah Sanya, Evridiki Tsounta, and Zhongxia Zhang. 2014. 
“Emerging Markets in Transition: Growth Prospects and 
Challenges.” IMF Staff Discussion Note 14/06, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington.
Dabla-Norris, Era, Si Guo, Vikram Haksar, Minsuk Kim, 
Kalpana Kochhar, Kevin Wiseman, and Aleksandra Zdzien-
icka. Forthcoming. “The New Normal: A Sector-Level 
Perspective on Productivity Trends in Advanced Economies.” 
IMF Staff Discussion Note, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington.
Dabla-Norris, Era, Giang Ho, Kalpana Kochhar, Annette 
Kyobe, and Robert Tchaidze. 2013. “Anchoring Growth: The 
Importance of Productivity-Enhancing Reforms in Emerging 
Market and Developing Economies.” IMF Staff Discussion 
Note 13/08, International Monetary Fund, Washington. 
Decker, Ryan, John Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin, and Javier 
Miranda. 2013. “The Secular Decline in Business Dynamism 
in the U.S.” Unpublished, University of Maryland, College 
Park, Maryland.
Elmeskov, Jørgen, and Karl Pichelman. 1993. “Unemployment 
and Labour Force Participation: Trend and Cycle.” Economics 
Department Working Paper 130, Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, Paris.
European Commission. 2014. “European Economic Forecast.” 
European Economy 7.
Fernald, John. 2012. “Productivity and Potential Output before, 
during, and after the Great Recession.” Working Paper 2012-
18, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco, 
California.
———. 2014a. “Productivity and Potential Output before, dur-
ing, and after the Great Recession.” In NBER Macroeconomics 
Annual 2014, Vol. 29. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 2014b. “A Quarterly, Utilization-Adjusted Series on 
Total Factor Productivity.” Working Paper 2012-19, Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco, California.
Feyrer, James D. 2007. “Demographics and Productivity.” Review 
of Economics and Statistics 89 (1): 100–9.
Figura, Andrew, and William Wascher. 2010. “The Causes and 
Consequences of Sectoral Reallocation: Evidence from the 
Early 21st Century.” Business Economics 45 (1): 49–68. 
Furceri, Davide, and Annabelle Mourougane. 2012. “The Effect 
of Financial Crises on Potential Output: New Empirical 
Evidence from OECD Countries.” Journal of Macroeconomics 
34 (3): 822–32.
Furlanetto, Francesco, Paolo Gelain, and Marzie Taheri Sanjani. 
2014. “Output Gap in Presence of Financial Frictions and 
Monetary Policy Trade-Offs.” IMF Working Paper 14/128, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington.
Gordon, Robert J. 2012. “Is U.S. Economic Growth Over? 
Faltering Innovation Confronts the Six Headwinds.” NBER 
Working Paper 18315, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
———. 2014. “The Demise of U.S. Economic Growth: Restate-
ment, Rebuttal and Reflections.” NBER Working Paper 
19895, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
Hall, Robert E. 2014. “Quantifying the Lasting Harm to the 
U.S. Economy from the Financial Crisis.” NBER Working 
Paper 20183, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts.
Hamilton, James D. 1994. Time Series Analysis. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Henn, Christian, Chris Papageorgiou, and Nikola Spatafora. 
2014. “Export Quality in Advanced and Developing Econo-
mies: Evidence from a New Dataset.” IMF Working Paper 
13/108, International Monetary Fund, Washington.
Herrendorf, Berthold, Richard Rogerson, and Ákos Valentinyi. 
2013. “Growth and Structural Transformation.” NBER 
Working Paper 18996, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: UNEVEN GROWTH—SHORT- AND LONG-TERM FACTORS
110 International Monetary Fund | April 2015
Higgins, Matthew. 1998. “Demography, National Savings, and 
International Capital Flows.” International Economic Review 
39 (2): 343–69.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2012. “Fiscal Policy and 
Employment in Advanced and Emerging Economies.” IMF 
Policy Paper, Washington.
———. 2013. “External Balance Assessment (EBA): Technical 
Background of the Pilot Methodology.” Washington.
Johansson, Åsa, Yvan Guillemette, Fabrice Murtin, David Turner, 
Giuseppe Nicoletti, Christine de la Maisonneuve, Phillip 
Bagnoli, Guillaume Bousquet, and Francesca Spinelli. 2013. 
“Long-Term Growth Scenarios.” Working Paper 1000, Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.
Jordà, Òscar. 2005. “Estimation and Inference of Impulse 
Responses by Local Projections.” American Economic Review 
95 (1): 161–82.
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sebnem. 2002. “Does the Mortality Decline 
Promote Economic Growth?” Journal of Economic Growth 7 
(4): 411–39.
KC, Samir, Bilal Barakat, Anne Goujon, Vegard Skirbekk, War-
ren C. Sanderson, and Wolfgang Lutz. 2010. “Projection of 
Populations by Level of Educational Attainment, Age, and 
Sex for 120 Countries for 2005–2050.” Demographic Research 
22 (15).
Kopelman, Jason S., and Harvey S. Rosen. 2014. “Are Public 
Sector Jobs Recession Proof? Were They Ever?” NBER Work-
ing Paper 20692, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Laeven, Luc, and Fabián Valencia. 2014. “Systemic Banking 
Crises.” In Financial Crises: Causes, Consequences, and Policy 
Responses, edited by Stijn Claessens, M. Ayhan Kose, Luc 
Laeven, and Fabián Valencia. Washington: International 
Monetary Fund. 
Lewis, William W. 2005. The Power of Productivity: Wealth, 
Poverty, and the Threat to Global Stability. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
Loungani, Prakesh, and Richard Rogerson. 1989.  “Cyclical 
Fluctuations and the Sectoral Reallocation of Labor: Evidence 
from the PSID.” Journal of Monetary Economics 23 (2): 
259–73.   
Martin, Phillip, and Carol A. Rogers. 1997. “Stabilization Policy, 
Learning by Doing and Economic Growth.” Oxford Economic 
Papers 49 (2): 152–66.
———. 2000. “Long-Term Growth and Short-Term Economic 
Instability.” European Economic Review 44 (2): 359–81.
McMillan, Margaret S., and Dani Rodrik. 2011. “Globalization, 
Structural Change and Productivity Growth.” NBER Work-
ing Paper 17143, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Mokyr, Joel. 2014. “The Next Age of Invention.” City Journal 
(Winter): 12–20.
Nabar, Malhar, and Papa N’Diaye. 2013. “Enhancing China’s 
Medium-Term Growth Prospects: The Path to a High-Income 
Economy.” IMF Working Paper 13/204, International Mon-
etary Fund, Washington.
Nickell, Steve, and Jan Van Ours. 2000. “Why Has Unemploy-
ment in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom Fallen So 
Much?” Canadian Public Policy 26 (1): 201–20.
Okun, Arthur M. 1970. The Political Economy of Prosperity. 
Washington: Brookings Institution.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). 2010. “The OECD Innovation Strategy: Getting a 
Head Start on Tomorrow.” Directorate for Science, Technol-
ogy and Innovation, Paris. 
Papageorgiou, Chris, and Nikola Spatafora. 2012. “Economic 
Diversification in LICs: Stylized Facts and Macroeconomic 
Implications.” IMF Staff Discussion Note 12/13, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, Washington.
Pindyck, Robert S. 1991. “Irreversibility, Uncertainty and Invest-
ments.” Journal of Economic Literature 29: 1110–48.
———, and Andres Solimano. 1993. “Economic Instability and 
Aggregate Investments.” In NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 
edited by Olivier J. Blanchard and Stanley Fischer, 259–318. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Pritchett, Lant, and Lawrence H. Summers. 2014. “Asiapho-
ria Meets Regression to the Mean.” NBER Working Paper 
20573, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.
Quint, Dominic, and Pau Rabanal. 2014. “Monetary and Mac-
roprudential Policy in an Estimated DSGE Model of the Euro 
Area.” International Journal of Central Banking 10 (2): 169–236.
Rabanal, Pau, and Marzie Taheri Sanjani. Forthcoming. “Incor-
porating Financial Cycles in Output Gap Measures: Estimates 
for the Euro Area.” IMF Working Paper, International Mon-
etary Fund, Washington.
Ramey, Valerie A., and Matthew D. Shapiro. 2001.  “Displaced 
Capital: A Study of Aerospace Plant Closings.” Journal of 
Political Economy 109 (5): 958–92.
Reifschneider, Dave, William L. Wascher, and David Wil-
cox. 2013. “Aggregate Supply in the United States: Recent 
Developments and Implications for the Conduct of Monetary 
Policy.” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 77, Federal 
Reserve Board, Washington.
Riosmena, Fernanda, Isolde Prommer, Anne Goujion, and Samir 
KC. 2008. “An Evaluation of the IIASA/VID Education-
Specific Back Projections.” Interim Report 019, International 
Institute for Applied System Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria.
Rondeau, Fabien, and Sébastien Pommier. 2012. “Factors of 
R&D Spillovers and European Integration.” Economics Bul-
letin 32 (3): 1970–77.
Stock, James H., and Mark W. Watson. 2007. “Why Has U.S. 
Inflation Become Harder to Forecast?” Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 39 (Suppl. 1): 3–33.
Teulings, Coenraad N., and Nick Zubanov. 2014. “Is Economic 
Recovery a Myth? Robust Estimation of Impulse Response 
Functions.” Journal of Applied Econometrics 29 (3): 497–514.
1CHAPTER
 International Monetary Fund | April 2015 111
4CHAPTER PRIVATE INVESTMENT: WHAT’S THE HOLDUP?
Private fixed investment in advanced economies con-
tracted sharply during the global financial crisis, and 
there has been little recovery since. Investment has 
generally slowed more gradually in the rest of the world. 
Although housing investment fell especially sharply during 
the crisis, business investment accounts for the bulk of 
the slump, and the overriding factor holding it back has 
been the overall weakness of economic activity. In some 
countries, other contributing factors include financial 
constraints and policy uncertainty. These findings suggest 
that addressing the general weakness in economic activity 
is crucial for restoring growth in private investment.
T
he disappointing performance of private 
fi xed investment has featured prominently in 
the public policy debate in recent years.1 As 
Chapter 3 suggests, the low level of private 
investment since the crisis has already contributed 
to the drop in potential output growth in numerous 
economies. In some countries, weak business invest-
ment has contrasted with the ebullience of stock mar-
kets, suggesting a possible disconnect between fi nancial 
and economic risk taking, as discussed in the Octo-
ber 2014 Global Financial Stability Report. A number 
of proposals aimed at encouraging fi rms to increase 
capital spending have been made.2 
However, there is little consensus as to what lies 
behind the weakness. Some view it as a symptom 
of the generally weak economic environment. For 
Th e authors of this chapter are Aqib Aslam, Samya Beidas-Strom, 
Daniel Leigh (team leader), Seok Gil Park, and Hui Tong, with sup-
port from Gavin Asdorian, Joshua Bosshardt, Angela Espiritu, Hao 
Jiang, Yun Liu, and Hong Yang. Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan was the 
external consultant.
1“Fixed investment” refers to investment in physical assets, 
for example, equipment and structures (in contrast, for example, 
to investments in labor, ongoing operating expenses, materials, 
or fi nancial assets), as well as intellectual property products (for 
example, expenditures for research and development and other rights 
providing long-lasting service to businesses). Th roughout the chapter, 
“investment” refers specifi cally to fi xed investment.
2Th ese include, for example, the European Commission’s proposal 
to establish the European Fund for Strategic Investments, which is 
based on risk sharing between the public and private sectors. 
example, Chinn (2011) and Krugman (2011) suggest 
that U.S. private investment has, if anything, been 
stronger since the crisis began than might have been 
expected based on the weakness in economic activ-
ity. Others suggest that private investment has been 
weaker than can be explained by output, highlighting 
the role of special impediments. Th e European Invest-
ment Bank (2013) concludes that the most important 
immediate cause of low investment in Europe has 
been uncertainty. Buti and Mohl (2014) highlight the 
roles of reduced public investment, fi nancial fragmen-
tation, and heightened uncertainty in constraining 
private investment in the euro area. A study by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (Lewis and others 2014) fi nds that, although 
it has been a major factor, low output growth since 
the crisis cannot fully account for the investment 
weakness in some of the major advanced economies, 
including France, Germany, Japan, and the United 
States. How should policymakers interpret the weak-
ness of private investment?
To contribute to the policy debate, and to put some 
of the fi ndings of recent studies into global perspective, 
this chapter focuses on the following fi ve questions:
 • Is there a global slump in private investment? Which 
economies have seen the weakest private investment 
performance since the crisis? 
 • Is the sharp slump in advanced economy private 
investment due just to weakness in housing, or is 
it broader? How has the performance of residential 
investment compared with that of other categories 
of investment, and how do the findings vary across 
economies?
 • How much of the slump in business investment 
reflects weakness in economic activity? In particu-
lar, how much of the slump in business investment 
compared with precrisis forecasts is explained by the 
weakness in output?
 • Which businesses have cut back more on invest-
ment? What does this imply about which chan-
nels—beyond output—have been relevant in 
explaining weak investment? 
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 • Is there a disconnect between financial markets and 
firms’ investment decisions? Have firms responded 
unusually weakly to stock market incentives? 
To address these questions, the chapter reviews 
the recent evolution of private investment in both 
advanced and emerging market and developing econo-
mies. Focusing on advanced economies, where the 
weakness in private investment has been most strik-
ing, the chapter assesses how broad based the slump 
in investment has been by comparing residential and 
nonresidential investment. It then investigates how 
much of the weakness in private nonresidential invest-
ment can be explained by the weakness in output. To 
provide additional insights into what factors, beyond 
output, have held back investment, the chapter inves-
tigates which types of firms have cut back most on 
investment using a “difference-in-difference” empirical 
approach. Finally, the chapter assesses, using standard 
“Tobin’s Q” models of investment, whether financial 
market valuations and profitability have become dis-
connected from firms’ investment decisions. 
The chapter’s main findings are as follows:
 • The sharp contraction in private investment during 
the crisis, and the subsequent weak recovery, have 
primarily been a phenomenon of the advanced 
economies. For these economies, private investment 
has declined by an average of 25 percent since the 
crisis compared with precrisis forecasts, and there 
has been little recovery. In contrast, private invest-
ment in emerging market and developing economies 
has gradually slowed in recent years, following a 
boom in the early to mid-2000s. 
 • The investment slump in the advanced economies 
has been broad based. Though the contraction has 
been sharpest in the private residential (housing) 
sector, nonresidential (business) investment—which 
is a much larger share of total investment—accounts 
for the bulk (more than two-thirds) of the slump.3 
There is little sign of recovery toward precrisis 
investment trends in either sector.
 • The overall weakness in economic activity since the 
crisis appears to be the primary restraint on business 
3Public investment constitutes less than 20 percent of total (pri-
vate and public) investment in the advanced economies. Although 
public investment has also declined in a number of these economies 
in recent years (see Chapter 3 in the October 2014 World Economic 
Outlook), after initially rising on the back of fiscal stimulus, the 
contraction in total investment has been largely driven by private 
investment.
investment in the advanced economies. In surveys, 
businesses often cite low demand as the dominant 
factor. Historical precedent indicates that business 
investment has deviated little, if at all, from what 
could be expected given the weakness in economic 
activity in recent years. Deviations from this pattern 
have typically been small in relation to the overall 
loss in investment—at most one-fifth of the total 
loss since the crisis—and not statistically significant. 
The analysis here employs a novel empirical strategy 
that addresses concerns regarding reverse causal-
ity running from investment to output, as well as 
more conventional “accelerator” models of invest-
ment. Although the proximate cause of lower firm 
investment appears to be weak economic activity, 
this itself is due to many factors. And it is worth 
acknowledging that, as explained in Chapter 3, a 
large share of the output loss compared with precri-
sis trends can now be seen as permanent.
 • Beyond weak economic activity, there is some evidence 
that financial constraints and policy uncertainty play 
an independent role in retarding investment in some 
economies, including euro area economies with high 
borrowing spreads during the 2010–11 sovereign debt 
crisis. Additional evidence comes from the chapter’s 
firm-level analysis. In particular, firms in sectors that 
rely more on external funds, such as pharmaceuticals, 
have seen a larger fall in investment than other firms 
since the crisis. This finding is consistent with the view 
that a weak financial system and weak firm balance 
sheets have constrained investment. Regarding the 
effect of uncertainty, firms whose stock prices typically 
respond more to measures of aggregate uncertainty have 
cut back more on investment in recent years, even after 
the role of weak sales is accounted for. This finding is 
consistent with the view that, given the irreversible and 
lumpy nature of investment projects, uncertainty has 
played a role in discouraging investment.
 • Finally, regarding the apparent disconnect between 
buoyant stock market performance and relatively 
restrained investment growth in some economies, 
the chapter finds that this too is not unusual. In 
line with much existing research, it finds that the 
relationship between market valuations and business 
investment is positive but weak. Nevertheless, there 
is some evidence that stock market performance is a 
leading indicator of future investment, implying that 
if stock markets remain buoyant, business invest-
ment could pick up.
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Is There a Global Slump in Private Investment? 
The sharp contraction in private investment during 
and since the global financial crisis combined with the 
subsequent weak recovery is largely an advanced econ-
omy phenomenon (Figure 4.1). For advanced econo-
mies as a whole, private investment during 2008–14 
declined by 25 percent compared with forecasts made 
in early 2007, before the onset of the crisis.4 The 
weakness in investment is evident across almost all 
advanced economies, although some economies saw 
a limited contraction in private investment and a 
more rapid recovery, due, for example, to mining and 
energy booms, as in Australia, Canada, and Norway 
(Figure 4.2).
To check whether the results are driven by the 
impact of any immediate precrisis boom or faltering, 
the analysis is repeated based on deviations relative to 
forecasts made in 2004, three years before the start 
of the crisis. For advanced economies, the estimated 
slump is similar in almost all cases.5 This slump also 
shows up when outturns are compared to long-term 
historical trends in private investment calculated over 
the period 1990–2004. It also emerges when ratios 
of private investment to GDP, which have declined 
relative to long-term historical averages in advanced 
economies, are considered.
Investment has slowed more gradually in the emerg-
ing market and developing economies as a whole than 
in the advanced economies, and from unusually high 
levels. The recent slowdown follows a period of rapid 
growth during the boom years of the mid-2000s. Pri-
vate investment remains broadly in line with forecasts 
made in the early 2000s. However, relative to forecasts 
made at the height of the boom, as in 2007, there has 
been a slowdown. Contributing factors vary by region 
but include lower commodity prices, spillovers from 
weak demand abroad, and tighter domestic and exter-
nal financial conditions (Box 4.1).
The striking underperformance of private invest-
ment in advanced economies provides a rationale for 
4The forecasts for private investment used here come from 
Consensus Economics’ Consensus Forecasts. When this source is not 
available, forecasts from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook are used 
instead.
5For Iceland, the measured slump is substantially deeper based on 
a comparison with the 2007 forecast rather than the 2004 forecast, 
which reflects the rapid growth and upward revisions in growth 
forecasts in the boom years preceding the crisis. 
focusing on these economies for the remainder of the 
chapter.
Is the Slump in Private Investment 
Due to Housing or Is It Broader? 
The weakening of fixed investment in the advanced 
economies has been broad based, with both residential 
(housing) and nonresidential (business) investment 
showing little sign of recovery (Figure 4.3). Residential 
private investment has contracted most sharply, but 
it is business investment, given its much larger share 
in total investment, that accounts for the bulk (more 
than two-thirds) of the investment slump (Figures 4.4 
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Note: The figure presents data, where available, for the country groups as defined 
in the WEO Statistical Appendix. EMDEs = emerging market and developing 
economies.
–0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
1990 94 98 2002 06 10 14
2. Advanced Economies1. World
3. EMDEs 4. EMDEs Excluding China
Actual Spring 2004 forecasts Spring 2007 forecasts
Figure 4.1.  Real Private Investment
(Log index, 1990 = 0)
Private fixed investment in advanced economies contracted sharply during the 
crisis, and there has been little recovery since. The investment slowdown in the 
rest of the world has generally been more gradual and from unusually high levels.
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and 4.5).6 Within business investment, both structures 
and equipment and software categories have contracted 
relative to precrisis trends.7 This development is wor-
rying, because business investment is considered to be 
a particularly productive contribution to the capital 
stock (Kopcke 1993) and thus essential for supporting 
the economy’s future productive capacity and com-
petitiveness. At the same time, despite the slump, the 
share of equipment investment in total private invest-
ment has been rising (Figure 4.5), in part reflecting its 
declining relative price and the rising rate of capital 
depreciation (Summers 2014).
Public investment has made a relatively small 
direct contribution, relative to private investment, 
to the recent slump in total investment (Figure 4.5). 
A 2009–10 uptick in public investment in the United 
6Given the lack of separate forecasts for residential investment 
and different categories of nonresidential investment, the analysis 
compares the evolution of these categories of investment relative to 
precrisis linear trends estimated for 1990–2004.
7See Annex 4.1 for the methodology used to calculate these 
contributions.
States and elsewhere resulting from fiscal stimulus was 
only a brief interlude in a long and gradual decline 
that started decades before the crisis (Figure 4.5). As 
discussed in Chapter 3 in the October 2014 World 
Economic Outlook, declining public investment can 
also reduce economic activity and private investment. 
This constitutes an additional indirect effect of public 
investment on total investment that is not captured by 
the accounting decomposition in Figure 4.5. 
How Much of the Slump in Business 
Investment Reflects Weak Economic Activity?
Devising policies to encourage a recovery in business 
investment requires a clear diagnosis of its weakness. 
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The weakness in investment is evident across most advanced economies, with few 
exceptions.
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Figure 4.3.  Categories of Real Fixed Investment
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The investment slump has been broad based, with both residential (housing) and 
nonresidential (business) investment showing little sign of recovery.
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Has investment been undermined primarily by the 
prevailing weak economic environment, or are special 
impediments at work? If weak investment is mainly a 
symptom of weak sales, calls for supporting aggregate 
demand, including through macroeconomic policies, 
could be justified. But if the weakness in investment 
is not well explained by the slow growth in economic 
activity and, instead, other obstacles are holding it 
back, those obstacles must be removed before invest-
ment can make a sustained recovery. The discussion of 
these questions here focuses on business investment––
the largest component of private investment and that 
which accounts for most of the investment slump. 
Sources: Haver Analytics; IMF, Fiscal Monitor database; national authorities; and 
IMF staff calculations.  
Note: The figure presents data for 28 advanced economies: Australia, Austria, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, United States.
1Relative price is calculated as the ratio of the investment category deflator to the 
overall GDP deflator.
Figure 4.5.  Shares and Relative Prices of Investment 
Categories 
(Percent of total fixed investment, unless noted otherwise)
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The share of equipment investment in total private investment has been rising, in 
part reflecting its declining relative price. An uptick in public investment in 2009– 
10 on the back of fiscal stimulus was only a brief interlude in a decline that started 
well before the crisis.
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Figure 4.4.  Decomposition of the Investment Slump, 2008–14
(Average percent deviation from spring 2007 forecasts)
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Residential investment fell especially sharply, but business investment accounts for 
the bulk of the slump, given its much larger share in total investment. The direct 
contribution of public investment to the recent slump was relatively small.
Sources: Consensus Economics; Haver Analytics; IMF, Fiscal Monitor database; 
national authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: The figure presents data for 28 advanced economies: Australia, Austria, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, United States.
1Euro area economies (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) with high borrowing 
spreads during the 2010–11 sovereign debt crisis.
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How might weak economic activity cause business 
investment to decline? A standard implication of theo-
retical models is that firms reduce investment when 
opportunities for selling their products are limited. A 
weak current and prospective economic climate and, 
hence, low current and expected sales are thus likely to 
deter firms from investing in new capital. Weak prod-
uct demand can also hamper investment through the 
“financial accelerator” channel, in which credit markets 
amplify and propagate both real and monetary shocks 
across the economy.8 For instance, a drop in sales may 
damage a firm’s financial position, constraining its 
ability to repay loans and borrow to finance further 
investment. 
This section starts by assessing whether the recent 
comovement of investment and output has been 
unusual by historical standards. The next step is to 
quantify the influence of weak economic activity 
on the poor performance of investment. In both of 
these subsections, the analysis focuses on a panel of 
advanced economies. Finally, the section complements 
the broad cross-country assessment with country-
specific estimates of the amount of business investment 
“explained” and “unexplained” by output.
Has the Comovement of Business Investment and 
Output Been Unusual since the Crisis? 
Previous recessions have generated various patterns 
for the relative paths of investment and output. These 
patterns are natural antecedents for benchmarking the 
joint evolution of investment and output following 
the global financial crisis. There is a consensus that 
the fall in investment during and since the crisis has, 
in general, been much worse than in previous reces-
sions. However, it is important to place this fall in the 
context of how output behaved.
To conduct an assessment of this, the chapter 
compares investment and output after historical reces-
sions relative to their respective forecasts published in 
the spring issues of Consensus Economics’ Consensus 
Forecasts and the IMF’s World Economic Outlook in 
the year of each recession. This method of computing 
the contraction in investment is similar to that used 
8The inverse relationship between the external finance premium—
the difference between the cost to a borrower of raising funds exter-
nally and the opportunity cost of internal funds—and the financial 
position of the borrowing firm creates a channel through which 
otherwise short-lived economic shocks may have long-lasting effects. 
See Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1996.
in the previous section for quantifying the deviation 
in investment from its precrisis forecasts.9 Based on 
the availability of data, including for the forecasts, the 
sample covers 27 advanced economies.
According to this analysis, investment contracted 
more severely following the global financial crisis than 
in historical recessions (Figure 4.6). For advanced 
economies as a whole, weighted by GDP, business 
investment declined by 20 percent relative to precrisis 
forecasts, on average, during the six years after the 
start of the global financial crisis. For those advanced 
economies that experienced banking crises, the decline 
was even larger, about 22 percent, whereas the drop for 
advanced economies that avoided banking crises was 
about 16 percent.10 In contrast, the decline in invest-
ment during the six years following historical reces-
sions averaged 10 percent.
However, the contraction in output was also much 
more severe than in historical recessions, implying a 
broadly normal comovement of investment and out-
put. The relative response of investment was, overall, 
two to three times greater than that of output in previ-
ous recessions, and this relative response was similar 
in the current context (Figure 4.6).11 If anything, 
9The starting dates of recessions are identified according to the 
Harding and Pagan 2002 algorithm of output peaks and troughs, as 
computed by Claessens, Kose, and Terrones 2012. The latter work 
identifies the start of recessions with quarterly data. The present 
analysis, which uses annual data, takes the start of a recession to be 
the beginning of the year that includes the starting quarter of the 
recession. For example, a recession starting in the fourth quarter 
of 1990 is assumed here to start in 1990. Annex 4.1 provides the 
sources used to compile the chapter’s data on investment.
10These two groups are based on the data set of banking crises of 
Laeven and Valencia 2012, according to which 19 advanced econo-
mies had a banking crisis between 2007 and the publication of that 
study: 13 of these are classified as having experienced a “systemic 
banking crisis” (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, United 
Kingdom, United States) and 6 as “borderline cases” (France, Italy, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland). The study found that 13 
advanced economies did not experience banking crises during that 
period: Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, 
Israel, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, 
and the Slovak Republic.
11These results are robust to the method of measuring the contrac-
tion of investment and output after the crisis and after historical 
recessions. In particular, while the baseline result that investment 
contracts by two to three times as much as output is based on 
deviations from precrisis and prerecession forecasts, the result is 
similar when the deviations are computed relative to univariate (local 
projection method) forecasts. More generally, the finding that invest-
ment contracts by two to three times as much as output is consistent 
with research showing that investment varies relatively strongly in 
response to overall economic conditions. Relatedly, since investment 
is more volatile than output, a decline in the investment-to-GDP 
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investment dipped slightly less relative to the output 
contraction than in previous recessions. 
At the same time, the endogenous nature of invest-
ment and output—that is, the simultaneous feedback 
from output to investment and then back to output—
complicates the interpretation of these results. The find-
ings on the relative movement of investment and output 
suggest that nothing unusual occurred. But to shed light 
on whether the weakness in investment was mainly a 
symptom of weak economic activity, an estimate that 
addresses the issue of reverse causality is needed.12
How Much Is Explained by Output? Insights Based on 
Instrumental Variables
This subsection investigates the extent to which 
weak economic activity has contributed to the 
decline in business investment using a simple but 
novel approach based on instrumental variables. The 
approach estimates the historical relationship between 
investment and output based on macroeconomic 
fluctuations not triggered by a contraction in business 
investment. The chapter focuses on changes in fiscal 
policy motivated primarily by the desire to reduce the 
budget deficit and not by a response to the current or 
prospective state of the economy.13 
The results from this exercise are then used to 
predict the contraction in investment that would 
have been expected to occur after 2007 based on 
the observed contraction in output.14 This predicted 
decline in investment after 2007 is then compared 
with the actual decline in investment to assess whether 
investment has been unusually weak given its histori-
cal relation with output—in other words, whether 
the actual decline exceeds the predicted decline. If the 
ratio following the crisis does not necessarily suggest that investment 
has fallen by more than can be explained by output weakness.
12It is worth clarifying that the finding that the recent comove-
ment of investment and output in advanced economies has been 
broadly normal is not inconsistent with the observation, highlighted 
in Box 1.2 in the October 2014 World Economic Outlook, that nega-
tive errors in the forecast for investment account for more than half 
of the recent negative forecast errors for output growth. Owing to 
the generally high volatility of investment relative to output, invest-
ment also accounted for more than half of the negative errors in the 
growth forecast during the precrisis period.
13To assess the robustness of the results, the chapter also considers 
an alternative source of fluctuations not triggered by business invest-
ment: recessions associated with housing slumps (Annex 4.3).
14As before, the contraction in output is measured as the devia-
tion of actual real GDP from the precrisis forecasts published in the 
spring 2007 issues of Consensus Economics’ Consensus Forecasts and 
the IMF’s World Economic Outlook.
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Figure 4.6.  Real Business Investment and Output Relative to 
Forecasts: Historical Recessions versus Global Financial Crisis
(Percent deviation from forecasts in the year of recession, unless noted 
otherwise; years on x-axis, unless noted otherwise)
Sources: Consensus Economics; Haver Analytics; national authorities; and IMF staff 
estimates.
Note: For historical recessions, t = 0 is the year of recession. Deviations from 
historical recessions (1990–2002) are relative to spring forecasts in the year of the 
recession. Recessions are as identified in Claessens, Kose, and Terrones 2012. For 
the global financial crisis (GFC), t = 0 is 2008. Deviations are relative to precrisis 
(spring 2007) forecasts. Shaded areas denote 90 percent confidence intervals. 
Panels 1 and 2 present data for the advanced economies (AEs) listed in Annex 
Table 4.1.1. GFC crisis and noncrisis advanced economies are as identified in 
Laeven and Valencia 2012. 
Real business investment has contracted more severely following the global 
financial crisis than in historical recessions. But the contraction in output has also 
been more severe than after prior recessions. Overall, investment has dipped 
slightly less relative to the output contraction than in previous recessions.
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contraction in output during that period was driven by 
a contraction in business investment, then the decline in 
investment should have been greater than predicted by 
the historical investment-output relationship based on 
output fluctuations not triggered by business investment.
The chapter estimates the historical investment-
output relationship using fiscal policy changes aimed 
at reducing budget deficits for a sample period ending 
in 2006. The series of fiscal policy changes—policy-
induced government spending reductions or tax 
increases—is “narrative” in nature. They come from 
Devries and others 2011, which examines contem-
poraneous policy documents for 17 Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development economies to 
identify changes in fiscal policy motivated by a desire to 
reduce budget deficits rather than to counteract current 
and prospective economic conditions. As reported in 
Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori 2014, these narrative fis-
cal policy changes are found to be uncorrelated with the 
state of the economy. In the context of this chapter, it 
is reassuring that they are also uncorrelated with lagged 
business investment.15 Such policy changes provide a 
source of output fluctuations not primarily triggered by 
a contraction in business investment and are thus appro-
priate for isolating the effect of output on investment.
The resulting estimated investment-output relation-
ship implies that a 1 percent decline in output is associ-
ated with a 2.4 percent decline in investment.16 This 
estimated relationship is then considered in conjunction 
with the actual deviation of output from its precrisis 
forecast since 2007 to provide an idea of how invest-
ment would have been expected to evolve after the crisis, 
given the change in output. 
15A regression of the fiscal shocks on lagged business investment 
yields a slope coefficient near zero with a p-value of 32 percent.
16The estimation results are obtained via two-stage least-squares 
regression. The equation estimated is
DlnIi,t = ai + lt + b{Instrumented DlnYi,t} + rDlnIi,t–1 + ei,t,
in which i denotes the ith country, and t denotes the tth year; ΔlnIi,t 
is the change in (log) real business investment; and ΔlnYi,t is the 
change in (log) real GDP. The equation controls for the lagged value 
of the investment term, given that investment projects can be spread 
over time, and includes a full set of country (ai) and time (lt) fixed 
effects. As reported in Annex Table 4.3.1, the first-stage regression 
results indicate that the narrative fiscal shocks have explanatory 
power for real GDP growth (the F-statistic on the excluded instru-
ment has a p-value below 0.01 percent [one one-hundredth of 1 
percent] and is above 15). The second stage yields an estimate for 
b of 2.4 that is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The 
predicted path of investment relative to forecast based on the path of 
output relative to forecast is defined as lnIi,t – Fi,2007 lnIi,t = b(lnYi,t – 
Fi,2007 lnYi,t), in which Fi,2007 denotes the spring 2007 forecast.
The analysis suggests that the bulk of the slump in 
business investment since the crisis reflects the weak-
ness in economic activity (Figure 4.7). For advanced 
economies as a whole, the predicted fall in business 
investment since the crisis, which averages 21 percent, 
in GDP-weighted terms is close to the actual path of 
investment. The actual decline of investment, which 
averages 20 percent, falls well inside the 90 percent 
confidence interval of the prediction. Thus, little of 
the observed decline in investment remains unex-
plained after the expected effects of the output decline 
are taken into consideration. The finding of little 
unexplained weakness in investment also holds when 
advanced economies are divided into broad subgroups 
comprising those that experienced a banking crisis 
after 2007 and those that did not.
To check whether the results are driven by the 
impact of any immediate precrisis boom or faltering, 
the analysis is repeated based on deviations relative to 
forecasts made in 2004, three years before the start 
of the crisis. As reported in Annex 4.3, the results are 
similar, and they also hold up to additional robustness 
tests. In each case, there is little evidence, if any, of 
investment being weaker than would be expected.
Overall, these results are consistent with the view 
that the weakness in business investment in advanced 
economies is, on the whole, primarily a symptom of 
weak economic activity. However, although the proxi-
mate cause of lower firm investment since the crisis 
appears to be weak economic activity, this weakness 
itself is due to many factors, including financial factors.
Country-Specific Insights
The results reported thus far for groups of advanced 
economies could hide specific cases of unexplained weak-
ness in business investment beyond what could be expected 
based on economic activity. This subsection therefore pres-
ents estimates of how much investment weakness can be 
explained by output dynamics based on investment models 
estimated at the individual-country level. 
The analysis is based on the conventional accelera-
tor model of investment, which is applied to a sample 
of 19 advanced economies. A key assumption is that 
firms adjust their capital stock gradually toward a level 
that is proportional to output. In addition, firms are 
assumed to invest to replace capital that depreciates 
over time. Based on these assumptions, the theory 
predicts that investment should respond positively 
to current and lagged changes in output and to the 
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lagged capital stock.17 The empirical literature has 
found strong support for this model, as in Oliner, 
Rudebusch, and Sichel 1995 and Lee and Raba-
nal 2010 for the United States, and, more recently, in 
IMF 2014a and Barkbu and others 2015 for European 
economies.18 Depending on data availability and the 
economy in question, the sample starts between the 
first quarter of 1990 and the second quarter of 2000 
and ends in the third quarter of 2014.19 
Overall, the country-specific results confirm the 
earlier finding of little unexplained weakness in invest-
ment in recent years. Figure 4.8 reports the actual and 
predicted values for business investment for France, 
Germany, Japan, and the United States.20 The actual 
and predicted values for investment are close to one 
another, and departures from the predicted level are 
typically inside the model’s 90 percent confidence 
interval.21 The model thus appears to account well 
17Jorgenson and Siebert (1968) provide a derivation of the 
accelerator model. Based on the theory underlying the model, the 
empirical specification typically estimated is as in Oliner, Rudebusch, 
and Sichel 1995:
It = a + SNi=0 biDK *t–i + dKt–1,
in which It denotes real business investment and DK t* denotes the 
change in the desired capital stock, which, in turn, is assumed to 
be proportional to the change in output: DK t* = zDYt. To allevi-
ate reverse-causality concerns, a typical approach involves dropping 
the contemporaneous value of the change in output. The analysis 
here includes 12 lags of the changes in output (N = 12), also a 
conventional choice. It also follows the literature in normalizing the 
equation by the lagged capital stock, Kt–1, to address concerns of 
nonstationarity, and computing standard errors using the Newey-
West procedure with a lag truncation parameter of 3, a conventional 
choice for samples of this size. The estimation results can be found 
in Annex Table 4.5.1.
18See IMF 2014b and IMF 2014c for further country-specific 
analysis of private investment in European economies.  
19For a number of economies, available data for the business capi-
tal stock are limited, constraining the size of the sample. Given that 
constraint, the analysis is conducted on an “in-sample” basis, using 
the full sample ending in 2014. However, for the eight economies 
in the sample with data starting in 1990, thus covering at least two 
business cycles, the analysis is also repeated, for the purposes of 
robustness, on an “out-of-sample” basis, based on data ending in 
2006 (Annex Figure 4.5.1 and Annex Table 4.5.2).
20The model yields predicted values for the investment rate 
(investment as a share of the previous period’s capital stock). Figure 
4.8 rescales the fitted values by the lagged capital stock to obtain 
predicted values for the level of investment. To put the residuals into 
perspective, the figure also reports the actual level of investment and 
the precrisis forecast, which comes from Consensus Economics’ April 
2007 Consensus Forecasts or, when this is unavailable, the April 2007 
World Economic Outlook.
21As reported in Annex Figure 4.5.2, the result of a close fit 
between the actual and predicted values of business investment also 
holds when the baseline specification is augmented to include the 
user cost of capital. 
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The bulk of the slump in business investment since the crisis reflects the
weakness in economic activity. For broad groups of advanced economies, there
is little unexplained investment. 
3. GFC Noncrisis Advanced Economies
Sources: Consensus Economics; Haver Analytics; national authorities; and IMF staff 
estimates.
Note: Prediction based on investment-output relationship estimates reported in 
Annex Table 4.3.1 and postcrisis decline in output relative to precrisis (spring 2007) 
forecasts. Shaded areas denote 90 percent confidence intervals. Global financial 
crisis (GFC) and noncrisis advanced economies are as identified in Laeven and 
Valencia 2012. 
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for the weakness of investment relative to precrisis 
forecasts, which are also indicated in Figure 4.8. The 
model also generally provides a close fit for the other 
economies in the sample, with residuals typically not 
statistically distinguishable from zero and accounting 
for, at most, one-fifth of the total loss in investment 
relative to precrisis forecasts for the 2008–14 period 
(Figure 4.9). Furthermore, these results are consis-
tent with those presented in the previous subsection. 
Figure 4.9 provides GDP-weighted averages of these 
country-specific results for the advanced economies in 
the sample, and these results show little evidence of 
unexplained investment weakness. 
At the same time, the analysis reveals a few cases 
of investment weakness during 2011–14 that are not 
explained by the model. In particular, for euro area 
economies with high borrowing spreads during the 
2010–11 sovereign debt crisis, actual real investment 
falls 7 percent short of the level implied by the accelera-
tor model, on average, during 2011–14, although the 
gap is not always statistically significant (Figure 4.10). 
To put these residuals into context, recall that the slump 
in investment relative to precrisis forecasts has averaged 
about 40 percent a year since the crisis. And dur-
ing 2008–10, investment was above the predicted level 
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Figure 4.8.  Accelerator Model: Real Business Investment
(Log index)
2. Japan
3. Germany
1. United States
4. France
Actual Accelerator model prediction
Spring 2007 forecasts
Sources: Consensus Economics; Haver Analytics; national authorities; and IMF staff 
estimates.
Note: Total investment loss denotes average deviations of actual investment from 
precrisis (spring 2007) forecasts. Residuals denote average deviations of actual 
investment from accelerator model predictions. Data labels in the figure use 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes. 
119 advanced economies as reported in the figure.
2Global financial crisis (GFC) and noncrisis advanced economies are as identified in 
Laeven and Valencia 2012.
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The model generally provides a close fit, with residuals typically not statistically 
distinguishable from zero and accounting for, at most, one-fifth of the total loss 
relative to forecasts for 2008–14 made prior to the global financial crisis.
Figure 4.9.  Real Business Investment: Accelerator Model 
Residuals and Investment Losses Relative to Precrisis 
Forecasts, 2008–14
(Percent)
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for these economies by about 4 percent, on average, 
although the deviation was not statistically significant.22
To investigate what may lie behind these cases of 
unexplained investment weakness, the analysis con-
siders two factors that have been emphasized in the 
policy debate: financial constraints and policy uncer-
tainty. Firms with financial constraints face difficul-
ties expanding business investment because they lack 
funding resources to do so, regardless of their business 
perspectives. Here, financial constraints are measured 
as the percentage of respondents in the European 
Commission’s Business and Consumer Surveys that 
identify such constraints as a factor limiting their busi-
ness production.23 Uncertainty about the economic 
outlook can discourage investment because of the 
lumpy and irreversible nature of investment projects. 
It is measured here by Baker, Bloom, and Davis’s 
(2013) index of policy uncertainty, which is based on 
newspaper coverage of policy-related economic uncer-
tainty.24 When these variables are added directly to the 
estimated model, the analysis can reveal their inde-
pendent influence—beyond their role via output—on 
investment.25  
The results are consistent with the view that, for 
some economies, financial constraints and policy 
uncertainty have played a role beyond output in 
impeding investment in recent years. For euro area 
economies with high borrowing spreads during the 
2010–11 sovereign debt crisis, adding these variables 
to the accelerator model reduces the degree of unex-
plained investment. Figure 4.10 shows the results of 
22Investment across Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain 
averaged some 1.1 percent of GDP less than the model’s predic-
tion during 2011–14 and some 0.6 percent of GDP more than the 
model’s prediction during 2008–10.
23These surveys ask respondents to identify what factors, if any, 
are limiting their production. Although survey-based variables have 
their limitations, the variable in principle reflects the role of both 
borrowing costs and quantitative restrictions on borrowing (credit 
rationing). To make it easier to interpret the regression results, the 
variable is normalized by subtracting the mean, for each economy, 
and dividing by the standard deviation. The index thus has a mean 
of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
24As explained by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013), the index 
quantifies newspaper coverage of terms related to economic policy 
uncertainty (Annex 4.1). The index also incorporates information on 
the extent of disagreement among professional forecasters about the 
future path of policy-relevant macroeconomic variables such as infla-
tion and government budget balances. It may thus reflect uncertainty 
about the overall economic outlook. 
25The normal influence of both variables on investment through 
output would already be captured in the baseline model estimated 
previously. 
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Figure 4.10.  Selected Euro Area Economies: Accelerator 
Model—Role of Financial Constraints and Policy Uncertainty
(Log index)
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For some euro area economies, there are cases of unexplained investment 
weakness during 2011–14, with evidence of financial constraints and policy 
uncertainty playing a role beyond output in impeding investment. Earlier in the 
crisis, investment was above the level predicted for these economies. 
Sources: Consensus Economics; Haver Analytics; national authorities; and IMF 
staff estimates.
Note: Fitted values for investment are obtained by multiplying fitted values for the 
investment rate by the lagged capital stock. Shaded areas denote 90 percent 
confidence intervals, based on the Newey-West estimator.
1Euro area economies (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) with high borrowing 
spreads during the 2010–11 sovereign debt crisis.
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adding these variables, one at a time, to the baseline 
model. The underlying regression coefficient estimates 
also typically have the expected negative sign and are 
statistically significant, although they are not always 
economically significant.26 These mixed results reflect 
the inherent difficulty of disentangling the indepen-
dent roles of these economy-wide variables, as well 
as the small number of observations for each country 
since the crisis for which the financial constraints and 
uncertainty data are available.
Overall, the results in this section indicate that the 
bulk of the slump in business investment since the 
crisis reflects the weakness in output and are consistent 
with the view that the weakness in investment is pri-
marily a symptom of the weak economic environment. 
The results are also in line with surveys of firms, which 
often indicate that a lack of customer demand is the 
dominant factor constraining their production (Fig-
ure 4.11). There is also some suggestive evidence that 
financial constraints and policy uncertainty play a role 
in certain economies. However, identifying the effect 
of these factors is challenging based on macroeconomic 
data, particularly given the limited number of obser-
vations for each country since the crisis. Therefore, 
the next section turns to firm-level data for a clearer 
assessment of whether financial constraints and policy 
uncertainty have held back investment since the crisis. 
Which Firms Have Cut Back More on 
Investment? The Roles of Financial 
Constraints and Policy Uncertainty
To provide additional insights into what factors, 
beyond aggregate economic activity, have held back 
investment since the crisis, this section investigates which 
types of firms have cut back most on investment in recent 
years. The focus is on the roles of financial constraints and 
policy uncertainty, for which the analysis in the previous 
section provides suggestive evidence. In particular, this 
section investigates whether reduced credit availability has 
caused lower firm investment, after the effect of sales and 
26As reported in Annex Table 4.5.3, the coefficient estimates 
imply that a one standard deviation rise in the financial constraints 
variable is associated with a decline in the investment rate (invest-
ment as a share of the previous year’s capital stock) by 0 to 1.1 
percentage points of the capital stock. A one standard deviation rise 
in the policy uncertainty variable is associated with a decline in the 
investment rate by 0 to 0.4 percentage point of the capital stock. To 
put these estimates into context, note that the investment rate for 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain averages 2.3 percent of the 
capital stock.
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Note: Solid lines in the figure report the median percentage of survey respondents 
across countries in the group, indicating that demand and financial constraints, 
respectively, have been a factor limiting production; shaded areas show the 
dispersion across countries (25th and 75th percentiles of the sample).
1Euro area economies (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) with high borrowing 
spreads during the 2010–11 sovereign debt crisis.
2Percentage of small businesses surveyed by the National Federation of 
Independent Business reporting “poor sales” (blue line) or “financial and interest 
rate” (red line) as the single most important problem they are facing; three-month 
moving average.
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other factors on investment is allowed for. It also investi-
gates whether periods of elevated uncertainty have played 
an independent role in reducing firm investment.
 Using firm-level data has notable advantages. The 
large number of observations allows the analysis to 
control for a profusion of factors affecting investment, 
including through the use of fixed effects at the firm, 
industry-year, and country-year levels. This analysis 
uses annual data for 27,661 firms across 32 advanced 
economies for 2000–13 based on annual data from 
Thomson Reuters Worldscope.27
At the same time, the use of firm-level data comes 
with a number of caveats. Since the data in Thomson 
Reuters Worldscope cover publicly listed firms only, 
the results of the analysis do not necessarily apply to 
whole economies, including to unlisted small and 
medium-sized enterprises. In addition, the data on 
firm-level investment are based on total capital expen-
diture, both in the domestic economy and abroad. 
In this context, however, it is reassuring that the sum 
of investment by all firms in the data set is correlated 
with domestic business investment from the national 
accounts.28 This suggests that the results obtained 
in this section for the listed firms in the sample are 
relevant for firms more generally.
The Role of Financial Constraints 
To shed light on the role of constrained credit avail-
ability in holding back investment, this subsection 
investigates whether, in recent banking crises, firms in 
more financially dependent sectors have seen a larger 
drop in investment than those in other sectors. 
The methodology is similar to the “difference-in-
difference” approach of Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and 
Rajan (2008), who investigate the impact of previous 
banking crises (during 1980–2000) on firm production 
in both advanced and emerging market economies. The 
27Data are obtained from Thomson Reuters Worldscope on the 
balance sheets, cash flows, and income statements for all listed 
nonfinancial companies. 
28On average, according to the firm-level data, investment by the 
firms in the data set amounts to 37 percent of total (economy-wide) 
business investment for the 2000–13 period. Reassuringly, however, 
as reported in Annex Table 4.2.1, total business investment and the 
sum of firm-level investment are correlated. In particular, a 1 percent 
rise in total business investment is associated with, on average, a 0.8 
percent rise in the sum of firm-level investment. The finding of an 
almost one-for-one relationship between economy-wide business 
investment and firm-level investment holds for various sample splits, 
and after controlling for country and time fixed effects.
premise of this difference-in-difference approach is that if 
a reduction in credit availability plays a role in depressing 
investment when a banking crisis occurs, then industries 
that rely more on external funds would be expected to cut 
investment more than other sectors. It is worth acknowl-
edging that, while this difference-in-difference approach 
is well suited to analyzing factors that explain differential 
performance across different firms following banking 
crises, it does not directly quantify economy-wide effects.
The analysis in this subsection covers the 2000–13 
period, focusing on advanced economies, which means 
that the bulk of the banking crises in the sample 
are those that have occurred since 2007. Unlike in 
the research of Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan 
(2008), the focus here is on firm investment rather 
than firm production. Following the literature, a 
firm’s dependence on external finance is measured by 
the fraction of its investment not financed through 
internal funds.29 An example of a sector among those 
most dependent on external finance would be drugs 
and pharmaceuticals; one of the least dependent on 
external finance would be beverages.
The estimation results are consistent with the view 
that a contraction in credit availability in recent bank-
ing crises played a role in reducing business invest-
ment. In particular, as reported in Table 4.1, more 
29The estimated equation has the firm’s investment rate (capital 
expenditure as a share of the previous year’s capital stock) as the 
dependent variable on the left side. On the right side, the explana-
tory variable of interest is the level of financial dependence interacted 
with a variable indicating whether the economy is experiencing a 
banking crisis. The equation estimated is 
 Iijk,t——– = b Financial Dependencej × Banking Crisisk,t Kijk,t–1
  + ∑ gl xijk,t + ai + ∑ lk,tdk,t + ∑ fj,tdj,t + eijk,t,   l k,t j,t
in which i denotes the ith firm, j denotes the jth sector, and k 
denotes the kth country. The equation also controls for two key 
firm-level factors included in the x terms: the level of sales and 
Tobin’s Q in the previous period. Following the literature, Tobin’s 
Q is calculated using Thomson Reuters Worldscope data as the sum 
of the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided 
by the book value of assets. Finally, as already mentioned, the equa-
tion controls for firm fixed effects (ai) and industry-year (dj,t), and 
country-year (dk,t) fixed effects. As in the pioneering work of Rajan 
and Zingales (1998), the analysis assumes that a firm’s dependence 
on external finance is an intrinsic feature of its industrial sector. 
Annex 4.2 provides details on how the sector-level approximation 
of a firm’s intrinsic dependence on external finance is computed. 
Standard errors are clustered at the three-digit-sector-country-year 
level. The results of the analysis are similar if the Banking Crisis 
dummy is lagged by one year and if the sample is limited to years 
from 2006 onward. 
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financially dependent sectors invest significantly less 
than less-dependent sectors during banking crises. 
In banking crises, more financially dependent sec-
tors (those in the top 25 percent of the external 
dependence distribution) see a fall in the investment 
rate—capital expenditure as a share of the previous 
year’s capital stock—about 1.6 percentage points larger 
than that of less financially dependent sectors (those 
in the lowest 25 percent of the external dependence 
distribution).30 This differential amounts to about 
10 percent of the sample median investment rate of 
16 percent.31
Figure 4.12 provides a simple illustration of this 
finding by reporting the evolution of investment for 
firms in the highest 25 percent and the lowest 25 per-
cent of the external dependence distribution for all 
30As Table 4.1 reports, the coefficient on the interaction of 
financial dependence and banking crisis is estimated to be −0.02, 
which implies that increasing the level of financial dependence from 
the lowest 25 percent to the top 25 percent of the distribution—an 
increase of 0.8 unit in the index––reduces the investment rate by 
1.6 percentage points (−0.02 × 0.8 × 100). The estimate is strongly 
statistically significant (at the 1 percent level) and robust to the 
inclusion of firm-level controls in the specification, in addition to 
the set of fixed effects already mentioned.  
31These results may be influenced by “survivorship bias,” which 
would bias the analysis against finding evidence of a role for financial 
constraints. In particular, firms that experienced the most severe 
financial constraints during the crisis and ceased operating are, by 
definition, excluded from the sample. Despite their exclusion, the 
analysis still finds significant effects of financial constraints, sug-
gesting that the true effects of such constraints may be larger than 
reported here.  
advanced economies since 2007. Given the lack of 
precrisis forecasts for investment in individual sectors, 
the results are reported as deviations from a univari-
ate forecast of investment.32 The figure suggests that 
by 2009, investment had dropped by 50 percent, 
relative to the forecast, among firms in more financially 
dependent sectors—about twice as much as for those 
in less financially dependent sectors. During 2009–10, 
the difference between the two groups of firms is 
statistically significant. In more recent years, however, 
the difference between the two groups declines, until 
by 2013 it is no longer apparent.
The effect of banking crises on firm investment dis-
cussed thus far could, in principle, reflect the normal 
response of firms’ balance sheets to a recession rather 
than special impediments due to a weak financial sec-
tor. Many banking crises coincide with recessions, dur-
ing which low sales result in weak firm balance sheets, 
which could induce firms that are more dependent on 
external finance to invest disproportionately less. 
To distinguish the effect of such balance sheet effects 
owing to recession from the specific effect of bank-
ing crises, the analysis allows for separate differential 
effects during recessions and during banking crises. 
32In particular, the figure reports impulse responses based on 
Jordà’s (2005) local projection method, as described in Annex 4.4. 
For the purposes of this illustration, the analysis does not control 
for county-year, sector-year, or firm fixed effects, or for any other 
sectoral features of firms, which might contribute to the impact of 
other channels through financial dependence.
Table 4.1. Firm-Level Evidence: Financial Constraints Channel
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Ratio of firm investment to lagged capital
Bank Crisis × Financial Dependence   –0.024*** 
(0.007)
–0.023*** 
(0.007)
–0.026***
(0.008)
Recession × Financial Dependence  0.008
(0.006)
Sales-to-Lagged-Capital Ratio 0.008*** 
(0.000)
0.008*** 
(0.000)
Lagged Tobin’s Q 0.042*** 
(0.002)
0.042*** 
(0.002)
Fixed Effects
Firm Y Y  Y 
Sector × Year Y Y  Y 
Country × Year Y Y  Y 
Number of Observations 161,073 160,239 160,239
R² 0.03 0.13 0.13
Sources: Haver Analytics; national authorities; Thomson Reuters Worldscope; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: The table presents results from a panel regression with fixed effects at the firm, sector-year, and country-year levels. Bank crisis 
dates are as identified in Laeven and Valencia 2012. Recession dates are taken from Claessens, Kose, and Terrones 2012. Standard 
errors are in parentheses.
***p < .01.
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When both effects are allowed for, the estimated effect 
of banking crises remains unchanged relative to the 
baseline estimate, suggesting that the results reflect 
disruptions in credit supply due to banking crises 
(Table 4.1).33 Although this chapter does not further 
investigate the separate roles of weak firm balance 
sheets and impaired credit supply, a growing number 
of studies do so and suggest that both channels have 
been relevant.34 
The Role of Policy Uncertainty
To shed light on the role of uncertainty in holding 
back investment, this subsection investigates whether 
investment in sectors that are more sensitive to uncer-
tainty is lower during times of elevated economy-wide 
uncertainty. 
The approach is analogous to the difference-in-
difference approach adopted in the last subsection. The 
premise is that if the uncertainty channel is important 
in suppressing investment, this should be reflected in 
a relatively worse performance, during times of high 
economy-wide uncertainty, of those sectors more 
sensitive to uncertainty compared with those sectors 
that are less sensitive to uncertainty. A firm’s sensitiv-
ity to economy-wide uncertainty is measured by the 
usual correlation of its stock return with economy-
wide uncertainty, after the overall market return is 
controlled for.35 Economy-wide uncertainty is, in turn, 
33Following Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan (2008), the 
chapter distinguishes between these two effects by adding an interac-
tion term to the baseline equation estimated: Financial Dependencej 
× Recessionk,t. As reported in Table 4.1, the coefficient on this term 
is found to be statistically indistinguishable from zero, while the 
coefficient on the key variable of interest, Financial Dependencej × 
Banking Crisisk,t, is unchanged and remains statistically significant. 
34For example, Kalemli-Ozcan, Laeven, and Moreno (forthcom-
ing) investigate the separate roles of weak corporate balance sheets, 
corporate debt overhang, and weak bank balance sheets in hindering 
investment in Europe in recent years using a firm-level data set on 
small and medium-sized enterprises in which each firm is matched 
to its bank. They find that all three of these factors have inhib-
ited investment in small firms but that corporate debt overhang 
(defined by the long-term debt-to-earnings ratio) has been the most 
important.
35As before, the estimated equation has the firm’s investment rate 
as the dependent variable on the left side. On the right side, the 
explanatory variable of interest is the level of uncertainty sensitiv-
ity interacted with the level of stock market volatility. The equation 
estimated is
 Iijk,t——– = b Uncertainty Sensitivityj × Volatilityk,t Kijk,t–1
  + ∑ gl xijk,t + ai + ∑ lk,tdk,t + ∑ fj,tdj,t + eijk,t,   l k,t j,t
based on Baker, Bloom, and Davis’s (2013) news-based 
measures of economic policy uncertainty, used in the 
analysis earlier in the chapter. Intuitively, sectors that 
emerge as the most sensitive to uncertainty include 
those that could plausibly be expected to have particu-
larly lumpy and irreversible investment decisions, such 
in which the same set of additional controls is included as before. 
The level of aggregate stock market volatility in country k in year t 
(Volatilityk,t) is here measured as the standard deviation of weekly 
returns of the country-level stock market index. Stock market volatil-
ity moves closely with the economy-wide policy uncertainty index 
constructed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013). The uncertainty 
sensitivity measure is at the sector level and is time invariant. It is 
estimated based on a precrisis sample spanning 2000–06.
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Sources: Thomson Reuters Worldscope; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Less (more) financially dependent and less (more) sensitive firms are those in 
the lowest (highest) 25 percent of the external dependence and news-based 
sensitivity distributions, respectively, as described in the chapter. Shaded areas 
(less dependent/sensitive) and dashed lines (more dependent/sensitive) denote 90 
percent confidence intervals. Sample includes all advanced economies except 
Cyprus, Latvia, Malta, and San Marino.
Firms in sectors that are more financially dependent cut investment more sharply 
than other firms, particularly early in the crisis. Firms in sectors that are more 
sensitive to policy uncertainty also reduced investment by more than other firms.
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as, for example, concrete work; those least sensitive 
include, for example, veterinary services.36
The estimation results are broadly consistent with 
the view that a rise in economy-wide uncertainty 
causes firms to invest less. In particular, as reported 
in Table 4.2, sectors that are more sensitive to uncer-
tainty experience a larger fall in investment relative to 
less sensitive sectors during times of high economy-
wide uncertainty. The results are economically and 
statistically significant. They imply that, during spikes 
in economy-wide stock market volatility (in the top 
10 percent of episodes, which generally corresponds 
to 2008–09 in the sample), investment in those sec-
tors more sensitive to uncertainty (those in the top 
25 percent of the distribution) falls by 1.3 percentage 
points more than investment in the less sensitive sec-
tors (those in the lowest 25 percent). This differential 
amounts to about 8 percent of the median investment 
rate of 16 percentage points (1.3/16).37 
36As is the case for the sector-specific financial dependence index 
used earlier, the estimation of sector-specific uncertainty sensitivity is 
computed for the United States and applied to other economies. In 
particular, the median firm-level coefficient for each sector obtained 
for the United States is applied to all other economies.
37As Table 4.2 reports, the coefficient on the interaction of news-
based uncertainty sensitivity and realized stock market volatility is 
estimated to be −0.02. The estimate is strongly statistically significant 
(at the 1 percent level) and robust to the inclusion of additional 
firm-level controls in the specification, as well as the set of fixed 
effects already mentioned. The estimate implies that during spikes in 
economy-wide uncertainty to the top 10 percent of the distribution 
Panel 2 of Figure 4.12 provides a simple illustra-
tion of this finding by reporting the evolution of 
investment for firms in the highest 25 percent and 
the lowest 25 percent of the uncertainty sensitivity 
distribution for all advanced economies since 2007.38 
It suggests that by 2011, investment had dropped by 
about 50 percent, relative to the forecast, in sectors 
more sensitive to uncertainty—more than twice as 
much as in less sensitive sectors. During 2011–12, the 
difference between the two groups of firms is statisti-
cally significant. After that, however, the difference 
between the two groups wanes.
Overall, the results based on firm-level data confirm 
that, beyond weak aggregate economic activity, there 
is some evidence that financial constraints and policy 
uncertainty have played independent roles in retarding 
investment. 
(a volatility above 4.46), firms that are in the more sensitive sectors 
(top 25 percent of the distribution) should have substantially less 
investment than those in the less sensitive sectors (in the lowest 25 
percent of the distribution). In particular, moving from the lowest 25 
percent of firms to the top 25 percent of firms, in terms of sensitivity, 
a difference of 0.14 units in the index, implies a reduction in the 
investment rate of 1.3 percentage points (−0.02 × 0.14 × 4.46 × 100). 
38As before, the figure reports impulse responses based on the 
local projection method. 
Table 4.2. Firm-Level Evidence: Policy Uncertainty Channel
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Ratio of firm investment to lagged capital
Market Volatility × Policy Uncertainty Sensitivity –0.010*
(0.006)
–0.028***
(0.008)
–0.017**
(0.008)
Bank Crisis × Financial Dependence –0.024***
(0.007)
–0.023**
(0.007)
Sales-to-Lagged-Capital Ratio 0.008*** 
(0.000)
Lagged Tobin’s Q 0.042*** 
(0.002)
Fixed Effects
Firm Y Y  Y 
Sector × Year Y Y  Y 
Country × Year Y Y  Y 
Number of Observations 202,211 160,476 159,645
R² 0.03 0.03 0.13
Sources: Haver Analytics; national authorities; Thomson Reuters Worldscope; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: The table presents results from a panel regression with fixed effects at the firm, sector-year, and country-year levels. Market 
volatility is measured as the standard deviation of weekly returns of the country-level stock market index. Policy uncertainty sensitivity 
is based on Baker, Bloom, and Davis’s (2013) news-based measures of economic policy uncertainty. Bank crisis dates are as identi-
fied in Laeven and Valencia 2012. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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Have Firms’ Investment Decisions 
Become Disconnected from Profitability 
and Financial Market Valuations? 
Despite the steady recovery in stock markets since 
the crisis, investment has remained subdued. This 
apparent divergence between economic and finan-
cial risk taking has already been highlighted in the 
October 2014 Global Financial Stability Report. The 
question is whether business investment has somehow 
become detached from growing expectations of future 
profitability, as captured by the stronger performance 
of equity markets.
To address this question, this section uses the Tobin’s 
Q model of investment. According to the theory 
underpinning this model, developed by Tobin (1969) 
and formalized by Mussa (1977) and Abel (1983), 
firms should invest in capital to the point at which 
the marginal product of capital equals its user cost. 
In other words, if the return from an extra unit of 
capital is greater than its cost, additional investment 
is warranted. This return-to-cost ratio has come to be 
known as “Tobin’s Q” (or “marginal Q”) and is typi-
cally approximated by the ratio of a firm’s stock market 
valuation to the replacement cost of its capital (also 
known as “average Q”).39 Therefore, theory would 
predict a close relationship between stock markets and 
investment, assuming perfect substitutability between 
internal and external finance. To estimate this relation-
ship, data from national authorities on capital expen-
diture and Tobin’s Q at the economy-wide level are 
used.40 
The weak relationship between investment rates 
and contemporaneous Tobin’s Q is noticeable but 
not historically unusual. For four major advanced 
economies, Tobin’s Q is found to have increased much 
more sharply in recent years than business investment 
39As shown by Hayashi (1982), marginal Q and average Q can 
be equal under certain conditions, including perfect competition, 
perfect capital markets, and a certain form of adjustment costs. 
Following the literature, the chapter constructs Tobin’s Q as the ratio 
of nonfinancial corporations’ equity liabilities to their total financial 
assets, using flow of funds data from national sources.
40Following the related literature (Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers 
1993, for example), the equation, estimated on aggregate annual 
data for 2000–13, is as follows:
 Ii,tDln —— = ai + lt + b0DlnQi,t + b1DlnQi,t–1 + b2DlnQi,t–2 + ei,t, Ki,t–1
in which Qi,t denotes the aggregate Tobin’s Q for country i in year t 
and ai and lt denote country and year fixed effects, respectively. As 
reported in Table 4.3, the analysis is also repeated with additional 
controls (cash flow and profits).
(Figure 4.13). This is also borne out in the estimated 
relationship between the growth of investment and 
contemporaneous changes in Tobin’s Q, which delivers 
a near-zero coefficient (Table 4.3). The relationship 
is weak whether the estimation sample is limited to 
the precrisis period (ending in 2006) or includes the 
years since the crisis. These findings are consistent with 
the broader literature, in which a weak connection 
between firm investment and stock market incentives 
is not unusual.41 
At the same time, there is also some evidence that, 
historically, stock market performance is a leading indi-
cator of future investment. In particular, the predicted 
growth rate of investment is closer to the actual once 
lagged values of Tobin’s Q are included (Figure 4.14 
and Table 4.3). The fit improves further when either 
current profits or cash flow are also included in the 
model. Overall, these results suggest that, despite 
the apparent disconnect between stock markets and 
investment, if stocks remain buoyant, investment could 
eventually pick up. 
Policy Implications 
The analysis in this chapter suggests that the main 
factor holding back business investment since the global 
financial crisis has been the overall weakness of eco-
nomic activity. Firms have reacted to weak sales—both 
current and prospective—by reducing capital spending. 
Evidence from business surveys provides complemen-
tary support: firms often mention lack of customer 
demand as the dominant factor limiting their produc-
tion. Beyond weak economic activity, other factors, 
including financial constraints and policy uncertainty, 
have also held back investment in some economies, 
particularly euro area economies with high borrowing 
spreads during the 2010–11 sovereign debt crisis. Con-
firmation of these additional factors at play comes from 
the chapter’s analysis based on firm-level data. 
What policies, then, could encourage a recovery 
in investment? The chapter’s findings suggest that 
addressing the broader weakness in economic activity is 
crucial for supporting private investment. As explained 
in Chapter 3, a large share of the output loss since the 
crisis can now be seen as permanent, and policies are 
thus unlikely to return investment fully to its precrisis 
41Given this weak relationship with Tobin’s Q, a number of stud-
ies instead focus on the effect of current profits and cash flow on 
investment (see Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988, for example).
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trend. This does not imply, however, that there is no 
scope for using fiscal and monetary policies to help 
sustain the recovery and thus to encourage firms to 
invest. As discussed in Chapter 1, in many advanced 
economies, accommodative monetary policy also 
remains essential to prevent real interest rates from ris-
ing prematurely, given persistent and sizable economic 
slack as well as strong disinflation dynamics.
Moreover, there is a strong case for increased public 
infrastructure investment in advanced economies with 
clearly identified infrastructure needs and efficient pub-
lic investment processes and for structural economic 
reforms more generally. In this context, additional pub-
lic infrastructure investment may be warranted to spur 
demand in the short term, raise potential output in the 
medium term, and thus “crowd in” private investment 
(Chapter 3 in the October 2014 World Economic Out-
look). There is also a broad need for structural reforms 
in many economies, including, for example, reforms 
to strengthen labor force participation and potential 
employment, given aging populations (Chapter 3). 
By increasing the outlook for potential output, such 
measures could encourage private investment. Finally, 
the evidence presented in this chapter of financial 
constraints holding back investment suggests a role 
for policies aimed at relieving crisis-related financial 
constraints, including through tackling debt overhang 
and cleaning up bank balance sheets to improve credit 
availability. Overall, a comprehensive policy effort to 
expand output would contribute to a sustained rise in 
private investment.
Percent change in investment-to-capital ratio
Percent change in Tobin’s Q
Investment has not moved in lockstep with Tobin’s Q in recent years. But this is 
not historically unusual.
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Figure 4.13.  Tobin’s Q and Real Business-Investment-to-
Capital Ratios
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Figure 4.14.  Investment: Actual and Predicted Based on 
Tobin’s Q
(Percentage points)
Sources: Haver Analytics; national authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: The figure reports the predicted and actual values for the change in the log of 
the investment-to-capital ratio. Shaded areas denote 90 percent confidence 
intervals.
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Historically, Tobin’s Q is only weakly related to investment in the current year. 
Tobin’s Q has more explanatory power for predicting future investment.
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Annex 4.1. Aggregate Data
Data Sources
The primary data sources for this chapter are the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, the 
April 2014 Fiscal Monitor, Haver Analytics, and the 
Thomson Reuters Worldscope database.42 
Investment and GDP
Data on nominal and real investment are col-
lected primarily from national sources on an annual 
and quarterly basis. Residential investment, for the 
most part, is composed of investment in dwellings 
(housing). Nonresidential or “business” investment is 
defined as the sum of fixed investment in equipment, 
machinery, intellectual property products, and other 
buildings and structures. Public sector contributions to 
residential and nonresidential investment are excluded 
from these categories when data for these contributions 
42The WEO list of 37 advanced economies is used as the basis for 
the analysis in this chapter. The maximum data range available spans 
1960–2014, with data for 2014 being preliminary. Data limita-
tions constrain the sample size in a number of cases, as noted in the 
chapter text.
are available. Where data for public sector contribu-
tions are unavailable, the evolution of private nonresi-
dential investment and total nonresidential investment 
may diverge. GDP data come from the same national 
sources as investment data.
Capital Stock and User Cost of Capital 
Capital stock series are collected for 19 advanced 
economies from national sources and, when these 
are not available, from the Penn World Table 
(Annex Table 4.1.1). Capital stock series for fixed 
assets corresponding to business investment are used 
when available. Linear interpolation is used to convert 
annual capital stock series to a quarterly frequency. 
The quarterly data are then linearly extrapolated using 
country-specific implied depreciation rates, which 
in turn are calculated based on the standard capital 
accumulation equation combined with existing capital 
stock and investment flow data. The user cost of capi-
tal is constructed as the sum of the country-specific 
real interest rate and depreciation rate multiplied by 
the relative price of investment goods to output. Real 
interest rates are defined as monetary financial institu-
tions’ lending rates for new business at all maturities 
Table 4.3. Investment, Tobin’s Q, Profits, and Cash 
Precrisis Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Growth rate of investment-to-capital ratio
Growth Rate of Tobin’s Qt 0.026
(0.021)
0.024
(0.037)
–0.030
(0.018)
–0.004
(0.022)
–0.002
(0.018)
0.012
(0.019)
Growth Rate of Tobin’s Qt–1 0.103***
(0.022)
0.211***
(0.038)
0.175**
(0.047)
0.194***
(0.041)
Growth Rate of Tobin’s Qt–2 0.082**
(0.026)
0.110***
(0.022)
0.096**
(0.024)
0.103***
(0.025)
Operating Profit Growtht 0.030**
(0.010)
Operating Profit Growtht–1 0.028**
(0.009)
Operating Profit Growtht–2 0.005
(0.009)
Cash Flow Growtht 0.072***
(0.014)
Cash Flow Growtht–1 0.046*
(0.017)
Cash Flow Growtht–2 0.004
(0.018)
Number of Observations 181 151 293 261 245 249
Adjusted R ² –0.001 0.117 0.001 0.266 0.354 0.354
Sources: Haver Analytics; national authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: The table presents results from a panel regression with country fixed effects; heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. The sample 
comprises 17 advanced economies, 1990–2013. Precrisis sample ends in 2006.
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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(for euro area countries) and corporate bond yields (for 
Japan and the United States) minus the year-over-year 
change in the investment deflator. The relative price of 
investment goods is defined as the ratio of the invest-
ment deflator to the overall GDP deflator.  
Firm Survey Responses: Factors Limiting Production
For European economies, survey responses are 
taken from the European Commission’s Business and 
Consumer Surveys for the manufacturing sector, which 
shows the percentage of respondents citing each listed 
factor as a factor limiting production. The chapter’s 
analysis uses the responses provided for two of the 
factors: “financial constraints” and “demand.” The data 
are available for European economies at a quarterly 
frequency. For the United States, survey responses are 
taken from the National Federation of Independent 
Business survey of small businesses for the single most 
important problem they are facing. The chapter’s 
analysis uses the responses provided for two factors: 
“poor sales” and “financial and interest rates.”
Policy Uncertainty
The chapter uses Baker, Bloom, and Davis’s (2013) 
news-based policy uncertainty index, which is available 
for major advanced economies at http://www.policy 
uncertainty.com. Among euro area economies, the 
index is available for France, Germany, Italy, and 
Spain. For other euro area economies, the euro area 
average is used as a proxy. 
Precrisis Forecasts and Trends
Precrisis forecasts of private investment and its 
components shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are based on 
the spring issues of Consensus Economics’ Consensus 
Forecasts for the years of interest (2004 and 2007) or, 
where those data are unavailable, on the IMF’s WEO 
Annex Table 4.1.1.  Data Sources
Country Business Investment Capital Stock
Australia Australian Bureau of Statistics/Haver Analytics Penn World Table 8.0
Austria Statistical Office of the European Communities/Haver Analytics Eurostat
Belgium Banque Nationale de Belgique/Haver Analytics . . .
Canada Statistics Canada/Haver Analytics Statistics Canada/Haver Analytics
Czech Republic Statistical Office of the European Communities/Haver Analytics Eurostat
Denmark Statistical Office of the European Communities/Haver Analytics Eurostat
Estonia Statistical Office of the European Communities/Haver Analytics . . .
Finland Statistical Office of the European Communities/Haver Analytics Eurostat
France Statistical Office of the European Communities/Haver Analytics Eurostat
Germany Statistisches Bundesamt/Haver Analytics Statistisches Bundesamt/Haver Analytics
Greece Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT)/Haver Analytics Penn World Table 8.0
Iceland Statistics Iceland/Haver Analytics . . .
Israel Central Bureau of Statistics/Haver Analytics . . .
Italy Istituto Nazionale di Statistica/Haver Analytics Eurostat
Japan Cabinet Office/Haver Analytics RIETI, Japan Industrial Productivity Database
Korea Bank of Korea/Haver Analytics Bank of Korea
Latvia Statistical Office of the European Communities/Haver Analytics . . .
Luxembourg Statistical Office of the European Communities/Haver Analytics . . .
Malta Statistical Office of the European Communities/Haver Analytics . . .
Netherlands Statistical Office of the European Communities/Haver Analytics Eurostat
New Zealand Statistics New Zealand/Haver Analytics . . .
Norway Statistics Norway/Haver Analytics . . .
Portugal Statistical Office of the European Communities/Haver Analytics Penn World Table 8.0
Singapore Department of Statistics/Haver Analytics . . .
Slovak Republic Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic . . .
Slovenia Statistical Office of the European Communities/Haver Analytics . . .
Spain Statistical Office of the European Communities/Haver Analytics Valencian Institute of Economic Research
Sweden Statistical Office of the European Communities/Haver Analytics Eurostat
United Kingdom Office of National Statistics/Haver Analytics Office of National Statistics/Haver Analytics
United States Bureau of Economic Analysis/Haver Analytics Bureau of Economic Analysis/Haver Analytics
Source: IMF staff calculations. 
Note: Business investment data are unavailable for Cyprus, Hong Kong SAR, Ireland, Lithuania, San Marino, Switzerland, and Taiwan Province of China. RIETI = Research 
Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry.
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database. The linear precrisis trends in Figure 4.3 are 
constructed using data for 1990–2004. 
Decomposing the Investment Slump
For the decomposition shown in Figure 4.4, data 
from Consensus Economics’ Consensus Forecasts for 
spring 2007 are used for both total private investment 
and nonresidential (business) investment. The forecast 
for residential investment is computed as the difference 
between the forecast for total private investment and 
the forecast for nonresidential investment (panel 1). 
For the decomposition of total investment (including 
both public and private investment), the forecast for 
total investment comes from the spring 2007 WEO. 
The forecast for public investment is then computed 
as the difference between the WEO forecast for total 
investment and the Consensus Economics forecast for 
private investment already mentioned. The decomposi-
tion calculation involves multiplying the deviation of 
each component from its precrisis forecast by its share 
in total investment. For panel 1, the share in total 
private investment is used. For panel 2, the share in 
total investment (including both private and public 
investment) is used.
Annex 4.2. Firm-Level Data
Annual data from Thomson Reuters Worldscope on 
the balance sheets, cash flows, and income statements 
for all listed nonfinancial companies are used. The 
data cover 28 advanced economies. The sample period 
is 2000–13. The data are winsorized at the 1 percent 
level to reduce the influence of outliers.
Comparison of Firm-Level and Aggregate Data
To assess how the firm-level investment data com-
pare with the economy-wide investment data, panel 
regressions of the annual growth rate of aggregate 
firm-level investment on the growth rate of economy-
wide business investment from the national accounts 
are performed. The results suggest that a 1 percent 
change in economy-wide investment is associated 
with a change in aggregate firm-level investment of 
about 0.8 percent (Annex Table 4.2.1). The firm-level 
data thus appear to capture the key dynamics of the 
economy-wide business investment data. 
Construction of Sector-Level Financial Dependence 
Index 
The sector-level approximation of a firm’s intrinsic 
dependence on external finance for fixed investment is 
constructed following the methodology first developed 
by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Specifically,
 Capital Expenditures 
 – Cash Flow
Financial Dependence = ———————————
 Capital Expenditure
For the purposes of this chapter, the index is con-
structed following the approach of Tong and Wei 
(2011) and Claessens, Tong, and Wei (2012). For 
each U.S. firm, the index is computed for the pre-
Annex Table 4.2.1. Aggregate Firm-Level Investment versus 
National Investment
Equation estimated:
Aggregate firm-level investment growthi,t = ai + lt + b{National accounts business 
investment growthi,t} + ei,t
Full Sample Pre-2007 Post-2007
b 0.834***
(0.161)
0.904***
(0.237)
0.719**
(0.238)
Number of Observations 482 315 167
Adjusted R ² 0.378 0.375 0.372
Sources: Haver Analytics; national authorities; Thomson Reuters Worldscope; and IMF staff 
calculations.
Note: The table presents results from a panel regression with country and time fixed effects; 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Extreme values are omitted.
**p < .05; ***p < .01.
WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: UNEVEN GROWTH—SHORT- AND LONG-TERM FACTORS
132 International Monetary Fund | April 2015
crisis period (1990–2006) based on annual data 
from Compustat USA Industrial Annual. The sector-
level value of the index for the United States is then 
obtained by calculating the median across all firms 
in the sector (at the Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion [SIC] three-digit level). Whereas Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) cover only 40 (mainly two-digit SIC) 
sectors, the analysis here is expanded to cover 111 
(three-digit SIC) sectors. Following Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), the analysis then assumes that the same 
intrinsic external financing dependence applies to the 
corresponding sector in all other economies, based on 
the argument that U.S. firms are the least likely to suf-
fer from financing constraints during normal times and 
thus the U.S. value of the index for a particular sector 
likely represents a minimum value for same-sector 
firms in other economies.
Annex 4.3. Instrumental Variables Estimation
The subsection “How Much Is Explained by Output? 
Insights Based on Instrumental Variables” estimates the 
effects of economic activity on investment using a two-
stage least-squares approach. The estimated equation is
Δln Ii,t = ai + lt + b{Instrumented Δln Yi,t} 
 + r Δln Ii,t–1 + ei,t, (A4.3.1)
in which i denotes the ith country and t denotes the 
tth year; Δln Ii,t is the change in (log) real business 
investment; and Δln Yi,t is the change in (log) real 
GDP. The approach includes a full set of country fixed 
effects (ai ) to take account of differences among coun-
tries’ normal growth rates. It also includes a full set of 
time fixed effects (lt ) to take account of global shocks. 
As already mentioned, in the first stage, output growth, 
Δln Yi,t, is regressed on the narrative series of fiscal 
policy changes of Devries and others (2011). In the 
second stage, these instrumented output growth rates 
are regressed on the growth in business investment.
The baseline estimate of b is 2.4, which implies 
that a 1 percent decline in output is associated with a 
2.4 percent decline in investment (Annex Table 4.3.1). 
To obtain a predicted path of investment relative to 
forecast, this estimate is used together with the equation 
ln Ii,t – Fi,2007 ln Ii,t = b(ln Yi,t – Fi,2007 ln Yi,t),
 (A4.3.2)
in which Fi,2007 denotes the spring 2007 forecast and  
ln Ii,t and ln Yi,t denote the log levels of business and 
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Annex Figure 4.3.1.  Actual versus Predicted Real Business 
Investment—Robustness
Sources: Haver Analytics; national authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: Shaded areas denote 90 percent confidence intervals. Sample includes 
advanced economies listed in Annex Table 4.1.1.
1Based on the relationship between investment and an alternative measure of 
aggregate demand (AD), defined as the sum of domestic consumption and exports.
2Based on recessions associated with house price busts.
3Uses both fiscal policy shocks and recessions associated with house price busts.
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real GDP, respectively, in year t. The 90 percent confi-
dence interval for the prediction is computed using the 
standard error for b (±1.645 times the standard error). 
The main result based on this approach is that the 
actual slump in business investment since the crisis is 
no weaker than expected given output, and the actual 
path of investment is inside the prediction’s 90 per-
cent confidence interval (Figure 4.7). This result holds 
up to repeating the analysis based on deviations of 
investment and output relative to forecasts made in 
the spring of 2004 rather than the spring of 2007. 
Replacing the deviations of investment and output 
from WEO and Consensus Economics forecasts with 
deviations from univariate trends estimated using the 
local projection method (Annex 4.4) also provides no 
evidence of a larger-than-explained decline in invest-
ment (Annex Figure 4.3.1). 
A similar result also emerges when the analysis is 
repeated with output replaced in the estimated equa-
tion by a measure of aggregate demand that excludes 
investment. In particular, equation (A4.3.1) is reesti-
mated with the term Δln Yi,t redefined as the change 
in the (log) sum of total consumption (private and 
government) and exports. As in the baseline, the first 
stage is strong (Annex Table 4.3.1). The F-statistic on 
the excluded instrument has a p-value below 0.01 per-
cent (one one-hundredth of 1 percent) and is above 
15, indicating that the narrative fiscal policy changes 
have explanatory power for domestic and foreign sales 
growth. The second stage yields an estimate for b of 
2.6. When combined with the path of consumption 
and exports since 2007, relative to forecast, this esti-
mate again yields a predicted fall in business invest-
ment that is close to the actual path of investment 
(Annex Figure 4.3.1). 
Using Housing Price Busts As an Alternative 
Instrumental Variable 
The analysis is also repeated with an alternative 
instrument based on recessions associated with hous-
ing price busts. These busts imply a sharp reduction 
in household wealth and, therefore, a contraction in 
household consumption and residential investment. 
Such developments could thus provide another source 
of output fluctuations not triggered by a contraction 
in business investment. The data on recessions and 
house price busts are taken from Claessens, Kose, and 
Terrones 2012. The overall results obtained using this 
approach, in terms of the estimate of b and the pre-
dicted path of investment, are similar to the baseline 
(Annex Table 4.3.1 and Annex Figure 4.3.1). However, 
the first stage is not as strong, with a p-value just less 
than 1 percent and an F-statistic less than 10. Using 
the housing bust recessions together with the fiscal 
policy changes––a set of two instruments––yields 
stronger first-stage results, and the implied predicted 
path of investment is similar to the baseline.
Annex Table 4.3.1. Investment-Output Relationship: Instrumental Variables Estimation
Growtht Equation estimated:
Business Investment Growtht (Dln Ii,t) = ai + lt + b{Instrumented Dln Yi,t} + r Dln Ii,t–1 + ei,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b 2.445***
(0.726)
2.633***
(0.883)
1.719***
(0.371)
2.243***
(0.583)
r 0.128*
(0.066)
0.179***
(0.062)
0.108*
(0.064)
0.138**
(0.064)
R2 0.652 0.465 0.511 0.659
Number of Observations 356 356 604 356
First-Stage F-Statistic 15.916 18.461 6.843 11.899
p-Value <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0090 <0.0001
Overidentification Restrictions p-Value . . . . . . . . . 0.516
Definition of Yi,t GDP C + X GDP GDP
Instruments for Dln Yi,t Fiscal shocks Fiscal shocks Housing shocks Fiscal and housing 
shocks
Sources: Haver Analytics; national authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: The table reports point estimates; heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Fiscal shocks denote changes in fiscal policy motivated 
primarily by the desire to reduce the budget deficit (Devries and others 2011). Housing shocks denote recessions associated with house price busts (Claessens, 
Kose, and Terrones 2012). C = consumption; X = exports.
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: UNEVEN GROWTH—SHORT- AND LONG-TERM FACTORS
134 International Monetary Fund | April 2015
Annex 4.4. Local Projection Methods
Local projection methods are used to estimate the 
responses of output and investment following specific 
events. As in Chapter 3, the methodology used is the 
one first set out in Jordà 2005 and developed further 
in Teulings and Zubanov 2014. It is used in the chap-
ter as a robustness check for the deviations of invest-
ment and output from precrisis WEO and Consensus 
Economics forecasts.
The method consists of estimating separate regres-
sions for the variable of interest (investment or output) 
at different horizons using the following specification:
yi,t+h = aih + lth + bhi,1 Si,t + ∑pj=1 bhi,2 Si,t–j 
 + ∑jh=–01 bhi,3 Si,t+h–j + ∑pj=1 bhi,4 yi,t–j 
 + ehi,t, (A4.4.1)
in which y denotes the growth rate of the variable of 
interest; i denotes countries; t denotes years; h denotes 
the horizon of the projection after time t; p denotes 
the number of lags included; and S is the event 
indicator dummy, which in this chapter indicates the 
start of the global financial crisis (Figure 4.12 and 
Annex Figure 4.3.1).
Annex 4.5. Accelerator Model 
Estimation Results
This annex reports the estimation results for the 
baseline and augmented versions of the accelera-
tor model discussed in the chapter text (see Annex 
Figures 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 and Annex Tables 4.5.1, 4.5.2, 
and 4.5.3).
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Annex Figure 4.5.1.  Accelerator Model: In Sample versus Out 
of Sample
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Sources: Consensus Economics; Haver Analytics; national authorities; and IMF staff 
estimates.
Note: Fitted values for investment are obtained by multiplying fitted values for the 
investment rate by the lagged capital stock. Shaded areas denote 90 percent 
confidence intervals, based on the Newey-West estimator.
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Annex Table 4.5.1. Baseline Accelerator Model 
 It a 12 DYt–iEquation estimated: —— = —— + ∑ bi ——– + d + et Kt–1 Kt–1 i=1 Kt–1
a d Sb Number of Observations R²
Australia 27.15*** 0.03*** 0.620 99 0.88
Austria 5.43*** 0.01*** 1.725*** 62 0.82
Canada –41.11*** 0.03*** 1.265*** 99 0.83
Czech Republic 9.59 0.01*** 3.431*** 62 0.70
Denmark –53.79*** 0.02*** 3.254*** 82 0.60
Finland –7.20*** 0.03*** 3.291*** 86 0.73
France –26.04*** 0.03*** 2.902*** 99 0.51
Germany 40.55*** 0.00*** 1.679*** 99 0.95
Greece –0.01 0.02*** 2.950*** 66 0.82
Ireland 0.81 0.01* 4.932*** 58 0.55
Italy –1.35 0.01*** 4.616*** 99 0.64
Japan 1,494.51* 0.02*** 2.084*** 99 0.85
Korea 13,296.28*** 0.01*** 6.063*** 99 0.92
Netherlands –25.01*** 0.03*** 3.260*** 99 0.82
Portugal 2.31 0.01*** 4.765*** 66 0.89
Spain 4.60*** 0.02*** 3.414*** 99 0.78
Sweden –77.94*** 0.05*** 3.212*** 74 0.69
United Kingdom 11.47*** 0.01*** 1.969*** 99 0.73
United States –230.26*** 0.03*** 3.150*** 99 0.91
Sources: Haver Analytics; national authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
*p < .10; ***p < .01; Newey-West estimator.
Annex Table 4.5.2. Accelerator Model: In-Sample versus Out-of-Sample Estimates
 It a 12 DYt–iEquation estimated: —— = —— + ∑ bi ——– + d + et Kt–1 Kt–1 i=1 Kt–1
Baseline Precrisis Sample
Sb R ² Number of Observations Sb R ²
Number of 
Observations
France 2.902*** 0.51 99 3.082*** 0.576 68
Germany 1.679*** 0.95 99 1.702*** 0.952 68
Italy 4.616*** 0.64 99 3.882*** 0.464 68
Japan 2.084*** 0.85 99 2.151*** 0.873 68
Spain 3.414*** 0.78 99 3.005*** 0.497 68
United States 3.150*** 0.91 99 3.833*** 0.934 68
Sources: Haver Analytics; national authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: The baseline model is estimated on a 1990:Q1–2014:Q2 sample. Out-of-sample estimation is based on a 1990:Q1–2006:Q4 
sample.
***p < .01; Newey-West estimator. 
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Annex Table 4.5.3. Selected Euro Area Economies: Baseline and Augmented Accelerator Model—Equalized 
Sample
 It a 12 DYt–i 12Equation estimated: —— = —— + ∑ bi ——– + ∑ gixt–i + d + et Kt–1 Kt–1 i=1 Kt–1 i=1
Baseline Financial Constraints Added
Sb R ² Number of Observations Sb Sg R ²
Number of 
Observations
Greece 2.957*** 0.80 59 1.455*** –0.136* 0.90 59
Ireland 4.932*** 0.55 58 6.093*** –1.109*** 0.81 58
Italy 2.776*** 0.72 59 4.101*** –0.167** 0.72 59
Portugal 4.301*** 0.87 59 5.489*** 0.098 0.85 59
Spain 6.170*** 0.91 59 2.898*** –0.373*** 0.99 59
Baseline Uncertainty Added
Sb R ² Number of Observations Sb Sg R ²
Number of 
Observations
Greece 2.957*** 0.80 59 1.402** –0.391*** 0.92 59
Ireland 4.932*** 0.55 58 2.784*** –0.249*** 0.80 58
Italy 2.776*** 0.72 59 1.853** –0.096 0.83 59
Portugal 4.301*** 0.87 59 –0.585 –0.226*** 0.95 59
Spain 6.170*** 0.91 59 6.438*** 0.0384 0.89 59
Sources: Haver Analytics; national authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: The table presents results for euro area economies (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) with high borrowing spreads during the 2010–11 sovereign 
debt crisis. The same number of observations is used to estimate baseline and augmented model specifications. x denotes the additional variable added to the 
equation (either financial constraints or policy uncertainty). The baseline model is reestimated for an equalized sample, for which the additional variables are 
available. The policy uncertainty variable is available only for Italy and Spain; the average level of euro area policy uncertainty is used for Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal.
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; Newey-West estimator.
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Following brisk private investment growth in emerg-
ing market and developing economies during the 
boom years of the 2000s, most regions have experi-
enced a slowdown in recent years. In many emerg-
ing market and developing economies, investment is 
back in line with forecasts made in the early 2000s 
but has disappointed relative to forecasts made at the 
height of the boom, such as in the spring of 2007 
(Figure 4.1.1).1 
A number of developments initially cushioned 
investment in emerging market and developing 
economies after the onset of the global financial crisis, 
and investment recovered rapidly. These developments 
included macroeconomic policy stimulus, which 
played a supportive role (as in China and a number 
of other Asian economies), and a strong improve-
ment in the terms of trade and robust capital inflows, 
which also helped (particularly in Latin America and 
the Caribbean). But the rebound was short-lived, and 
a slowdown set in from 2011 onward, with signifi-
cant investment growth disappointments across most 
emerging market regions during 2011–13 (Box 1.2 in 
the October 2014 World Economic Outlook).
Part of the investment slowdown since 2011 likely 
reflects the general weakness in economic activity. The 
investment slowdown has coincided with a reduc-
tion in overall output growth––both current and 
expected (Chapter 3)—and it is plausible that firms 
have responded to the associated weakening in sales by 
reducing investment. Nevertheless, unlike in advanced 
economies, the relative slowdown of investment 
compared with output has been unusually large by 
historical standards, which suggests that factors beyond 
output have been at work (Figure 4.1.2). In particular, 
during past episodes of unexpected weakness in output 
growth, private investment has generally fallen by less 
than twice as much as output. In contrast, the slow-
down in private investment since 2011 has been some 
two to four times as large as that of output, depending 
on the region (Figure 4.1.2). This greater dip in invest-
ment relative to output suggests that the investment 
slowdown reflects more than weak output. 
The authors of this box are Samya Beidas-Strom, Nicolas 
Magud, and Sebastian Sosa.
1Private investment as a share of the capital stock in emerging 
market and developing economies has also declined in recent 
years, although it remains above the levels of the early 2000s that 
preceded the boom (Figure 3.10).
What factors beyond output lie behind the slow-
down in investment since 2011, and how do they 
vary by region? The analysis in this box addresses this 
question by examining firm-level Thomson Reuters 
Worldscope data for 16,000 firms across 38 emerging 
markets for the period 1990–2013. It draws on the 
results reported in Magud and Sosa, forthcoming, and 
the April 2015 Regional Economic Outlook: Western 
Box 4.1. After the Boom: Private Investment in Emerging Market and Developing Economies 
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Hemisphere. The empirical model is a variation of the 
traditional Tobin’s Q investment model, augmented 
to include other variables identified in the literature as 
possible determinants of corporate investment.2 
The analysis yields an illustrative decomposition of 
the 2011–13 change in the investment rate for major 
emerging market regions (Figure 4.1.3).3 It is worth 
acknowledging that the panel regression approach used 
here does not fully disentangle causal channels through 
which these factors transmit to private investment. The 
main results are as follows: 
 • Lower commodity export prices (green bars in 
Figure 4.1.3)—measured as a country-specific 
2The baseline equation estimated for each major emerging 
market region, while allowing for different coefficients by region, 
has the following basic specification:
 Iic,t CFic,t—–– = b0 + b1Qic,t + b2 —–– + b3Levic,t–1  Kic,t–1 Kic,t–1
  ΔDebtic,t + b4 —–—–– + b5Intic,t + b6ΔPxc,t–1 + b7KIc,t   Kic,t–1
 + dRECENT + ηh RECENT × ht + di + t + eic,t,
 CFic,t ΔDebtic,tfor ht = ——–, Levic,t–1, ——–—, ΔPxc,t–1, KIc,t. Kic,t–1 Kic,t–1
The subscripts i, c, and t denote firms, countries, and years, 
respectively. The specification controls for firm fixed effects and 
includes a trend (di and t, respectively). The results hold when 
replacing the trend with time fixed effects and adding country 
fixed effects. I denotes investment and K the stock of capital; 
Q represents Tobin’s Q; CF denotes the firm’s cash flow; Lev 
denotes leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt to total 
assets; ΔDebt stands for the change in total debt from the previ-
ous period; Int is a measure of the firm’s cost of capital; ΔPx 
denotes the change in the log of the economy-specific commod-
ity export price index; KI denotes (net) economy-level capital 
inflows (measured by the financial account balance in percent of 
GDP); RECENT stands for a dummy variable that takes a value 
of 1 for observations during 2011–13; and e represents the error 
term. Estimation is conducted based on ordinary least squares, 
with standard errors clustered by country. The estimation results 
for the firm-specific variables (such as Tobin’s Q and cash flow) 
are similar when country-year fixed effects are added to the equa-
tion in place of the economy-level variables. In addition, similar 
results hold if the regression is estimated using the Arellano-
Bond generalized method of moments approach. 
3The investment rate is defined as firm capital expenditure as 
a share of the previous year’s capital stock. As reported in Magud 
and Sosa, forthcoming, the estimated interaction coefficients are 
of the expected sign, although not all are statistically significant. 
Only the coefficient estimates that are found to be statistically 
significant are used to decompose the change in the investment 
rate reported in Figure 4.1.3.
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Note: The average forecast error of private investment is 
compared to that of real GDP in years in which actual output 
growth is below the forecast made early in the year (implying a 
negative forecast error). The forecast errors are defined as 
actual growth in year t minus the forecast made in the spring of 
year t. The forecasts come from Consensus Economics’ 
Consensus Forecasts or, when these are unavailable, the World 
Economic Outlook (WEO). The sample consists of 128 emerging 
market and developing economies from 1990 to 2014. The 
figure presents data, where available, for the country groups as 
defined in the WEO Statistical Appendix. CHN = China; ED = 
emerging and developing; EMDEs = emerging market and 
developing economies; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean.
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export price index—emerge as the largest contribu-
tor to the slowdown, particularly for Latin America 
and the Caribbean. The substantial contribution of 
weaker commodity prices to the decline in private 
investment growth observed since 2011 is not sur-
prising given the large share of commodities in this 
region’s economies. Outside Latin America and the 
Caribbean, investment in other emerging markets 
has also been adversely affected by lower commod-
ity prices, including, for example, in Indonesia, 
Russia, and South Africa. Since the regressions 
control for a period dummy covering 2011–13 
(RECENT), this result does not simply reflect shifts 
in global growth.
 • Weaker expectations of firms’ future profitability 
have also played a key role, as reflected in the large 
contribution of Tobin’s Q (blue bars), particularly 
for emerging market and developing Asia. This 
result is consistent with the view that a dimming 
outlook for potential output growth has sapped 
firm investment. As Chapter 3 explains, potential 
GDP growth has slowed considerably in emerging 
markets since 2011.
 • Tighter financial conditions—both external and 
domestic—have also been associated with the invest-
ment slowdown. A number of economies have seen 
a decline in capital inflows (yellow bars) since 2012, 
and the firm-level analysis suggests that this explains 
a nonnegligible share of the investment slowdown.4 
The contribution of higher corporate leverage and 
lower internal cash flow (red bars) in explaining 
the slowdown is consistent with the view that, in 
an environment of tightening external financial 
conditions, domestic corporate financial weaknesses 
constrain investment more.5 Here, additional analysis 
suggests that larger firms (measured by the size of 
assets or revenues) and those with a larger share of 
foreign ownership have faced, on average, less severe 
financial constraints. And the extent of the relaxation 
of borrowing constraints associated with capital 
4For a further discussion of the role of capital flows, see 
Chapter 4 in the October 2013 World Economic Outlook and the 
IMF’s 2014 Spillover Report (IMF 2014d).
5The domestic “financial factors” component groups the con-
tributions of firm cash flow and leverage and the change in debt. 
For a further discussion of the role of leverage, see Chapter 2 in 
the April 2014 Regional Economic Outlook: Asia and Pacific and 
IMF 2015. The latter finds that about one-third of the decline in 
India’s corporate-investment-to-GDP ratio since 2011–12 can be 
attributed to the buildup of corporate leverage. 
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Source: IMF staff calculations. 
Note: The figure shows the relative contribution of each 
determinant of business investment to the 2011–13 change 
in the private-investment-to-capital ratio in percent of the 
2011 level. The contributions are computed as the recent 
period’s change in each factor multiplied by the sum of its 
corresponding estimated coefficient and the coefficient on its 
interaction with the recent dummy. Contributions are based 
on the specific regression corresponding to each emerging 
market subregion. The figure presents data for 38 emerging 
markets: emerging Asia = China, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, 
Thailand, Vietnam; Latin America = Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela; emerging markets 
include, in addition, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, 
Hungary, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Morocco, 
Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Ukraine. 
1Financial factors comprise cash flow, leverage, and “change 
in debt.”
2Actual percentage change in private-investment-to-capital 
ratio between 2011 and 2013.
3Predicted percentage change in private-investment-to-
capital ratio between 2011 and 2013.
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inflows is stronger for firms in the nontradables sec-
tor (Magud and Sosa, forthcoming).6 
The foregoing firm-level analysis, however, does 
not capture all the developments that have inhibited 
private investment in emerging market and develop-
ing economies. Indeed, a number of recent studies 
have highlighted more country-specific constraints to 
investment in some large emerging markets, including 
Brazil, India, Russia, and South Africa. IMF 2014e 
argues that weak competitiveness and low business 
confidence are factors that have held back private 
investment in Brazil. Anand and Tulin 2014 and 
IMF 2014f estimate that business and regulatory 
uncertainty has contributed about three-quarters of the 
most recent slump in India, delaying project approvals 
6The latter result is also consistent with the indirect evidence 
in Tornell and Westermann 2005. 
and implementation of infrastructure and other large-
scale projects. IMF 2014g suggests that in Russia, a 
difficult business environment and, more recently, 
sanctions have increased the uncertainty of doing 
business, with a chilling effect on investment. Finally, 
IMF 2014h reports that in South Africa, in addition 
to the factors analyzed in this box, deep-seated struc-
tural and infrastructure bottlenecks, weak business 
confidence, and perceptions of political uncertainty 
have played an important role in inhibiting private 
investment. 
What does this imply for private investment in 
emerging market and developing economies? Given 
the sustained weakness in commodity prices and 
tighter domestic and external financial conditions with 
lower capital inflows (see Chapter 1 and the Com-
modity Special Feature), a strong rebound in private 
investment seems unlikely in the near term.
Box 4.1 (continued)
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The Statistical Appendix presents historical data as well as projections. It comprises six sections: Assumptions, What’s New, Data and Conventions, Classification of Coun-
tries, Key Data Documentation, and Statistical Tables.
The assumptions underlying the estimates and pro-
jections for 2015–16 and the medium-term scenario 
for 2017–20 are summarized in the first section. The 
second section presents a brief description of the 
changes to the database and statistical tables since the 
October 2014 World Economic Outlook (WEO). The 
third section provides a general description of the 
data and the conventions used for calculating country 
group composites. The classification of countries in 
the various groups presented in the WEO is summa-
rized in the fourth section. The fifth section provides 
information on methods and reporting standards for 
the member countries’ national account and govern-
ment finance indicators included in the report.
The last, and main, section comprises the statistical 
tables. (Statistical Appendix A is included here; Sta-
tistical Appendix B is available online.) Data in these 
tables have been compiled on the basis of information 
available through April 3, 2015. The figures for 2015 
and beyond are shown with the same degree of preci-
sion as the historical figures solely for convenience; 
because they are projections, the same degree of accu-
racy is not to be inferred.
Assumptions
Real effective exchange rates for the advanced econo-
mies are assumed to remain constant at their average 
levels during the period February 6 to March 6, 2015. 
For 2015 and 2016, these assumptions imply average 
U.S. dollar/special drawing right (SDR) conversion 
rates of 1.411 and 1.415, U.S. dollar/euro conversion 
rates of 1.132 and 1.133, and yen/U.S. dollar conver-
sion rates of 118.9 and 117.1, respectively.
It is assumed that the price of oil will average $58.14 a 
barrel in 2015 and $65.65 a barrel in 2016.
Established policies of national authorities are 
assumed to be maintained. The more specific policy 
assumptions underlying the projections for selected 
economies are described in Box A1.
With regard to interest rates, it is assumed that the 
London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) on six-month 
U.S. dollar deposits will average 0.7 percent in 2015 
and 1.9 percent in 2016, that three-month euro depos-
its will average 0.0 percent in 2015 and 2016, and 
that six-month yen deposits will average 0.1 percent in 
2015 and 0.2 percent in 2016.
With respect to introduction of the euro, on December 
31, 1998, the Council of the European Union decided 
that, effective January 1, 1999, the irrevocably fixed 
conversion rates between the euro and currencies of the 
member countries adopting the euro are as follows:
See Box 5.4 in the October 1998 WEO for details on 
how the conversion rates were established.
1 euro = 13.7603 Austrian schillings
 = 40.3399 Belgian francs
 = 0.585274 Cyprus pound1
 = 1.95583 Deutsche marks
 = 15.6466 Estonian krooni2
 = 5.94573 Finnish markkaa
 = 6.55957 French francs
 = 340.750 Greek drachmas3
 = 0.787564 Irish pound
 = 1,936.27 Italian lire
 = 0.702804 Latvian lat4
 = 3.45280 Lithuanian litas5
 = 40.3399 Luxembourg francs
 = 0.42930 Maltese lira1
 = 2.20371 Netherlands guilders
 = 200.482 Portuguese escudos
 = 30.1260 Slovak koruna6
 = 239.640 Slovenian tolars7
 = 166.386 Spanish pesetas
1Established on January 1, 2008.
2Established on January 1, 2011.
3Established on January 1, 2001.
4Established on January 1, 2014.
5Established on January 1, 2015.
6Established on January 1, 2009.
7Established on January 1, 2007.
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What’s New
 • On January 1, 2015, Lithuania became the 19th 
country to join the euro area. Data for Lithuania 
are not included in the euro area aggregates because 
Eurostat has not fully released the consolidated data for 
the group, but the data are included in the advanced 
economies and subgroups aggregated by the WEO.
 • As in the October 2014 WEO, data for Syria are 
excluded from 2011 onward because of the uncertain 
political situation.
 • As in the October 2014 WEO, the consumer price 
projections for Argentina are excluded because of a 
structural break in the data. Please refer to note 6 in 
Table A7 for further details.
 • Because of the ongoing IMF program with Pakistan, 
the series from which nominal exchange rate assump-
tions are calculated are not made public—the nominal 
exchange rate is a market-sensitive issue in Pakistan.
 • The series from which the nominal exchange rate 
assumptions are calculated are not made public for 
Egypt because the nominal exchange rate is a market-
sensitive issue in Egypt.
 • Starting with the April 2015 WEO, the classification 
for official external financing among emerging market 
and developing economies classified as net debtors has 
been eliminated because of a lack of available data.
Data and Conventions
Data and projections for 189 economies form the 
statistical basis of the WEO database. The data are 
maintained jointly by the IMF’s Research Department 
and regional departments, with the latter regularly 
updating country projections based on consistent 
global assumptions.
Although national statistical agencies are the 
ultimate providers of historical data and definitions, 
international organizations are also involved in statisti-
cal issues, with the objective of harmonizing meth-
odologies for the compilation of national statistics, 
including analytical frameworks, concepts, definitions, 
classifications, and valuation procedures used in the 
production of economic statistics. The WEO database 
reflects information from both national source agencies 
and international organizations. 
Most countries’ macroeconomic data presented in 
the WEO conform broadly to the 1993 version of 
the System of National Accounts (SNA). The IMF’s 
sector statistical standards—the Balance of Payments 
Manual and International Investment Position Manual 
(BPM6), the Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual 
(MFSM 2000), and the Government Finance Statistics 
Manual 2001 (GFSM 2001)—have been or are being 
aligned with the SNA 2008.1 These standards reflect 
the IMF’s special interest in countries’ external posi-
tions, financial sector stability, and public sector fiscal 
positions. The process of adapting country data to the 
new standards begins in earnest when the manuals are 
released. However, full concordance with the manuals 
is ultimately dependent on the provision by national 
statistical compilers of revised country data; hence, 
the WEO estimates are only partially adapted to these 
manuals. Nonetheless, for many countries the impact, 
on major balances and aggregates, of conversion to the 
updated standards will be small. Many other countries 
have partially adopted the latest standards and will 
continue implementation over a period of years.
Composite data for country groups in the WEO are 
either sums or weighted averages of data for individual 
countries. Unless noted otherwise, multiyear averages 
of growth rates are expressed as compound annual rates 
of change.2 Arithmetically weighted averages are used 
for all data for the emerging market and developing 
economies group except data on inflation and money 
growth, for which geometric averages are used. The 
following conventions apply:
 • Country group composites for exchange rates, inter-
est rates, and growth rates of monetary aggregates 
are weighted by GDP converted to U.S. dollars at 
market exchange rates (averaged over the preceding 
three years) as a share of group GDP.
 • Composites for other data relating to the domes-
tic economy, whether growth rates or ratios, are 
weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parity 
as a share of total world or group GDP.3
1Many other countries are implementing the SNA 2008 or ESA 
2010 and began releasing national accounts data based on the new 
standard in 2014. A few countries use versions of the SNA older 
than 1993. A similar adoption pattern is expected for the BPM6. 
Please refer to Table G, which lists the statistical standards adhered 
to by each country.
2Averages for real GDP and its components, employment, GDP 
per capita, inflation, factor productivity, trade, and commodity 
prices are calculated based on the compound annual rate of change, 
except in the case of the unemployment rate, which is based on the 
simple arithmetic average.
3See Box A2 in the April 2004 WEO for a summary of the revised 
purchasing-power-parity-based weights and Annex IV in the May 
1993 WEO. See also Anne-Marie Gulde and Marianne Schulze-
Ghattas, “Purchasing Power Parity Based Weights for the World 
Economic Outlook,” in Staff Studies for the World Economic Outlook 
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 • Unless noted otherwise, composites for all sectors 
for the euro area are corrected for reporting discrep-
ancies in intra-area transactions. Annual data are not 
adjusted for calendar-day effects. For data prior to 
1999, data aggregations apply 1995 European cur-
rency unit exchange rates.
 • Composites for fiscal data are sums of individual 
country data after conversion to U.S. dollars at the 
average market exchange rates in the years indicated.
 • Composite unemployment rates and employment 
growth are weighted by labor force as a share of 
group labor force.
 • Composites relating to external sector statistics are 
sums of individual country data after conversion to 
U.S. dollars at the average market exchange rates 
in the years indicated for balance of payments data 
and at end-of-year market exchange rates for debt 
denominated in currencies other than U.S. dollars. 
 • Composites of changes in foreign trade volumes and 
prices, however, are arithmetic averages of percent 
changes for individual countries weighted by the 
U.S. dollar value of exports or imports as a share 
of total world or group exports or imports (in the 
preceding year).
 • Unless noted otherwise, group composites are com-
puted if 90 percent or more of the share of group 
weights is represented.
Data refer to calendar years, except in the case of a few 
countries that use fiscal years. Please refer to Table F, 
which lists the economies with exceptional reporting 
periods for national accounts and government finance 
data for each country. 
For some countries, the figures for 2014 and earlier 
are based on estimates rather than actual outturns. Please 
refer to Table G, which lists the latest actual outturns for 
the indicators in the national accounts, prices, govern-
ment finance, and balance of payments indicators for 
each country.
Classification of Countries
Summary of the Country Classification
The country classification in the WEO divides the 
world into two major groups: advanced economies 
and emerging market and developing economies.4 This 
(Washington: International Monetary Fund, December 1993), pp. 
106–23.
4As used here, the terms “country” and “economy” do not always 
refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by interna-
classification is not based on strict criteria, economic 
or otherwise, and it has evolved over time. The objec-
tive is to facilitate analysis by providing a reasonably 
meaningful method of organizing data. Table A pro-
vides an overview of the country classification, showing 
the number of countries in each group by region and 
summarizing some key indicators of their relative size 
(GDP valued by purchasing power parity, total exports 
of goods and services, and population). 
Some countries remain outside the country classifi-
cation and therefore are not included in the analysis. 
Anguilla, Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, and Montserrat are examples of countries that 
are not IMF members, and their economies therefore 
are not monitored by the IMF. Somalia is omitted 
from the emerging market and developing economies 
group composites because of data limitations.
General Features and Composition of  
Groups in the World Economic Outlook 
Classification
Advanced Economies
The 37 advanced economies are listed in Table B. 
The seven largest in terms of GDP based on market 
exchange rates—the United States, Japan, Germany, 
France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Canada—con-
stitute the subgroup of major advanced economies often 
referred to as the Group of Seven (G7). The members 
of the euro area are also distinguished as a subgroup. 
Composite data shown in the tables for the euro area 
cover the current members for all years, even though 
the membership has increased over time.
Table C lists the member countries of the European 
Union, not all of which are classified as advanced 
economies in the WEO.
Emerging Market and Developing Economies
The group of emerging market and developing 
economies (152) includes all those that are not classi-
fied as advanced economies.
The regional breakdowns of emerging market and 
developing economies are Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States (CIS), emerging and developing Asia, emerg-
tional law and practice. Some territorial entities included here are 
not states, although their statistical data are maintained on a separate 
and independent basis.
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ing and developing Europe (sometimes also referred to 
as “central and eastern Europe”), Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC), Middle East, North Africa, Afghani-
stan, and Pakistan (MENAP), and sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA).
Emerging market and developing economies are also 
classified according to analytical criteria. The analyti-
cal criteria reflect the composition of export earnings 
and a distinction between net creditor and net debtor 
economies. The detailed composition of emerging 
market and developing economies in the regional and 
analytical groups is shown in Tables D and E. 
The analytical criterion source of export earnings 
distinguishes between categories fuel (Standard Interna-
tional Trade Classification [SITC] 3) and nonfuel and 
then focuses on nonfuel primary products (SITCs 0, 1, 
2, 4, and 68). Economies are categorized into one of 
these groups when their main source of export earnings 
exceeded 50 percent of total exports on average between 
2009 and 2013.
The financial criteria focus on net creditor economies, 
net debtor economies, heavily indebted poor countries 
(HIPCs), and low-income developing countries (LIDCs). 
Economies are categorized as net debtors when their 
latest net international investment position, where 
available, was less than zero or their current account 
balance accumulations from 1972 (or earliest available 
data) to 2013 were negative. Net debtor economies are 
further differentiated on the basis of experience with debt 
servicing.5 
The HIPC group comprises the countries that are or 
have been considered by the IMF and the World Bank 
for participation in their debt initiative known as the 
HIPC Initiative, which aims to reduce the external debt 
burdens of all the eligible HIPCs to a “sustainable” level 
in a reasonably short period of time.6 Many of these 
countries have already benefited from debt relief and 
have graduated from the initiative.
The LIDCs are countries that were designated as 
eligible to use the IMF’s concessional financing resources 
under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) 
in the 2013 PRGT eligibility review and had a level of 
per capita gross national income less than the PRGT 
income graduation threshold for non–small states (that 
is, twice the World Bank International Development 
Association operational threshold, or US$2,390 in 2011 
as measured by the World Bank’s Atlas method) and 
Zimbabwe.
5 During 2009–13, 16 economies incurred external payments 
arrears or entered into official or commercial bank debt-rescheduling 
agreements. This group is referred to as economies with arrears and/or 
rescheduling during 2009–13.
6See David Andrews, Anthony R. Boote, Syed S. Rizavi, and Suk-
winder Singh, Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries: The Enhanced 
HIPC Initiative, IMF Pamphlet Series 51 (Washington: International 
Monetary Fund, November 1999).
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Table A. Classification by World Economic Outlook Groups and Their Shares in Aggregate GDP, Exports of 
Goods and Services, and Population, 20141
(Percent of total for group or world)
GDP
Exports of Goods 
and Services Population
Number of
Economies
Advanced
Economies World
Advanced
Economies World
Advanced
Economies World
Advanced Economies 37 100.0 43.1 100.0 62.0 100.0 14.7
United States 37.4 16.1 16.1 10.0 30.6 4.5
Euro Area2 18 28.1 12.1 40.8 25.3 31.8 4.7
Germany 8.0 3.4 12.1 7.5 7.8 1.1
France 5.5 2.4 5.8 3.6 6.1 0.9
Italy 4.6 2.0 4.3 2.7 5.7 0.8
Spain 3.4 1.5 3.1 1.9 4.5 0.7
Japan 10.2 4.4 5.9 3.7 12.2 1.8
United Kingdom 5.5 2.4 5.7 3.6 6.2 0.9
Canada 3.4 1.5 3.9 2.4 3.4 0.5
Other Advanced Economies 15 15.4 6.6 27.6 17.1 15.8 2.3
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies 7 74.7 32.2 53.8 33.4 72.0 10.6
Emerging  
Market and 
Developing 
Economies World
Emerging 
Market and 
Developing 
Economies World
Emerging 
Market and 
Developing 
Economies World
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 152 100.0 56.9 100.0 38.0 100.0 85.3
Regional Groups
Commonwealth of Independent States3 12 8.2 4.7 9.4 3.6 4.7 4.0
Russia 5.8 3.3 6.3 2.4 2.4 2.0
Emerging and Developing Asia 29 51.9 29.5 45.4 17.2 57.2 48.8
China 28.7 16.3 27.8 10.5 22.6 19.3
India 12.0 6.8 5.4 2.1 20.8 17.7
Excluding China and India 27 11.2 6.4 12.2 4.6 13.8 11.8
Emerging and Developing Europe 12 5.8 3.3 8.9 3.4 2.8 2.4
Latin America and the Caribbean 32 15.2 8.7 13.7 5.2 9.9 8.5
Brazil 5.3 3.0 3.0 1.1 3.3 2.9
Mexico 3.5 2.0 4.7 1.8 2.0 1.7
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan 22 13.4 7.6 17.4 6.6 10.5 9.0
Middle East and North Africa 20 11.9 6.8 17.1 6.5 7.0 5.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 45 5.4 3.1 5.2 2.0 14.8 12.6
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 43 2.6 1.5 2.9 1.1 11.0 9.4
Analytical Groups4
By Source of Export Earnings
Fuel 29 20.8 11.8 27.8 10.5 12.4 10.6
Nonfuel 123 79.2 45.1 72.2 27.4 87.6 74.8
Of Which, Primary Products 28 4.9 2.8 4.6 1.7 7.6 6.5
By External Financing Source
Net Debtor Economies 123 50.9 28.9 45.5 17.3 65.8 56.2
Net Debtor Economies by Debt-
Servicing Experience
Economies with Arrears and/or 
Rescheduling during 2009–13 16 2.5 1.4 1.5 0.6 4.9 4.1
Other Groups
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 38 2.4 1.4 1.9 0.7 11.1 9.5
Low-Income Developing Countries 59 7.4 4.2 6.2 2.4 22.4 19.1
1The GDP shares are based on the purchasing-power-parity valuation of economies’ GDP. The number of economies comprising each group reflects those for 
which data are included in the group aggregates.
2Data for Lithuania are not included in the euro area aggregates because Eurostat has not fully released the consolidated data for the group.
3Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography 
and similarity in economic structure.
4South Sudan is omitted from the net external position groups composite for lack of a fully developed database.
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Table B. Advanced Economies by Subgroup
Major Currency Areas
United States
Euro Area
Japan
Euro Area1
Austria Germany Malta
Belgium Greece Netherlands
Cyprus Ireland Portugal
Estonia Italy Slovak Republic
Finland Latvia Slovenia
France Luxembourg Spain
Major Advanced Economies
Canada Italy United States
France Japan
Germany United Kingdom
Other Advanced Economies
Australia Israel San Marino
Czech Republic Korea Singapore
Denmark Lithuania Sweden
Hong Kong SAR2 New Zealand Switzerland
Iceland Norway Taiwan Province of China
1Data for Lithuania are not included in the euro area aggregates because Eurostat has not fully released 
the consolidated data for the group.
2On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong was returned to the People’s Republic of China and became a Special 
Administrative Region of China.
Table C. European Union
Austria Germany Poland
Belgium Greece Portugal
Bulgaria Hungary Romania
Croatia Ireland Slovak Republic
Cyprus Italy Slovenia
Czech Republic Latvia Spain
Denmark Lithuania Sweden
Estonia Luxembourg United Kingdom
Finland Malta
France Netherlands 
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Table D. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region and Main Source of Export Earnings
Fuel Nonfuel Primary Products
Commonwealth of Independent States1
Azerbaijan Uzbekistan 
Kazakhstan
Russia
Turkmenistan
Emerging and Developing Asia
Brunei Darussalam Mongolia 
Timor-Leste Papua New Guinea
Solomon Islands
Tuvalu
Latin America and the Caribbean
Bolivia Argentina
Colombia Chile
Ecuador Guyana
Trinidad and Tobago Paraguay
Venezuela Suriname
Uruguay
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan
Algeria Afghanistan
Bahrain Mauritania
Iran Sudan
Iraq
Kuwait
Libya
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
United Arab Emirates
Yemen
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola Burkina Faso
Chad Burundi
Republic of Congo Côte d’Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea Democratic Republic of the Congo
Gabon Eritrea
Nigeria Guinea
South Sudan Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Malawi
Mali
Niger
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Zambia
1Turkmenistan, which is not a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, is included in this group for reasons of geography and similarity in 
economic structure.
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Net External 
Position1
Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries2
Low-Income 
Developing 
Countries
Commonwealth of Independent States3
Armenia *
Azerbaijan •
Belarus *
Georgia *
Kazakhstan *
Kyrgyz Republic * *
Moldova * *
Russia •
Tajikistan * *
Turkmenistan •
Ukraine *
Uzbekistan • *
Emerging and Developing Asia
Bangladesh * *
Bhutan * *
Brunei Darussalam •
Cambodia * *
China •
Fiji *
India *
Indonesia *
Kiribati • *
Lao P.D.R. * *
Malaysia *
Maldives *
Marshall Islands *
Micronesia *
Mongolia * *
Myanmar * *
Nepal * *
Palau *
Papua New Guinea * *
Philippines *
Samoa *
Solomon Islands * *
Sri Lanka *
Thailand *
Timor-Leste •
Tonga *
Tuvalu *
Vanuatu *
Vietnam * *
Emerging and Developing Europe
Albania *
Bosnia and Herzegovina *
Net External 
Position1
Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries2
Low-Income 
Developing 
Countries
Bulgaria *
Croatia *
Hungary *
Kosovo *
FYR Macedonia *
Montenegro *
Poland *
Romania *
Serbia *
Turkey *
Latin America and the Caribbean
Antigua and Barbuda *
Argentina •
The Bahamas *
Barbados *
Belize *
Bolivia • • *
Brazil *
Chile *
Colombia *
Costa Rica *
Dominica *
Dominican Republic *
Ecuador *
El Salvador *
Grenada *
Guatemala *
Guyana * •
Haiti * • *
Honduras * • *
Jamaica *
Mexico *
Nicaragua * • *
Panama *
Paraguay *
Peru *
St. Kitts and Nevis *
St. Lucia *
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines *
Suriname *
Trinidad and Tobago •
Uruguay *
Venezuela •
Table E. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region, Net External Position, and Status as Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries and Low-Income Developing Countries
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Net External 
Position1
Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries2
Low-Income 
Developing 
Countries
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan
Afghanistan * • *
Algeria •
Bahrain •
Djibouti * *
Egypt *
Iran •
Iraq •
Jordan *
Kuwait •
Lebanon *
Libya •
Mauritania * • *
Morocco *
Oman •
Pakistan *
Qatar •
Saudi Arabia •
Sudan * * *
Syria *
Tunisia *
United Arab Emirates •
Yemen * *
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola •
Benin * • *
Botswana •
Burkina Faso * • *
Burundi * • *
Cabo Verde *
Cameroon * • *
Central African Republic * • *
Chad * * *
Comoros * • *
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo * • *
Net External 
Position1
Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries2
Low-Income 
Developing 
Countries
Republic of Congo * • *
Côte d’Ivoire * • *
Equatorial Guinea *
Eritrea * * *
Ethiopia * • *
Gabon •
The Gambia * • *
Ghana * • *
Guinea * • *
Guinea-Bissau * • *
Kenya * *
Lesotho * *
Liberia * • *
Madagascar * • *
Malawi * • *
Mali * • *
Mauritius •
Mozambique * • *
Namibia •
Niger * • *
Nigeria • *
Rwanda * • *
São Tomé and Príncipe * • *
Senegal * • *
Seychelles *
Sierra Leone * • *
South Africa *
South Sudan4 . . . *
Swaziland *
Tanzania * • *
Togo * • *
Uganda * • *
Zambia * • *
Zimbabwe * *
Table E. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region, Net External Position, and Status as Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries and Low-Income Developing Countries (continued)
1Dot (star) indicates that the country is a net creditor (net debtor). 
2Dot instead of star indicates that the country has reached the completion point.
3Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarity in 
economic structure.
4South Sudan is omitted from the net external position group composite for lack of a fully developed database.
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Table F. Economies with Exceptional Reporting Periods1
National Accounts    Government Finance
The Bahamas Jul/Jun
Bangladesh Jul/Jun
Barbados Apr/Mar
Belize Apr/Mar
Bhutan Jul/Jun Jul/Jun
Botswana Apr/Mar
Dominica Jul/Jun
Egypt Jul/Jun Jul/Jun
Ethiopia Jul/Jun Jul/Jun
Haiti Oct/Sep Oct/Sep
Hong Kong SAR Apr/Mar
India Apr/Mar Apr/Mar
Iran Apr/Mar Apr/Mar
Jamaica Apr/Mar
Lao P.D.R. Oct/Sep
Lesotho Apr/Mar
Malawi Jul/Jun
Marshall Islands Oct/Sep Oct/Sep
Micronesia Oct/Sep Oct/Sep
Myanmar Apr/Mar Apr/Mar
Namibia Apr/Mar
Nepal Aug/Jul Aug/Jul
Pakistan Jul/Jun Jul/Jun
Palau Oct/Sep Oct/Sep
Qatar Apr/Mar
Samoa Jul/Jun Jul/Jun
Singapore Apr/Mar
St. Lucia Apr/Mar
Swaziland Apr/Mar
Thailand Oct/Sep
Tonga Jul/Jun
Trinidad and Tobago Oct/Sep
1Unless noted otherwise, all data refer to calendar years.
S TAT I S T I C A L A P P E N D I X
 International Monetary Fund | April 2015 155
Table G. Key Data Documentation
Country Currency
National Accounts Prices (CPI)
Historical Data  
Source1
Latest Actual  
Data Base Year2
 
System of 
National 
Accounts
Use of Chain-
Weighted 
Methodology3
Historical Data 
Source1
Latest 
Actual  
Data
Afghanistan Afghan Afghani NSO 2013 2002 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Albania Albanian lek IMF staff 2012 1996 SNA 1993 From 1996 NSO 2013
Algeria Algerian dinar NSO 2013 2001 SNA 1993 From 2005 NSO 2014
Angola Angolan kwanza NSO 2012 2002 ESA 1995 CB 2014
Antigua and 
Barbuda
Eastern Caribbean 
dollar
CB 2013 20066 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Argentina Argentine peso MEP 2013 2004 SNA 2008 NSO 2013
Armenia Armenian dram NSO 2013 2005 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Australia Australian dollar NSO 2014 2012/13 SNA 2008 From 1980 NSO 2013
Austria Euro NSO 2013 2010 ESA 2010 From 1995 NSO 2014
Azerbaijan Azerbaijan manat NSO 2013 2003 SNA 1993 From 1994 NSO 2013
The Bahamas Bahamian dollar NSO 2013 2006 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Bahrain Bahrain dinar MoF 2014 2010 SNA 2008 NSO 2014
Bangladesh Bangladesh taka NSO 2013 2005 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Barbados Barbados dollar NSO and CB 2013 19746 SNA 1993 CB 2014
Belarus Belarusian rubel NSO 2013 2009 ESA 1995 From 2005 NSO 2014
Belgium Euro CB 2014 2012 ESA 2010 From 1995 CB 2014
Belize Belize dollar NSO 2013 2000 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Benin CFA franc NSO 2012 2000 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Bhutan Bhutanese 
ngultrum
NSO 2011/12 20006 Other CB 2013
Bolivia Bolivian boliviano NSO 2013 1990 Other NSO 2014
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Convertible marka NSO 2012 2010 ESA 1995 From 2000 NSO 2013
Botswana Botswana pula NSO 2012 2006 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Brazil Brazilian real NSO 2014 1995 SNA 2008 NSO 2014
Brunei Darussalam Brunei dollar NSO and PMO 2013 2000 SNA 1993 NSO and PMO 2013
Bulgaria Bulgarian lev NSO 2013 2010 ESA 2010 From 2010 NSO 2014
Burkina Faso CFA franc NSO and MEP 2012 1999 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Burundi Burundi franc NSO 2011 2005 SNA 1993 NSO 2012
Cabo Verde Cabo Verde 
escudo
NSO 2012 2007 SNA 1993 From 2011 NSO 2014
Cambodia Cambodian riel NSO 2013 2000 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Cameroon CFA franc NSO 2013 1990 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Canada Canadian dollar NSO 2014 2007 SNA 2008 From 1980 NSO 2014
Central African 
Republic
CFA franc NSO 2012 2005 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Chad CFA franc CB 2013 2005 Other NSO 2013
Chile Chilean peso CB 2013 2008 SNA 2008 From 2003 NSO 2014
China Chinese yuan NSO 2013 19906 SNA 2008 NSO 2014
Colombia Colombian peso NSO 2013 2005 Other From 2000 NSO 2014
Comoros Comorian franc NSO 2013 2000 Other NSO 2013
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo
Congo franc NSO 2006 2005 SNA 1993 CB 2014
Republic of Congo CFA franc NSO 2013 1990 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Costa Rica Costa Rican colón CB 2013 1991 SNA 1993 CB 2013
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Table G. Key Data Documentation (continued)
Country
Government Finance Balance of Payments
Historical Data  
Source1
Latest Actual 
Data
Statistics 
Manual 
in Use at 
Source
Subsectors 
Coverage4
Accounting 
Practice5
Historical Data  
Source1
Latest 
Actual  
Data
Statistics 
Manual 
in Use at 
Source
Afghanistan MoF 2013 2001 CG C NSO 2013 BPM 5
Albania IMF staff 2012 1986 CG,LG,SS Other CB 2012 BPM 5
Algeria CB 2014 1986 CG C CB 2014 BPM 5
Angola MoF 2013 2001 CG,LG Other CB 2013 BPM 5
Antigua and 
Barbuda
MoF 2013 2001 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Argentina MEP 2013 1986 CG,SG,LG,SS C CB 2013 BPM 5
Armenia MoF 2013 2001 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Australia MoF 2013/14 2001 CG,SG,LG,TG A NSO 2013 BPM 6
Austria NSO 2013 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS A CB 2013 BPM 6
Azerbaijan MoF 2012 Other CG C CB 2012 BPM 5
The Bahamas MoF 2013/14 2001 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Bahrain MoF 2014 1986 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Bangladesh MoF 2013/14 Other CG C CB 2013 BPM 4
Barbados MoF 2013/14 1986 CG,SS,NFPC C CB 2013 BPM 5
Belarus MoF 2013 2001 CG,LG,SS C CB 2013 BPM 6
Belgium CB 2013 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS A CB 2014 BPM 6
Belize MoF 2013/14 1986 CG,MPC C CB 2013 BPM 5
Benin MoF 2013 2001 CG C CB 2012 BPM 5
Bhutan MoF 2012/13 1986 CG C CB 2011/12 BPM 6
Bolivia MoF 2013 2001 CG,LG,SS,MPC, 
NMPC,NFPC
C CB 2013 BPM 5
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
MoF 2013 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS A CB 2013 BPM 6
Botswana MoF 2011/12 1986 CG C CB 2012 BPM 5
Brazil MoF 2014 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS, 
MPC,NFPC
C CB 2014 BPM 5
Brunei Darussalam MoF 2014 Other CG, BCG C MEP 2013 BPM 5
Bulgaria MoF 2013 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS C CB 2013 BPM 6
Burkina Faso MoF 2014 2001 CG C CB 2013 BPM 6
Burundi MoF 2013 2001 CG A CB 2012 BPM 6
Cabo Verde MoF 2013 2001 CG,SS A CB 2013 BPM 5
Cambodia MoF 2013 2001 CG,LG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Cameroon MoF 2013 2001 CG,NFPC C MoF 2013 BPM 5
Canada NSO and OECD 2014 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS A NSO 2014 BPM 6
Central African 
Republic
MoF 2014 2001 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Chad MoF 2012 1986 CG,NFPC C CB 2012 BPM 5
Chile MoF 2013 2001 CG,LG A CB 2013 BPM 6
China MoF 2014 2001 CG,SG,LG C SAFE 2014 BPM 6
Colombia MoF 2012 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS C/A CB and NSO 2013 BPM 5
Comoros MoF 2013 1986 CG C/A CB and IMF staff 2013 BPM 5
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo
MoF 2013 2001 CG,SG,LG A CB 2013 BPM 5
Republic of Congo MoF 2013 2001 CG A CB 2008 BPM 5
Costa Rica MoF and CB 2013 1986 CG,SS,NFPC C CB 2013 BPM 5
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Table G. Key Data Documentation (continued)
Country Currency
National Accounts Prices (CPI)
Historical Data  
Source1
Latest Actual  
Data Base Year2
 
System of 
National 
Accounts
Use of Chain-
Weighted 
Methodology3
Historical Data 
Source1
Latest 
Actual  
Data
Côte d'Ivoire CFA franc NSO 2012 2009 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Croatia Croatian kuna NSO 2014 2005 ESA 2010 NSO 2014
Cyprus Euro Eurostat 2014 2005 ESA 2010 From 1995 Eurostat 2014
Czech Republic Czech koruna NSO 2014 2005 ESA 2010 From 1995 NSO 2014
Denmark Danish krone NSO 2013 2010 ESA 2010 From 1980 NSO 2014
Djibouti Djibouti franc NSO 2014 1990 Other NSO 2014
Dominica Eastern Caribbean 
dollar
NSO 2013 2006 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Dominican 
Republic
Dominican peso CB 2013 2007 SNA 2008 From 2007 CB 2014
Ecuador U.S. dollar CB 2013 2007 SNA 1993 NSO and CB 2014
Egypt Egyptian pound MEP 2013/14 2011/12 SNA 1993 NSO 2013/14
El Salvador U.S. dollar CB 2013 1990 Other NSO 2013
Equatorial Guinea CFA franc MEP and CB 2013 2006 SNA 1993 MEP 2013
Eritrea Eritrean nakfa IMF staff 2006 2000 SNA 1993 NSO 2009
Estonia Euro NSO 2013 2010 ESA 2010 From 1995 NSO 2014
Ethiopia Ethiopian birr NSO 2013/14 2010/11 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Fiji Fiji dollar NSO 2013 20086 SNA 1993/ 
2008
NSO 2013
Finland Euro NSO 2014 2000 ESA 2010 From 1980 NSO and 
Eurostat
2014
France Euro NSO 2014 2010 ESA 2010 From 1980 NSO 2014
Gabon CFA franc MoF 2013 2001 SNA 1993 MoF 2013
The Gambia Gambian dalasi NSO 2012 2004 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Georgia Georgian lari NSO 2013 2000 SNA 1993 From 1996 NSO 2014
Germany Euro NSO 2013 2010 ESA 2010 From 1991 NSO 2014
Ghana Ghanaian cedi NSO 2012 2006 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Greece Euro NSO 2014 2010 ESA 2010 From 1995 NSO 2014
Grenada Eastern Caribbean 
dollar
NSO 2013 2006 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Guatemala Guatemalan 
quetzal
CB 2013 2001 SNA 1993 From 2001 NSO 2013
Guinea Guinean franc NSO 2009 2003 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Guinea-Bissau CFA franc NSO 2011 2005 SNA 1993 NSO 2011
Guyana Guyana dollar NSO 2012 20066 SNA 1993 NSO 2012
Haiti Haitian gourde NSO 2012/13 1986/87 SNA 2008 NSO 2013
Honduras Honduran lempira CB 2013 2000 SNA 1993 CB 2013
Hong Kong SAR Hong Kong dollar NSO 2014 2012 SNA 2008 From 1980 NSO 2014
Hungary Hungarian forint NSO 2013 2005 ESA 1995 From 2005 NSO 2013
Iceland Icelandic króna NSO 2013 2005 ESA 2010 From 1990 NSO 2013
India Indian rupee NSO 2013/14 2011/12 SNA 1993 NSO 2013/14
Indonesia Indonesian rupiah NSO 2014 2010 SNA 2008 NSO 2014
Iran Iranian rial CB 2012/13 2004/05 SNA 1993 CB 2014
Iraq Iraqi dinar NSO 2014 2007 Other NSO 2014
Ireland Euro NSO 2014 2012 ESA 2010 From 2012 NSO 2014
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Table G. Key Data Documentation (continued)
Country
Government Finance Balance of Payments
Historical Data  
Source1
Latest  
Actual  
Data
Statistics 
Manual 
in Use at 
Source
Subsectors 
Coverage4
Accounting 
Practice5
Historical Data  
Source1
Latest 
Actual  
Data
Statistics 
Manual 
in Use at 
Source
Côte d'Ivoire MoF 2014 1986 CG A CB 2012 BPM 6
Croatia MoF 2014 2001 CG,LG C CB 2013 BPM 6
Cyprus Eurostat 2014 ESA 2010 CG,LG,SS C Eurostat 2014 BPM 5
Czech Republic MoF 2013 2001 CG,LG,SS,BCG A NSO 2013 BPM 6
Denmark NSO 2013 2001 CG,LG,SS A NSO 2014 BPM 6
Djibouti MoF 2014 2001 CG A CB 2014 BPM 5
Dominica MoF 2012/13 1986 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Dominican 
Republic
MoF 2014 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS A CB 2013 BPM 6
Ecuador CB and MoF 2013 1986 CG,SG,LG,SS, 
NFPC
C CB 2013 BPM 5
Egypt MoF 2013/14 2001 CG,LG,SS,MPC C CB 2013/14 BPM 5
El Salvador MoF 2013 1986 CG,LG,SS C CB 2013 BPM 6
Equatorial Guinea MoF 2013 1986 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Eritrea MoF 2008 2001 CG C CB 2008 BPM 5
Estonia MoF 2013 1986/2001 CG,LG,SS C CB 2013 BPM 6
Ethiopia MoF 2013/14 1986 CG,SG,LG,NFPC C CB 2013/14 BPM 5
Fiji MoF 2013 2001 CG C CB 2013 BPM 6
Finland MoF 2013 2001 CG,LG,SS A CB 2013 BPM 6
France NSO 2013 2001 CG,LG,SS A CB 2014 BPM 6
Gabon IMF staff 2013 2001 CG A CB 2006 BPM 5
The Gambia MoF 2013 2001 CG C CB and IMF staff 2012 BPM 4
Georgia MoF 2013 2001 CG,LG C NSO and CB 2013 BPM 5
Germany NSO and Eurostat 2014 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS A CB 2013 BPM 6
Ghana MoF 2013 2001 CG,SG,LG C CB 2012 BPM 5
Greece MoF 2013 1986 CG,LG,SS A CB 2014 BPM 5
Grenada MoF 2013 2001 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Guatemala MoF 2013 1986 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Guinea MoF 2014 2001 CG Other CB and MEP 2013 BPM 6
Guinea-Bissau MoF 2011 2001 CG A CB 2011 BPM 6
Guyana MoF 2012 2001 CG,SS C CB 2012 BPM 5
Haiti MoF 2012/13 2001 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Honduras MoF 2013 1986 CG,LG,SS,NFPC A CB 2013 BPM 5
Hong Kong SAR NSO 2013/14 2001 CG C NSO 2013 BPM 6
Hungary MEP and Eurostat 2013 2001 CG,LG,SS,NMPC A CB 2013 BPM 6
Iceland NSO 2013 2001 CG,LG A CB 2013 BPM 6
India MoF 2012/13 2001 CG,SG A CB 2013/14 BPM 5
Indonesia MoF 2014 2001 CG,LG C CB 2014 BPM 6
Iran MoF 2012/13 2001 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Iraq MoF 2014 2001 CG C CB 2012 BPM 5
Ireland MoF 2014 2001 CG,LG,SS A NSO 2014 BPM 6
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Table G. Key Data Documentation (continued)
Country Currency
National Accounts Prices (CPI)
Historical Data  
Source1
Latest Actual  
Data Base Year2
 
System of 
National 
Accounts
Use of Chain-
Weighted 
Methodology3
Historical Data 
Source1
Latest 
Actual  
Data
Israel New Israeli shekel NSO 2014 2010 SNA 2008 From 1995 Haver 
Analytics
2014
Italy Euro NSO 2014 2010 ESA 2010 From 1980 NSO 2014
Jamaica Jamaica dollar NSO 2013 2007 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Japan Japanese yen Cabinet Office 2014 2005 SNA 1993 From 1980 MIAC 2014
Jordan Jordanian dinar NSO 2013 1994 Other NSO 2013
Kazakhstan Kazakhstani tenge NSO 2013 2007 Other From 1994 CB 2013
Kenya Kenya shilling NSO 2014 2009 SNA 2008 NSO 2014
Kiribati Australian dollar NSO 2013 2006 Other NSO 2014
Korea Korean won CB 2014 2010 SNA 2008 From 1980 MoF 2014
Kosovo Euro NSO 2013 2013 Other NSO 2013
Kuwait Kuwaiti dinar MEP and NSO 2013 2010 SNA 1993 NSO and MEP 2014
Kyrgyz Republic Kyrgyz som NSO 2014 1995 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Lao P.D.R. Lao kip NSO 2013 2002 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Latvia Euro NSO 2013 2010 ESA 1995 From 1995 Eurostat 2013
Lebanon Lebanese pound NSO 2011 2000 SNA 2008 From 2010 NSO 2013
Lesotho Lesotho loti NSO 2012 2004 Other NSO 2013
Liberia U.S. dollar CB 2011 1992 SNA 1993 CB 2013
Libya Libyan dinar MEP 2014 2003 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Lithuania Lithuanian litas NSO 2013 2010 ESA 1995 From 2005 NSO 2013
Luxembourg Euro NSO 2013 2005 ESA 2010 From 1995 NSO 2014
FYR Macedonia Macedonian denar NSO 2013 2005 ESA 2010 NSO 2014
Madagascar Malagasy ariary NSO 2014 2000 Other NSO 2014
Malawi Malawi kwacha NSO 2010 2007 SNA 2008 NSO 2014
Malaysia Malaysian ringgit NSO 2014 2005 SNA 2008 NSO 2014
Maldives Maldivian rufiyaa MoF and NSO 2013 20036 SNA 1993 CB 2014
Mali CFA franc MoF 2011 1987 SNA 1993 MoF 2013
Malta Euro Eurostat 2013 2010 ESA 2010 From 2000 Eurostat 2013
Marshall Islands U.S. dollar NSO 2012/13 2003/04 Other NSO 2013
Mauritania Mauritanian 
ouguiya
NSO 2014 1998 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Mauritius Mauritian rupee NSO 2013 2006 SNA 1993 From 1999 NSO 2013
Mexico Mexican peso NSO 2014 2008 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Micronesia U.S. dollar NSO 2013 2004 Other NSO 2013
Moldova Moldovan leu NSO 2013 1995 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Mongolia Mongolian togrog NSO 2013 2010 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Montenegro Euro NSO 2014 2006 ESA 1995 NSO 2014
Morocco Moroccan dirham NSO 2013 1998 SNA 1993 From 1998 NSO 2013
Mozambique Mozambican 
metical
NSO 2013 2009 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Myanmar Myanmar kyat MEP 2013/14 2010/11 Other NSO 2014
Namibia Namibia dollar NSO 2011 2000 SNA 1993 NSO 2012
Nepal Nepalese rupee NSO 2013/14 2000/01 SNA 1993 CB 2013/14
Netherlands Euro NSO 2014 2010 ESA 2010 From 1980 NSO 2014
New Zealand New Zealand 
dollar
NSO 2012/13 2009/10 Other From 1987 NSO 2014
Nicaragua Nicaraguan 
córdoba
IMF staff 2013 2006 SNA 1993 From 1994 CB 2014
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Table G. Key Data Documentation (continued)
Country
Government Finance Balance of Payments
Historical Data  
Source1
Latest  
Actual  
Data
Statistics 
Manual 
in Use at 
Source
Subsectors 
Coverage4
Accounting 
Practice5
Historical Data  
Source1
Latest 
Actual  
Data
Statistics 
Manual 
in Use at 
Source
Israel MoF 2013 2001 CG,SS A Haver Analytics 2014 BPM 6
Italy NSO 2013 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS A NSO 2013 BPM 6
Jamaica MoF 2013/14 1986 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Japan Cabinet Office 2013 2001 CG,LG,SS A CB 2014 BPM 6
Jordan MoF 2013 2001 CG,NFPC C CB 2013 BPM 5
Kazakhstan IMF staff 2013 2001 CG,LG A CB 2013 BPM 6
Kenya MoF 2014 2001 CG A CB 2013 BPM 5
Kiribati MoF 2013 1986 CG,LG C NSO 2012 BPM 5
Korea MoF 2013 2001 CG C CB 2014 BPM 6
Kosovo MoF 2013 Other CG,LG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Kuwait MoF 2013 1986 CG C/A CB 2013 BPM 5
Kyrgyz Republic MoF 2014 Other CG,LG,SS C MoF 2014 BPM 5
Lao P.D.R. MoF 2012/13 2001 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Latvia MoF 2013 Other CG,LG,SS,NFPC C CB 2013 BPM 5
Lebanon MoF 2013 1986 CG C CB and IMF staff 2012 BPM 5
Lesotho MoF 2012/13 2001 CG,LG C CB 2012 BPM 6
Liberia MoF 2012 2001 CG A CB 2013 BPM 5
Libya MoF 2014 1986 CG,SG,LG C CB 2014 BPM 5
Lithuania MoF 2013 2001 CG,LG,SS A CB 2013 BPM 6
Luxembourg MoF 2013 2001 CG,LG,SS A NSO 2013 BPM 6
FYR Macedonia MoF 2014 1986 CG,SG,SS C CB 2014 BPM 6
Madagascar MoF 2013 1986 CG,LG C CB 2014 BPM 5
Malawi MoF 2014/15 1986 CG C NSO 2013 BPM 5
Malaysia MoF 2013 1986 CG,SG,LG C NSO 2014 BPM 6
Maldives MoF and Treasury 2012 1986 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Mali MoF 2013 2001 CG C/A CB 2011 BPM 5
Malta Eurostat 2013 2001 CG,SS A NSO 2013 BPM 6
Marshall Islands MoF 2012/13 2001 CG,LG,SS A NSO 2013 Other
Mauritania MoF 2014 1986 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Mauritius MoF 2013 2001 CG,SG,LG,NFPC C CB 2013 BPM 5
Mexico MoF 2014 2001 CG,SS,NFPC C CB 2014 BPM 5
Micronesia MoF 2012/13 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS Other NSO 2013 Other
Moldova MoF 2013 1986 CG,LG,SS C CB 2013 BPM 5
Mongolia MoF 2013 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS C CB 2013 BPM 5
Montenegro MoF 2014 1986 CG,LG,SS C CB 2014 BPM 5
Morocco MEP 2014 2001 CG A FEO 2013 BPM 5
Mozambique MoF 2013 2001 CG,SG C/A CB 2013 BPM 5
Myanmar MoF 2013/14 2001 CG,NFPC C/A IMF staff 2013 Other
Namibia MoF 2011/12 2001 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Nepal MoF 2013/14 2001 CG C CB 2013/14 BPM 5
Netherlands MoF 2014 2001 CG,LG,SS A CB 2014 BPM 6
New Zealand MoF 2013/14 2001 CG A NSO 2013 BPM 6
Nicaragua MoF 2014 1986 CG,LG,SS C IMF staff 2013 BPM 6
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Table G. Key Data Documentation (continued)
Country Currency
National Accounts Prices (CPI)
Historical Data  
Source1
Latest Actual  
Data Base Year2
 
System of 
National 
Accounts
Use of Chain-
Weighted 
Methodology3
Historical Data 
Source1
Latest 
Actual  
Data
Niger CFA franc NSO 2013 2000 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Nigeria Nigerian naira NSO 2014 2010 SNA 2008 NSO 2014
Norway Norwegian krone NSO 2014 2012 ESA 2010 From 1980 NSO 2014
Oman Omani rial NSO 2012 2010 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Pakistan Pakistan rupee NSO 2013/14 2005/06 SNA 1968/ 
1993
NSO 2013/14
Palau U.S. dollar MoF 2013 2005 Other MoF 2013/14
Panama U.S. dollar NSO 2014 1996 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Papua New Guinea Papua New 
Guinea kina
NSO and MOF 2013 1998 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Paraguay Paraguayan 
guaraní
CB 2013 1994 SNA 1993 CB 2013
Peru Peruvian nuevo 
sol
CB 2014 2007 SNA 1993 CB 2014
Philippines Philippine peso NSO 2014 2000 SNA 2008 NSO 2014
Poland Polish zloty NSO 2013 2010 ESA 2010 From 1995 NSO 2013
Portugal Euro NSO 2014 2011 ESA 2010 From 1980 NSO 2014
Qatar Qatari riyal NSO and MEP 2013 2004 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Romania Romanian leu NSO and 
Eurostat
2014 2010 ESA 2010 From 2000 NSO 2014
Russia Russian ruble NSO 2013 2008 SNA 1993 From 1995 NSO 2014
Rwanda Rwanda franc MoF 2014 2011 SNA 1993 MoF 2014
Samoa Samoa tala NSO 2013/14 2009 SNA 1993 NSO 2013/14
San Marino Euro NSO 2013 2007 Other NSO 2014
São Tomé and 
Príncipe
São Tomé and 
Príncipe dobra
NSO 2012 2000 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabian 
riyal
NSO and MEP 2014 2010 SNA 1993 NSO and MEP 2014
Senegal CFA franc NSO 2013 2000 SNA 1993 NSO 2011
Serbia Serbian dinar NSO 2014 2010 ESA 2010 From 2010 NSO 2014
Seychelles Seychelles rupee NSO 2012 2006 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Sierra Leone Sierra Leonean 
leone
NSO 2013 2006 SNA 1993 From 2010 NSO 2014
Singapore Singapore dollar NSO 2014 2010 SNA 1993 From 2010 NSO 2014
Slovak Republic Euro Eurostat 2014 2010 ESA 2010 From 1993 Eurostat 2014
Slovenia Euro NSO 2014 2000 ESA 2010 From 2000 NSO 2014
Solomon Islands Solomon Islands 
dollar
CB 2013 2004 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
South Africa South African 
rand
CB 2014 2010 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
South Sudan South Sudanese 
pound
NSO 2014 2010 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Spain Euro NSO 2014 2010 ESA 2010 From 1995 NSO 2014
Sri Lanka Sri Lanka rupee CB 2012 2002 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
St. Kitts and Nevis Eastern Caribbean 
dollar
NSO 2013 20066 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
St. Lucia Eastern Caribbean 
dollar
NSO 2013 2006 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
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Table G. Key Data Documentation (continued)
Country
Government Finance Balance of Payments
Historical Data  
Source1
Latest  
Actual  
Data
Statistics 
Manual 
in Use at 
Source
Subsectors 
Coverage4
Accounting 
Practice5
Historical Data  
Source1
Latest 
Actual  
Data
Statistics 
Manual 
in Use at 
Source
Niger MoF 2013 1986 CG A CB 2012 BPM 6
Nigeria MoF 2013 2001 CG,SG,LG,NFPC C CB 2013 BPM 5
Norway NSO and MoF 2014 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS A NSO 2014 BPM 6
Oman MoF 2013 2001 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Pakistan MoF 2013/14 1986 CG,SG,LG C CB 2013/14 BPM 5
Palau MoF 2013 2001 CG Other MoF 2013 BPM 6
Panama MEP 2013 1986 CG,SG,LG,SS, 
NFPC
C NSO 2014 BPM 5
Papua New Guinea MoF 2013 1986 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Paraguay MoF 2013 2001 CG,LG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Peru MoF 2014 1986 CG,SG,LG,SS C CB 2014 BPM 5
Philippines MoF 2014 2001 CG,LG,SS C CB 2014 BPM 6
Poland MoF 2013 2001 CG,LG,SS A CB 2013 BPM 6
Portugal NSO 2013 2001 CG,LG,SS A CB 2014 BPM 6
Qatar MoF 2013/14 1986 CG C CB and IMF staff 2013 BPM 5
Romania MoF 2014 1986 CG,LG,SS C CB 2013 BPM 6
Russia MoF 2013 2001 CG,SG,SS C/A CB 2014 BPM 6
Rwanda MoF 2014 2001 CG,LG C/A CB 2014 BPM 5
Samoa MoF 2013/14 2001 CG A CB 2012/13 BPM 6
San Marino MoF 2013 Other CG,SG,SS Other . . . . . . . . .
São Tomé and 
Príncipe
MoF and Customs 2014 2001 CG C CB 2014 BPM 5
Saudi Arabia MoF 2014 1986 CG,SS C CB 2013 BPM 5
Senegal MoF 2011 1986 CG C CB and IMF staff 2011 BPM 5
Serbia MoF 2014 Other CG,SG,LG,SS C CB 2014 BPM 6
Seychelles MoF 2013 1986 CG,SS C CB 2013 BPM 6
Sierra Leone MoF 2013 1986 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Singapore MoF 2013/14 2001 CG C NSO 2014 BPM 6
Slovak Republic Eurostat 2013 2001 CG,LG,SS A CB 2013 BPM 6
Slovenia MoF 2014 1986 CG,SG,LG,SS C NSO 2014 BPM 6
Solomon Islands MoF 2012 1986 CG C CB 2013 BPM 6
South Africa MoF 2013/14 2001 CG,SG,SS C CB 2013 BPM 6
South Sudan MoF 2014 Other CG C Other 2014 BPM 5
Spain MoF and Eurostat 2014 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS A CB 2013 BPM 6
Sri Lanka MoF 2013 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS C CB 2012 BPM 5
St. Kitts and Nevis MoF 2013 2001 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
St. Lucia MoF 2012/13 1986 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
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Table G. Key Data Documentation (continued)
Country Currency
National Accounts Prices (CPI)
Historical Data  
Source1
Latest Actual  
Data Base Year2
 
System of 
National 
Accounts
Use of Chain-
Weighted 
Methodology3
Historical Data 
Source1
Latest 
Actual  
Data
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines
Eastern Caribbean 
dollar
NSO 2013 20066 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Sudan Sudanese pound NSO 2013 2007 Other NSO 2013
Suriname Surinamese dollar NSO 2011 2007 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Swaziland Swaziland 
lilangeni
NSO 2010 2000 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Sweden Swedish krona NSO 2014 2013 ESA 2010 From 1993 NSO 2014
Switzerland Swiss franc NSO 2014 2010 ESA 2010 From 1980 NSO 2014
Syria Syrian pound NSO 2010 2000 SNA 1993 NSO 2011
Taiwan Province of 
China
New Taiwan dollar NSO 2014 2011 SNA 2008 NSO 2014
Tajikistan Tajik somoni NSO 2013 1995 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Tanzania Tanzania shilling NSO 2012 2007 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Thailand Thai baht NESDB 2014 1988 SNA 1993 MoC 2014
Timor-Leste U.S. dollar MoF 2012 20106 Other NSO 2013
Togo CFA franc NSO 2009 2000 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Tonga Tongan pa’anga CB 2012 2010/11 SNA 1993 CB 2013
Trinidad and 
Tobago
Trinidad and 
Tobago dollar
NSO 2012 2000 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Tunisia Tunisian dinar NSO 2014 2004 SNA 1993 From 2009 NSO 2014
Turkey Turkish lira NSO 2013 1998 SNA 1993/ 
ESA 1995
NSO 2014
Turkmenistan New Turkmen 
manat
NSO 2013 2005 SNA 1993 From 2000 NSO 2013
Tuvalu Australian dollar PFTAC advisors 2012 2005 Other NSO 2013
Uganda Uganda shilling NSO 2013 2009/10 SNA 1993 CB 2013/14
Ukraine Ukrainian hryvnia NSO 2014 2010 SNA 2008 From 2005 NSO 2014
United Arab 
Emirates
U.A.E. dirham NSO 2013 2007 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
United Kingdom Pound sterling NSO 2014 2011 ESA 2010 From 1980 NSO 2014
United States U.S. dollar NSO 2014 2009 Other From 1980 NSO 2014
Uruguay Uruguayan peso CB 2014 2005 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Uzbekistan Uzbek sum NSO 2012 1995 SNA 1993 NSO 2012
Vanuatu Vanuatu vatu NSO 2013 2006 SNA 1993 NSO 2014
Venezuela Venezuelan 
bolívar fuerte
CB 2013 1997 SNA 2008 CB 2013
Vietnam Vietnamese dong NSO 2013 2010 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Yemen Yemeni rial IMF staff 2008 1990 SNA 1993 NSO and CB 2009
Zambia Zambian kwacha NSO 2013 2010 SNA 1993 NSO 2013
Zimbabwe U.S. dollar NSO 2012 2009 Other NSO 2013
Table G. Key Data Documentation (continued)
Country
Government Finance Balance of Payments
Historical Data  
Source1
Latest  
Actual  
Data
Statistics 
Manual 
in Use at 
Source
Subsectors 
Coverage4
Accounting 
Practice5
Historical Data  
Source1
Latest 
Actual  
Data
Statistics 
Manual 
in Use at 
Source
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines
MoF 2013 1986 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Sudan MoF 2013 2001 CG A CB 2013 BPM 5
Suriname MoF 2013 1986 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Swaziland MoF 2012/13 2001 CG A CB 2013 BPM 6
Sweden MoF 2012 2001 CG,LG,SS A NSO 2014 BPM 6
Switzerland MoF 2012 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS A CB 2013 BPM 6
Syria MoF 2009 1986 CG C CB 2009 BPM 5
Taiwan Province of 
China
MoF 2013 1986 CG,LG,SS A CB 2014 BPM 6
Tajikistan MoF 2013 1986 CG,LG,SS C CB 2013 BPM 5
Tanzania MoF 2013 2001 CG,LG C CB 2011 BPM 5
Thailand MoF 2013/14 2001 CG,BCG,LG,SS A CB 2014 BPM 6
Timor-Leste MoF 2012 2001 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Togo MoF 2013 2001 CG C CB 2012 BPM 5
Tonga CB and MoF 2012 2001 CG C CB and NSO 2012 BPM 5
Trinidad and 
Tobago
MoF 2012/13 1986 CG,NFPC C CB and NSO 2012 BPM 5
Tunisia MoF 2014 1986 CG C CB 2014 BPM 5
Turkey MoF 2013 2001 CG,LG,SS A CB 2014 BPM 6
Turkmenistan MoF 2013 1986 CG,LG C NSO and IMF staff 2012 BPM 5
Tuvalu IMF staff 2013 Other CG C/A IMF staff 2012 BPM 6
Uganda MoF 2013 2001 CG C CB 2013 BPM 6
Ukraine MoF 2014 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS C CB 2013 BPM 5
United Arab 
Emirates
MoF 2013 2001 CG,BCG,SG,SS A CB 2013 BPM 5
United Kingdom NSO 2014 2001 CG,LG A NSO 2013 BPM 6
United States BEA 2013 2001 CG,SG,LG A NSO 2014 BPM 6
Uruguay MoF 2014 1986 CG,LG,SS,MPC, 
NFPC
A CB 2014 BPM 6
Uzbekistan MoF 2012 Other CG,SG,LG,SS C MEP 2012 BPM 5
Vanuatu MoF 2014 2001 CG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Venezuela MoF 2010 2001 CG,LG,SS,NFPC C CB 2012 BPM 5
Vietnam MoF 2013 2001 CG,SG,LG C CB 2013 BPM 5
Yemen MoF 2013 2001 CG,LG C IMF staff 2009 BPM 5
Zambia MoF 2013 1986 CG C CB 2013 BPM 6
Zimbabwe MoF 2013 1986 CG C CB and MoF 2013 BPM 4
Note: BPM = Balance of Payments Manual (number following abbreviation signifies edition); CPI = consumer price index; ESA = European System of National Accounts; SNA = System of 
National Accounts.
1BEA = U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; CB = Central Bank; FEO = Foreign Exchange Office; IFS = IMF, International Financial Statistics; MEP = Ministry of Economy and/or Planning;  
MIAC = Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; MoC = Ministry of Commerce; MoF = Ministry of Finance; NESDB =  National Economic and Social Development Board; NSO = 
National Statistics Office; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; PFTAC = Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Centre; PMO = Prime Minister’s Office; 
SAFE = State Administration of Foreign Exchange.
2National accounts base year is the period with which other periods are compared and the period for which prices appear in the denominators of the price relationships used to calculate 
the index. 
3Use of chain-weighted methodology allows countries to measure GDP growth more accurately by reducing or eliminating the downward biases in volume series built on index numbers 
that average volume components using weights from a year in the moderately distant past.
4For some countries, the structures of government consist of a broader coverage than specified for the general government. Coverage: BCG = Budgetary Central Government; CG = Central 
Government; LG = Local Government; MPC = Monetary Public Corporation, including Central Bank; NFPC = Nonfinancial Public Corporations; NMPC = Nonmonetary Financial Public 
Corporations; SG = State Government; SS = Social Security Funds; TG = Territorial Governments.
5Accounting Standard: A = Accrual; C = Cash.
6Nominal GDP is not measured in the same way as real GDP.
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Fiscal Policy Assumptions
The short-term fiscal policy assumptions used in the 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) are based on officially 
announced budgets, adjusted for differences between 
the national authorities and the IMF staff regarding 
macroeconomic assumptions and projected fiscal out-
turns. The medium-term fiscal projections incorporate 
policy measures that are judged likely to be imple-
mented. For cases in which the IMF staff has insuf-
ficient information to assess the authorities’ budget 
intentions and prospects for policy implementation, 
an unchanged structural primary balance is assumed 
unless indicated otherwise. Specific assumptions used 
in regard to some of the advanced economies follow. 
(See also Tables B5 to B9 in the online section of the 
Statistical Appendix for data on fiscal net lending/ 
borrowing and structural balances.)1
Argentina: The fiscal forecast is based on the projec-
tions for GDP growth, exports, and imports and the 
nominal exchange rate. 
Australia: Fiscal projections are based on Australian 
Bureau of Statistics data, the 2014–15 budget docu-
ments, and the 2014–15 Mid-year Economic and 
Fiscal Outlook.
Austria: Projections take into account only the 
tax-related measures for the financing of the recent 
income tax reform (although the yield from the anti–
tax fraud measures is highly uncertain). For 2014, the 
creation of a defeasance structure for Hypo Alpe Adria 
is assumed to increase the general-government-debt-
to-GDP ratio by 5½ percentage points and the deficit 
by 1.8 percentage points.
1 The output gap is actual minus potential output, as a 
percentage of potential output. Structural balances are expressed 
as a percentage of potential output. The structural balance is the 
actual net lending/borrowing minus the effects of cyclical output 
from potential output, corrected for one-time and other factors, 
such as asset and commodity prices and output composition 
effects. Changes in the structural balance consequently include 
effects of temporary fiscal measures, the impact of fluctuations 
in interest rates and debt-service costs, and other noncyclical 
fluctuations in net lending/borrowing. The computations of 
structural balances are based on IMF staff estimates of potential 
GDP and revenue and expenditure elasticities. (See Annex I of 
the October 1993 WEO.) Net debt is calculated as gross debt 
minus financial assets corresponding to debt instruments. Esti-
mates of the output gap and of the structural balance are subject 
to significant margins of uncertainty.
Belgium: Projections reflect the authorities’ 2015 
budget, adjusted for differences in the IMF staff’s 
macroeconomic framework and assumptions about 
fiscal developments in the federal, regional, and local 
governments.
Brazil: For 2014, outturn estimates are based on the 
information available as of February 2015. Projections 
for 2015 take into account the 2015 budget approved 
by Congress in March 2015 and recent announce-
ments made by the authorities; any measures still to 
be identified as of the end of March 2015 to meet the 
annual fiscal target are assumed to be on the expen-
diture side. In outer years, projections are consistent 
with the announced surplus objective.
Canada: Projections use the baseline forecasts in the 
Economic Action Plan 2014 (the fiscal year 2014/15 
budget) and 2014 provincial budgets as available. The 
IMF staff makes adjustments to this forecast for dif-
ferences in macroeconomic projections. The IMF staff 
forecast also incorporates the most recent data releases 
from Statistics Canada’s Canadian System of National 
Economic Accounts, including federal, provincial, and 
territorial budgetary outturns through the end of the 
fourth quarter of 2014.
Chile: Projections are based on the authorities’ 
budget projections, adjusted to reflect the IMF staff’s 
projections for GDP and copper prices. Projections 
also include the official yield estimate of the tax 
reform submitted to Congress in April 2014.
China: The pace of fiscal consolidation is likely to 
be more gradual, reflecting reforms to strengthen social 
safety nets and the social security system announced as 
part of the Third Plenum reform agenda.
Denmark: Projections for 2014–15 are aligned with 
the latest official budget estimates and the underly-
ing economic projections, adjusted where appropriate 
for the IMF staff’s macroeconomic assumptions. For 
2016–20, the projections incorporate key features 
of the medium-term fiscal plan as embodied in the 
authorities’ 2014 Convergence Programme submitted 
to the European Union (EU).
France: Projections for 2015 reflect the budget law. 
For 2016–17, they are based on the multiyear budget, 
adjusted for differences in assumptions on macro and 
financial variables, and revenue projections. Historical 
fiscal data reflect the September 2014 revision by the 
statistical institute of the fiscal accounts and its May 
2014 revision of the national accounts. 
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Germany: The IMF staff’s projections for 2015 and 
beyond reflect the authorities’ adopted core federal 
government budget plan, adjusted for the differences 
in the IMF staff’s macroeconomic framework and 
assumptions about fiscal developments in state and 
local governments, the social insurance system, and 
special funds. The estimate of gross debt includes 
portfolios of impaired assets and noncore business 
transferred to institutions that are winding up, as well 
as other financial sector and EU support operations.
Greece: Fiscal projections for 2014 and the medium 
term are consistent with the policies needed to achieve 
the fiscal targets underlying the program supported by 
the Extended Fund Facility, as agreed under the fifth 
review of the program. 
Hong Kong SAR: Projections are based on the author-
ities’ medium-term fiscal projections on expenditures.
Hungary: Fiscal projections include IMF staff pro-
jections of the macroeconomic framework and of the 
impact of recent legislative measures, as well as fiscal 
policy plans announced in the 2014 budget.
India: Historical data are based on budgetary execu-
tion data. Projections are based on available informa-
tion on the authorities’ fiscal plans, with adjustments 
for IMF staff assumptions. Subnational data are 
incorporated with a lag of up to two years; general 
government data are thus finalized well after central 
government data. IMF and Indian presentations differ, 
particularly regarding divestment and license auction 
proceeds, net versus gross recording of revenues in cer-
tain minor categories, and some public sector lending.
Indonesia: IMF projections are based on moderate 
tax policy and administration reforms, fuel subsidy 
pricing reforms introduced in January 2015, and a 
gradual increase in social and capital spending over the 
medium term in line with fiscal space.
Ireland: Fiscal projections are based on the 2015 
budget, adjusted for differences between the IMF 
staff’s macroeconomic projections and those of the 
Irish authorities.
Italy: Fiscal projections incorporate the govern-
ment’s announced fiscal policy, as outlined in the 2015 
Stability Law, adjusted for different growth outlooks 
and estimated impact of measures. Sovereign yields 
have fallen significantly since the 2015 Stability Law 
was passed, and the IMF staff has assumed that the 
savings from a lower interest bill will be used to pay 
down debt. Estimates of the cyclically adjusted balance 
include the expenditures to clear capital arrears in 
2013, which are excluded from the structural bal-
ance. After 2014, the IMF staff projects convergence 
to a structural balance in line with Italy’s fiscal rule, 
which implies corrective measures in some years, as yet 
unidentified. 
Japan: The projections include fiscal measures 
already announced by the government, including 
consumption tax increases, earthquake reconstruction 
spending, and the stimulus package. 
Korea: The medium-term forecast incorporates the 
government’s announced medium-term consolidation 
path.
Mexico: Fiscal projections for 2014 are broadly in 
line with the approved budget; projections for 2014 
onward assume compliance with rules established in 
the fiscal responsibility law.
Netherlands: Fiscal projections for the period 
2015–20 are based on the authorities’ Bureau for Eco-
nomic Policy Analysis budget projections, after differ-
ences in macroeconomic assumptions are adjusted for. 
Historical data were revised following the June 2014 
Central Bureau of Statistics release of revised macro 
data because of the adoption of the European System 
of National and Regional Accounts (ESA 2010) and 
the revisions of data sources.
New Zealand: Fiscal projections are based on the 
authorities’ Half Year Economic and Fiscal Update 
2014 and on IMF staff estimates. 
Portugal: For 2014, the general government fiscal 
balance projection does not include one-off trans-
actions arising from banking support and other 
operations related to government-owned enterprises, 
pending decisions on their statistical classification by 
the Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE)/Eurostat. 
Projections for 2014–15 remain consistent with the 
authorities’ EU budgetary commitments, subject to 
additional measures to be approved in the forthcom-
ing 2015 budget; projections thereafter are based 
on IMF staff estimates, under the assumption of 
unchanged policies.
Russia: Projections for 2015–20 are based on the 
oil-price-based fiscal rule introduced in December 
2012, with adjustments by the IMF staff.
Saudi Arabia: The authorities base their budget on 
a conservative assumption for oil prices, with adjust-
ments to expenditure allocations considered in the 
event that revenues differ from budgeted amounts. 
Box A1 (continued)
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IMF staff projections of oil revenues are based on 
WEO baseline oil prices. On the expenditure side, 
wage bill estimates incorporate 13th-month pay 
awards every three years in accordance with the lunar 
calendar; projections assume that, to adjust to lower 
oil prices, capital spending falls as a percentage of 
GDP over the medium term as large-scale projects 
currently being implemented are completed.
Singapore: For fiscal years 2014/15 and 2015/16, 
projections are based on budget numbers. For the 
remainder of the projection period, the IMF staff 
assumes unchanged policies.
South Africa: Fiscal projections are based on the 
authorities’ 2015 Budget Review.
Spain: For 2015 and beyond, fiscal projections 
are based on the measures specified in the Stabil-
ity Programme Update 2014–17, the 2015 budget 
plan issued in October 2014, and the 2015 budget 
approved in December 2014.
Sweden: Fiscal projections take into account the 
authorities’ projections based on the December 2014 
forecasts. The impact of cyclical developments on the 
fiscal accounts is calculated using the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 2005 
elasticity to take into account output and employment 
gaps.
Switzerland: The projections assume that fiscal 
policy is adjusted as necessary to keep fiscal balances 
in line with the requirements of Switzerland’s fiscal 
rules.
Turkey: Fiscal projections assume that both current 
and capital spending will be in line with the authori-
ties’ 2013–15 Medium Term Programme based on 
current trends and policies.
United Kingdom: Fiscal projections are based on 
the U.K. Treasury’s 2015 Budget, published in March 
2015. However, on the revenue side, the authori-
ties’ projections are adjusted for differences between 
IMF staff forecasts of macroeconomic variables (such 
as GDP growth) and the forecasts of these variables 
assumed in the authorities’ fiscal projections. On the 
expenditure side, given uncertainties pertaining to the 
May elections, a slightly slower pace of consolidation 
than that in the Budget is assumed for FY2016/17 
and beyond, though fiscal projections are fully con-
sistent with the fiscal mandates. In addition, IMF 
staff data exclude public sector banks and the effect of 
transferring assets from the Royal Mail Pension Plan 
to the public sector in April 2012. Real government 
consumption and investment are part of the real GDP 
path, which, according to the IMF staff, may or may 
not be the same as projected by the U.K. Office for 
Budget Responsibility. 
United States: Fiscal projections are based on the 
January 2015 Congressional Budget Office baseline 
adjusted for the IMF staff’s policy and macroeconomic 
assumptions. The baseline incorporates the key provi-
sions of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, including 
a partial rollback of the sequester spending cuts in 
fiscal years 2014 and 2015. The rollback is fully offset 
by savings elsewhere in the budget. In fiscal years 
2016 through 2021, the IMF staff assumes that the 
sequester cuts will continue to be partially replaced, 
in proportions similar to those agreed upon under 
the Bipartisan Budget Act for fiscal years 2014 and 
2015, with back-loaded measures generating savings 
in mandatory programs and additional revenues. Over 
the medium term, the IMF staff assumes that war 
drawdown will continue and Congress will continue 
to make regular adjustments to Medicare payments 
(“doc fix”) and will extend certain traditional programs 
(such as the research and development tax credit). 
Fiscal projections are adjusted to reflect the IMF staff’s 
forecasts of key macroeconomic and financial variables 
and different accounting treatment of financial sector 
support and of defined-benefit pension plans and 
are converted to a general government basis. Histori-
cal data start at 2001 for most series because data 
compiled according to the 2001 Government Finance 
Statistics Manual (GFSM 2001) may not be available 
for earlier years.
Monetary Policy Assumptions
Monetary policy assumptions are based on the 
established policy framework in each country. In most 
cases, this implies a nonaccommodative stance over 
the business cycle: official interest rates will increase 
when economic indicators suggest that inflation 
will rise above its acceptable rate or range; they will 
decrease when indicators suggest that inflation will 
not exceed the acceptable rate or range, that out-
put growth is below its potential rate, and that the 
margin of slack in the economy is significant. On this 
basis, the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) on 
six-month U.S. dollar deposits is assumed to aver-
age 0.7 percent in 2015 and 1.9 percent in 2016 (see 
Box A1 (continued)
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Table 1.1). The rate on three-month euro deposits is 
assumed to average 0.0 percent in 2015 and 2016. 
The interest rate on six-month Japanese yen deposits 
is assumed to average 0.1 percent in 2015 and 0.2 
percent in 2016.
Australia: Monetary policy assumptions are in line 
with market expectations.
Brazil: Monetary policy assumptions are consistent 
with gradual convergence of inflation toward the 
middle of the target range over the relevant horizon.
Canada: Monetary policy assumptions are in line 
with market expectations.
China: Monetary policy will remain broadly 
unchanged from its current status, consistent with 
the authorities’ announcement of maintaining stable 
economic growth.
Denmark: The monetary policy is to maintain the 
peg to the euro.
Euro area: Monetary policy assumptions for euro 
area member countries are in line with market 
expectations.
Hong Kong SAR: The IMF staff assumes that the 
currency board system remains intact.
India: The policy (interest) rate assumption is con-
sistent with an inflation rate within the Reserve Bank 
of India’s targeted band.
Indonesia: Monetary policy assumptions are in line 
with a reduction of inflation to within the central 
bank’s targeted band by the end of 2015.
Japan: The current monetary policy conditions are 
maintained for the projection period, and no further 
tightening or loosening is assumed.
Korea: Monetary policy assumptions are in line with 
market expectations.
Mexico: Monetary assumptions are consistent with 
attaining the inflation target.
Russia: Monetary projections assume increasing 
exchange rate flexibility as part of the transition to 
the new full-fledged inflation-targeting regime, as 
indicated in recent statements by the Central Bank of 
Russia. Specifically, policy rates are assumed to remain 
at the current levels, gradually reducing the number of 
interventions in the foreign exchange markets.
Saudi Arabia: Monetary policy projections are based 
on the continuation of the exchange rate peg to the 
U.S. dollar.
Singapore: Broad money is projected to grow in line 
with the projected growth in nominal GDP.
South Africa: Monetary projections are consistent 
with South Africa’s 3–6 percent inflation target range.
Sweden: Monetary projections are in line with Riks-
bank projections.
Switzerland: Monetary policy variables reflect 
historical data from the national authorities and the 
market.
Turkey: Broad money and the long-term bond yield 
are based on IMF staff projections. The short-term 
deposit rate is projected to evolve with a constant 
spread against the interest rate of a similar U.S. 
instrument.
United Kingdom: Projections assume no change 
in monetary policy or the level of asset purchases in 
2015.
United States: Given the outlook for sluggish growth 
and inflation, the IMF staff expects the federal funds 
target to remain near zero until mid-2015, consistent 
with the Federal Open Market Committee’s forward 
guidance and market expectations.
Box A1 (continued)
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Table A1. Summary of World Output1
(Annual percent change)
Average Projections
1997–2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020
World 4.0 5.7 3.1 0.0 5.4 4.2 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.8 4.0
Advanced Economies 2.8 2.8 0.2 –3.4 3.1 1.7 1.2 1.4 1.8 2.4 2.4 1.9
United States 3.3 1.8 –0.3 –2.8 2.5 1.6 2.3 2.2 2.4 3.1 3.1 2.0
Euro Area2 2.3 3.0 0.5 –4.5 2.0 1.6 –0.8 –0.5 0.9 1.5 1.6 1.5
Japan 0.9 2.2 –1.0 –5.5 4.7 –0.5 1.8 1.6 –0.1 1.0 1.2 0.7
Other Advanced Economies3 3.7 4.1 1.2 –2.1 4.6 2.9 1.7 2.1 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 5.5 8.7 5.8 3.1 7.4 6.2 5.2 5.0 4.6 4.3 4.7 5.3
Regional Groups
Commonwealth of Independent States4 5.5 9.0 5.3 –6.3 4.6 4.8 3.4 2.2 1.0 –2.6 0.3 2.4
Emerging and Developing Asia 7.0 11.2 7.3 7.5 9.6 7.7 6.8 7.0 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.6
Emerging and Developing Europe 4.1 5.5 3.1 –3.0 4.8 5.4 1.3 2.9 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.4
Latin America and the Caribbean 3.1 5.7 3.9 –1.3 6.1 4.9 3.1 2.9 1.3 0.9 2.0 3.0
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan 5.1 6.3 5.2 2.2 4.8 4.4 4.8 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.8 4.1
Middle East and North Africa 5.2 6.4 5.2 2.3 5.1 4.5 4.9 2.3 2.4 2.7 3.7 4.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.9 7.6 6.0 4.0 6.7 5.0 4.2 5.2 5.0 4.5 5.1 5.4
Memorandum
European Union 2.6 3.3 0.7 −4.3 2.0 1.8 –0.4 0.1 1.4 1.8 1.9 1.9
Analytical Groups
By Source of Export Earnings
Fuel 5.2 7.7 5.4 –0.9 5.0 5.0 4.7 2.6 2.3 0.7 2.3 3.3
Nonfuel 5.5 9.0 6.0 4.2 8.1 6.6 5.3 5.6 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.7
Of Which, Primary Products 3.8 6.7 3.8 1.0 6.6 5.7 3.1 4.1 2.4 2.4 2.8 3.3
By External Financing Source
Net Debtor Economies 4.3 6.7 4.3 1.9 6.7 5.1 4.1 4.5 4.1 4.3 4.8 5.4
Net Debtor Economies by  
Debt-Servicing Experience
Economies with Arrears and/or 
Rescheduling during 2009–13 5.4 6.4 6.2 3.8 4.5 2.3 2.8 3.4 3.2 4.0 4.6 5.1
Memorandum
Median Growth Rate
Advanced Economies 3.5 4.2 1.0 –3.8 2.3 2.1 0.9 1.4 2.1 2.5 2.3 2.2
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 4.4 6.1 5.0 1.7 4.5 4.5 4.0 3.9 3.5 3.5 3.9 4.0
Output per Capita
Advanced Economies 2.1 2.0 –0.6 –4.0 2.5 1.2 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.9 1.9 1.5
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 4.1 7.2 4.3 1.9 6.2 5.1 3.9 3.8 3.5 3.1 3.6 4.2
World Growth Rate Based on Market Exchange 3.1 3.9 1.5 –2.0 4.1 3.0 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.2
Value of World Output (billions of U.S. dollars)
At Market Exchange Rates 37,521 57,456 62,999 59,711 65,206 72,188 73,475 75,471 77,302 74,551 78,302 98,116
At Purchasing Power Parities 54,309 78,486 82,370 82,739 88,156 93,576 98,191 102,966 107,921 112,552 118,471 149,436
1Real GDP.
2Excludes Lithuania.
3Excludes the United States, euro area countries, and Japan but includes Lithuania.
4Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarity in economic 
structure.
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Table A2. Advanced Economies: Real GDP and Total Domestic Demand1
(Annual percent change)
Fourth Quarter2
Average Projections Projections 
1997–2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020 2014:Q4 2015:Q4 2016:Q4
Real GDP
Advanced Economies 2.8 2.8 0.2 –3.4 3.1 1.7 1.2 1.4 1.8 2.4 2.4 1.9 1.7 2.5 2.3
United States 3.3 1.8 –0.3 –2.8 2.5 1.6 2.3 2.2 2.4 3.1 3.1 2.0 2.4 3.1 2.8
Euro Area3 2.3 3.0 0.5 –4.5 2.0 1.6 –0.8 –0.5 0.9 1.5 1.6 1.5 0.9 1.7 1.6
Germany 1.5 3.4 0.8 –5.6 3.9 3.7 0.6 0.2 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.7
France 2.4 2.4 0.2 –2.9 2.0 2.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 1.2 1.5 1.9 0.2 1.6 1.3
Italy 1.5 1.5 –1.0 –5.5 1.7 0.6 –2.8 –1.7 –0.4 0.5 1.1 1.0 –0.5 1.0 1.1
Spain 3.9 3.8 1.1 –3.6 0.0 –0.6 –2.1 –1.2 1.4 2.5 2.0 1.7 2.0 2.4 1.8
Netherlands 2.7 4.2 2.1 –3.3 1.1 1.7 –1.6 –0.7 0.9 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.4 1.1 1.7
Belgium 2.4 3.0 1.0 –2.6 2.5 1.6 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.0 1.6 1.6
Austria 2.5 3.6 1.5 –3.8 1.9 3.1 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.9 1.6 1.1 –0.2 1.6 1.5
Greece 4.1 3.5 –0.4 –4.4 –5.4 –8.9 –6.6 –3.9 0.8 2.5 3.7 2.6 1.3 4.0 3.5
Portugal 2.3 2.5 0.2 –3.0 1.9 –1.8 –4.0 –1.6 0.9 1.6 1.5 1.2 0.7 1.4 1.6
Ireland 6.9 4.9 –2.6 –6.4 –0.3 2.8 –0.3 0.2 4.8 3.9 3.3 2.5 4.1 2.1 1.6
Finland 3.8 5.2 0.7 –8.3 3.0 2.6 –1.4 –1.3 –0.1 0.8 1.4 1.8 –0.2 1.6 1.3
Slovak Republic 4.3 10.7 5.4 –5.3 4.8 2.7 1.6 1.4 2.4 2.9 3.3 3.0 2.4 3.3 3.3
Lithuania 6.4 11.1 2.6 –14.8 1.6 6.1 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.8 3.2 3.7 2.1 3.7 6.1
Slovenia 4.1 6.9 3.3 –7.8 1.2 0.6 –2.6 –1.0 2.6 2.1 1.9 1.8 2.0 1.3 6.5
Luxembourg 4.9 6.5 0.5 –5.3 5.1 2.6 –0.2 2.0 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.2 3.9 2.0 2.4
Latvia 7.6 9.8 –3.2 –14.2 –2.9 5.0 4.8 4.2 2.4 2.3 3.3 4.0 2.1 2.7 3.3
Estonia 7.4 7.9 –5.3 –14.7 2.5 8.3 4.7 1.6 2.1 2.5 3.4 3.4 3.0 5.1 3.4
Cyprus4 3.9 4.9 3.6 –2.0 1.4 0.3 –2.4 –5.4 –2.3 0.2 1.4 1.8 –2.0 . . . . . .
Malta . . . 4.0 3.3 –2.5 3.5 2.3 2.5 2.7 3.5 3.2 2.7 2.5 4.1 4.4 2.9
Japan 0.9 2.2 –1.0 –5.5 4.7 –0.5 1.8 1.6 –0.1 1.0 1.2 0.7 –0.7 2.4 0.5
United Kingdom 3.1 2.6 –0.3 –4.3 1.9 1.6 0.7 1.7 2.6 2.7 2.3 2.1 2.7 2.7 2.2
Korea 4.9 5.5 2.8 0.7 6.5 3.7 2.3 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.7 2.8 3.9 3.0
Canada 3.4 2.0 1.2 –2.7 3.4 3.0 1.9 2.0 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.6 1.8 2.0
Australia 3.6 4.5 2.7 1.6 2.3 2.7 3.6 2.1 2.7 2.8 3.2 2.8 2.5 3.6 2.7
Taiwan Province of China 4.9 6.5 0.7 –1.6 10.6 3.8 2.1 2.2 3.7 3.8 4.1 4.2 3.5 3.4 4.6
Switzerland 2.2 4.1 2.2 –2.1 2.9 1.9 1.1 1.9 2.0 0.8 1.2 1.9 2.0 0.1 1.7
Sweden 3.4 3.4 –0.6 –5.2 6.0 2.7 –0.3 1.3 2.1 2.7 2.8 2.3 2.6 2.2 3.1
Singapore 5.4 9.1 1.8 –0.6 15.2 6.2 3.4 4.4 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.2 2.2 3.2 2.7
Hong Kong SAR 3.7 6.5 2.1 –2.5 6.8 4.8 1.7 2.9 2.3 2.8 3.1 3.5 2.2 3.0 3.2
Norway 2.6 2.9 0.4 –1.6 0.6 1.0 2.7 0.7 2.2 1.0 1.5 2.0 3.0 –0.3 2.7
Czech Republic 3.1 5.5 2.7 –4.8 2.3 2.0 –0.8 –0.7 2.0 2.5 2.7 2.2 1.5 3.1 2.4
Israel 3.7 6.3 3.5 1.9 5.8 4.2 3.0 3.2 2.8 3.5 3.3 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.7
Denmark 2.3 0.8 –0.7 –5.1 1.6 1.2 –0.7 –0.5 1.0 1.6 2.0 2.2 1.3 1.5 2.3
New Zealand 3.4 3.4 –0.5 –1.4 1.6 1.8 2.4 2.2 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.3 3.5 2.3 3.2
Iceland 4.5 9.7 1.1 –5.1 –3.1 2.1 1.1 3.5 1.8 3.5 3.2 2.6 5.4 2.8 3.3
San Marino . . . 7.1 1.7 –12.8 –4.6 –9.5 –7.5 –4.5 –1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 . . . . . . . . .
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies 2.5 2.1 –0.2 –3.8 2.9 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.7 2.3 2.3 1.7 1.6 2.5 2.1
Real Total Domestic Demand
Advanced Economies 2.9 2.3 –0.3 –3.7 3.0 1.4 0.8 1.0 1.8 2.3 2.4 2.0 1.6 2.6 2.2
United States 3.7 1.1 –1.3 –3.8 2.9 1.6 2.2 1.9 2.5 3.4 3.4 2.2 2.9 3.4 3.2
Euro Area3 2.3 2.8 0.4 –3.9 1.5 0.7 –2.3 –0.9 0.8 1.2 1.5 1.5 0.7 1.4 1.5
Germany 0.9 1.8 0.9 –3.2 2.9 3.1 –0.8 0.8 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.0 2.0 1.6
France 2.5 3.1 0.5 –2.5 2.1 2.0 –0.3 0.2 0.7 0.8 1.4 1.8 0.5 1.0 1.6
Italy 2.2 1.3 –1.2 –4.1 2.0 –0.6 –5.5 –2.5 –0.7 –0.2 0.7 1.0 –1.1 0.5 0.9
Spain 4.8 4.1 –0.4 –6.0 –0.5 –2.7 –4.2 –2.7 2.3 3.1 1.7 1.4 2.8 2.8 1.6
Japan 0.5 1.1 –1.3 –4.0 2.9 0.4 2.6 1.9 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.5 –1.6 2.2 –0.6
United Kingdom 3.4 2.5 –1.3 –4.4 2.5 0.3 1.4 1.8 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.1 3.0 2.1
Canada 3.6 3.4 2.8 –2.7 5.2 3.3 2.2 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.9 1.7 1.4 0.9 2.3
Other Advanced Economies5 3.3 5.0 1.7 –2.8 6.2 3.1 1.8 1.2 2.2 3.2 3.0 3.3 1.7 2.9 3.1
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies 2.7 1.6 –0.7 –3.7 2.9 1.5 1.2 1.4 1.7 2.2 2.4 1.8 1.5 2.6 2.1
1In this and other tables, when countries are not listed alphabetically, they are ordered on the basis of economic size.
2From the fourth quarter of the preceding year.
3Excludes Lithuania.
4Owing to the unusual macroeconomic uncertainty, quarterly real GDP projections are not available.
5Excludes the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) and euro area countries but includes Lithuania.
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Table A3. Advanced Economies: Components of Real GDP
(Annual percent change)
Averages Projections
1997–2006 2007–16 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Private Consumer Expenditure
Advanced Economies 2.9 1.4 2.4 0.1 –1.1 1.9 1.4 1.0 1.4 1.7 2.5 2.6
United States 3.8 1.8 2.2 –0.3 –1.6 1.9 2.3 1.8 2.4 2.5 3.5 3.2
Euro Area1 2.1 0.4 1.8 0.3 –1.0 0.8 0.2 –1.3 –0.7 1.0 1.7 1.5
Germany 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.5 2.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 2.0 1.5
France 2.5 0.9 2.5 0.4 0.2 1.8 0.5 –0.4 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.7
Italy 1.7 –0.5 1.2 –1.0 –1.6 1.3 0.0 –3.9 –2.9 0.3 1.2 1.1
Spain 3.9 0.0 3.3 –0.7 –3.6 0.3 –2.0 –2.9 –2.3 2.4 3.9 2.5
Japan 0.9 0.8 0.9 –0.9 –0.7 2.8 0.3 2.3 2.1 –1.2 0.6 2.0
United Kingdom 4.0 1.0 2.6 –0.5 –3.1 0.4 0.1 1.1 1.7 2.0 3.2 2.9
Canada 3.5 2.5 4.2 2.9 0.3 3.4 2.3 1.9 2.5 2.7 2.3 2.2
Other Advanced Economies2 3.5 2.4 4.6 1.2 –0.1 3.6 2.9 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.7 3.0
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies 2.8 1.3 1.9 –0.2 –1.2 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.7 1.6 2.5 2.6
Public Consumption
Advanced Economies 2.7 1.0 1.9 2.4 3.0 1.0 –0.6 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.8 0.4
United States 2.1 0.4 1.4 2.5 3.7 0.1 –2.7 –0.6 –1.3 0.4 0.0 0.5
Euro Area1 1.8 1.0 2.1 2.5 2.4 0.8 –0.2 –0.1 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.5
Germany 0.8 1.5 1.5 3.4 3.0 1.3 0.7 1.2 0.7 1.1 1.0 1.0
France 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.1 2.4 1.3 1.0 1.7 2.0 1.9 1.3 0.4
Italy 2.8 –0.2 0.4 1.0 0.4 0.6 –1.8 –1.2 –0.3 –0.9 0.1 0.1
Spain 4.5 1.0 6.2 5.9 4.1 1.5 –0.3 –3.7 –2.9 0.1 0.3 –1.1
Japan 2.1 0.9 1.1 –0.1 2.3 1.9 1.2 1.7 1.9 0.3 0.4 –1.6
United Kingdom 2.8 0.8 1.2 2.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 2.3 –0.3 1.5 0.8 –0.7
Canada 2.1 1.8 2.8 4.6 3.3 2.7 0.8 1.2 0.4 0.3 1.0 1.2
Other Advanced Economies2 2.9 2.5 3.1 3.0 3.3 2.8 1.6 2.0 2.0 2.4 3.0 1.8
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies 2.0 0.7 1.4 2.1 2.9 0.7 –1.1 0.3 –0.2 0.6 0.4 0.2
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
Advanced Economies 3.3 0.5 2.4 –2.6 –11.1 1.9 2.9 1.8 1.1 2.7 3.3 3.9
United States 4.6 0.8 –1.2 –4.8 –13.1 1.1 3.7 5.3 2.7 3.9 5.8 6.2
Euro Area1 3.1 –0.8 4.9 –0.6 –11.1 –0.4 1.6 –3.7 –2.5 1.0 1.5 2.4
Germany 0.9 1.3 4.4 0.5 –9.8 4.6 7.5 0.0 –0.5 3.4 1.4 2.2
France 3.5 0.0 5.5 0.8 –9.1 2.1 2.1 0.3 –1.0 –1.6 –0.2 2.0
Italy 3.0 –3.3 1.6 –3.1 –9.9 –0.5 –1.9 –9.3 –5.8 –3.3 –0.3 0.4
Spain 7.0 –3.1 4.4 –3.9 –16.9 –4.9 –6.3 –8.1 –3.8 3.4 4.5 3.1
Japan –1.1 –0.7 0.3 –4.1 –10.6 –0.2 1.4 3.4 3.2 2.5 –1.3 –0.5
United Kingdom 2.3 1.1 5.3 –4.7 –14.4 5.9 2.3 0.7 3.4 6.8 3.2 4.3
Canada 5.9 1.4 3.2 1.6 –12.0 11.3 4.8 4.8 0.4 0.4 –0.7 1.7
Other Advanced Economies2 3.6 2.6 6.8 0.2 –5.1 6.4 4.0 2.5 2.2 1.7 3.8 3.8
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies 3.0 0.4 1.0 –3.3 –11.9 2.1 3.2 2.8 1.6 2.8 3.1 3.9
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Table A3. Advanced Economies: Components of Real GDP (continued)
(Annual percent change)
Averages Projections
1997–2006 2007–16 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Final Domestic Demand
Advanced Economies 2.9 1.1 2.3 –0.1 –2.6 1.7 1.4 1.0 1.1 1.7 2.4 2.5
United States 3.7 1.4 1.4 –0.9 –3.1 1.5 1.7 2.1 1.9 2.5 3.4 3.4
Euro Area1 2.2 0.3 2.6 0.5 –2.7 0.6 0.4 –1.6 –0.8 0.9 1.4 1.5
Germany 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.0 –1.4 1.5 3.0 0.6 0.6 1.7 1.7 1.5
France 2.4 0.8 3.0 0.7 –1.5 1.8 0.9 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.4
Italy 2.2 –1.0 1.1 –1.1 –3.0 0.8 –0.7 –4.4 –2.9 –0.6 0.7 0.8
Spain 4.8 –0.6 4.1 –0.5 –5.9 –0.7 –2.6 –4.2 –2.7 2.1 3.3 1.9
Japan 0.6 0.5 0.8 –1.6 –2.3 2.0 0.7 2.4 2.3 –0.1 0.2 0.8
United Kingdom 3.4 1.0 2.8 –0.7 –4.1 1.1 0.4 1.3 1.5 2.7 2.7 2.4
Canada 3.8 2.1 3.7 2.9 –1.9 5.0 2.5 2.5 1.5 1.7 1.3 1.9
Other Advanced Economies2 3.3 2.5 4.9 1.2 –0.7 4.3 2.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 3.2 3.0
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies 2.7 1.0 1.6 –0.5 –2.7 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.7 2.3 2.4
Stock Building3
Advanced Economies 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.2 –1.2 1.3 0.1 –0.2 –0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
United States 0.0 0.0 –0.2 –0.5 –0.8 1.5 –0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Euro Area1 0.0 –0.1 0.2 –0.2 –1.2 0.9 0.3 –0.7 0.0 –0.1 –0.2 0.0
Germany 0.0 –0.1 0.6 –0.1 –1.7 1.3 0.1 –1.4 0.1 –0.4 –0.2 0.1
France 0.1 0.0 0.1 –0.2 –1.1 0.3 1.1 –0.6 –0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0
Italy 0.0 –0.1 0.2 –0.1 –1.2 1.3 0.2 –1.1 0.4 –0.1 –0.9 0.0
Spain 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 –0.2 0.2 0.0 –0.2 –0.1 0.2 –0.2 –0.2
Japan 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 –1.5 0.9 –0.2 0.2 –0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0
United Kingdom 0.0 0.1 –0.1 –0.5 –0.6 1.5 –0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0
Canada 0.1 0.0 –0.1 0.0 –0.8 0.2 0.8 –0.2 0.4 –0.2 –0.1 0.0
Other Advanced Economies2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 –2.0 2.0 0.2 –0.3 –0.8 0.1 0.1 0.0
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.3 –1.0 1.2 0.0 –0.2 0.0 0.0 –0.1 0.0
Foreign Balance3
Advanced Economies –0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0
United States –0.6 0.2 0.6 1.1 1.2 –0.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 –0.2 –0.4 –0.4
Euro Area1 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 –0.6 0.6 0.9 1.5 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2
Germany 0.5 0.2 1.6 –0.1 –2.6 1.1 0.7 1.4 –0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1
France –0.1 –0.1 –0.8 –0.3 –0.4 –0.1 0.0 0.7 0.1 –0.3 0.3 0.0
Italy –0.4 0.5 0.2 0.2 –1.3 –0.3 1.2 2.8 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.4
Spain –0.8 0.9 –0.6 1.6 2.8 0.5 2.1 2.2 1.4 –0.8 –0.6 0.4
Japan 0.4 0.1 1.0 0.2 –2.0 2.0 –0.8 –0.7 –0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4
United Kingdom –0.5 0.0 –0.4 1.1 0.7 –0.9 1.4 –0.8 0.0 –0.5 –0.1 –0.1
Canada –0.3 –0.4 –1.5 –1.9 0.0 –2.0 –0.4 –0.4 0.2 1.2 0.9 0.1
Other Advanced Economies2 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.3 1.6 –0.1 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.3
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies –0.2 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 –0.1
1Excludes Lithuania.
2Excludes the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) and euro area countries but includes Lithuania.
3Changes expressed as percent of GDP in the preceding period.
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Table A4. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Real GDP
(Annual percent change)
Average Projections
1997–2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020
Commonwealth of Independent States1,2 5.5 9.0 5.3 –6.3 4.6 4.8 3.4 2.2 1.0 –2.6 0.3 2.4
Russia 5.0 8.5 5.2 –7.8 4.5 4.3 3.4 1.3 0.6 –3.8 –1.1 1.5
Excluding Russia 6.6 10.4 5.6 –2.5 5.0 6.2 3.6 4.2 1.9 0.4 3.2 4.3
Armenia 9.4 13.7 6.9 –14.1 2.2 4.7 7.1 3.5 3.4 –1.0 0.0 3.5
Azerbaijan 12.5 25.0 10.8 9.3 5.0 0.1 2.2 5.8 2.8 0.6 2.5 3.3
Belarus 7.6 8.7 10.3 0.1 7.7 5.5 1.7 1.0 1.6 –2.3 –0.1 0.5
Georgia 6.4 12.6 2.6 –3.7 6.2 7.2 6.4 3.3 4.7 2.0 3.0 5.0
Kazakhstan 7.4 8.9 3.3 1.2 7.3 7.5 5.0 6.0 4.3 2.0 3.1 4.2
Kyrgyz Republic 4.3 8.5 7.6 2.9 –0.5 6.0 –0.9 10.5 3.6 1.7 3.4 5.3
Moldova 3.3 3.0 7.8 –6.0 7.1 6.8 –0.7 9.4 4.6 –1.0 3.0 4.0
Tajikistan 7.2 7.8 7.9 3.9 6.5 7.4 7.5 7.4 6.7 3.0 4.1 5.0
Turkmenistan 11.9 11.1 14.7 6.1 9.2 14.7 11.1 10.2 10.3 9.0 9.2 6.9
Ukraine3 4.6 8.2 2.2 –15.1 0.3 5.5 0.2 0.0 –6.8 –5.5 2.0 4.0
Uzbekistan 5.2 9.5 9.0 8.1 8.5 8.3 8.2 8.0 8.1 6.2 6.5 6.5
Emerging and Developing Asia 7.0 11.2 7.3 7.5 9.6 7.7 6.8 7.0 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.6
Bangladesh 5.6 6.5 5.5 5.3 6.0 6.5 6.3 6.1 6.1 6.3 6.8 6.7
Bhutan 7.0 12.6 10.8 5.7 9.3 10.1 6.5 5.0 6.4 7.6 8.2 6.9
Brunei Darussalam 1.9 0.2 –1.9 –1.8 2.6 3.4 0.9 –1.8 –0.7 –0.5 2.8 5.0
Cambodia 8.9 10.2 6.7 0.1 6.0 7.1 7.3 7.4 7.0 7.2 7.2 7.3
China 9.4 14.2 9.6 9.2 10.4 9.3 7.8 7.8 7.4 6.8 6.3 6.3
Fiji 2.2 –0.9 1.0 –1.4 3.0 2.7 1.8 4.6 4.1 3.3 3.0 3.0
India 6.6 9.8 3.9 8.5 10.3 6.6 5.1 6.9 7.2 7.5 7.5 7.8
Indonesia 2.5 6.3 7.4 4.7 6.4 6.2 6.0 5.6 5.0 5.2 5.5 6.0
Kiribati 1.9 2.2 –0.8 0.3 –0.9 –0.2 3.4 2.4 3.8 2.9 1.5 2.0
Lao P.D.R. 6.2 7.8 7.8 7.5 8.1 8.0 7.9 8.0 7.4 7.3 7.8 7.3
Malaysia 4.3 6.3 4.8 –1.5 7.4 5.2 5.6 4.7 6.0 4.8 4.9 5.0
Maldives 7.7 10.6 12.2 –3.6 7.1 6.5 1.3 4.7 5.0 5.0 3.9 5.0
Marshall Islands . . . 3.8 –2.0 –1.7 6.1 0.0 4.7 3.0 0.5 1.7 2.2 1.6
Micronesia 0.5 –2.2 –2.5 1.0 3.2 1.8 0.1 –4.0 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.1
Mongolia 5.4 8.8 8.1 –2.3 20.9 17.3 12.3 11.6 7.8 4.4 4.2 9.2
Myanmar . . . 12.0 3.6 5.1 5.3 5.9 7.3 8.3 7.7 8.3 8.5 7.5
Nepal 4.0 3.4 6.1 4.5 4.8 3.4 4.8 3.9 5.5 5.0 5.0 4.5
Palau . . . 1.7 –5.5 –10.7 3.2 5.2 5.5 –0.2 8.0 2.2 2.7 2.0
Papua New Guinea 1.0 7.2 6.6 6.1 7.7 10.7 8.1 5.5 5.8 19.3 3.3 3.5
Philippines 4.0 6.6 4.2 1.1 7.6 3.7 6.8 7.2 6.1 6.7 6.3 6.0
Samoa 3.6 1.1 2.9 –6.4 –2.3 6.2 1.2 –1.1 1.9 2.8 1.4 2.0
Solomon Islands 0.3 6.4 7.1 –4.7 6.9 12.9 4.7 3.0 1.5 3.3 3.0 3.4
Sri Lanka 4.5 6.8 6.0 3.5 8.0 8.2 6.3 7.3 7.4 6.5 6.5 6.5
Thailand 2.7 5.0 2.5 –2.3 7.8 0.1 6.5 2.9 0.7 3.7 4.0 3.8
Timor-Leste4 . . . 11.4 14.2 13.0 9.4 14.7 7.8 5.4 6.6 6.8 6.9 7.0
Tonga 1.0 –1.1 1.8 2.6 3.1 1.3 –1.1 –0.3 2.3 2.7 2.4 0.7
Tuvalu . . . 6.4 8.0 –4.4 –2.7 8.5 0.2 1.3 2.2 2.5 2.5 1.7
Vanuatu 2.5 5.2 6.5 3.3 1.6 1.2 1.8 2.0 2.9 –4.0 5.0 2.5
Vietnam 6.9 7.1 5.7 5.4 6.4 6.2 5.2 5.4 6.0 6.0 5.8 6.0
Emerging and Developing Europe 4.1 5.5 3.1 –3.0 4.8 5.4 1.3 2.9 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.4
Albania 5.1 5.9 7.5 3.4 3.7 2.5 1.6 1.4 2.1 3.0 4.0 4.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . 6.0 5.6 –2.7 0.8 1.0 –1.2 2.5 0.8 2.3 3.1 4.0
Bulgaria 3.8 6.9 5.8 –5.0 0.7 2.0 0.5 1.1 1.7 1.2 1.5 2.5
Croatia 3.8 5.2 2.1 –7.4 –1.7 –0.3 –2.2 –0.9 –0.4 0.5 1.0 2.0
Hungary 4.0 0.5 0.9 –6.6 0.8 1.8 –1.5 1.5 3.6 2.7 2.3 2.1
Kosovo . . . 8.3 4.5 3.6 3.3 4.4 2.8 3.4 2.7 3.3 3.5 3.5
FYR Macedonia 2.7 6.5 5.5 –0.4 3.4 2.3 –0.5 2.7 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.0
Montenegro . . . 10.7 6.9 –5.7 2.5 3.2 –2.5 3.3 1.1 4.7 3.5 3.3
Poland 4.2 7.2 3.9 2.6 3.7 4.8 1.8 1.7 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.6
Romania 2.7 6.9 8.5 –7.1 –0.8 1.1 0.6 3.4 2.9 2.7 2.9 3.5
Serbia . . . 5.9 5.4 –3.1 0.6 1.4 –1.0 2.6 –1.8 –0.5 1.5 4.0
Turkey 4.3 4.7 0.7 –4.8 9.2 8.8 2.1 4.1 2.9 3.1 3.6 3.5
S TAT I S T I C A L A P P E N D I X
 International Monetary Fund | April 2015 175
Table A4. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Real GDP (continued)
(Annual percent change)
Average Projections
1997–2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020
Latin America and the Caribbean 3.1 5.7 3.9 –1.3 6.1 4.9 3.1 2.9 1.3 0.9 2.0 3.0
Antigua and Barbuda 4.5 7.1 1.5 –10.7 –8.5 –1.9 3.6 1.8 2.4 1.9 2.3 2.7
Argentina5 2.6 8.0 3.1 0.1 9.5 8.4 0.8 2.9 0.5 –0.3 0.1 0.5
The Bahamas 3.8 1.4 –2.3 –4.2 1.5 1.1 1.0 0.7 1.3 2.3 2.8 1.5
Barbados 2.2 1.7 0.3 –4.1 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.0 –0.3 0.8 1.4 2.0
Belize 6.0 1.2 3.8 0.3 3.1 2.1 3.3 1.5 3.4 2.0 3.0 2.5
Bolivia 3.3 4.6 6.1 3.4 4.1 5.2 5.2 6.8 5.4 4.3 4.3 4.0
Brazil 2.7 6.0 5.0 –0.2 7.6 3.9 1.8 2.7 0.1 –1.0 1.0 2.5
Chile 4.1 5.2 3.2 –1.0 5.7 5.8 5.5 4.3 1.8 2.7 3.3 3.9
Colombia 2.7 6.9 3.5 1.7 4.0 6.6 4.0 4.9 4.6 3.4 3.7 4.3
Costa Rica 5.3 7.9 2.7 –1.0 5.0 4.5 5.2 3.4 3.5 3.8 4.4 4.3
Dominica 2.5 6.1 7.4 –1.1 1.1 –0.1 –1.4 –0.9 1.1 2.4 2.9 1.9
Dominican Republic 5.5 8.5 3.1 0.9 8.3 2.8 2.6 4.8 7.3 5.1 4.5 4.0
Ecuador 3.2 2.2 6.4 0.6 3.5 7.9 5.2 4.6 3.6 1.9 3.6 4.0
El Salvador 2.9 3.8 1.3 –3.1 1.4 2.2 1.9 1.7 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.0
Grenada 5.0 6.1 0.9 –6.6 –0.5 0.8 –1.2 2.4 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.5
Guatemala 3.5 6.3 3.3 0.5 2.9 4.2 3.0 3.7 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.8
Guyana 1.3 7.0 2.0 3.3 4.4 5.4 4.8 5.2 3.8 3.8 4.4 3.2
Haiti 0.8 3.3 0.8 3.1 –5.5 5.5 2.9 4.2 2.7 3.3 3.8 3.5
Honduras 4.1 6.2 4.2 –2.4 3.7 3.8 4.1 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.8
Jamaica 1.0 1.4 –0.8 –3.4 –1.5 1.4 –0.5 0.2 0.5 1.7 2.2 2.7
Mexico 3.3 3.1 1.4 –4.7 5.1 4.0 4.0 1.4 2.1 3.0 3.3 3.8
Nicaragua 3.9 5.3 2.9 –2.8 3.2 6.2 5.0 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.3 4.0
Panama 5.0 12.1 10.1 3.9 7.5 10.8 10.7 8.4 6.2 6.1 6.4 6.0
Paraguay 1.5 5.4 6.4 –4.0 13.1 4.3 –1.2 14.2 4.4 4.0 4.0 4.0
Peru 3.9 8.5 9.1 1.0 8.5 6.5 6.0 5.8 2.4 3.8 5.0 4.5
St. Kitts and Nevis 3.7 4.8 3.4 –3.8 –3.8 –1.9 –0.9 3.8 7.0 3.5 3.0 2.5
St. Lucia 2.2 –0.5 3.4 0.6 –0.2 1.3 0.6 –0.5 –1.1 1.8 1.4 2.2
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 4.3 3.0 –0.5 –2.0 –2.3 0.2 1.1 2.4 1.1 2.1 3.1 3.2
Suriname 3.9 5.1 4.1 3.0 4.2 5.3 4.8 4.1 2.9 2.7 3.8 4.2
Trinidad and Tobago 8.5 4.8 3.4 –4.4 –0.1 0.0 1.4 1.7 1.1 1.2 1.5 2.0
Uruguay 1.1 6.5 7.2 2.4 8.4 7.3 3.7 4.4 3.3 2.8 2.9 3.3
Venezuela 2.6 8.8 5.3 –3.2 –1.5 4.2 5.6 1.3 –4.0 –7.0 –4.0 0.0
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, 
and Pakistan 5.1 6.3 5.2 2.2 4.8 4.4 4.8 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.8 4.1
Afghanistan . . . 13.3 3.9 20.6 8.4 6.5 14.0 3.7 1.5 3.5 4.9 5.3
Algeria 4.1 3.4 2.4 1.6 3.6 2.8 3.3 2.8 4.1 2.6 3.9 3.6
Bahrain 5.2 8.3 6.2 2.5 4.3 2.1 3.4 5.3 4.7 2.7 2.4 2.9
Djibouti 2.2 5.1 5.8 5.0 3.5 4.5 4.8 5.0 6.0 6.5 7.0 6.0
Egypt 5.0 7.1 7.2 4.7 5.1 1.8 2.2 2.1 2.2 4.0 4.3 5.0
Iran 4.6 9.1 0.9 2.3 6.6 3.7 –6.6 –1.9 3.0 0.6 1.3 2.1
Iraq . . . 1.9 8.2 3.4 6.4 7.5 13.9 6.6 –2.4 1.3 7.6 7.5
Jordan 5.4 8.2 7.2 5.5 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.8 3.1 3.8 4.5 4.5
Kuwait 5.7 6.0 2.5 –7.1 –2.4 9.6 6.6 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.8 3.2
Lebanon 3.2 9.4 9.1 10.3 8.0 0.9 2.8 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.5 4.0
Libya 3.5 6.4 2.7 –0.8 5.0 –62.1 104.5 –13.6 –24.0 4.6 17.7 3.0
Mauritania 4.7 2.8 1.1 –1.0 4.8 4.4 6.0 5.7 6.4 5.5 6.7 5.1
Morocco 4.0 2.7 5.6 4.8 3.6 5.0 2.7 4.4 2.9 4.4 5.0 5.4
Oman 2.5 4.5 8.2 6.1 4.8 4.1 5.8 4.7 2.9 4.6 3.1 1.3
Pakistan 4.5 5.5 5.0 0.4 2.6 3.6 3.8 3.7 4.1 4.3 4.7 5.0
Qatar 11.8 18.0 17.7 12.0 16.7 13.0 6.0 6.3 6.1 7.1 6.5 3.9
Saudi Arabia 3.9 6.0 8.4 1.8 4.8 10.0 5.4 2.7 3.6 3.0 2.7 3.3
Sudan6 15.8 8.5 3.0 4.7 3.0 –1.2 –3.5 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.9 5.1
Syria7 2.9 5.7 4.5 5.9 3.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tunisia 4.9 6.3 4.5 3.1 2.6 –1.9 3.7 2.3 2.3 3.0 3.8 4.7
United Arab Emirates 6.2 3.2 3.2 –5.2 1.6 4.9 4.7 5.2 3.6 3.2 3.2 4.1
Yemen 4.5 3.3 3.6 3.9 7.7 –12.7 2.4 4.8 –0.2 –2.2 3.6 5.6
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Table A4. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Real GDP (continued)
(Annual percent change)
Average Projections
1997–2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.9 7.6 6.0 4.0 6.7 5.0 4.2 5.2 5.0 4.5 5.1 5.4
Angola 8.2 22.6 13.8 2.4 3.4 3.9 5.2 6.8 4.2 4.5 3.9 5.8
Benin 4.4 4.6 5.0 2.7 2.6 3.3 5.4 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.8
Botswana 6.2 8.7 3.9 –7.8 8.6 6.2 4.3 5.9 4.9 4.2 4.0 3.4
Burkina Faso 6.1 4.1 5.8 3.0 8.4 6.6 6.5 6.6 4.0 5.0 6.0 6.4
Burundi 2.3 3.4 4.9 3.8 5.1 4.2 4.0 4.5 4.7 4.8 5.0 5.5
Cabo Verde 7.4 9.2 6.7 –1.3 1.5 4.0 1.2 0.5 1.0 3.0 4.0 4.0
Cameroon 4.0 3.3 2.9 1.9 3.3 4.1 4.6 5.6 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.0
Central African Republic 2.0 4.6 2.1 1.7 3.0 3.3 4.1 –36.0 1.0 5.7 5.7 5.9
Chad 8.4 3.3 3.1 4.2 13.5 0.1 8.9 5.7 6.9 7.6 4.9 2.9
Comoros 2.4 0.5 1.0 1.8 2.1 2.2 3.0 3.5 3.3 3.5 4.0 4.0
Democratic Republic of the Congo 0.5 6.3 6.2 2.9 7.1 6.9 7.2 8.5 9.1 9.2 8.4 5.3
Republic of Congo 3.4 –1.6 5.6 7.5 8.7 3.4 3.8 3.3 6.0 5.2 7.5 2.3
Côte d’Ivoire 0.9 1.8 2.5 3.3 2.0 –4.4 10.7 8.7 7.5 7.7 7.8 5.9
Equatorial Guinea 31.7 13.1 12.3 –8.1 –1.3 5.0 3.2 –4.8 –3.1 –15.4 3.7 –7.2
Eritrea 0.8 1.4 –9.8 3.9 2.2 8.7 7.0 1.3 1.7 0.2 2.2 3.8
Ethiopia 5.3 11.8 11.2 10.0 10.6 11.4 8.7 9.8 10.3 8.6 8.5 7.5
Gabon –0.1 6.3 1.7 –2.3 6.3 6.9 5.5 5.6 5.1 4.4 5.5 5.9
The Gambia 3.9 3.6 5.7 6.4 6.5 –4.3 5.6 4.8 –0.2 5.1 8.7 5.9
Ghana 5.1 4.5 9.3 5.8 7.9 14.0 8.0 7.3 4.2 3.5 6.4 4.3
Guinea 3.4 1.8 4.9 –0.3 1.9 3.9 3.8 2.3 0.4 –0.3 6.5 8.2
Guinea-Bissau 0.0 3.2 3.2 3.3 4.4 9.0 –2.2 0.3 2.5 4.5 4.0 4.0
Kenya 3.0 6.9 0.2 3.3 8.4 6.1 4.5 5.7 5.3 6.9 7.2 6.6
Lesotho 3.4 5.0 5.1 4.5 6.9 4.5 5.3 3.5 2.2 4.0 4.4 6.4
Liberia . . . 12.7 6.0 5.1 6.1 7.4 8.2 8.7 0.5 –1.4 5.0 9.9
Madagascar 3.4 6.4 7.2 –4.7 0.3 1.5 3.0 2.4 3.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Malawi 2.5 9.5 8.3 9.0 6.5 4.3 1.9 5.2 5.7 5.5 5.7 5.9
Mali 4.9 4.3 5.0 4.5 5.8 2.7 0.0 1.7 6.8 5.6 5.1 5.1
Mauritius 4.5 5.9 5.5 3.0 4.1 3.9 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.5
Mozambique 8.7 7.4 5.8 6.5 7.1 7.4 7.1 7.4 7.4 6.5 8.1 14.5
Namibia 4.7 5.4 2.6 0.3 6.0 5.1 5.2 5.1 5.3 5.6 6.5 5.3
Niger 4.4 3.2 9.6 –0.7 8.4 2.2 11.8 4.6 6.9 4.6 5.4 5.1
Nigeria 7.2 9.1 8.0 9.0 10.0 4.9 4.3 5.4 6.3 4.8 5.0 6.0
Rwanda 8.4 7.6 11.2 6.2 6.3 7.5 8.8 4.7 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.5
São Tomé and Príncipe 3.8 0.6 8.1 4.0 4.5 4.8 4.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.2 6.0
Senegal 4.4 4.9 3.7 2.4 4.2 1.7 3.4 3.5 4.5 4.6 5.1 7.0
Seychelles 2.8 10.4 –2.1 –1.1 5.9 7.9 6.0 6.6 2.9 3.5 3.8 3.5
Sierra Leone 4.0 8.0 5.3 3.2 5.4 6.0 15.2 20.1 6.0 –12.8 8.4 6.0
South Africa 3.4 5.4 3.2 –1.5 3.0 3.2 2.2 2.2 1.5 2.0 2.1 2.8
South Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –46.8 24.2 5.5 3.4 20.7 3.1
Swaziland 2.5 3.5 2.4 1.2 1.9 –0.6 1.9 2.8 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.6
Tanzania 5.3 8.8 5.6 5.4 6.4 7.9 5.1 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.1 6.9
Togo 1.3 2.3 2.4 3.5 4.1 4.8 5.9 5.4 5.2 6.0 6.0 6.1
Uganda 6.8 8.1 10.4 8.1 7.7 6.8 2.6 3.9 4.9 5.4 5.6 6.3
Zambia 4.6 8.4 7.8 9.2 10.3 6.4 6.8 6.7 5.4 6.7 6.9 6.4
Zimbabwe8 . . . –3.4 –16.6 7.5 11.4 11.9 10.6 4.5 3.2 2.8 2.7 3.7
1Data for some countries refer to real net material product (NMP) or are estimates based on NMP. The figures should be interpreted only as indicative of broad orders of magnitude because 
reliable, comparable data are not generally available. In particular, the growth of output of new private enterprises of the informal economy is not fully reflected in the recent figures. 
2Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarity in economic 
structure.
3Data are based on the 2008 System of National Accounts. The revised national accounts data are available beginning in 2000 and exclude Crimea and Sevastopol from 2010 onward.
4In this table only, the data for Timor-Leste are based on non-oil GDP.
5The data for Argentina are officially reported data as revised in May 2014. On February 1, 2013, the IMF issued a declaration of censure, and in December 2013 called on Argentina to 
implement specified actions to address the quality of its official GDP data according to a specified timetable. On December 15, 2014, the Executive Board recognized the implementation of 
the specified actions it had called for by end-September 2014 and the steps taken by the Argentine authorities to remedy the inaccurate provision of data. The Executive Board will review 
this issue again as per the calendar specified in December 2013 and in line with the procedures set forth in the Fund’s legal framework.
6Data for 2011 exclude South Sudan after July 9. Data for 2012 and onward pertain to the current Sudan.
7Data for Syria are excluded for 2011 onward owing the uncertain political situation.
8The Zimbabwean dollar ceased circulating in early 2009. Data are based on IMF staff estimates of price and exchange rate developments in U.S. dollars. IMF staff estimates of U.S. dollar 
values may differ from authorities’ estimates. Real GDP is in constant 2009 prices.
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Table A5. Summary of Inflation
(Percent)
Average Projections
1997–2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020
GDP Deflators
Advanced Economies 1.7 2.2 1.9 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 0.9 1.2 1.7
United States 2.1 2.7 2.0 0.8 1.2 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.5 0.9 1.5 2.0
Euro Area1 1.7 2.4 2.0 1.0 0.7 1.1 1.3 1.3 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.5
Japan –1.0 –0.9 –1.3 –0.5 –2.2 –1.9 –0.9 –0.5 1.7 1.6 0.5 0.8
Other Advanced Economies2 2.0 2.8 3.0 1.0 2.4 2.0 1.3 1.3 1.4 0.5 1.4 2.0
Consumer Prices
Advanced Economies 2.0 2.2 3.4 0.1 1.5 2.7 2.0 1.4 1.4 0.4 1.4 2.0
United States 2.5 2.9 3.8 –0.3 1.6 3.1 2.1 1.5 1.6 0.1 1.5 2.3
Euro Area1,3 2.0 2.2 3.3 0.3 1.6 2.7 2.5 1.3 0.4 0.1 1.0 1.7
Japan –0.1 0.1 1.4 –1.3 –0.7 –0.3 0.0 0.4 2.7 1.0 0.9 1.5
Other Advanced Economies2 1.9 2.1 3.9 1.4 2.4 3.4 2.1 1.7 1.5 0.8 1.8 2.3
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 8.8 6.6 9.4 5.3 5.9 7.3 6.1 5.9 5.1 5.4 4.8 4.5
Regional Groups
Commonwealth of Independent States4 20.5 9.7 15.5 11.1 7.1 9.8 6.2 6.4 8.1 16.8 9.4 4.9
Emerging and Developing Asia 4.2 5.4 7.6 2.8 5.2 6.5 4.7 4.8 3.5 3.0 3.1 3.7
Emerging and Developing Europe 24.2 6.0 8.0 4.8 5.6 5.4 6.0 4.3 3.8 2.7 3.7 4.0
Latin America and the Caribbean5 . . . 5.5 8.1 6.1 6.2 6.8 6.1 7.1 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan 5.5 10.2 11.7 7.1 6.5 9.2 9.8 9.1 6.7 6.1 6.2 5.6
Middle East and North Africa 5.5 10.5 11.7 6.0 6.2 8.7 9.7 9.3 6.5 6.2 6.4 5.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 11.3 5.4 13.0 9.8 8.2 9.5 9.4 6.5 6.3 6.6 7.0 5.7
Memorandum
European Union 3.4 2.4 3.7 0.9 2.0 3.1 2.6 1.5 0.5 0.0 1.2 1.9
Analytical Groups
By Source of Export Earnings
Fuel 13.1 10.0 13.4 8.3 7.3 9.1 8.4 9.1 8.2 11.7 9.3 6.9
Nonfuel 7.5 5.6 8.2 4.4 5.5 6.8 5.5 5.1 4.3 3.8 3.7 3.9
Of Which, Primary Products5 . . . 7.6 10.7 6.7 7.0 8.1 8.6 8.4 . . . . . . . . . . . .
By External Financing Source
Net Debtor Economies 9.6 5.8 9.3 6.8 6.4 7.4 6.8 6.3 5.6 5.4 5.0 4.5
Net Debtor Economies by  
Debt-Servicing Experience
Economies with Arrears and/or 
Rescheduling during 2009–13 9.8 9.1 11.8 13.2 10.3 10.6 9.8 8.5 10.4 8.9 8.3 5.3
Memorandum
Median Inflation Rate
Advanced Economies 2.1 2.2 4.0 0.8 1.8 3.3 2.6 1.3 0.7 0.2 1.5 2.0
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 5.1 6.1 10.2 4.1 4.3 5.5 4.9 4.0 3.2 3.0 3.4 3.7
1Excludes Lithuania.
2Excludes the United States, euro area countries, and Japan but includes Lithuania.
3Based on Eurostat’s harmonized index of consumer prices.
4Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarity in economic 
structure.
5See note 5 to Table A7.
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Table A6. Advanced Economies: Consumer Prices1
(Annual percent change)
End of Period2
Average Projections Projections
1997–2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020 2014 2015 2016
Advanced Economies 2.0 2.2 3.4 0.1 1.5 2.7 2.0 1.4 1.4 0.4 1.4 2.0 0.8 0.7 1.7
United States 2.5 2.9 3.8 –0.3 1.6 3.1 2.1 1.5 1.6 0.1 1.5 2.3 0.9 0.5 2.1
Euro Area3,4 2.0 2.2 3.3 0.3 1.6 2.7 2.5 1.3 0.4 0.1 1.0 1.7 –0.2 0.2 1.2
Germany 1.4 2.3 2.7 0.2 1.2 2.5 2.1 1.6 0.8 0.2 1.3 1.9 0.2 0.2 1.3
France 1.6 1.6 3.2 0.1 1.7 2.3 2.2 1.0 0.6 0.1 0.8 1.7 0.3 0.1 0.8
Italy 2.3 2.0 3.5 0.8 1.6 2.9 3.3 1.3 0.2 0.0 0.8 1.3 –0.1 0.0 1.2
Spain 2.9 2.8 4.1 –0.2 2.0 3.1 2.4 1.5 –0.2 –0.7 0.7 1.5 –1.0 0.4 0.4
Netherlands 2.4 1.6 2.2 1.0 0.9 2.5 2.8 2.6 0.3 –0.1 0.9 1.6 0.1 0.4 1.0
Belgium 1.8 1.8 4.5 0.0 2.3 3.4 2.6 1.2 0.5 0.1 0.9 1.7 –0.4 0.5 1.2
Austria 1.5 2.2 3.2 0.4 1.7 3.6 2.6 2.1 1.5 1.1 1.5 1.9 1.5 1.1 1.5
Greece 3.6 2.9 4.2 1.2 4.7 3.3 1.5 –1.0 –1.4 –0.3 0.3 1.8 –2.6 0.1 0.6
Portugal 2.8 2.4 2.7 –0.9 1.4 3.6 2.8 0.4 –0.2 0.6 1.3 1.7 –0.3 –1.6 5.9
Ireland 3.1 2.9 3.1 –1.7 –1.6 1.2 1.9 0.5 0.3 0.2 1.5 2.0 0.2 0.3 0.8
Finland 1.5 1.6 3.9 1.6 1.7 3.3 3.2 2.2 1.2 0.6 1.6 2.0 0.6 1.2 1.6
Slovak Republic 6.9 1.9 3.9 0.9 0.7 4.1 3.7 1.5 –0.1 0.0 1.4 2.0 –0.1 0.7 1.4
Lithuania . . . 5.8 11.1 4.2 1.2 4.1 3.2 1.2 0.2 –0.3 2.0 2.3 –0.2 0.5 2.0
Slovenia 6.1 3.6 5.7 0.9 1.8 1.8 2.6 1.8 0.2 –0.4 0.7 1.7 0.2 –0.2 1.9
Luxembourg 2.4 2.7 4.1 0.0 2.8 3.7 2.9 1.7 0.7 0.5 1.6 2.2 –0.9 2.0 1.5
Latvia 4.4 10.1 15.3 3.3 –1.2 4.2 2.3 0.0 0.7 0.5 1.7 2.0 0.3 1.6 1.7
Estonia 4.9 6.7 10.6 0.2 2.7 5.1 4.2 3.2 0.5 0.4 1.7 2.2 0.0 0.8 2.1
Cyprus3 2.7 2.2 4.4 0.2 2.6 3.5 3.1 0.4 –0.3 –1.0 0.9 1.9 –1.0 –1.0 0.9
Malta 2.8 0.7 4.7 1.8 2.0 2.5 3.2 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.7 0.4 1.1 1.4
Japan –0.1 0.1 1.4 –1.3 –0.7 –0.3 0.0 0.4 2.7 1.0 0.9 1.5 2.6 0.9 0.5
United Kingdom3 1.5 2.3 3.6 2.2 3.3 4.5 2.8 2.6 1.5 0.1 1.7 2.0 0.9 0.5 1.9
Korea 3.4 2.5 4.7 2.8 2.9 4.0 2.2 1.3 1.3 1.5 2.5 3.0 0.8 2.6 2.5
Canada 2.1 2.1 2.4 0.3 1.8 2.9 1.5 1.0 1.9 0.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.0 2.4
Australia 2.6 2.3 4.4 1.8 2.9 3.3 1.8 2.4 2.5 2.0 2.3 2.5 1.7 2.6 1.9
Taiwan Province of China 0.8 1.8 3.5 –0.9 1.0 1.4 1.9 0.8 1.2 0.7 1.3 2.0 0.6 1.3 1.4
Switzerland 0.8 0.7 2.4 –0.5 0.7 0.2 –0.7 –0.2 0.0 –1.2 –0.4 1.0 –0.3 –1.5 0.3
Sweden 1.0 2.2 3.4 –0.5 1.2 3.0 0.9 0.0 –0.2 0.2 1.1 2.2 –0.3 0.4 1.5
Singapore 0.7 2.1 6.6 0.6 2.8 5.2 4.6 2.4 1.0 0.0 1.7 1.8 0.0 0.8 2.1
Hong Kong SAR –0.4 2.0 4.3 0.6 2.3 5.3 4.1 4.3 4.4 3.2 3.4 3.5 4.8 3.2 3.4
Norway 2.1 0.7 3.8 2.2 2.4 1.3 0.7 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.1 2.3 2.3
Czech Republic 3.9 2.9 6.3 1.0 1.5 1.9 3.3 1.4 0.4 –0.1 1.3 2.0 0.1 0.8 1.8
Israel 3.1 0.5 4.6 3.3 2.7 3.5 1.7 1.5 0.5 –0.2 2.1 2.0 –0.2 0.7 2.2
Denmark 2.1 1.7 3.4 1.3 2.3 2.8 2.4 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.6 2.0 0.3 0.8 1.6
New Zealand 2.1 2.4 4.0 2.1 2.3 4.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 0.8 2.1 2.0 0.8 1.6 1.8
Iceland 3.9 5.1 12.7 12.0 5.4 4.0 5.2 3.9 2.0 0.9 2.1 2.5 0.8 0.8 2.3
San Marino . . . 2.5 4.1 2.4 2.6 2.0 2.8 1.3 1.1 0.4 0.9 1.4 1.1 0.4 0.9
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies 1.8 2.2 3.2 –0.1 1.4 2.6 1.9 1.3 1.5 0.3 1.3 2.0 1.0 0.5 1.7
1Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages.
2Monthly year-over-year changes and, for several countries, on a quarterly basis.
3Based on Eurostat’s harmonized index of consumer prices.
4Excludes Lithuania.
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Table A7. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Consumer Prices1
(Annual percent change)
End of Period2
Average Projections Projections
1997–2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020 2014 2015 2016
Commonwealth of Independent States3,4 20.5 9.7 15.5 11.1 7.1 9.8 6.2 6.4 8.1 16.8 9.4 4.9 11.4 12.3 8.0
Russia 21.8 9.0 14.1 11.7 6.9 8.4 5.1 6.8 7.8 17.9 9.8 4.0 11.4 12.0 8.0
Excluding Russia 16.8 11.7 19.3 9.7 7.8 13.2 9.1 5.6 8.7 14.3 8.6 6.7 11.5 12.8 7.9
Armenia 4.1 4.6 9.0 3.5 7.3 7.7 2.5 5.8 3.1 6.4 4.0 4.0 4.6 5.4 4.0
Azerbaijan 2.6 16.6 20.8 1.6 5.7 7.9 1.0 2.4 1.4 7.9 6.2 4.0 –0.1 8.9 3.5
Belarus 61.8 8.4 14.8 13.0 7.7 53.2 59.2 18.3 18.1 22.1 17.4 16.5 16.2 22.0 18.1
Georgia 7.1 9.2 10.0 1.7 7.1 8.5 –0.9 –0.5 3.1 3.0 5.0 4.0 2.0 5.0 5.0
Kazakhstan 9.0 10.8 17.1 7.3 7.1 8.3 5.1 5.8 6.7 5.2 5.5 5.7 7.4 4.9 5.5
Kyrgyz Republic 11.0 10.2 24.5 6.8 7.8 16.6 2.8 6.6 7.5 10.7 8.6 2.5 10.5 10.1 7.8
Moldova 14.9 12.4 12.7 0.0 7.4 7.6 4.6 4.6 5.1 7.5 6.3 5.0 4.7 8.6 5.4
Tajikistan 26.4 13.2 20.4 6.4 6.5 12.4 5.8 5.0 6.1 12.8 6.3 6.0 7.4 11.7 6.5
Turkmenistan 16.6 6.3 14.5 –2.7 4.4 5.3 5.3 6.8 6.0 7.7 6.6 4.7 4.2 6.2 7.0
Ukraine5 12.4 12.8 25.2 15.9 9.4 8.0 0.6 –0.3 12.1 33.5 10.6 5.0 24.9 26.7 8.7
Uzbekistan 24.0 12.3 12.7 14.1 9.4 12.8 12.1 11.2 8.4 9.5 9.8 10.0 9.8 9.4 9.5
Emerging and Developing Asia 4.2 5.4 7.6 2.8 5.2 6.5 4.7 4.8 3.5 3.0 3.1 3.7 3.3 2.8 3.1
Bangladesh 5.3 9.1 8.9 4.9 9.4 11.5 6.2 7.5 7.0 6.4 6.4 5.9 6.1 6.4 6.5
Bhutan 5.3 5.2 6.3 7.1 4.8 8.6 10.1 8.7 7.7 6.3 6.1 5.6 9.6 8.4 7.6
Brunei Darussalam 0.3 1.0 2.1 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 –0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 –0.2 0.0 0.1
Cambodia 4.1 7.7 25.0 –0.7 4.0 5.5 2.9 3.0 3.9 –0.3 2.5 3.2 1.0 1.2 2.9
China 0.9 4.8 5.9 –0.7 3.3 5.4 2.6 2.6 2.0 1.2 1.5 3.0 1.5 1.2 1.5
Fiji 2.9 4.8 7.7 3.7 3.7 7.3 3.4 2.9 0.5 1.5 3.0 2.9 0.1 3.0 3.0
India 5.4 5.9 9.2 10.6 9.5 9.4 10.2 10.0 6.0 6.1 5.7 5.0 6.0 5.8 5.9
Indonesia 14.0 6.7 9.8 5.0 5.1 5.3 4.0 6.4 6.4 6.8 5.8 4.8 8.4 4.6 4.8
Kiribati 1.7 3.6 13.7 9.8 –3.9 1.5 –3.0 –1.5 2.1 1.4 0.3 2.1 3.1 1.4 0.3
Lao P.D.R. 27.3 4.5 7.6 0.0 6.0 7.6 4.3 6.4 4.1 4.0 5.0 5.5 2.4 4.6 5.4
Malaysia 2.5 2.0 5.4 0.6 1.7 3.2 1.7 2.1 3.1 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.7 3.0
Maldives 1.9 6.8 12.0 4.5 6.1 11.3 10.9 4.0 2.5 0.3 2.1 4.0 1.2 0.4 2.8
Marshall Islands . . . 2.6 14.7 0.5 1.8 5.4 4.3 1.9 1.1 –0.6 1.0 2.3 0.5 –0.6 1.0
Micronesia 1.9 3.6 6.6 7.7 3.7 4.3 6.3 2.1 0.7 –1.0 1.9 2.0 0.7 –1.0 1.9
Mongolia 9.9 8.2 26.8 6.3 10.2 7.7 15.0 8.6 12.9 9.2 7.6 6.5 10.7 8.0 7.4
Myanmar . . . 30.9 11.5 2.2 8.2 2.8 2.8 5.7 5.9 8.4 7.6 5.1 7.5 9.3 5.9
Nepal 5.7 6.2 6.7 12.6 9.5 9.6 8.3 9.9 9.0 7.1 6.3 5.7 8.1 6.5 6.2
Palau . . . 3.0 10.0 4.7 1.1 2.6 5.4 2.8 4.0 1.8 2.0 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.0
Papua New Guinea 8.9 0.9 10.8 6.9 5.1 4.4 4.5 5.0 5.3 4.8 5.0 5.0 6.3 4.8 5.0
Philippines 5.5 2.9 8.2 4.2 3.8 4.7 3.2 2.9 4.2 2.1 2.8 3.6 2.7 2.4 3.4
Samoa 4.5 4.7 6.3 14.6 –0.2 2.9 6.2 –0.2 –1.2 3.0 2.2 3.0 0.2 2.3 2.1
Solomon Islands 8.8 7.7 17.3 7.1 0.9 7.4 5.9 5.4 5.1 3.8 3.4 4.5 4.0 0.2 6.7
Sri Lanka 9.2 15.8 22.4 3.5 6.2 6.7 7.5 6.9 3.3 1.7 3.4 5.0 2.1 3.2 3.6
Thailand 3.1 2.2 5.5 –0.9 3.3 3.8 3.0 2.2 1.9 0.3 2.4 2.2 0.6 2.1 1.8
Timor-Leste . . . 8.6 7.4 –0.2 5.2 13.2 10.9 9.5 2.5 1.8 3.3 4.0 1.0 2.7 3.8
Tonga 7.0 7.4 7.5 3.5 3.9 4.6 2.0 1.5 1.3 0.8 1.5 3.3 1.0 1.2 1.9
Tuvalu . . . 2.3 10.4 –0.3 –1.9 0.5 1.4 2.0 3.3 3.1 3.0 2.6 3.3 3.1 3.0
Vanuatu 2.4 3.8 4.2 5.2 2.7 0.7 1.4 1.3 1.0 2.0 2.2 3.0 1.1 2.2 2.5
Vietnam 4.4 8.3 23.1 6.7 9.2 18.7 9.1 6.6 4.1 2.5 3.2 3.8 1.9 3.1 3.4
Emerging and Developing Europe 24.2 6.0 8.0 4.8 5.6 5.4 6.0 4.3 3.8 2.7 3.7 4.0 3.1 3.6 3.6
Albania 6.8 2.9 3.4 2.3 3.6 3.4 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.8 2.5 3.0 0.7 2.1 2.8
Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . 1.5 7.4 –0.4 2.1 3.7 2.0 –0.1 –0.9 0.6 1.1 2.0 –0.5 1.2 1.7
Bulgaria 36.2 7.6 12.0 2.5 3.0 3.4 2.4 0.4 –1.6 –1.0 0.6 2.1 –2.0 0.3 0.9
Croatia 3.5 2.9 6.1 2.4 1.0 2.3 3.4 2.2 –0.2 –0.9 0.9 2.2 0.2 –0.6 1.2
Hungary 8.5 7.9 6.1 4.2 4.9 4.0 5.7 1.7 –0.3 0.0 2.3 3.0 –0.9 1.7 2.4
Kosovo . . . 4.4 9.4 –2.4 3.5 7.3 2.5 1.8 0.4 0.3 1.4 1.8 –0.4 1.5 1.5
FYR Macedonia 2.0 2.8 7.2 –0.6 1.7 3.9 3.3 2.8 –0.1 0.1 1.3 2.0 –0.5 0.8 1.8
Montenegro . . . 3.4 9.0 3.6 0.7 3.1 3.6 2.2 –0.7 0.5 1.0 1.5 –0.3 0.9 1.2
Poland 5.8 2.5 4.2 3.4 2.6 4.3 3.7 0.9 0.0 –0.8 1.2 2.5 –1.0 0.4 1.5
Romania 35.7 4.8 7.8 5.6 6.1 5.8 3.3 4.0 1.1 1.0 2.4 2.5 0.8 2.2 2.2
Serbia 26.7 6.0 12.4 8.1 6.1 11.1 7.3 7.7 2.1 2.7 4.0 4.0 1.8 4.2 4.0
Turkey 41.3 8.8 10.4 6.3 8.6 6.5 8.9 7.5 8.9 6.6 6.5 6.0 8.2 7.0 6.0
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Table A7. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Consumer Prices1 (continued)
(Annual percent change)
End of Period2
Average Projections Projections
1997–2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020 2014 2015 2016
Latin America and the Caribbean6 . . . 5.5 8.1 6.1 6.2 6.8 6.1 7.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Antigua and Barbuda 1.7 1.4 5.3 –0.6 3.4 3.5 3.4 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.5 1.3 1.0 1.6
Argentina6 . . . 8.8 8.6 6.3 10.5 9.8 10.0 10.6 . . . 18.6 23.2 19.1 23.9 20.5 20.5
The Bahamas 1.7 2.5 4.7 1.9 1.3 3.2 2.0 0.4 1.2 2.3 1.6 1.4 0.2 2.3 1.6
Barbados 2.8 4.0 8.1 3.7 5.7 9.4 4.5 1.8 1.9 1.3 1.4 2.3 2.3 0.9 1.9
Belize 1.6 2.3 6.4 –1.1 0.9 1.7 1.2 0.5 0.9 0.5 1.9 2.0 –0.4 1.5 2.3
Bolivia 3.9 6.7 14.0 3.3 2.5 9.9 4.5 5.7 5.8 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.2 5.0 5.0
Brazil 6.9 3.6 5.7 4.9 5.0 6.6 5.4 6.2 6.3 7.8 5.9 4.5 6.4 8.0 5.4
Chile 3.5 4.4 8.7 1.5 1.4 3.3 3.0 1.9 4.4 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.6 2.9 3.0
Colombia 9.3 5.5 7.0 4.2 2.3 3.4 3.2 2.0 2.9 3.4 3.0 3.0 3.7 3.6 3.2
Costa Rica 11.3 9.4 13.4 7.8 5.7 4.9 4.5 5.2 3.2 4.6 4.0 4.0 5.1 4.0 4.0
Dominica 1.5 3.2 6.4 0.0 2.8 1.1 1.4 0.0 0.7 –0.8 1.1 2.1 –0.1 0.9 0.6
Dominican Republic 12.4 6.1 10.6 1.4 6.3 8.5 3.7 4.8 3.0 1.6 3.5 4.0 1.6 3.0 4.0
Ecuador 25.4 2.3 8.4 5.2 3.6 4.5 5.1 2.7 3.6 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.7 3.0 3.0
El Salvador 3.1 4.6 7.3 0.5 1.2 5.1 1.7 0.8 1.1 –0.8 1.7 2.0 0.5 0.6 1.7
Grenada 1.9 3.9 8.0 –0.3 3.4 3.0 2.4 0.0 –0.9 –1.5 1.8 1.9 –0.7 –1.0 2.3
Guatemala 7.1 6.8 11.4 1.9 3.9 6.2 3.8 4.3 3.4 3.0 3.0 4.0 2.9 3.0 3.4
Guyana 5.4 12.2 8.1 3.0 4.3 4.4 2.4 2.2 1.0 1.2 2.6 3.9 1.2 1.2 3.9
Haiti 15.9 9.0 14.4 3.4 4.1 7.4 6.8 6.8 3.9 6.4 5.3 5.0 5.3 6.1 5.0
Honduras 10.3 6.9 11.4 5.5 4.7 6.8 5.2 5.2 6.1 4.1 5.1 5.4 5.8 4.7 5.2
Jamaica 9.3 9.2 22.0 9.6 12.6 7.5 6.9 9.4 7.1 5.9 7.1 6.0 4.7 7.0 7.2
Mexico 8.9 4.0 5.1 5.3 4.2 3.4 4.1 3.8 4.0 3.2 3.0 3.0 4.1 3.1 3.0
Nicaragua 8.8 11.1 19.8 3.7 5.5 8.1 7.2 7.1 6.0 5.4 7.0 7.0 6.5 6.0 7.0
Panama 1.2 4.2 8.8 2.4 3.5 5.9 5.7 4.0 2.6 0.9 2.0 2.0 1.0 2.4 2.0
Paraguay 8.7 8.1 10.2 2.6 4.7 8.3 3.7 2.7 5.0 3.6 4.5 4.5 4.2 4.5 4.5
Peru 3.4 1.8 5.8 2.9 1.5 3.4 3.7 2.8 3.2 2.5 2.0 2.0 3.2 2.2 2.0
St. Kitts and Nevis 3.8 4.5 5.3 2.1 0.6 7.1 1.4 0.7 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
St. Lucia 2.5 2.8 5.5 –0.2 3.3 2.8 4.2 1.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 1.7 3.1 3.1
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1.5 7.0 10.1 0.4 0.8 3.2 2.6 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.9 1.8 0.6 0.1 1.6
Suriname 26.7 6.6 14.9 –0.4 6.8 17.7 5.0 1.9 3.4 1.9 2.6 3.2 3.9 2.1 3.0
Trinidad and Tobago 4.8 7.9 12.0 7.6 10.5 5.1 9.3 5.2 7.0 7.3 5.7 4.0 8.5 6.0 5.3
Uruguay 9.8 8.1 7.9 7.1 6.7 8.1 8.1 8.6 8.9 7.9 7.5 6.4 8.3 7.4 7.3
Venezuela 23.8 18.7 30.4 27.1 28.2 26.1 21.1 40.6 62.2 96.8 83.7 75.3 68.5 94.9 78.4
Middle East, North Africa, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan 5.5 10.2 11.7 7.1 6.5 9.2 9.8 9.1 6.7 6.1 6.2 5.6 6.4 6.0 6.3
Afghanistan . . . 8.7 26.4 –6.8 2.2 11.8 6.4 7.4 4.6 3.7 5.5 5.0 1.4 5.0 5.0
Algeria 3.1 3.7 4.9 5.7 3.9 4.5 8.9 3.3 2.9 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.3 4.0 4.0
Bahrain 0.9 3.3 3.5 2.8 2.0 –0.4 2.8 3.3 2.5 2.1 1.5 1.7 2.5 1.5 1.5
Djibouti 2.0 5.0 12.0 1.7 4.0 5.1 3.7 2.4 2.9 3.0 3.5 3.0 2.8 3.0 3.0
Egypt 4.4 11.0 11.7 16.2 11.7 11.1 8.6 6.9 10.1 10.3 10.5 6.3 8.2 11.0 10.7
Iran 14.8 18.4 25.3 10.8 12.4 21.5 30.5 34.7 15.5 16.5 17.0 17.0 16.0 17.0 17.0
Iraq . . . 30.8 2.7 –2.2 2.4 5.6 6.1 1.9 2.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.6 3.0 3.0
Jordan 2.6 4.7 14.0 –0.7 4.8 4.2 4.5 4.8 2.9 1.2 2.5 2.0 1.7 2.3 2.5
Kuwait 1.8 5.5 6.3 4.6 4.5 4.9 3.2 2.7 2.9 3.3 3.6 4.0 2.9 3.3 3.6
Lebanon 2.1 4.1 10.8 1.2 4.0 5.0 6.6 4.8 1.9 1.1 2.8 2.9 –0.7 3.0 2.5
Libya –1.0 6.2 10.4 2.4 2.5 15.9 6.1 2.6 2.8 2.2 4.4 2.5 3.7 0.9 7.4
Mauritania 6.2 7.3 7.5 2.1 6.3 5.7 4.9 4.1 3.5 4.5 4.6 5.1 4.0 3.7 4.2
Morocco 1.7 2.0 3.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.3 1.9 0.4 1.5 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.5 2.0
Oman 0.4 5.9 12.6 3.5 3.3 4.0 2.9 1.2 1.0 1.0 2.6 2.7 1.0 1.0 2.6
Pakistan 6.0 7.8 10.8 17.6 10.1 13.7 11.0 7.4 8.6 4.7 4.5 5.0 8.2 4.0 5.0
Qatar 4.0 13.6 15.2 –4.9 –2.4 1.9 1.9 3.1 3.0 1.8 2.7 2.3 2.9 1.8 2.7
Saudi Arabia –0.2 5.0 6.1 4.1 3.8 3.7 2.9 3.5 2.7 2.0 2.5 2.9 2.4 2.0 2.5
Sudan7 12.8 8.0 14.3 11.3 13.0 18.1 35.5 36.5 36.9 19.0 10.5 5.2 25.7 12.4 8.6
Syria8 2.3 4.7 15.2 2.8 4.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tunisia 2.5 3.0 4.3 3.7 3.3 3.5 5.1 5.8 4.9 5.0 4.1 4.0 4.8 4.4 4.0
United Arab Emirates 3.8 11.1 12.3 1.6 0.9 0.9 0.7 1.1 2.3 2.1 2.3 3.0 2.2 2.2 2.3
Yemen 10.3 7.9 19.0 3.7 11.2 19.5 9.9 11.0 8.2 8.1 7.5 6.0 10.0 8.0 7.0
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Table A7. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Consumer Prices1 (continued)
(Annual percent change)
End of Period2
Average Projections Projections
1997–2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020 2014 2015 2016
Sub-Saharan Africa 11.3 5.4 13.0 9.8 8.2 9.5 9.4 6.5 6.3 6.6 7.0 5.7 6.1 7.4 6.6
Angola 114.5 12.2 12.5 13.7 14.5 13.5 10.3 8.8 7.3 8.4 8.5 6.5 7.5 9.0 8.0
Benin 3.2 1.3 7.4 0.9 2.2 2.7 6.7 1.0 –1.0 0.7 2.0 2.6 0.3 1.1 2.3
Botswana 8.3 7.1 12.6 8.1 6.9 8.5 7.5 5.8 3.9 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.9
Burkina Faso 2.4 –0.2 10.7 0.9 –0.6 2.8 3.8 0.5 –0.3 0.7 1.8 2.0 –0.1 1.6 1.8
Burundi 10.9 8.4 24.4 10.6 6.5 9.6 18.2 7.9 4.4 5.0 5.3 5.1 3.8 7.9 5.8
Cabo Verde 2.5 4.4 6.8 1.0 2.1 4.5 2.5 1.5 –0.2 1.5 2.5 2.5 –0.4 2.0 2.5
Cameroon 2.7 1.1 5.3 3.0 1.3 2.9 2.4 2.1 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.6 2.0 2.1
Central African Republic 1.9 0.9 9.3 3.5 1.5 1.2 5.5 7.0 15.0 5.2 6.3 2.4 10.5 9.5 3.6
Chad 2.6 –7.4 8.3 10.1 –2.1 1.9 7.7 0.2 1.7 3.2 2.9 3.0 3.7 2.0 3.0
Comoros 3.3 4.5 4.8 4.8 3.9 2.2 5.9 1.6 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.8 1.8 2.5
Democratic Republic of the Congo 97.3 16.7 18.0 46.2 23.5 15.5 2.1 0.8 1.0 2.4 3.5 3.5 1.2 3.5 3.5
Republic of Congo 3.4 2.6 6.0 4.3 5.0 1.8 5.0 4.6 0.9 3.0 2.9 2.5 0.5 3.0 2.6
Côte d'Ivoire 3.0 1.9 6.3 1.0 1.4 4.9 1.3 2.6 0.4 1.2 1.5 2.0 0.9 0.9 1.8
Equatorial Guinea 5.4 2.8 4.7 5.7 5.3 4.8 3.4 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Eritrea 14.7 9.3 19.9 33.0 12.7 13.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3
Ethiopia 4.5 17.2 44.4 8.5 8.1 33.2 24.1 8.1 7.4 6.8 8.2 8.5 7.1 8.1 8.5
Gabon 0.8 –1.0 5.3 1.9 1.4 1.3 2.7 0.5 4.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.7 2.5 2.5
The Gambia 5.9 5.4 4.5 4.6 5.0 4.8 4.6 5.2 6.3 6.2 5.2 5.0 7.0 5.3 5.0
Ghana 19.3 10.7 16.5 13.1 6.7 7.7 7.1 11.7 15.5 12.2 10.2 7.4 17.0 12.0 8.6
Guinea 11.6 22.9 18.4 4.7 15.5 21.4 15.2 11.9 9.7 9.1 9.6 7.1 9.1 9.7 9.5
Guinea-Bissau 6.3 4.6 10.4 –1.6 1.1 5.1 2.1 0.8 –1.0 1.3 2.3 2.5 –0.1 2.0 2.5
Kenya 7.0 4.3 15.1 10.6 4.3 14.0 9.4 5.7 6.9 5.1 5.0 5.0 6.0 5.2 5.0
Lesotho 7.2 9.2 10.7 5.9 3.4 6.0 5.6 5.0 3.9 4.0 4.6 5.0 2.6 4.3 5.0
Liberia . . . 11.4 17.5 7.4 7.3 8.5 6.8 7.6 9.9 7.9 7.8 6.4 7.7 8.0 7.5
Madagascar 9.4 10.3 9.3 9.0 9.2 9.5 5.7 5.8 6.1 7.6 6.9 5.5 6.0 7.9 6.5
Malawi 19.6 8.0 8.7 8.4 7.4 7.6 21.3 28.3 23.8 17.3 10.0 7.3 24.2 12.0 8.0
Mali 1.5 1.5 9.1 2.2 1.3 3.1 5.3 –0.6 0.9 2.2 1.9 2.6 1.2 1.3 2.6
Mauritius 5.9 8.8 9.7 2.5 2.9 6.5 3.9 3.5 3.0 1.7 3.0 3.0 0.2 3.0 3.0
Mozambique 9.5 8.2 10.3 3.3 12.7 10.4 2.1 4.2 2.3 5.0 5.6 5.6 1.1 5.5 5.6
Namibia 7.4 6.5 9.1 9.5 4.9 5.0 6.7 5.6 5.3 5.1 5.8 6.0 4.6 5.6 6.0
Niger 2.1 0.1 11.3 4.3 –2.8 2.9 0.5 2.3 –0.9 1.4 1.8 1.8 –0.6 2.4 1.5
Nigeria 11.8 5.4 11.6 12.5 13.7 10.8 12.2 8.5 8.1 9.6 10.7 7.0 7.9 12.0 9.5
Rwanda 6.2 9.1 15.4 10.3 2.0 5.7 6.3 4.2 1.8 2.9 4.4 5.0 2.1 3.7 5.0
São Tomé and Príncipe 20.4 18.6 32.0 17.0 13.3 14.3 10.6 8.1 7.0 5.6 4.6 3.0 6.4 5.2 4.0
Senegal 1.4 5.9 6.3 –2.2 1.2 3.4 1.4 0.7 –0.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4
Seychelles 2.8 –8.6 37.0 31.7 –2.4 2.6 7.1 4.3 1.4 4.0 3.2 3.0 0.5 5.0 3.1
Sierra Leone 11.9 11.6 14.8 9.2 17.8 18.5 13.8 9.8 8.3 13.1 11.8 5.4 10.0 14.0 10.0
South Africa 5.6 7.1 11.5 7.1 4.3 5.0 5.7 5.8 6.1 4.5 5.6 5.5 5.3 5.0 5.5
South Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45.1 0.0 –0.7 29.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Swaziland 6.4 8.1 12.7 7.4 4.5 6.1 8.9 5.6 5.8 4.6 5.4 5.2 6.2 4.5 5.4
Tanzania 7.1 7.0 10.3 12.1 7.2 12.7 16.0 7.9 6.1 4.2 4.5 4.5 4.8 4.5 4.5
Togo 2.3 0.9 8.7 3.7 1.4 3.6 2.6 1.8 0.1 1.9 2.1 2.5 0.5 2.2 2.3
Uganda 4.7 6.1 12.0 13.1 4.0 18.7 14.0 4.8 4.7 4.9 4.8 5.0 5.0 4.8 4.8
Zambia 21.1 10.7 12.4 13.4 8.5 8.7 6.6 7.0 7.9 7.7 6.5 5.0 8.2 7.0 6.0
Zimbabwe9 . . . –72.7 157.0 6.2 3.0 3.5 3.7 1.6 –0.2 –1.0 0.0 1.9 –0.8 –0.5 0.5
1Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages.
2Monthly year-over-year changes and, for several countries, on a quarterly basis.
3For many countries, inflation for the earlier years is measured on the basis of a retail price index. Consumer price index (CPI) inflation data with broader and more up-to-date coverage are 
typically used for more recent years.
4Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarity in economic 
structure.
5Starting in 2014 data exclude Crimea and Sevastopol.
6Consumer price data from December 2013 onwards reflect the new national CPI (IPCNu), which differs substantively from the preceding CPI (the CPI for the Greater Buenos Aires Area, CPI-
GBA). Because of the differences in geographical coverage, weights, sampling, and methodology, the IPCNu data cannot be directly compared to the earlier CPI-GBA data. Because of this 
structural break in the data, the average CPI inflation for 2014 is not reported in the April 2015 World Economic Outlook. Following a declaration of censure by the IMF on February 1, 2013, the 
public release of a new national CPI by end-March 2014 was one of the specified actions in the IMF Executive Board’s December 2013 decision calling on Argentina to address the quality of its 
official CPI data. On December 15, 2014, the Executive Board recognized the implementation of the specified actions it had called for by end-September 2014 and the steps taken by the Argentine 
authorities to remedy the inaccurate provision of data. The Executive Board will review this issue again as per the calendar specified in December 2013 and in line with the procedures set forth 
in the Fund’s legal framework.
7Data for 2011 exclude South Sudan after July 9. Data for 2012 and onward pertain to the current Sudan.
8Data for Syria are excluded for 2011 onward owing the uncertain political situation.
9The Zimbabwean dollar ceased circulating in early 2009. Data are based on IMF staff estimates of price and exchange rate developments in U.S. dollars. IMF staff estimates of U.S. dollar values 
may differ from authorities’ estimates. 
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Table A8. Major Advanced Economies: General Government Fiscal Balances and Debt1
(Percent of GDP unless noted otherwise)
Average Projections
1997–2006 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020
Major Advanced Economies
Net Lending/Borrowing –3.6 –10.2 –8.9 –7.6 –6.8 –5.0 –4.6 –3.8 –3.3 –2.6
Output Gap2 0.8 –4.7 –2.9 –2.5 –2.3 –2.2 –1.9 –1.2 –0.5 –0.1
Structural Balance2 –4.0 –6.5 –7.5 –6.5 –5.4 –4.2 –3.7 –3.3 –2.9 –2.6
United States
Net Lending/Borrowing3 –3.4 –13.5 –11.3 –9.9 –8.6 –5.8 –5.3 –4.2 –3.9 –3.9
Output Gap2 1.6 –5.1 –3.9 –3.6 –2.9 –2.5 –2.0 –1.0 –0.1 0.0
Structural Balance2 –3.9 –7.9 –9.7 –8.3 –6.8 –5.2 –4.4 –3.8 –3.8 –3.9
Net Debt 41.3 62.1 69.5 76.1 79.2 79.5 79.7 80.4 80.7 82.1
Gross Debt 60.2 86.0 94.8 99.1 102.4 103.4 104.8 105.1 104.9 104.3
Euro Area4
Net Lending/Borrowing –2.1 –6.2 –6.1 –4.1 –3.6 –2.9 –2.7 –2.3 –1.7 –0.3
Output Gap2 0.0 –2.9 –1.5 –0.6 –1.9 –2.9 –2.8 –2.3 –1.7 –0.2
Structural Balance2 –2.3 –4.5 –4.5 –3.6 –2.1 –1.0 –0.9 –0.8 –0.6 0.0
Net Debt 48.9 52.8 56.4 58.5 66.7 69.0 69.8 69.8 69.2 63.0
Gross Debt 68.7 78.4 83.9 86.5 91.1 93.4 94.0 93.5 92.4 84.2
Germany 
Net Lending/Borrowing –2.5 –3.0 –4.0 –0.8 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.6
Output Gap2 –0.4 –3.9 –1.0 1.2 0.5 –0.6 –0.3 0.0 0.4 0.5
Structural Balance2 –2.2 –0.7 –2.2 –1.1 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.3
Net Debt 44.8 55.0 56.8 55.0 54.3 52.7 49.7 46.9 44.7 37.1
Gross Debt 61.3 72.4 80.3 77.6 79.0 76.9 73.1 69.5 66.6 56.9
France
Net Lending/Borrowing –2.6 –7.2 –6.8 –5.1 –4.9 –4.1 –4.2 –3.9 –3.5 –0.4
Output Gap2 1.1 –3.1 –2.1 –0.9 –1.5 –2.2 –2.8 –2.8 –2.5 –0.5
Structural Balance2 –3.4 –5.3 –5.5 –4.5 –3.7 –2.6 –2.3 –2.0 –1.7 0.0
Net Debt 53.1 70.1 73.7 76.4 81.5 84.7 87.4 89.3 90.4 84.4
Gross Debt 61.9 78.8 81.5 85.0 89.2 92.4 95.1 97.0 98.1 92.1
Italy
Net Lending/Borrowing –3.0 –5.3 –4.2 –3.5 –3.0 –2.9 –3.0 –2.6 –1.7 0.3
Output Gap2 –0.7 –3.1 –1.3 –0.6 –2.9 –4.3 –4.6 –4.2 –3.5 –1.1
Structural Balance2,5 –3.4 –4.2 –3.7 –3.8 –1.5 –0.3 –0.9 –0.3 0.2 0.9
Net Debt 90.1 94.2 96.3 98.4 103.0 107.5 110.4 111.8 111.1 102.3
Gross Debt 105.0 112.5 115.3 116.4 123.2 128.6 132.1 133.8 132.9 122.4
Japan
Net Lending/Borrowing –6.0 –10.4 –9.3 –9.8 –8.8 –8.5 –7.7 –6.2 –5.0 –4.4
Output Gap2 –1.0 –7.1 –3.1 –3.8 –2.5 –1.2 –1.7 –1.0 –0.2 0.0
Structural Balance2 –5.7 –7.4 –7.8 –8.3 –7.8 –8.2 –7.2 –6.0 –4.9 –4.4
Net Debt 65.3 106.2 113.1 127.3 129.1 122.9 127.3 129.6 131.9 138.7
Gross Debt6 155.0 210.2 216.0 229.8 236.8 242.6 246.4 246.1 247.0 251.6
United Kingdom
Net Lending/Borrowing –1.5 –10.8 –9.7 –7.6 –7.8 –5.7 –5.7 –4.8 –3.1 –0.3
Output Gap2 1.5 –2.2 –1.9 –2.5 –3.0 –2.8 –1.8 –0.9 –0.5 0.0
Structural Balance2 –2.6 –9.9 –8.1 –5.8 –5.6 –3.6 –4.2 –4.0 –2.6 –0.5
Net Debt 36.2 58.8 69.1 73.4 77.1 78.7 81.0 82.6 83.1 74.7
Gross Debt 40.6 65.8 76.4 81.8 85.8 87.3 89.5 91.1 91.7 83.2
Canada
Net Lending/Borrowing 1.1 –4.5 –4.9 –3.7 –3.1 –2.8 –1.8 –1.7 –1.3 –0.2
Output Gap2 1.0 –3.6 –2.2 –1.2 –1.3 –1.2 –0.6 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1
Structural Balance2 0.6 –2.4 –3.7 –3.0 –2.4 –2.2 –1.7 –1.5 –1.2 –0.2
Net Debt 46.0 29.9 32.9 34.6 36.4 37.1 37.3 38.3 37.9 34.3
Gross Debt 81.3 83.0 84.6 85.3 87.9 87.7 86.5 87.0 85.0 78.7
Note: The methodology and specific assumptions for each country are discussed in Box A1. The country group composites for fiscal data are calculated as the sum of the U.S. dollar 
values for the relevant individual countries. 
1Debt data refer to the end of the year and are not always comparable across countries. Gross and net debt levels reported by national statistical agencies for countries that have adopted 
the System of National Accounts (SNA) 2008 (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong SAR, United States) are adjusted to exclude unfunded pension liabilities of government employees’ defined-
benefit pension plans. Fiscal data for the aggregated Major Advanced Economies and the United States start in 2001, and the average for the aggregate and the United States is therefore 
for the period 2001–07.
2Percent of potential GDP.
3Figures reported by the national statistical agency are adjusted to exclude items related to the accrual-basis accounting of government employees’ defined-benefit pension plans.
4Excludes Lithuania.
5Excludes one-time measures based on the authorities’ data and, in the absence of the latter, receipts from the sale of assets.
6Includes equity shares; nonconsolidated basis.
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Table A9. Summary of World Trade Volumes and Prices
(Annual percent change)
Averages Projections
1997–2006 2007–16 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Trade in Goods and Services
World Trade1
Volume 6.8 3.7 8.3 3.0 –10.6 12.6 6.8 2.8 3.5 3.4 3.7 4.7
Price Deflator
In U.S. Dollars 1.5 1.0 7.6 11.4 –10.2 5.7 11.0 –1.6 –0.7 –1.6 –10.2 1.3
In SDRs 1.4 1.4 3.4 7.9 –8.0 6.8 7.3 1.5 0.1 –1.6 –3.3 1.0
Volume of Trade
Exports
Advanced Economies 6.1 3.0 7.5 2.2 –11.8 12.3 6.3 2.0 3.1 3.3 3.2 4.1
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 8.3 5.0 9.7 4.4 –7.7 13.6 7.4 4.4 4.6 3.4 5.3 5.7
Imports
Advanced Economies 6.6 2.3 5.7 0.5 –12.2 11.7 5.5 0.9 2.1 3.3 3.3 4.3
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 8.1 6.3 15.6 9.1 –7.9 14.1 9.8 6.0 5.5 3.7 3.5 5.5
Terms of Trade
Advanced Economies –0.2 –0.1 0.1 –2.3 2.8 –0.9 –1.7 –0.6 0.7 0.3 1.0 –0.4
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 1.6 0.2 1.9 3.7 –5.3 2.0 3.6 0.7 –0.3 –0.6 –3.7 0.1
Trade in Goods 
World Trade1
Volume 7.0 3.4 7.7 2.5 –12.0 14.3 6.9 2.5 3.1 3.0 3.5 4.7
Price Deflator
In U.S. Dollars 1.4 1.0 7.8 12.4 –11.3 6.5 12.5 –1.6 –1.1 –2.1 –11.0 1.4
In SDRs 1.2 1.4 3.7 8.8 –9.1 7.6 8.7 1.4 –0.3 –2.1 –4.2 1.2
World Trade Prices in U.S. Dollars2
Manufactures 0.3 0.9 5.4 6.3 –6.4 2.6 6.1 0.6 –1.4 –0.8 –3.3 0.5
Oil 12.2 0.2 10.7 36.4 –36.3 27.9 31.6 1.0 –0.9 –7.5 –39.6 12.9
Nonfuel Primary Commodities 2.2 1.1 13.9 7.9 –15.8 26.5 17.9 –10.0 –1.2 –4.0 –14.1 –1.0
Food –0.1 2.4 14.8 24.5 –14.8 11.9 19.9 –2.4 1.1 –4.2 –15.8 –2.6
Beverages 0.2 4.0 13.8 23.3 1.6 14.1 16.6 –18.6 –11.9 20.7 –9.7 –0.5
Agricultural Raw Materials –0.6 1.9 5.0 –0.7 –17.1 33.2 22.7 –12.7 1.6 1.9 –6.8 1.7
Metal 8.9 –1.4 17.4 –7.8 –19.2 48.2 13.5 –16.8 –4.3 –10.3 –16.6 –0.4
World Trade Prices in SDRs2
Manufactures 0.1 1.3 1.3 3.0 –4.0 3.7 2.5 3.7 –0.7 –0.8 4.2 0.3
Oil 12.0 0.6 6.4 32.1 –34.8 29.3 27.2 4.1 –0.1 –7.5 –35.0 12.7
Nonfuel Primary Commodities 2.1 1.5 9.5 4.5 –13.7 27.9 13.9 –7.3 –0.4 –4.0 –7.5 –1.2
Food –0.2 2.8 10.3 20.5 –12.7 13.1 15.8 0.6 1.9 –4.2 –9.4 –2.8
Beverages 0.1 4.4 9.4 19.4 4.1 15.4 12.7 –16.1 –11.2 20.8 –2.8 –0.7
Agricultural Raw Materials –0.8 2.3 0.9 –3.8 –15.1 34.6 18.6 –10.0 2.4 1.9 0.4 1.5
Metal 8.8 –1.0 12.8 –10.7 –17.2 49.8 9.7 –14.3 –3.5 –10.3 –10.2 –0.6
World Trade Prices in Euros2
Manufactures 0.4 1.9 –3.4 –1.0 –1.1 7.7 1.1 8.9 –4.6 –0.9 13.6 0.4
Oil 12.3 1.2 1.4 27.1 –32.7 34.3 25.5 9.3 –4.1 –7.6 –29.1 12.8
Nonfuel Primary Commodities 2.3 2.2 4.3 0.5 –11.0 32.8 12.4 –2.6 –4.3 –4.1 0.8 –1.1
Food 0.0 3.4 5.1 15.9 –9.9 17.4 14.3 5.6 –2.1 –4.3 –1.2 –2.7
Beverages 0.3 5.0 4.2 14.8 7.3 19.8 11.2 –11.9 –14.7 20.7 6.0 –0.6
Agricultural Raw Materials –0.5 3.0 –3.8 –7.5 –12.5 39.8 17.0 –5.5 –1.6 1.8 9.4 1.6
Metal 9.1 –0.3 7.5 –14.1 –14.6 55.5 8.3 –10.0 –7.3 –10.3 –2.1 –0.5
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Table A9. Summary of World Trade Volumes and Prices (continued)
(Annual percent change)
 Averages Projections
1997–2006 2007–16 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Trade in Goods
Volume of Trade
Exports
Advanced Economies 6.1 2.7 6.6 1.4 –13.7 14.8 6.2 1.4 2.6 2.9 3.1 4.0
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 8.6 4.9 9.2 3.9 –8.2 14.4 7.5 4.9 4.5 3.5 4.9 5.7
Fuel Exporters 5.1 2.3 4.6 3.5 –7.4 4.5 5.5 5.4 1.4 0.2 2.9 3.4
Nonfuel Exporters 10.0 5.9 11.3 4.1 –8.6 18.5 8.4 4.6 5.9 5.0 5.7 6.4
Imports
Advanced Economies 6.8 2.0 5.1 0.1 –13.7 13.5 5.4 0.1 1.7 2.5 3.0 4.2
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 8.4 6.2 15.3 9.0 –9.3 14.9 10.4 6.0 4.9 3.6 3.7 5.4
Fuel Exporters 8.6 5.5 23.4 14.3 –12.0 7.2 8.9 10.5 5.7 2.0 –5.7 5.1
Nonfuel Exporters 8.4 6.3 13.4 7.6 –8.6 16.9 10.8 4.9 4.8 4.0 5.9 5.4
Price Deflators in SDRs
Exports
Advanced Economies 0.5 0.9 3.1 5.9 –6.4 4.2 6.2 0.4 0.5 –1.4 –3.1 0.6
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 4.0 2.4 6.0 14.9 –13.4 13.7 12.8 2.6 –0.9 –3.1 –6.8 2.0
Fuel Exporters 8.6 1.7 7.6 25.2 –25.5 23.3 23.6 3.4 –1.8 –6.2 –23.6 6.4
Nonfuel Exporters 2.1 2.5 5.2 10.1 –7.2 9.6 8.3 2.2 –0.5 –1.7 0.0 0.6
Imports
Advanced Economies 0.7 1.1 3.0 8.2 –9.7 5.9 8.7 1.3 –0.3 –1.4 –4.1 1.0
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 2.2 2.0 4.1 9.8 –8.4 11.2 8.6 2.1 –0.8 –3.2 –2.9 1.5
Fuel Exporters 1.6 2.1 4.0 8.2 –5.9 8.4 7.4 2.0 –1.0 –2.2 1.0 0.4
Nonfuel Exporters 2.4 2.0 4.1 10.2 –9.1 11.9 8.9 2.1 –0.8 –3.5 –3.9 1.7
Terms of Trade
Advanced Economies –0.2 –0.2 0.1 –2.1 3.6 –1.6 –2.3 –0.9 0.8 0.1 1.0 –0.4
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 1.7 0.4 1.8 4.6 –5.5 2.2 3.8 0.5 –0.1 0.2 –4.0 0.5
Regional Groups
Commonwealth of Independent States3 5.4 0.1 1.9 16.3 –17.9 13.2 11.5 0.7 –0.9 –2.7 –19.5 4.8
Emerging and Developing Asia –1.5 0.5 0.4 –1.2 3.1 –6.1 –2.3 1.2 1.1 3.8 6.6 –1.0
Emerging and Developing Europe –0.4 0.2 2.6 –0.6 3.0 –3.6 –2.1 –1.0 1.6 1.1 2.3 –1.5
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.5 0.4 3.1 4.8 –4.8 8.6 5.6 –1.0 –1.8 –2.4 –6.5 –0.7
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, 
and Pakistan 6.1 –0.5 2.8 12.2 –17.9 9.8 14.2 0.2 –0.6 –3.7 –20.7 5.3
Middle East and North Africa 6.4 –0.5 2.8 12.9 –18.3 9.7 14.5 0.8 –0.7 –3.7 –21.2 5.1
Sub-Saharan Africa . . . 0.0 4.8 9.1 –12.7 13.1 10.5 –1.5 –2.6 –4.2 –14.1 2.1
Analytical Groups
By Source of Export Earnings
Fuel Exporters 6.9 –0.4 3.5 15.7 –20.8 13.7 15.1 1.4 –0.8 –4.1 –24.3 6.0
Nonfuel Exporters –0.2 0.5 1.1 –0.1 2.1 –2.1 –0.6 0.0 0.2 1.9 4.0 –1.1
Memorandum
World Exports in Billions of U.S. Dollars
Goods and Services 9,151 20,724 17,103 19,587 15,711 18,700 22,162 22,436 23,117 23,476 21,818 23,129
Goods 7,318 16,612 13,707 15,789 12,327 15,009 18,012 18,192 18,632 18,817 17,285 18,352
Average Oil Price4 12.2 0.2 10.7 36.4 –36.3 27.9 31.6 1.0 –0.9 –7.5 –39.6 12.9
In U.S. Dollars a Barrel 31.21 84.21 71.13 97.04 61.78 79.03 104.01 105.01 104.07 96.25 58.14 65.65
Export Unit Value of Manufactures5 0.3 0.9 5.4 6.3 –6.4 2.6 6.1 0.6 –1.4 –0.8 –3.3 0.5
1Average of annual percent change for world exports and imports.
2As represented, respectively, by the export unit value index for manufactures of the advanced economies and accounting for 83 percent of the advanced economies’ trade (export of goods) weights; 
the average of U.K. Brent, Dubai Fateh, and West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices; and the average of world market prices for nonfuel primary commodities weighted by their 2002–04 shares in 
world commodity exports.
3Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarity in economic structure.
4Percent change of average of U.K. Brent, Dubai Fateh, and West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices.
5Percent change for manufactures exported by the advanced economies.
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Table A10. Summary of Current Account Balances
(Billions of U.S. dollars)
Projections
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020
Advanced Economies –354.7 –574.6 –85.7 –6.0 –63.5 –28.4 157.6 169.9 260.1 177.6 76.1
United States –718.6 –686.6 –380.8 –443.9 –459.3 –460.8 –400.3 –410.6 –410.2 –454.6 –592.3
Euro Area1 5.1 –233.2 –30.3 –3.7 –9.6 194.2 284.3 313.0 388.3 371.1 347.3
Germany 237.3 217.5 199.4 194.6 228.1 252.3 251.3 287.5 286.8 276.9 276.5
France –25.9 –27.6 –22.5 –22.2 –29.6 –41.4 –40.2 –29.9 –2.7 –7.7 –7.7
Italy –31.3 –68.1 –42.3 –73.9 –70.1 –8.9 20.5 38.9 48.4 47.0 12.4
Spain –142.9 –152.0 –64.3 –56.2 –47.4 –3.8 20.0 1.6 3.3 4.8 16.6
Japan 212.1 142.6 145.3 217.6 126.5 58.7 33.6 24.3 81.6 85.2 114.2
United Kingdom –81.3 –104.6 –64.8 –62.7 –43.4 –98.2 –119.9 –162.2 –135.6 –136.9 –122.8
Canada 11.4 1.8 –40.0 –56.7 –47.7 –60.0 –54.6 –39.4 –42.0 –39.1 –36.4
Other Advanced Economies2 181.4 155.8 199.5 267.9 248.3 261.9 338.4 330.9 313.8 285.9 288.2
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 623.1 684.0 247.1 315.7 413.1 383.3 217.0 197.0 40.1 125.4 141.9
Regional Groups
Commonwealth of Independent States3 65.3 108.2 42.8 69.1 107.9 67.0 16.3 54.7 43.6 72.8 89.7
Russia 71.3 103.9 50.4 67.5 97.3 71.3 34.1 57.4 63.3 86.1 89.0
Excluding Russia –6.0 4.3 –7.6 1.7 10.6 –4.2 –17.8 –2.7 –19.7 –13.2 0.7
Emerging and Developing Asia 395.8 425.7 274.6 234.7 99.2 122.2 142.5 195.3 338.1 340.9 370.0
China 353.2 420.6 243.3 237.8 136.1 215.4 182.8 209.8 356.3 380.2 484.1
India –15.7 –27.9 –38.2 –48.1 –78.2 –88.2 –32.4 –29.5 –29.4 –39.8 –89.6
ASEAN-54 53.3 31.1 65.8 45.3 49.9 8.0 2.0 25.8 23.7 14.6 –6.6
Emerging and Developing Europe –124.7 –148.2 –53.5 –86.8 –119.5 –81.2 –72.5 –54.4 –42.4 –55.3 –90.6
Latin America and the Caribbean 5.8 –39.3 –30.4 –65.3 –82.1 –107.4 –163.7 –164.8 –167.3 –162.8 –180.5
Brazil 1.6 –28.2 –24.3 –47.3 –52.5 –54.2 –81.2 –91.3 –69.7 –66.3 –76.0
Mexico –14.7 –20.2 –8.3 –4.9 –13.3 –15.9 –29.7 –26.5 –26.6 –28.1 –38.1
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan 266.8 336.1 41.4 171.6 417.2 411.4 334.0 221.5 –60.9 –2.3 44.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 14.1 1.5 –27.9 –7.7 –9.7 –28.7 –39.7 –55.2 –71.1 –67.9 –91.2
South Africa –16.1 –15.9 –8.1 –5.6 –9.0 –19.7 –21.1 –19.1 –14.8 –15.7 –17.1
Analytical Groups
By Source of Export Earnings
Fuel 420.3 581.8 135.7 311.2 624.9 591.8 450.9 332.0 –9.5 98.0 183.8
Nonfuel 202.8 102.2 111.3 4.5 –211.8 –208.5 –234.0 –135.0 49.6 27.4 –41.9
Of Which, Primary Products –2.4 –21.2 –4.9 –10.3 –24.3 –57.1 –64.2 –47.9 –45.3 –51.6 –62.5
By External Financing Source
Net Debtor Economies –172.9 –323.7 –152.4 –243.2 –345.9 –434.6 –428.2 –362.4 –335.0 –374.5 –542.1
Net Debtor Economies by  
Debt-Servicing Experience
Economies with Arrears and/or 
Rescheduling during 2009–13 –1.0 –2.8 –13.2 –13.1 –12.3 –25.7 –25.8 –19.3 –28.9 –33.7 –50.8
Memorandum
World 268.4 109.5 161.4 309.7 349.6 354.9 374.5 366.9 300.2 303.0 217.9
European Union –82.3 –234.0 –11.1 14.3 85.7 198.4 305.2 321.5 365.0 341.0 321.3
Low-Income Developing Countries 5.7 –10.5 –24.5 –17.6 –27.1 –39.4 –43.9 –47.4 –56.6 –56.5 –94.4
Middle East and North Africa 270.6 349.7 49.1 174.3 415.9 414.8 335.0 223.4 –58.0 1.5 54.3
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Table A10. Summary of Current Account Balances (continued)
(Percent of GDP)
Projections
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020
Advanced Economies –0.9 –1.3 –0.2 0.0 –0.1 –0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.1
United States –5.0 –4.7 –2.6 –3.0 –3.0 –2.9 –2.4 –2.4 –2.3 –2.4 –2.6
Euro Area1 0.0 –1.7 –0.2 0.0 –0.1 1.5 2.2 2.3 3.3 3.1 2.5
Germany 6.9 5.8 5.8 5.7 6.1 7.1 6.7 7.5 8.4 7.9 6.7
France –1.0 –0.9 –0.8 –0.8 –1.0 –1.5 –1.4 –1.1 –0.1 –0.3 –0.3
Italy –1.4 –2.8 –1.9 –3.5 –3.1 –0.4 1.0 1.8 2.6 2.5 0.6
Spain –9.6 –9.3 –4.3 –3.9 –3.2 –0.3 1.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.1
Japan 4.9 2.9 2.9 4.0 2.1 1.0 0.7 0.5 1.9 2.0 2.3
United Kingdom –2.7 –3.7 –2.8 –2.6 –1.7 –3.7 –4.5 –5.5 –4.8 –4.6 –3.3
Canada 0.8 0.1 –2.9 –3.5 –2.7 –3.3 –3.0 –2.2 –2.6 –2.3 –1.8
Other Advanced Economies2 3.5 2.9 4.0 4.7 3.8 4.0 5.0 4.8 4.9 4.3 3.5
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 3.8 3.5 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.3
Regional Groups
Commonwealth of Independent States3 3.8 5.0 2.6 3.4 4.3 2.5 0.6 2.2 2.5 3.7 3.1
Russia 5.5 6.3 4.1 4.4 5.1 3.5 1.6 3.1 5.4 6.3 4.3
Excluding Russia –1.5 0.8 –1.8 0.3 1.8 –0.7 –2.5 –0.4 –3.5 –2.2 0.1
Emerging and Developing Asia 6.5 5.8 3.4 2.4 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.3 2.1 2.0 1.6
China 10.1 9.2 4.8 4.0 1.9 2.6 1.9 2.0 3.2 3.2 3.0
India –1.3 –2.3 –2.8 –2.8 –4.2 –4.8 –1.7 –1.4 –1.3 –1.6 –2.5
ASEAN-54 4.7 2.3 5.0 2.8 2.6 0.4 0.1 1.3 1.1 0.6 –0.2
Emerging and Developing Europe –7.9 –8.0 –3.4 –5.1 –6.5 –4.6 –3.8 –2.9 –2.4 –3.0 –3.8
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.2 –0.9 –0.7 –1.3 –1.4 –1.8 –2.8 –2.8 –3.2 –3.0 –2.7
Brazil 0.1 –1.7 –1.5 –2.1 –2.0 –2.2 –3.4 –3.9 –3.7 –3.4 –3.2
Mexico –1.4 –1.8 –0.9 –0.5 –1.1 –1.3 –2.4 –2.1 –2.2 –2.2 –2.3
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, 
and Pakistan 12.6 12.8 1.8 6.2 13.0 12.3 9.8 6.4 –1.9 –0.1 1.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.5 0.1 –2.7 –0.6 –0.7 –1.9 –2.5 –3.3 –4.6 –4.1 –4.2
South Africa –5.4 –5.5 –2.7 –1.5 –2.2 –5.0 –5.8 –5.4 –4.6 –4.7 –4.2
Analytical Groups
By Source of Export Earnings
Fuel 10.7 11.7 3.3 6.3 10.4 9.3 7.0 5.3 –0.2 1.8 2.4
Nonfuel 1.6 0.7 0.8 0.0 –1.0 –1.0 –1.0 –0.6 0.2 0.1 –0.1
Of Which, Primary Products –0.2 –1.9 –0.4 –0.8 –1.5 –3.5 –3.8 –3.0 –2.8 –3.1 –3.1
By External Financing Source
Net Debtor Economies –2.0 –3.2 –1.6 –2.1 –2.7 –3.3 –3.2 –2.6 –2.5 –2.6 –2.9
Net Debtor Economies by  
Debt-Servicing Experience
Economies with Arrears and/or 
Rescheduling during 2009–13 –0.3 –0.8 –3.4 –3.0 –2.5 –4.9 –4.7 –3.3 –4.6 –5.0 –5.4
Memorandum
World 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.2
European Union –0.5 –1.2 –0.1 0.1 0.5 1.1 1.7 1.7 2.2 2.0 1.6
Low-Income Developing Countries 0.6 –0.9 –2.2 –1.3 –1.8 –2.4 –2.5 –2.5 –2.9 –2.7 –3.3
Middle East and North Africa 13.8 14.3 2.2 6.8 14.0 13.4 10.7 7.0 –2.0 0.0 1.3
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Table A10. Summary of Current Account Balances (continued)
(Percent of exports of goods and services)
Projections
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020
Advanced Economies –3.1 –4.5 –0.8 –0.1 –0.5 –0.2 1.1 1.2 1.9 1.2 0.4
United States –43.5 –37.3 –24.1 –23.9 –21.6 –20.8 –17.6 –17.5 –17.6 –18.9 –20.7
Euro Area1 0.2 –7.7 –1.2 –0.1 –0.3 6.1 8.4 9.0 . . . . . . . . .
Germany 16.0 13.3 15.4 13.5 13.6 15.6 14.8 16.3 17.6 16.1 12.7
France –3.7 –3.3 –3.4 –3.1 –3.6 –5.2 –4.8 –3.5 –0.3 –0.9 –0.7
Italy –5.2 –10.5 –8.6 –13.8 –11.4 –1.5 3.3 6.2 8.7 8.1 1.8
Spain –37.5 –36.5 –18.9 –15.3 –11.0 –0.9 4.6 0.4 0.8 1.1 2.9
Japan 26.4 16.0 21.7 25.1 13.6 6.4 4.1 2.8 10.2 10.2 11.8
United Kingdom –10.7 –13.4 –10.3 –9.1 –5.4 –12.4 –14.9 –19.4 –17.1 –16.3 –11.3
Canada 2.3 0.3 –10.3 –12.1 –8.7 –10.8 –9.8 –7.0 –8.6 –7.5 –5.4
Other Advanced Economies2 6.4 4.8 7.5 8.2 6.4 6.7 8.4 8.2 8.4 7.3 6.0
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 11.3 10.1 4.7 4.7 5.0 4.4 2.4 2.2 0.5 1.4 1.2
Regional Groups
Commonwealth of Independent States3 11.2 13.7 8.2 10.3 12.2 7.4 1.8 6.5 6.8 10.5 10.3
Russia 18.3 19.9 14.7 15.3 17.0 12.1 5.8 10.2 15.0 18.8 15.8
Excluding Russia –3.1 1.6 –4.2 0.7 3.4 –1.3 –5.8 –1.0 –9.0 –5.6 0.2
Emerging and Developing Asia 18.1 16.6 12.4 8.2 2.9 3.3 3.7 4.8 8.2 7.7 6.2
China 28.1 28.2 19.3 14.4 6.8 9.8 7.7 8.5 14.1 14.0 13.4
India –6.1 –9.5 –13.7 –12.6 –17.3 –19.5 –6.9 –6.1 –6.0 –7.4 –11.6
ASEAN-54 8.7 4.4 10.9 6.0 5.5 0.8 0.2 2.7 2.4 1.4 –0.5
Emerging and Developing Europe –23.3 –22.7 –10.2 –14.8 –17.2 –11.7 –9.7 –6.9 –5.5 –6.8 –8.7
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.7 –3.9 –3.9 –6.5 –6.7 –8.6 –13.1 –13.4 –15.0 –13.6 –11.3
Brazil 0.8 –12.4 –13.5 –20.4 –18.0 –19.4 –29.2 –34.7 –28.2 –25.2 –23.1
Mexico –5.1 –6.5 –3.4 –1.6 –3.6 –4.1 –7.4 –6.3 –6.4 –6.2 –5.8
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan 26.0 25.2 4.3 14.5 27.2 25.1 20.4 14.2 –4.9 –0.2 2.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.4 0.4 –9.4 –2.0 –2.0 –6.0 –8.3 –12.0 –18.2 –15.8 –16.5
South Africa –17.3 –15.5 –9.8 –5.2 –7.1 –16.7 –18.6 –17.4 –13.9 –14.3 –13.1
Analytical Groups
By Source of Export Earnings
Fuel 25.8 26.9 9.2 16.7 25.0 22.4 17.2 13.4 –0.5 4.8 6.9
Nonfuel 5.2 2.2 2.9 0.1 –3.7 –3.5 –3.7 –2.1 0.8 0.4 –0.5
Of Which, Primary Products –0.8 –6.0 –1.7 –2.7 –5.5 –13.6 –15.3 –11.8 –11.8 –12.8 –12.2
By External Financing Source
Net Debtor Economies –6.4 –10.2 –5.8 –7.5 –9.0 –11.1 –10.7 –8.9 –8.5 –8.8 –9.6
Net Debtor Economies by  
Debt-Servicing Experience
Economies with Arrears and/or 
Rescheduling during 2009–13 –1.0 –2.3 –12.9 –11.3 –9.5 –21.1 –19.6 –14.7 –23.9 –26.0 –26.9
Memorandum
World 1.6 0.6 1.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.3 0.7
European Union –1.2 –3.2 –0.2 0.2 1.1 2.7 4.0 4.0 5.0 4.4 3.3
Low-Income Developing Countries 2.0 –2.9 –8.2 –4.6 –5.6 –7.9 –8.3 –8.6 –10.6 –9.6 –11.8
Middle East and North Africa 26.9 26.7 5.2 15.1 27.7 25.8 20.9 14.7 –4.8 0.1 3.0
1Excludes Lithuania.
2Excludes the United States, euro area countries, and Japan but includes Lithuania.
3Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarity in economic 
structure.
4Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam.
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Table A11. Advanced Economies: Balance on Current Account
(Percent of GDP)
Projections
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020
Advanced Economies –0.9 –1.3 –0.2 0.0 –0.1 –0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.1
United States –5.0 –4.7 –2.6 –3.0 –3.0 –2.9 –2.4 –2.4 –2.3 –2.4 –2.6
Euro Area1 0.0 –1.7 –0.2 0.0 –0.1 1.5 2.2 2.3 3.3 3.1 2.5
Germany 6.9 5.8 5.8 5.7 6.1 7.1 6.7 7.5 8.4 7.9 6.7
France –1.0 –0.9 –0.8 –0.8 –1.0 –1.5 –1.4 –1.1 –0.1 –0.3 –0.3
Italy –1.4 –2.8 –1.9 –3.5 –3.1 –0.4 1.0 1.8 2.6 2.5 0.6
Spain –9.6 –9.3 –4.3 –3.9 –3.2 –0.3 1.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.1
Netherlands 6.3 4.1 4.8 6.9 8.4 8.9 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.1 9.1
Belgium 4.3 –1.0 –1.1 1.8 –1.1 –0.7 –0.2 1.6 2.3 2.4 2.2
Austria 3.4 4.7 2.6 3.4 1.5 2.3 1.0 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7
Greece –14.0 –14.5 –10.9 –10.1 –9.9 –2.5 0.6 0.9 1.4 1.1 0.9
Portugal –9.7 –12.1 –10.4 –10.1 –6.0 –2.1 1.4 0.6 1.4 1.0 0.1
Ireland –5.4 –5.7 –3.0 0.6 0.8 1.6 4.4 6.2 4.9 4.8 4.8
Finland 5.2 3.1 2.7 2.4 –0.6 –1.2 –0.9 –0.6 –0.3 –0.3 0.0
Slovak Republic –4.8 –6.5 –3.5 –4.7 –5.0 0.9 1.5 0.2 0.4 0.4 2.2
Lithuania –14.9 –13.0 2.1 –0.3 –3.8 –1.2 1.6 –0.4 0.2 –0.8 –2.3
Slovenia –4.2 –5.4 –0.6 –0.1 0.2 2.7 5.6 5.8 7.1 6.5 4.5
Luxembourg 10.1 7.4 7.6 7.0 5.8 5.7 4.9 5.2 4.7 4.6 4.2
Latvia –20.8 –12.4 8.0 2.3 –2.8 –3.3 –2.3 –3.1 –2.2 –3.0 –2.4
Estonia –15.0 –8.7 2.5 1.8 1.4 –2.5 –1.1 –0.1 –0.4 –0.7 –0.8
Cyprus –10.8 –14.3 –9.8 –9.0 –3.1 –6.3 –1.7 –1.9 –1.9 –1.4 –1.1
Malta –3.9 –4.9 –4.8 –5.9 5.0 3.6 3.2 2.7 3.1 3.1 3.4
Japan 4.9 2.9 2.9 4.0 2.1 1.0 0.7 0.5 1.9 2.0 2.3
United Kingdom –2.7 –3.7 –2.8 –2.6 –1.7 –3.7 –4.5 –5.5 –4.8 –4.6 –3.3
Korea 1.1 0.3 3.7 2.6 1.6 4.2 6.2 6.3 7.1 5.2 3.6
Canada 0.8 0.1 –2.9 –3.5 –2.7 –3.3 –3.0 –2.2 –2.6 –2.3 –1.8
Australia –6.7 –4.9 –4.6 –3.6 –2.9 –4.3 –3.3 –2.8 –4.0 –3.7 –3.4
Taiwan Province of China 8.6 6.6 10.9 8.9 8.2 9.9 10.8 12.3 12.4 11.7 9.9
Switzerland 10.0 2.2 7.1 14.0 6.8 9.9 10.7 7.0 5.8 5.5 5.3
Sweden 8.9 8.5 5.9 6.0 6.9 6.6 7.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 5.6
Singapore 26.0 14.4 16.8 23.7 22.0 17.2 17.9 19.1 20.7 18.8 14.5
Hong Kong SAR 13.0 15.0 9.9 7.0 5.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 2.0 2.2 3.1
Norway 12.2 15.7 10.6 10.9 12.4 12.4 10.0 8.5 7.6 7.0 4.8
Czech Republic –4.3 –1.9 –2.4 –3.7 –2.1 –1.6 –0.5 0.6 1.6 0.9 –0.7
Israel 3.1 1.5 3.9 3.4 1.5 0.8 2.4 3.0 4.5 4.4 3.8
Denmark 1.4 2.7 3.3 5.7 5.7 5.6 7.2 6.3 6.1 5.5 4.4
New Zealand –6.8 –7.7 –2.3 –2.3 –2.8 –4.0 –3.2 –3.5 –4.8 –5.2 –4.6
Iceland –13.7 –22.8 –9.9 –6.4 –5.2 –4.2 5.5 4.7 6.1 4.7 2.4
San Marino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies –1.3 –1.6 –0.7 –0.8 –0.9 –1.0 –0.9 –0.8 –0.5 –0.6 –0.8
Euro Area2 0.3 –0.6 0.4 0.6 0.8 2.1 2.7 3.2 3.9 3.6 3.0
1Excludes Lithuania; corrected for reporting discrepancies in intra-area transactions.
2Excludes Lithuania; calculated as the sum of the balances of individual euro area countries.
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Table A12. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Balance on Current Account
(Percent of GDP)
Projections
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020
Commonwealth of Independent States1 3.8 5.0 2.6 3.4 4.3 2.5 0.6 2.2 2.5 3.7 3.1
Russia 5.5 6.3 4.1 4.4 5.1 3.5 1.6 3.1 5.4 6.3 4.3
Excluding Russia –1.5 0.8 –1.8 0.3 1.8 –0.7 –2.5 –0.4 –3.5 –2.2 0.1
Armenia –8.5 –15.0 –17.6 –14.2 –11.1 –11.1 –8.0 –9.2 –8.6 –8.6 –7.3
Azerbaijan 27.3 35.5 23.0 28.0 26.5 21.8 17.0 15.3 5.3 8.2 11.1
Belarus –6.7 –8.2 –12.6 –15.0 –8.5 –2.9 –10.5 –6.1 –7.0 –4.2 –4.0
Georgia –19.8 –22.0 –10.5 –10.2 –12.8 –11.7 –5.7 –9.6 –11.5 –12.0 –6.6
Kazakhstan –8.0 4.7 –3.6 0.9 5.4 0.5 0.5 1.6 –4.1 –3.1 –0.4
Kyrgyz Republic –6.0 –15.3 –2.2 –6.1 –9.6 –15.6 –15.0 –13.7 –17.0 –15.2 –8.8
Moldova –15.2 –16.1 –8.2 –7.5 –11.0 –7.4 –5.0 –5.5 –4.5 –5.4 –4.2
Tajikistan –8.6 –7.6 –5.9 –1.2 –4.8 –2.5 –2.9 –9.1 –7.1 –5.8 –3.4
Turkmenistan 15.5 16.5 –14.7 –10.6 2.0 0.0 –7.3 –5.9 –11.1 –6.7 3.1
Ukraine2 –3.5 –6.8 –1.4 –2.2 –6.3 –8.1 –9.2 –4.0 –1.4 –1.3 –2.3
Uzbekistan 7.3 8.7 2.2 6.2 5.8 1.2 –1.7 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
Emerging and Developing Asia 6.5 5.8 3.4 2.4 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.3 2.1 2.0 1.6
Bangladesh 0.7 1.2 2.4 0.4 –1.0 0.7 1.2 –0.1 –0.6 –0.4 –1.2
Bhutan 14.6 –2.2 –2.0 –10.3 –23.7 –17.6 –22.1 –21.9 –26.3 –24.6 –6.4
Brunei Darussalam 47.8 48.9 40.3 45.5 36.4 34.1 34.5 23.6 –9.8 –5.6 12.4
Cambodia –1.9 –6.6 –6.9 –6.8 –10.2 –11.0 –12.2 –12.0 –10.0 –9.3 –5.3
China 10.1 9.2 4.8 4.0 1.9 2.6 1.9 2.0 3.2 3.2 3.0
Fiji –10.4 –15.9 –4.2 –4.5 –5.3 –1.8 –20.7 –8.8 –8.0 –8.2 –8.1
India –1.3 –2.3 –2.8 –2.8 –4.2 –4.8 –1.7 –1.4 –1.3 –1.6 –2.5
Indonesia 1.4 0.0 1.8 0.7 0.2 –2.7 –3.2 –3.0 –3.0 –2.9 –2.6
Kiribati –18.3 –19.3 –22.5 –16.3 –31.0 –24.5 –21.8 4.1 –24.3 –26.5 –12.8
Lao P.D.R. –13.6 –19.2 –22.2 –20.0 –17.3 –30.2 –28.9 –24.9 –20.1 –16.3 –14.9
Malaysia 15.4 17.1 15.5 10.9 11.6 5.8 4.0 4.6 2.1 1.4 1.4
Maldives –15.2 –28.8 –10.4 –8.1 –18.1 –10.6 –6.5 –8.4 –4.6 –5.9 –4.6
Marshall Islands –0.9 0.9 –14.9 –26.6 –5.3 –8.7 –13.4 –20.9 –1.3 –3.8 –10.0
Micronesia –9.5 –16.6 –18.9 –15.1 –17.9 –12.6 –10.1 2.5 –0.7 –0.8 –3.4
Mongolia 5.4 –11.1 –7.7 –13.0 –26.5 –27.4 –25.4 –8.2 –11.1 –17.3 –5.7
Myanmar –0.7 –4.2 –1.3 –1.2 –1.9 –4.3 –5.1 –7.2 –7.0 –5.9 –4.9
Nepal –0.1 2.7 4.2 –2.4 –1.0 4.8 3.3 4.6 4.1 2.5 –1.9
Palau –16.7 –16.8 –4.7 –7.2 –4.1 –5.0 –6.5 –10.3 –5.4 –8.4 –3.1
Papua New Guinea 3.9 8.5 –15.2 –21.5 –23.6 –53.6 –30.8 –12.1 10.2 7.1 4.3
Philippines 5.4 0.1 5.0 3.6 2.5 2.8 4.2 4.4 5.5 5.0 3.0
Samoa –13.5 –5.5 –5.3 –6.8 –3.5 –7.8 0.4 –3.7 –6.8 –5.5 –4.5
Solomon Islands –15.6 –18.2 –21.9 –33.3 –8.6 1.5 –4.5 –8.5 –8.4 –12.6 –8.0
Sri Lanka –4.3 –9.5 –0.5 –2.2 –7.8 –6.7 –3.9 –3.7 –2.0 –2.6 –3.0
Thailand 6.3 0.8 8.3 3.1 2.6 –0.4 –0.6 3.8 4.4 2.4 0.7
Timor-Leste 39.4 46.0 38.9 39.8 41.1 47.8 44.8 26.1 11.2 10.9 –3.8
Tonga –7.0 –7.3 –9.3 –7.4 –11.8 –15.6 –12.6 –8.9 –6.8 –5.8 –0.9
Tuvalu –13.0 7.1 6.9 –11.9 –36.5 25.3 26.4 27.0 –39.0 –24.5 –4.9
Vanuatu –7.3 –10.8 –7.9 –5.4 –8.1 –6.5 –3.3 –1.3 –14.4 –13.4 –8.2
Vietnam –9.0 –11.0 –6.5 –3.8 0.2 6.0 5.6 5.4 4.8 4.9 0.3
Emerging and Developing Europe –7.9 –8.0 –3.4 –5.1 –6.5 –4.6 –3.8 –2.9 –2.4 –3.0 –3.8
Albania –10.6 –15.8 –15.9 –11.3 –13.2 –10.2 –10.7 –13.9 –15.7 –15.5 –8.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina –9.4 –14.1 –6.6 –6.2 –9.6 –9.2 –5.9 –7.1 –9.0 –8.2 –5.3
Bulgaria –24.3 –22.4 –8.6 –1.5 0.1 –1.1 2.3 0.0 0.2 –0.8 –2.0
Croatia –7.1 –8.8 –5.1 –1.1 –0.8 –0.1 0.8 0.7 2.2 2.0 –0.9
Hungary –7.1 –7.2 –0.8 0.3 0.8 1.9 4.1 4.2 4.8 4.1 1.2
Kosovo –10.2 –16.2 –9.2 –11.7 –13.7 –7.5 –6.4 –7.1 –7.3 –8.0 –7.2
FYR Macedonia –6.9 –12.7 –6.8 –2.0 –2.5 –2.9 –1.8 –1.3 –2.0 –3.3 –2.5
Montenegro –39.5 –49.8 –27.9 –22.9 –17.7 –18.7 –14.6 –17.8 –20.6 –25.3 –17.2
Poland –6.3 –6.6 –4.0 –5.5 –5.2 –3.5 –1.3 –1.2 –1.8 –2.4 –3.5
Romania –13.5 –11.5 –4.5 –4.6 –4.6 –4.5 –0.8 –0.5 –1.1 –1.5 –3.6
Serbia –17.2 –21.0 –6.2 –6.4 –8.6 –11.5 –6.1 –6.0 –4.7 –4.7 –3.7
Turkey –5.8 –5.5 –2.0 –6.2 –9.7 –6.2 –7.9 –5.7 –4.2 –4.8 –5.0
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Table A12. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Balance on Current Account (continued)
(Percent of GDP)
Projections
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.2 –0.9 –0.7 –1.3 –1.4 –1.8 –2.8 –2.8 –3.2 –3.0 –2.7
Antigua and Barbuda –29.9 –26.7 –14.0 –14.7 –10.4 –14.6 –14.6 –14.5 –10.7 –12.4 –14.8
Argentina3 2.0 1.5 2.0 –0.4 –0.7 –0.2 –0.8 –0.9 –1.7 –1.8 –1.5
The Bahamas –11.5 –10.6 –10.3 –10.1 –15.0 –18.3 –17.7 –21.6 –12.4 –8.2 –7.4
Barbados –5.4 –10.6 –6.7 –5.8 –12.8 –9.3 –9.3 –9.1 –5.1 –5.9 –5.5
Belize –4.0 –10.6 –4.9 –2.4 –1.1 –1.2 –4.4 –5.7 –4.5 –6.1 –7.0
Bolivia 11.4 11.9 4.3 3.9 0.3 8.3 3.3 0.7 –2.8 –4.2 –1.0
Brazil 0.1 –1.7 –1.5 –2.1 –2.0 –2.2 –3.4 –3.9 –3.7 –3.4 –3.2
Chile 4.1 –3.2 2.0 1.7 –1.2 –3.6 –3.7 –1.2 –1.2 –2.0 –2.4
Colombia –3.0 –2.8 –2.2 –3.2 –3.1 –3.2 –3.4 –5.0 –5.8 –4.9 –3.6
Costa Rica –6.3 –9.3 –2.0 –3.5 –5.4 –5.3 –5.0 –4.5 –3.6 –4.0 –4.9
Dominica –20.3 –27.7 –22.3 –16.3 –13.4 –17.7 –13.1 –13.0 –13.1 –19.4 –12.8
Dominican Republic –5.0 –9.4 –4.8 –7.4 –7.5 –6.6 –4.1 –3.1 –2.4 –3.0 –4.2
Ecuador 3.7 2.9 0.5 –2.3 –0.3 –0.2 –1.0 –0.8 –3.3 –3.0 –3.0
El Salvador –6.1 –7.1 –1.5 –2.5 –4.8 –5.4 –6.5 –5.0 –4.3 –4.9 –5.9
Grenada –29.7 –28.0 –22.2 –22.1 –21.8 –19.2 –27.0 –23.6 –17.4 –16.1 –16.3
Guatemala –5.2 –3.6 0.7 –1.4 –3.4 –2.6 –2.5 –2.3 –1.6 –1.8 –2.5
Guyana –9.5 –13.7 –9.1 –9.6 –13.1 –11.6 –13.3 –15.9 –16.4 –21.9 –10.7
Haiti –1.5 –3.1 –1.9 –1.5 –4.3 –5.7 –6.7 –5.8 –3.0 –3.7 –3.5
Honduras –9.1 –15.4 –3.8 –4.3 –8.0 –8.5 –9.5 –7.4 –6.5 –6.4 –5.0
Jamaica –15.3 –17.7 –11.0 –8.0 –12.1 –10.7 –8.9 –6.4 –5.0 –4.6 –3.4
Mexico –1.4 –1.8 –0.9 –0.5 –1.1 –1.3 –2.4 –2.1 –2.2 –2.2 –2.3
Nicaragua –15.7 –17.0 –8.1 –8.1 –10.7 –9.8 –8.9 –6.2 –6.8 –7.5 –6.7
Panama –8.0 –10.9 –0.7 –11.4 –15.9 –9.8 –12.2 –12.0 –10.4 –10.0 –5.9
Paraguay 5.7 1.0 3.0 –0.3 0.5 –0.9 2.2 0.1 –1.7 –2.2 –1.7
Peru 1.5 –4.3 –0.5 –2.4 –1.9 –2.7 –4.4 –4.1 –4.6 –4.3 –3.0
St. Kitts and Nevis –17.4 –26.8 –25.7 –20.8 –15.9 –9.8 –6.7 –10.7 –16.2 –16.8 –15.1
St. Lucia –30.0 –28.9 –11.6 –16.2 –18.7 –13.5 –12.8 –12.4 –13.4 –13.9 –15.0
St. Vincent and the Grenadines –28.0 –33.1 –29.2 –30.6 –29.4 –27.5 –31.3 –29.4 –27.6 –25.4 –18.4
Suriname 11.1 9.2 2.9 14.9 5.8 3.4 –3.9 –7.3 –7.8 –6.9 –0.3
Trinidad and Tobago 23.9 30.5 8.5 19.8 11.9 3.4 6.7 8.3 5.2 4.4 3.9
Uruguay –0.9 –5.7 –1.3 –1.9 –2.9 –5.4 –5.2 –4.7 –3.8 –4.1 –3.6
Venezuela 7.2 11.0 1.0 3.2 8.2 3.7 2.4 4.3 –4.7 –0.8 1.4
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, 
and Pakistan 12.6 12.8 1.8 6.2 13.0 12.3 9.8 6.4 –1.9 –0.1 1.0
Afghanistan 36.8 2.7 13.1 8.3 6.4 6.3 7.5 5.7 3.1 0.5 –1.9
Algeria 22.7 20.1 0.3 7.5 9.9 5.9 0.4 –4.3 –15.7 –13.2 –7.0
Bahrain 13.4 8.8 2.4 3.0 11.2 7.2 7.8 5.3 –2.1 –0.7 –0.8
Djibouti –21.4 –24.3 –9.3 0.6 –13.7 –20.3 –23.3 –27.4 –28.7 –23.2 –12.6
Egypt 2.1 0.5 –2.3 –2.0 –2.6 –3.9 –2.4 –0.8 –3.3 –4.3 –4.8
Iran 9.7 5.8 2.4 5.9 10.5 6.3 7.4 3.8 0.8 1.2 0.0
Iraq 0.9 15.9 –6.8 3.0 12.0 6.7 1.3 –3.5 –9.6 –3.6 2.5
Jordan –16.8 –9.4 –5.2 –7.1 –10.2 –15.2 –10.3 –7.0 –7.6 –6.6 –4.7
Kuwait 36.8 40.9 26.7 31.8 42.7 45.2 39.6 35.3 15.7 19.3 14.7
Lebanon –7.2 –11.1 –12.5 –20.7 –15.1 –24.3 –26.7 –24.9 –22.2 –21.7 –15.3
Libya 44.1 42.5 14.9 19.5 9.1 29.1 13.6 –30.1 –52.8 –30.9 –1.5
Mauritania –14.6 –13.3 –13.4 –7.7 –6.0 –26.5 –24.8 –27.6 –14.6 –21.9 –24.6
Morocco –0.1 –5.2 –5.4 –4.1 –8.0 –9.7 –7.6 –5.8 –3.4 –3.3 –2.9
Oman 6.0 8.5 –1.1 8.9 13.2 10.3 6.6 2.2 –15.0 –13.0 –9.3
Pakistan –4.5 –8.1 –5.5 –2.2 0.1 –2.1 –1.1 –1.2 –1.3 –1.4 –2.5
Qatar 14.4 23.1 6.5 19.1 30.6 32.6 30.8 25.1 8.4 5.0 3.8
Saudi Arabia 22.5 25.5 4.9 12.7 23.7 22.4 17.8 14.1 –1.0 3.7 5.4
Sudan4 –6.0 –1.6 –9.6 –2.1 –0.4 –9.3 –8.6 –5.2 –4.2 –3.9 –3.2
Syria5 –0.2 –1.3 –2.9 –2.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tunisia –2.4 –3.8 –2.8 –4.8 –7.4 –8.2 –8.3 –8.9 –6.4 –5.2 –3.0
United Arab Emirates 12.5 7.1 3.1 2.5 14.7 18.5 16.1 12.1 5.3 7.2 6.6
Yemen –7.0 –4.6 –10.1 –3.4 –3.0 –1.7 –3.1 –1.6 –2.2 –1.5 –1.2
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Table A12. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Balance on Current Account (continued)
(Percent of GDP)
Projections
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.5 0.1 –2.7 –0.6 –0.7 –1.9 –2.5 –3.3 –4.6 –4.1 –4.2
Angola 17.5 8.5 –10.0 9.1 12.6 12.0 6.7 –0.8 –6.3 –4.2 –2.5
Benin –10.2 –8.1 –8.9 –8.7 –7.8 –8.4 –15.9 –8.5 –11.6 –12.2 –8.7
Botswana 15.1 –1.1 –11.2 –6.0 –0.6 –3.5 10.4 17.1 18.2 16.6 16.0
Burkina Faso –8.3 –11.5 –4.5 –2.0 –1.5 –4.5 –6.6 –6.1 –8.1 –8.5 –6.8
Burundi –5.4 –1.0 1.7 –12.2 –13.6 –17.3 –18.4 –17.6 –13.3 –12.9 –12.2
Cabo Verde –12.9 –13.7 –14.6 –12.4 –16.3 –11.4 –4.0 –9.1 –9.6 –10.6 –4.1
Cameroon 1.4 –1.2 –3.1 –2.8 –2.7 –3.6 –3.8 –4.2 –4.8 –4.8 –4.7
Central African Republic –6.2 –9.9 –9.1 –10.2 –7.6 –4.6 –3.0 –6.2 –11.1 –9.1 –7.0
Chad 8.2 3.7 –9.2 –9.0 –5.6 –8.7 –9.0 –8.7 –10.5 –8.3 –3.5
Comoros –10.1 –18.7 –15.4 –15.9 –22.1 –14.7 –14.6 –10.6 –14.1 –13.7 –11.6
Democratic Republic of the Congo 3.2 –0.8 –6.1 –10.6 –5.4 –6.2 –11.1 –9.6 –10.7 –9.5 –10.1
Republic of Congo –6.5 –0.5 –14.1 7.5 4.7 –2.4 –4.8 –6.2 –11.3 –3.1 1.1
Côte d’Ivoire –0.7 1.9 6.6 1.9 10.5 –1.2 –4.9 –3.3 –2.3 –1.7 –4.6
Equatorial Guinea 15.9 12.3 –8.0 –9.8 –0.6 –4.5 –12.1 –13.1 –32.5 –18.3 –7.6
Eritrea –6.1 –5.5 –7.6 –5.6 0.6 2.3 0.3 –0.2 –1.6 –1.9 –3.6
Ethiopia –4.2 –6.7 –6.7 –1.4 –2.5 –6.9 –6.0 –9.0 –6.6 –6.3 –6.1
Gabon 14.8 21.9 6.5 7.8 13.1 21.3 15.0 11.2 –2.3 0.9 –2.7
The Gambia –8.3 –12.2 –12.5 –16.3 –12.3 –7.9 –10.7 –12.7 –11.7 –10.0 –8.7
Ghana –8.7 –11.9 –5.4 –8.6 –9.0 –11.7 –11.7 –9.2 –7.0 –6.2 –4.3
Guinea –10.8 –9.7 –7.9 –9.7 –18.8 –28.7 –21.4 –18.5 –16.7 –18.3 –37.7
Guinea-Bissau –4.4 –3.3 –5.8 –8.3 –1.3 –8.7 –14.1 –10.0 –11.3 –14.6 –2.0
Kenya –3.2 –5.5 –4.6 –5.9 –9.1 –8.4 –8.7 –9.2 –7.7 –7.4 –7.0
Lesotho 22.7 21.8 4.8 –7.9 –9.0 –2.7 –4.2 –6.6 –5.4 –23.3 –23.0
Liberia –6.2 –46.7 –23.2 –32.0 –27.4 –21.4 –28.2 –31.9 –40.2 –27.8 –29.0
Madagascar –12.7 –20.6 –21.2 –9.7 –6.9 –6.7 –5.6 –2.3 –3.2 –3.4 –3.9
Malawi 1.0 –9.7 –4.8 –1.3 –5.9 –3.5 –1.8 –5.1 –3.4 –2.7 –1.5
Mali –8.1 –12.1 –7.3 –12.6 –6.1 –2.6 –5.2 –8.0 –5.6 –5.6 –6.4
Mauritius –5.4 –10.1 –7.4 –10.3 –13.8 –7.3 –9.9 –7.2 –6.3 –6.2 –6.0
Mozambique –9.5 –11.6 –11.0 –10.6 –23.1 –42.3 –40.0 –34.7 –41.1 –45.6 –41.0
Namibia 8.6 3.0 –1.5 –3.5 –3.0 –5.8 –4.1 –6.6 –9.9 –12.3 –10.7
Niger –8.2 –12.0 –24.4 –19.8 –22.3 –15.3 –15.3 –18.0 –27.1 –24.7 –10.6
Nigeria 10.7 9.0 5.1 3.9 3.0 4.4 3.9 2.2 0.7 1.3 0.6
Rwanda –2.3 –5.0 –7.1 –7.3 –7.5 –11.4 –7.1 –12.0 –10.5 –10.1 –9.9
São Tomé and Príncipe –29.0 –33.1 –23.2 –21.7 –25.5 –21.3 –16.8 –20.8 –12.4 –12.0 –9.6
Senegal –11.6 –14.1 –6.7 –4.4 –7.9 –10.8 –10.9 –10.3 –7.6 –7.3 –6.4
Seychelles –18.8 –27.2 –22.4 –22.1 –28.3 –25.8 –15.2 –22.5 –19.3 –18.1 –14.8
Sierra Leone –7.4 –9.0 –13.3 –22.7 –65.3 –22.0 –10.4 –7.6 –13.2 –8.6 –6.3
South Africa –5.4 –5.5 –2.7 –1.5 –2.2 –5.0 –5.8 –5.4 –4.6 –4.7 –4.2
South Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.2 –22.4 –0.5 –0.7 –13.9 –8.3 –8.4
Swaziland –2.1 –7.6 –13.0 –10.0 –8.2 3.8 6.3 0.9 0.4 –1.4 –3.3
Tanzania –8.6 –7.8 –7.3 –6.9 –10.4 –11.6 –10.3 –10.2 –10.0 –9.5 –8.3
Togo –8.6 –7.0 –5.6 –6.3 –8.0 –8.1 –7.2 –6.3 –5.0 –5.8 –8.0
Uganda –4.6 –7.8 –6.2 –9.4 –10.4 –8.1 –6.4 –7.5 –8.8 –9.0 –8.9
Zambia –5.4 –5.8 3.8 5.9 3.0 3.2 0.0 –0.2 0.3 0.9 0.4
Zimbabwe6 –5.4 –16.5 –47.1 –16.0 –30.9 –24.6 –25.4 –22.3 –21.6 –23.8 –23.5
1Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarity in economic 
structure.
2Starting in 2014 data exclude Crimea and Sevastopol.
3Calculations are based on Argentina’s official GDP data. See note 5 to Table A4.
4Data for 2011 exclude South Sudan after July 9. Data for 2012 and onward pertain to the current Sudan.
5Data for Syria are excluded for 2011 onward owing the uncertain political situation.
6The Zimbabwean dollar ceased circulating in early 2009. Data are based on IMF staff estimates of price and exchange rate developments in U.S. dollars. IMF staff estimates of U.S. dollar 
values may differ from authorities’ estimates.
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Table A13. Summary of Financial Account Balances
(Billions of U.S. dollars)
Projections
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Advanced Economies
Financial Account Balance –308.3 –721.4 –17.7 –66.4 –217.7 –2.5 267.7 473.0 241.9 172.0
Direct Investment, Net 611.4 628.1 249.2 355.6 369.3 219.0 171.8 422.8 352.8 381.8
Portfolio Investment, Net –1,003.8 –1,186.2 –342.3 –722.4 –898.1 –70.5 –208.5 209.7 –67.1 –147.5
Financial Derivatives, Net 95.9 352.6 –118.9 –84.5 –0.1 –70.2 28.0 –106.7 –35.1 –39.1
Other Investment, Net –57.4 –516.1 –237.8 79.9 49.3 –305.6 166.6 –79.1 –73.4 –34.0
Change in Reserves 67.1 75.0 473.8 347.6 340.5 270.4 153.8 83.0 96.3 40.7
United States
Financial Account Balance –617.3 –730.6 –231.0 –437.0 –515.8 –423.5 –370.7 –141.6 –408.4 –451.9
Direct Investment, Net 192.9 19.0 159.9 95.2 183.0 157.8 113.3 260.1 210.8 229.0
Portfolio Investment, Net –775.8 –808.0 18.5 –620.8 –226.3 –507.2 –1.1 –145.1 –265.7 –381.7
Financial Derivatives, Net –6.2 32.9 –44.8 –14.1 –35.0 7.1 2.2 –53.5 –29.8 –51.7
Other Investment, Net –28.2 20.6 –416.9 100.9 –453.4 –85.6 –482.0 –199.5 –323.8 –247.5
Change in Reserves 0.1 4.8 52.3 1.8 15.9 4.5 –3.1 –3.6 0.0 0.0
Euro Area1
Financial Account Balance 682.0 555.2 688.7 687.6 773.2 688.9 598.4 462.3 . . . . . .
Direct Investment, Net 331.6 545.6 303.2 305.6 354.3 261.4 36.4 91.2 . . . . . .
Portfolio Investment, Net –339.1 –537.6 –518.4 –269.1 –502.6 –258.4 20.2 153.1 . . . . . .
Financial Derivatives, Net 232.9 276.4 117.1 123.2 151.2 121.8 43.9 57.7 . . . . . .
Other Investment, Net 449.4 265.6 792.9 513.7 755.8 544.4 491.6 154.3 . . . . . .
Change in Reserves 7.2 5.1 –6.2 14.1 14.5 19.6 6.4 5.9 . . . . . .
Germany
Financial Account Balance 296.7 249.2 211.3 148.9 224.1 274.3 326.9 287.5 286.8 276.9
Direct Investment, Net 89.8 67.1 43.0 60.6 20.0 65.4 29.7 40.9 36.2 37.2
Portfolio Investment, Net –215.4 –44.5 119.2 154.1 –42.6 83.4 218.8 192.4 191.9 185.3
Financial Derivatives, Net 116.4 44.0 –7.5 17.6 37.1 32.8 24.1 21.2 21.2 20.4
Other Investment, Net 304.7 179.9 44.3 –85.5 205.7 91.0 53.2 33.0 37.5 33.9
Change in Reserves 1.2 2.7 12.4 2.1 3.9 1.7 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
France
Financial Account Balance –41.5 –45.9 –49.6 2.3 –72.3 –27.0 –18.8 –46.0 0.1 –4.9
Direct Investment, Net 68.2 66.0 70.3 34.3 19.4 18.1 –6.8 32.5 32.6 37.6
Portfolio Investment, Net 166.1 –37.8 –328.7 –155.0 –335.1 –34.1 –92.8 –14.7 –12.0 –54.9
Financial Derivatives, Net –57.4 40.0 –15.5 –4.1 –19.4 –18.4 –22.3 –63.7 –21.3 11.1
Other Investment, Net –219.0 –101.6 216.0 119.4 270.5 2.2 105.0 –1.2 –1.0 –1.0
Change in Reserves 0.7 –12.5 8.4 7.7 –7.7 5.2 –1.9 1.0 1.7 2.3
Italy
Financial Account Balance –40.0 –49.0 –56.1 –116.4 –97.5 –19.1 15.9 72.0 50.3 48.8
Direct Investment, Net 52.5 76.2 –0.3 21.3 17.1 6.8 5.8 6.6 3.7 2.3
Portfolio Investment, Net –7.6 –110.7 –55.4 56.4 13.5 –33.3 –19.4 –10.7 –14.6 –5.6
Financial Derivatives, Net 3.8 –0.4 –6.9 6.6 –10.1 7.5 4.0 –4.0 0.0 0.0
Other Investment, Net –90.7 –22.3 6.6 –202.1 –119.4 –1.9 23.5 81.1 61.2 52.2
Change in Reserves 2.1 8.2 –0.1 1.4 1.3 1.9 2.0 –1.0 0.0 0.0
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Table A13. Summary of Financial Account Balances (continued)
(Billions of U.S. dollars)
Projections
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Spain
Financial Account Balance –137.5 –147.6 –70.8 –56.9 –41.4 0.3 53.9 35.9 8.5 10.0
Direct Investment, Net 72.9 –2.3 2.7 –1.9 12.8 –29.7 –15.9 4.3 2.1 1.7
Portfolio Investment, Net –122.3 1.9 –69.6 –46.6 43.1 53.7 –59.8 –3.7 –6.1 –3.6
Financial Derivatives, Net 5.6 10.4 8.4 –11.4 2.9 –10.7 1.4 1.0 0.0 0.0
Other Investment, Net –93.9 –158.6 –18.4 1.9 –114.1 –15.8 127.5 29.1 12.5 11.9
Change in Reserves 0.2 0.9 6.0 1.1 13.9 2.8 0.7 5.2 0.0 0.0
Japan
Financial Account Balance 224.3 187.3 174.8 253.5 165.8 62.9 –16.7 52.0 78.4 82.0
Direct Investment, Net 51.7 89.1 61.2 72.5 117.8 119.2 132.4 108.8 95.2 101.5
Portfolio Investment, Net –68.3 294.7 217.6 154.1 –155.5 38.5 –269.8 –42.4 3.1 9.6
Financial Derivatives, Net –2.9 –24.9 –10.5 –11.9 –17.1 6.7 58.1 35.2 4.0 4.6
Other Investment, Net 207.3 –202.3 –120.9 –5.5 43.4 –63.6 23.9 –58.0 –32.9 –43.1
Change in Reserves 36.5 30.8 27.2 44.3 177.3 –37.9 38.7 8.5 9.0 9.5
United Kingdom
Financial Account Balance –71.2 –85.0 –49.2 –44.4 –23.6 –77.9 –102.4 –160.9 –134.4 –135.7
Direct Investment, Net 137.7 96.5 –70.3 –12.3 66.1 –30.5 –62.7 –48.9 –53.7 –50.1
Portfolio Investment, Net –216.5 –458.0 –48.9 20.9 11.1 332.0 –49.1 146.6 44.3 91.4
Financial Derivatives, Net 54.0 225.5 –45.5 –39.4 4.9 –47.6 21.9 –13.2 4.6 –3.9
Other Investment, Net –48.9 53.5 106.6 –23.0 –113.6 –343.8 –20.1 –255.8 –138.2 –182.4
Change in Reserves 2.4 –2.5 9.0 9.4 7.9 12.1 7.8 10.4 8.7 9.3
Canada
Financial Account Balance 14.7 –2.6 –41.0 –55.0 –54.6 –59.2 –54.1 –33.2 –46.7 –40.2
Direct Investment, Net –52.2 17.7 16.9 6.3 12.5 14.7 –20.0 –1.2 –6.5 –3.0
Portfolio Investment, Net 73.5 –40.8 –89.7 –96.1 –83.1 –48.4 –13.4 –3.1 –28.9 –27.8
Financial Derivatives, Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other Investment, Net –10.8 18.9 21.7 30.9 7.8 –27.2 –25.4 –34.1 –11.4 –9.4
Change in Reserves 4.3 1.6 10.2 3.9 8.1 1.7 4.7 5.3 0.0 0.0
Other Advanced Economies2
Financial Account Balance 94.2 –20.3 102.3 237.6 194.1 215.4 324.5 280.2 284.9 258.9
Direct Investment, Net 9.9 17.0 16.9 96.9 –11.0 –20.6 6.6 –2.8 5.6 6.4
Portfolio Investment, Net 180.8 180.6 –108.2 –53.7 34.1 139.7 127.0 210.7 167.7 197.4
Financial Derivatives, Net –0.6 –12.7 19.9 –17.8 41.3 –26.8 –25.9 –19.3 –7.1 –9.7
Other Investment, Net –87.2 –172.9 –114.6 –19.8 91.4 –103.0 159.5 89.3 72.9 75.2
Change in Reserves 13.0 42.3 330.3 274.6 116.8 271.7 101.4 59.1 77.5 19.5
Emerging Market and Developing  
Economies
Financial Account Balance 579.7 617.1 73.6 172.0 258.3 158.7 21.2 31.9 16.3 101.5
Direct Investment, Net –439.3 –463.7 –330.8 –429.8 –517.6 –471.3 –476.7 –497.4 –442.2 –441.1
Portfolio Investment, Net –24.1 136.0 –77.8 –233.1 –134.7 –242.2 –150.4 –104.8 –113.7 –134.7
Financial Derivatives, Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other Investment, Net –175.9 236.3 –43.7 –4.0 158.1 436.7 76.4 560.9 395.9 302.1
Change in Reserves 1,216.6 701.9 523.2 835.6 750.3 439.3 570.8 65.8 178.6 379.0
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Table A13. Summary of Financial Account Balances (continued)
(Billions of U.S. dollars)
Projections
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Regional Groups
Commonwealth of Independent States3
Financial Account Balance 44.5 98.1 23.2 70.7 95.4 49.0 –5.6 19.1 46.8 75.7
Direct Investment, Net –28.3 –49.4 –17.2 –9.4 –16.1 –27.8 –5.1 –27.5 –2.1 –2.5
Portfolio Investment, Net 3.8 35.8 –6.3 –14.4 17.9 3.5 –0.2 25.6 10.6 0.4
Financial Derivatives, Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other Investment, Net –98.8 137.2 36.4 40.6 68.5 45.6 24.7 159.7 101.2 66.1
Change in Reserves 167.8 –26.7 7.2 52.0 23.9 26.3 –25.5 –139.0 –62.6 12.4
Emerging and Developing Asia
Financial Account Balance 412.4 448.4 212.4 140.8 59.2 1.9 33.4 105.9 326.6 332.5
Direct Investment, Net –172.4 –151.9 –115.6 –223.0 –280.1 –222.1 –243.4 –260.7 –230.9 –201.1
Portfolio Investment, Net –56.4 8.1 –68.8 –99.4 –56.8 –119.5 –70.8 –73.7 –46.7 –86.0
Financial Derivatives, Net . . . . . . . . . 0.5 –0.4 –3.1 3.0 0.2 0.3 0.3
Other Investment, Net 22.0 114.3 –63.6 –103.5 –36.7 208.7 –105.5 267.0 220.5 187.8
Change in Reserves 619.0 476.4 462.4 566.5 434.3 135.0 450.7 172.6 383.7 431.1
Emerging and Developing Europe
Financial Account Balance –125.5 –160.6 –51.7 –91.1 –107.9 –64.7 –61.9 –42.6 –33.0 –48.0
Direct Investment, Net –69.9 –63.7 –30.6 –29.4 –40.4 –27.2 –23.7 –25.4 –31.4 –35.5
Portfolio Investment, Net 6.1 14.4 –10.1 –44.5 –53.2 –70.2 –39.8 –27.7 –11.0 –12.3
Financial Derivatives, Net 1.4 2.5 0.9 0.5 1.5 –2.9 –1.4 4.7 –1.9 –3.8
Other Investment, Net –98.7 –119.7 –41.5 –53.6 –30.4 7.6 –15.4 4.3 6.7 3.0
Change in Reserves 35.6 5.9 29.6 35.7 14.5 28.0 18.4 1.5 4.6 0.6
Latin America and the Caribbean
Financial Account Balance 15.7 –37.4 –25.8 –86.5 –95.2 –132.3 –206.5 –178.7 –165.7 –161.8
Direct Investment, Net –94.7 –101.1 –71.0 –88.0 –128.3 –134.7 –161.6 –134.1 –123.1 –134.9
Portfolio Investment, Net –44.2 –7.2 –19.5 –104.8 –96.7 –85.6 –94.6 –95.4 –70.5 –62.6
Financial Derivatives, Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other Investment, Net 24.6 28.0 9.1 14.7 16.9 28.7 43.6 12.0 43.4 35.9
Change in Reserves 129.1 41.5 54.7 90.5 110.5 59.4 5.5 35.6 –17.1 –1.7
Middle East, North Africa, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan
Financial Account Balance 223.9 271.6 –35.3 140.1 320.2 332.9 316.6 185.3 –89.1 –30.9
Direct Investment, Net –52.1 –62.4 –66.1 –44.9 –21.4 –27.7 –19.3 –19.4 –21.9 –26.3
Portfolio Investment, Net 72.8 61.1 35.3 30.0 69.8 55.0 73.4 82.2 15.4 38.7
Financial Derivatives, Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other Investment, Net –34.0 85.5 18.0 63.1 126.2 134.6 140.2 122.5 43.6 26.6
Change in Reserves 237.2 187.3 –22.6 91.9 145.5 171.0 122.3 0.1 –126.2 –69.9
Sub-Saharan Africa
Financial Account Balance 8.8 –2.9 –49.1 –2.1 –13.4 –27.9 –54.8 –57.1 –69.2 –66.1
Direct Investment, Net –21.9 –35.4 –30.2 –35.2 –31.3 –31.9 –23.5 –30.3 –32.8 –40.7
Portfolio Investment, Net –6.2 23.9 –8.4 0.0 –15.8 –25.4 –18.5 –15.8 –11.4 –13.0
Financial Derivatives, Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other Investment, Net 9.0 –9.0 –2.2 34.6 13.6 11.6 –11.3 –4.7 –19.6 –17.4
Change in Reserves 27.9 17.6 –8.2 –1.0 21.7 19.6 –0.6 –5.0 –3.8 6.5
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Table A13. Summary of Financial Account Balances (continued)
(Billions of U.S. dollars)
Projections
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Analytical Groups
By Source of Export Earnings
Fuel Exporters
Financial Account Balance 342.3 465.3 8.7 256.4 497.8 481.0 358.7 238.9 –44.1 63.8
Direct Investment, Net –53.7 –83.9 –62.6 –30.4 –29.5 –47.5 –12.0 –45.2 –18.7 –24.7
Portfolio Investment, Net 86.6 98.3 13.4 22.7 83.0 42.1 79.2 103.3 21.0 35.1
Financial Derivatives, Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other Investment, Net –84.8 277.5 104.5 148.8 245.9 232.7 192.4 323.9 187.7 136.3
Change in Reserves 394.2 172.2 –49.8 113.4 197.2 252.3 98.7 –143.4 –233.7 –82.1
Nonfuel Exporters
Financial Account Balance 237.4 151.8 64.9 –84.4 –239.5 –322.3 –337.5 –207.0 60.4 37.7
Direct Investment, Net –385.6 –379.8 –268.1 –399.5 –488.1 –423.8 –464.6 –452.2 –423.5 –416.4
Portfolio Investment, Net –110.7 37.7 –91.2 –255.9 –217.7 –284.3 –229.6 –208.1 –134.7 –169.8
Financial Derivatives, Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other Investment, Net –91.0 –41.2 –148.3 –152.7 –87.9 204.0 –116.0 237.0 208.2 165.8
Change in Reserves 822.4 529.7 573.0 722.2 553.1 187.0 472.1 209.2 412.3 461.2
By External Financing Source
Net Debtor Economies
Financial Account Balance –158.9 –308.7 –160.8 –266.3 –367.1 –467.4 –458.6 –365.1 –328.9 –368.9
Direct Investment, Net –259.0 –279.7 –192.6 –196.2 –262.7 –257.6 –285.6 –268.1 –269.7 –297.6
Portfolio Investment, Net –85.7 73.0 –66.9 –238.8 –181.7 –223.8 –162.5 –190.6 –151.9 –144.4
Financial Derivatives, Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other Investment, Net –164.7 –160.4 –70.6 –84.7 –96.1 –78.1 –69.6 0.5 –29.4 –50.6
Change in Reserves 347.8 53.2 169.8 251.9 172.5 97.0 58.3 85.8 123.8 126.6
Net Debtor Economies by  
Debt-Servicing Experience
Economies with Arrears and/or 
Rescheduling during 2009–13
Financial Account Balance –3.4 –2.1 –9.1 0.0 –8.3 –31.9 –28.9 –17.9 –28.4 –33.5
Direct Investment, Net –18.5 –20.4 –11.7 –14.4 –11.1 –15.0 –14.8 –12.9 –15.4 –18.1
Portfolio Investment, Net –1.8 3.5 13.9 –3.7 4.6 6.9 –1.3 –1.2 –3.0 –4.6
Financial Derivatives, Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other Investment, Net 8.8 6.9 –9.0 13.1 4.7 –7.2 –14.4 –6.4 –16.2 –16.5
Change in Reserves 8.1 7.9 –2.3 5.1 –6.5 –16.6 1.5 2.6 6.2 5.7
Memorandum
World
Financial Account Balance 271.4 –104.2 55.9 105.6 40.6 156.2 288.9 504.9 258.2 273.5
Note: The estimates in this table are based on individual countries’ national accounts and balance of payments statistics. Country group composites are calculated as the sum of the U.S. dollar 
values for the relevant individual countries. Some group aggregates for the financial derivatives are not shown because of incomplete data. Projections for the euro area are not available because 
of data constraints.
1Excludes Lithuania.
2Excludes the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) and euro area countries but includes Lithuania.
3Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarity in economic 
structure.
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Table A14. Summary of Net Lending and Borrowing
(Percent of GDP)
Projections
Averages Average
1997–2006 2001–08 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017–20
Advanced Economies
Net Lending and Borrowing –0.6 –0.9 –0.2 0.0 –0.1 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.2
Current Account Balance –0.6 –0.9 –0.2 0.0 –0.1 –0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.2
Savings 22.3 21.7 19.0 20.0 20.5 20.9 21.1 21.1 21.2 21.3 21.8
Investment 22.9 22.6 19.5 20.4 20.8 20.7 20.5 20.7 20.7 21.1 21.7
Capital Account Balance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
United States
Net Lending and Borrowing –4.0 –4.8 –2.6 –3.0 –3.0 –2.8 –2.4 –2.4 –2.3 –2.4 –2.6
Current Account Balance –4.0 –4.8 –2.6 –3.0 –3.0 –2.9 –2.4 –2.4 –2.3 –2.4 –2.6
Savings 19.3 17.8 14.4 15.1 15.7 17.5 18.1 17.9 18.1 18.6 19.2
Investment 22.6 22.2 17.5 18.4 18.5 19.2 19.3 19.8 20.4 21.0 21.8
Capital Account Balance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Euro Area1
Net Lending and Borrowing . . . 0.1 –0.1 0.0 0.0 1.6 2.4 2.5 . . . . . . . . .
Current Account Balance 0.0 0.0 –0.2 0.0 –0.1 1.5 2.2 2.3 3.3 3.1 2.7
Savings 22.8 23.0 20.8 21.5 22.2 22.2 22.1 22.5 22.7 22.7 22.8
Investment 22.4 22.6 20.4 20.9 21.4 20.1 19.4 19.2 18.8 19.0 19.5
Capital Account Balance . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 . . . . . . . . .
Germany
Net Lending and Borrowing 1.3 3.8 5.8 5.7 6.1 7.2 6.8 7.5 8.4 7.9 7.2
Current Account Balance 1.4 3.8 5.8 5.7 6.1 7.1 6.7 7.5 8.4 7.9 7.2
Savings 22.6 23.9 24.0 25.2 26.7 26.3 25.7 26.3 26.9 26.7 26.3
Investment 21.3 20.1 18.1 19.5 20.6 19.2 19.0 18.9 18.5 18.8 19.1
Capital Account Balance 0.0 0.0 –0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
France
Net Lending and Borrowing 1.3 0.1 –0.7 –0.8 –1.0 –1.5 –1.3 –0.9 0.0 –0.2 –0.2
Current Account Balance 1.3 0.1 –0.8 –0.8 –1.0 –1.5 –1.4 –1.1 –0.1 –0.3 –0.3
Savings 22.8 22.6 20.5 21.1 22.2 21.2 20.6 20.9 21.3 21.2 21.8
Investment 21.5 22.5 21.3 21.9 23.2 22.7 22.0 22.0 21.4 21.5 22.1
Capital Account Balance 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Italy
Net Lending and Borrowing 0.2 –1.0 –1.9 –3.5 –3.0 –0.2 1.0 2.0 2.7 2.6 1.4
Current Account Balance 0.1 –1.1 –1.9 –3.5 –3.1 –0.4 1.0 1.8 2.6 2.5 1.3
Savings 20.7 20.3 17.5 17.1 17.4 17.4 18.3 18.3 17.6 17.4 17.2
Investment 20.7 21.4 19.4 20.5 20.4 17.8 17.3 16.5 15.0 14.9 15.9
Capital Account Balance 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Spain
Net Lending and Borrowing –3.4 –5.9 –4.0 –3.5 –2.8 0.2 2.1 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.2
Current Account Balance –4.3 –6.6 –4.3 –3.9 –3.2 –0.3 1.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.8
Savings 22.4 22.4 20.3 19.6 18.7 19.9 20.4 19.6 19.8 20.0 20.4
Investment 26.9 29.0 24.6 23.5 21.9 20.2 19.0 19.5 19.5 19.6 19.6
Capital Account Balance 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Japan
Net Lending and Borrowing 2.9 3.3 2.8 3.9 2.1 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.9 1.9 2.1
Current Account Balance 3.0 3.4 2.9 4.0 2.1 1.0 0.7 0.5 1.9 2.0 2.2
Savings 27.1 26.3 22.6 23.8 22.3 21.9 21.8 22.4 23.1 22.7 22.7
Investment 24.1 22.8 19.7 19.8 20.2 20.9 21.1 21.8 21.1 20.7 20.5
Capital Account Balance –0.2 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 0.0 0.0 –0.2 0.0 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1
United Kingdom
Net Lending and Borrowing –1.7 –2.2 –2.7 –2.5 –1.6 –3.7 –4.4 –5.5 –4.7 –4.6 –3.6
Current Account Balance –1.7 –2.2 –2.8 –2.6 –1.7 –3.7 –4.5 –5.5 –4.8 –4.6 –3.6
Savings 17.4 16.4 12.3 13.7 14.6 12.6 12.5 12.2 13.1 13.8 15.9
Investment 19.1 18.6 15.0 16.3 16.3 16.3 17.0 17.7 17.8 18.4 19.6
Capital Account Balance 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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Table A14. Summary of Net Lending and Borrowing (continued)
(Percent of GDP)
Projections
Averages Average
1997–2006 2001–08 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017–20
Canada
Net Lending and Borrowing 1.0 1.4 –3.0 –3.5 –2.7 –3.3 –3.0 –2.2 –2.6 –2.3 –2.1
Current Account Balance 1.0 1.4 –2.9 –3.5 –2.7 –3.3 –3.0 –2.2 –2.6 –2.3 –2.1
Savings 22.3 23.5 18.9 19.8 21.5 21.6 21.5 21.9 21.3 21.4 21.8
Investment 21.3 22.1 21.8 23.3 24.1 24.9 24.5 24.1 23.9 23.7 23.9
Capital Account Balance 0.0 0.0 –0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other Advanced Economies2
Net Lending and Borrowing 3.5 3.8 4.0 4.7 3.9 4.0 5.1 4.8 4.9 4.3 3.8
Current Account Balance 3.5 3.9 4.0 4.7 3.8 4.0 5.0 4.8 4.9 4.3 3.8
Savings 28.7 29.1 28.2 29.8 30.0 30.0 30.1 30.2 30.3 30.1 30.0
Investment 25.9 25.9 24.6 25.9 26.6 26.4 25.3 25.3 25.2 25.6 26.1
Capital Account Balance –0.1 –0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Emerging Market and Developing 
Economies
Net Lending and Borrowing 1.7 3.0 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.5 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.5
Current Account Balance 1.5 2.9 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.5
Savings 26.4 29.7 31.7 32.6 33.4 33.1 32.5 32.3 32.3 32.5 32.4
Investment 25.3 27.1 30.6 31.3 31.9 31.9 31.8 31.6 32.2 32.1 32.1
Capital Account Balance 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Regional Groups
Commonwealth of Independent States3
Net Lending and Borrowing 6.1 5.8 1.9 3.9 4.3 2.3 0.6 0.5 2.5 3.7 3.5
Current Account Balance 6.3 6.7 2.6 3.4 4.3 2.5 0.6 2.2 2.5 3.7 3.5
Savings 26.8 29.4 22.0 26.3 29.0 26.6 23.3 23.4 23.1 24.3 24.5
Investment 20.6 22.8 19.2 22.7 24.6 24.1 22.6 21.0 20.3 20.4 21.1
Capital Account Balance –0.4 –0.9 –0.7 0.4 0.0 –0.2 0.0 –1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Emerging and Developing Asia
Net Lending and Borrowing 2.7 3.9 3.5 2.5 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 2.1 2.0 1.7
Current Account Balance 2.6 3.9 3.4 2.4 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.3 2.1 2.0 1.7
Savings 35.1 39.0 44.6 44.5 43.9 43.7 43.5 43.0 42.9 42.5 41.4
Investment 33.0 35.5 41.1 42.0 42.9 42.7 42.4 41.6 40.8 40.5 39.7
Capital Account Balance 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Emerging and Developing Europe
Net Lending and Borrowing –3.7 –4.9 –2.7 –4.4 –5.7 –3.6 –2.7 –1.6 –1.4 –2.2 –2.8
Current Account Balance –3.9 –5.1 –3.4 –5.1 –6.5 –4.6 –3.8 –2.9 –2.4 –3.0 –3.6
Savings 17.9 17.1 16.0 15.9 16.7 16.5 16.6 17.3 17.0 16.9 17.0
Investment 21.6 22.1 19.4 21.0 23.1 21.0 20.4 20.1 19.3 19.8 20.5
Capital Account Balance 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.8
Latin America and the Caribbean
Net Lending and Borrowing –1.1 0.1 –0.7 –1.1 –1.4 –1.8 –2.8 –2.8 –3.2 –3.0 –2.7
Current Account Balance –1.1 0.0 –0.7 –1.3 –1.4 –1.8 –2.8 –2.8 –3.2 –3.0 –2.7
Savings 18.7 20.6 19.6 20.4 20.7 19.8 18.8 18.2 17.0 17.2 17.9
Investment 19.9 20.6 20.4 21.7 22.1 21.7 21.6 21.1 20.1 20.1 20.7
Capital Account Balance 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, 
and Pakistan
Net Lending and Borrowing 7.2 10.5 1.6 6.4 13.0 12.2 9.8 6.5 –1.7 0.0 1.3
Current Account Balance 6.9 10.2 1.8 6.2 13.0 12.3 9.8 6.4 –1.9 –0.1 1.3
Savings 29.9 35.1 31.2 34.4 38.6 37.2 35.1 31.7 25.0 27.1 28.4
Investment 23.9 25.8 31.2 29.1 26.1 25.7 25.0 25.4 27.1 27.3 27.4
Capital Account Balance 0.3 0.3 –0.1 0.1 0.0 –0.1 –0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa
Net Lending and Borrowing 1.1 2.2 –1.9 1.2 –0.2 –1.5 –2.1 –3.0 –4.2 –3.8 –3.7
Current Account Balance –0.2 0.8 –2.7 –0.6 –0.7 –1.9 –2.5 –3.3 –4.6 –4.1 –4.0
Savings 17.6 19.9 19.2 20.1 19.6 18.8 17.6 16.7 15.9 17.0 17.5
Investment 18.6 19.5 21.6 20.5 20.2 20.7 20.1 19.9 20.4 21.0 21.4
Capital Account Balance 1.3 1.4 0.8 1.8 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: UNEVEN GROWTH—SHORT- AND LONG-TERM FACTORS
198 International Monetary Fund | April 2015
Table A14. Summary of Net Lending and Borrowing (continued)
(Percent of GDP)
Projections
Averages Average
1997–2006 2001–08 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017–20
Analytical Groups
By Source of Export Earnings
Fuel Exporters
Net Lending and Borrowing 7.9 10.1 3.0 6.6 10.4 9.2 6.9 4.6 –0.1 1.8 2.8
Current Account Balance 7.9 10.3 3.3 6.3 10.4 9.3 7.0 5.3 –0.2 1.8 2.8
Savings 29.8 33.8 28.5 31.4 34.9 33.5 30.7 28.4 24.2 25.9 26.7
Investment 22.8 24.3 26.0 25.6 24.9 24.6 23.5 23.2 24.1 24.0 24.0
Capital Account Balance 0.0 –0.2 –0.3 0.3 0.0 –0.1 0.0 –0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0
Nonfuel Exporters
Net Lending and Borrowing 0.1 0.9 0.9 0.3 –0.9 –0.8 –0.9 –0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
Current Account Balance –0.1 0.7 0.8 0.0 –1.0 –1.0 –1.0 –0.6 0.2 0.1 –0.1
Savings 25.5 28.6 32.6 33.0 32.9 33.0 33.0 33.2 34.0 33.9 33.7
Investment 25.9 28.0 31.8 32.9 33.9 34.0 34.0 33.8 33.8 33.8 33.7
Capital Account Balance 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
By External Financing Source
Net Debtor Economies
Net Lending and Borrowing –1.1 –1.0 –1.4 –1.7 –2.5 –3.1 –3.0 –2.4 –2.3 –2.5 –2.6
Current Account Balance –1.4 –1.3 –1.6 –2.1 –2.7 –3.3 –3.2 –2.6 –2.5 –2.6 –2.8
Savings 20.4 21.9 22.4 23.2 23.3 22.1 21.5 21.3 21.7 22.1 22.7
Investment 22.1 23.4 23.9 25.2 25.8 25.4 24.6 23.9 24.2 24.7 25.5
Capital Account Balance 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Net Debtor Economies by  
Debt-Servicing Experience
Economies with Arrears and/or 
Rescheduling during 2009–13
Net Lending and Borrowing –0.6 0.0 –3.9 –0.9 –1.9 –5.2 –5.2 –3.4 –4.3 –4.8 –5.2
Current Account Balance –1.1 –0.5 –3.4 –3.0 –2.5 –4.9 –4.7 –3.3 –4.6 –5.0 –5.3
Savings 17.2 19.2 16.9 18.4 17.4 15.0 14.3 15.0 13.8 13.7 13.8
Investment 19.4 19.9 20.4 21.1 19.9 20.0 19.0 18.3 18.4 18.7 19.3
Capital Account Balance 0.5 0.5 –0.5 2.1 0.7 –0.3 –0.5 –0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2
Memorandum
World
Net Lending and Borrowing –0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
Current Account Balance –0.1 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3
Savings 23.3 23.7 23.0 24.4 25.2 25.5 25.6 25.5 25.6 25.9 26.3
Investment 23.4 23.7 23.0 24.1 24.8 24.9 24.9 24.9 25.2 25.5 26.0
Capital Account Balance 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Note: The estimates in this table are based on individual countries’ national accounts and balance of payments statistics. Country group composites are calculated as the sum of the U.S. 
dollar values for the relevant individual countries. This differs from the calculations in the April 2005 and earlier issues of the WEO, in which the composites were weighted by GDP valued 
at purchasing power parities as a share of total world GDP. The estimates of gross national savings and investment (or gross capital formation) are from individual countries’ national 
accounts statistics. The estimates of the current account balance, the capital account balance, and the financial account balance (or net lending/net borrowing) are from the balance of 
payments statistics. The link between domestic transactions and transactions with the rest of the world can be expressed as accounting identities. Savings (S ) minus investment (I ) is equal 
to the current account balance (CAB ) (S – I = CAB ). Also, net lending/net borrowing (NLB ) is the sum of the current account balance and the capital account balance (KAB ) (NLB = CAB + 
KAB ). In practice, these identities do not hold exactly; imbalances result from imperfections in source data and compilation as well as from asymmetries in group composition due to data 
availability.
1Excludes Lithuania.
2Excludes the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) and euro area countries but includes Lithuania.
3Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarity in economic 
structure.
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Table A15. Summary of World Medium-Term Baseline Scenario
Projections
Averages Averages
1997–2006 2007–16 2013 2014 2015 2016 2013–16 2017–20
Annual Percent Change
World Real GDP 4.0 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.8 3.5 3.9
Advanced Economies 2.8 1.3 1.4 1.8 2.4 2.4 2.0 2.0
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 5.5 5.5 5.0 4.6 4.3 4.7 4.6 5.2
Memorandum
Potential Output
Major Advanced Economies 2.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.7
World Trade, Volume1 6.8 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.7 4.7 3.8 5.1
Imports
Advanced Economies 6.6 2.3 2.1 3.3 3.3 4.3 3.2 4.6
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 8.1 6.3 5.5 3.7 3.5 5.5 4.5 6.2
Exports
Advanced Economies 6.1 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.2 4.1 3.4 4.4
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 8.3 5.0 4.6 3.4 5.3 5.7 4.7 6.0
Terms of Trade
Advanced Economies –0.2 –0.1 0.7 0.3 1.0 –0.4 0.4 0.0
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 1.6 0.2 –0.3 –0.6 –3.7 0.1 –1.2 –0.2
World Prices in U.S. Dollars
Manufactures 0.3 0.9 –1.4 –0.8 –3.3 0.5 –1.3 0.6
Oil 12.2 0.2 –0.9 –7.5 –39.6 12.9 –11.1 3.0
Nonfuel Primary Commodities 2.2 1.1 –1.2 –4.0 –14.1 –1.0 –5.2 –0.6
Consumer Prices
Advanced Economies 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.4 0.4 1.4 1.1 2.0
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 8.8 6.2 5.9 5.1 5.4 4.8 5.3 4.5
Interest Rates Percent
Real Six-Month LIBOR2 2.0 –0.2 –1.1 –1.1 –0.5 0.3 –0.6 1.7
World Real Long-Term Interest Rate3 2.5 1.1 0.8 0.5 1.6 1.1 1.0 1.4
Current Account Balances Percent of GDP
Advanced Economies –0.6 –0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.2
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 1.5 1.5 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.5
Total External Debt
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 34.2 25.7 25.4 25.8 27.5 27.2 26.5 26.2
Debt Service
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 9.5 8.7 8.9 9.3 9.8 9.5 9.4 9.7
1Data refer to trade in goods and services.
2London interbank offered rate on U.S. dollar deposits minus percent change in U.S. GDP deflator.
3GDP-weighted average of 10-year (or nearest-maturity) government bond rates for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States.
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Executive Directors noted that a moderate recovery continues in the global economy, with uneven prospects across countries and regions. Growth in emerging market econo-
mies is softening, reflecting an adjustment to weaker 
medium-term growth expectations, lower commodity 
prices and exports, and country-specific factors. The 
outlook for advanced economies shows some signs of 
improvement on the back of lower oil prices, contin-
ued support from accommodative monetary policy 
stances, and some moderation in the pace of fiscal 
adjustment. A number of Directors considered that 
global economic developments might turn out to be 
more positive than currently expected. A few other 
Directors emphasized the importance of decisive policy 
actions to counter the “new mediocre.”
Directors noted that global growth should con-
tinue to increase gradually as crisis legacies fade 
and advanced economies benefit from accommo-
dative macroeconomic policies. Emerging market 
economies are likely to slow further in 2015, but 
growth should pick up again in 2016 and beyond, 
as the current setbacks to activity begin to dissipate. 
Directors agreed that the near-term distribution 
of risks to global growth has become more bal-
anced, although most noted that it remains tilted 
to the downside. The decline in oil prices could 
boost activity more than expected, but geopoliti-
cal tensions continue to pose threats, and risks of 
abrupt shifts in asset prices—including exchange 
rates—have increased. In some advanced economies, 
protracted below-target inflation or deflation could 
affect activity and public and private debt dynamics. 
A few Directors considered that this risk has dimin-
ished. A few others urged greater focus on global 
imbalances.
Despite the expected improvement in the out-
look, Directors broadly agreed that short-term 
financial stability risks have increased. Oil- and 
commodity-exporting countries and firms gener-
ally face revenue losses and higher risks. Emerging 
market corporations that have borrowed heavily in 
U.S. dollars and are not sufficiently hedged are now 
faced with potential balance sheet pressures from the 
appreciating U.S. dollar. A retrenchment of over-
invested industries and property price declines—
especially in China—could spill over to emerging 
markets more broadly. In advanced economies, the 
low-interest-rate environment poses challenges for 
long-term investors, including weaker life insurance 
companies in Europe. High debt levels and nonper-
forming loans in the private sector continue to pose 
headwinds to growth and financial stability in some 
advanced economies. Recent declines in liquidity in 
some markets may amplify financial stability risks. 
At the same time, Directors also noted important 
medium-term risks to the global recovery. In emerg-
ing market economies, tighter financial conditions 
or unaddressed supply-side constraints represent 
significant risks. Growth prospects in advanced 
economies are held down by aging populations, 
weak investment, and lackluster productivity growth 
while sustained weakness in demand could weigh on 
potential output. 
To address these risks and challenges, Direc-
tors underscored that boosting actual and poten-
tial growth remains a policy priority. In emerging 
market economies, macroeconomic policy space 
to support growth remains limited, but lower oil 
prices will alleviate inflation pressures and could 
increase fiscal space in oil importers. In oil export-
ers, adjusting public spending in view of lower fiscal 
revenues is a priority, although countries with strong 
financial buffers may adjust more gradually. Better 
fiscal frameworks with clear medium-term objec-
tives are needed in many countries to anchor fiscal 
policy and avoid a procyclical policy stance. Direc-
tors also emphasized that lower oil prices provide an 
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opportunity to reform inefficient energy subsidies 
and provide breathing room for more productive 
and equitable spending and growth-enhancing tax 
reforms.
Directors broadly concurred that continued 
accommodative monetary policy is essential in many 
advanced economies. To support credit markets, 
additional measures are needed to restore balance 
sheet health in the private sector, including in the 
euro area. At the same time, many Directors noted 
the limitations and risks of prolonged accommodative 
monetary policies and divergent monetary stances, 
and some underscored the need to better understand 
their implications for emerging market and develop-
ing countries. Fiscal policy could be used to support 
demand and contribute to global rebalancing, for 
example through infrastructure investment in some 
advanced economies, while countries constrained 
by high levels of public debt should pursue growth-
friendly reforms affecting the composition of rev-
enues and expenditures. Credible medium-term fiscal 
consolidation plans are still needed in a number of 
countries, especially in Japan and the United States. 
Directors highlighted the importance of a sound 
international banking system, and noted that more 
progress on the implementation of regulatory 
standards and cross-border resolution is needed. 
Strengthening microprudential policies and build-
ing a macroprudential toolkit remains a priority in 
many emerging market and developing economies. 
In advanced economies, the oversight of certain 
parts of the nonbank financial sector needs to be 
strengthened, particularly the asset management 
industry, as well as the life insurance industry in 
Europe, with better microprudential supervision and 
stronger emphasis on systemic risk. A number of 
Directors noted progress in the international regula-
tory reform agenda and increased efforts to monitor 
financial risks and build resilience. They cautioned 
that additional regulation and oversight should be 
commensurate to the systemic risk posed and take 
into account both costs and benefits.
Directors emphasized the importance of exchange 
rate flexibility for emerging markets without cur-
rency pegs, while recognizing that measures may be 
necessary to limit excessive exchange rate volatil-
ity. Bolstering resilience to external shocks will also 
require stronger macroeconomic and macropruden-
tial policy frameworks, and robust prudential regula-
tion and supervision. In China, further progress to 
gradually shift the composition of demand toward 
domestic consumption and reduce reliance on credit 
and investment would help forestall medium-term 
risks of financial disruption or a sharp slowdown. 
Directors called for further structural reforms 
to raise potential growth. In emerging market 
and developing economies, the main priorities are 
removing infrastructure bottlenecks, reforming labor 
and product markets, strengthening education, 
easing limits on trade and investment, improving 
business conditions, and enhancing government ser-
vices delivery. In advanced economies, strengthening 
public infrastructure, increasing labor force partici-
pation, and enabling innovation and productivity-
enhancing investment are key priorities. In the euro 
area, reforms need to tackle legacy debt overhang, 
barriers to product market entry, labor market 
regulations that hamper adjustment, and obstacles 
to investment activity. In Japan, there is scope to 
improve service sector productivity and support 
investment through corporate governance reform. 
Directors also stressed that continued strong 
growth in low income developing countries calls 
for greater progress in diversification and structural 
transformation. Key requirements include boost-
ing fiscal positions with stronger revenues and 
rationalized public spending, strengthening public 
financial management, achieving greater monetary 
policy independence, promoting financial deepen-
ing, and attracting capital flows. Infrastructure 
investment, anchored in well-designed debt man-
agement strategies, is essential to increase growth 
potential. Advanced and systemically important 
emerging economies should play a supportive role 
in maintaining an enabling external environment for 
low-income developing countries. Priorities include 
further trade liberalization, providing development 
aid and technical assistance, completing the global 
regulatory reform agenda, and cooperating on inter-
national taxation and climate change issues.
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